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PREFACE

I have in previous Prefaces to Mrs. Klein's writings expressed my estimation of her scientific work, which, therefore, need not be repeated here. The present occasion, however, is a more personal one. We are united in our birthday wishes to her, but I feel sure that to Mrs. Klein their value is far transcended by another matter for congratulation that can be associated with them. It is that she has lived to see her work firmly established. So long as it was simply deposited in what she herself had published there was always the hope, but by no means the certainty, that it would be taken up by future students. Now the situation is far more favourable. It has moved beyond that possibly static stage. As a result of her personal instruction, combined with the insight of those who decided to accept it, she has a considerable number of colleagues and pupils who follow her lead in exploring the deepest depths. To the papers that many of them contributed on this happy occasion I have the pleasure of adding this *envoi*.

ERNEST JONES.

A CONTRIBUTION TO THE RE-EVALUATION OF THE ŒDIPUS COMPLEX—THE EARLY STAGES [1]

By PAULA HEIMANN, London

Introductory Remarks

For the purpose of this paper I have decided to concentrate on the early stages of the Œdipus complex which Melanie Klein has discovered in her analyses of young children. Her contributions naturally influence also the assessment of the later stages, but I think that the most useful way of approaching divergences of opinion lies in discussing the field in which they originate.

Although my presentation seems to emphasize the controversial points in our views on the Œdipus complex, this does not mean that we underrate the amount or the significance of the ground which we share.

Before dealing with my subject matter I wish to define our position with regard to some basic concepts and to outline briefly the period preceding the Œdipus complex.

The Theory of the Instincts

All understanding of psychological phenomena rests on Freud's discovery of the dynamic Unconscious. The two primary instincts of life and death, the borderland entities between soma and psyche, from which all instinctual impulses are derived, are the source of mental energy; all mental processes start from an unconscious stage.

Freud's concept of an inherent antithesis in the deepest and the most dynamic levels of the mind is fully born out by Melanie Klein's work. More than this, her work has produced many observations which substantiate his theory, but precisely on this account major divergences between her views and classical theory have arisen.

I am referring to the position which the mental facet of the instinctual urges, which we call 'unconscious phantasy', occupies in Melanie Klein's work.

Unconscious Phantasies

By the term unconscious phantasies we mean the most primitive psychic formations, inherent in the operation of the instinctual urges, and because these are inborn, we attribute unconscious phantasies to the infant from the beginning of his life. Unconscious phantasies occur not only in the infant, they are part of the unconscious mind at any time and form the matrix from which the pre-conscious and conscious processes develop. In the earliest stages they are almost the whole of psychical processes, and, of course, they are pre-verbal, or rather non-verbal. The words which we use when we wish to convey their contents and meaning, are a foreign element but we cannot do without it—unless we are artists.

Unconscious phantasies are associated with the infant's experience of pleasure or pain, happiness or anxiety, they involve his relation with his objects. They are dynamic processes, because they are charged with the energy of the instinctual impulses, and they influence the development of ego mechanisms. For example, introjection develops from the infant's unconscious phantasy of incorporating the mother's breast, which accompanies the desire for the breast and the actual sensation of sucking and swallowing when in contact with it.

Conversely, the mechanism of projection develops from the phantasy of expelling an object.

In order to understand the infant's psychic development and many of his physical processes, we must appreciate his unconscious phantasies.

Earliest Object Relations

The first childhood period is characterized by the infant's maximal dependence on his mother and by the maximal immaturity of his ego. The instinctual urges and the phantasies which they imply reign supreme. Perception of the reality of the self and of objects is poor and phantasy flourishes the more. To obtain satisfaction, the infant needs his object. He wills it, when he experiences his needs. He

[1] Read before the Seventeenth International Psycho-Analytic Congress at Amsterdam in August 1951 as part of the Symposium on the Re-evaluation of the Œdipus Complex.

omnipotently possesses it, when he is satisfied. When he is caressed and gratified, he has the ideally good breast. He loves this breast, he could eat it. He incorporates the gratifying breast and is one with it. He goes to sleep with his loved object. If things go well, he will do the same thing in adult life.

In states of hunger or pain, he does not believe that the pain is part of himself; it is the malicious breast which is responsible, and he hates it. His attempts at introjecting and keeping the good breast, and projecting his pain and the bad breast, have been without avail. He feels persecuted by the bad breast within his own self.

Throughout, in Melanie Klein's work, the focus has been on anxiety as the most dynamic element in frustration and conflict. By consistently analysing the phantasies associated with anxiety, and the defences determined by these phantasies, she discovered that the most primitive type of fear is the fear of persecutory objects (at first the bad breast), and that splitting mechanisms are amongst the earliest ego defences.

She has termed these early processes the paranoid-schizoid position, thus pinpointing the character of the anxiety and of the defences against it, which prevail during the first few months of life, and which underlie later schizophrenic illnesses.

Lack of cohesion in the early ego and the use of splitting mechanisms lead to the infant's living with a good and a bad double of his object, which correspond with his feelings of gratification or frustration.

Love, hate and fear, the fundamental units of psychological experience, develop in the wake of instinctual urges and physical sensations.

The Whole Object Stage

At this stage, which begins roughly in the second quarter of the first year, the infant's ego is stronger and more coherent. Perception leads to more integrated objects. The infant sees more at the time, and remembers more of the past. He recognizes his parents as whole objects, that is, as persons. He has lost some of his omnipotence and gained more sense of reality. This holds not only for the external world of objects, but also for internal psychic reality.

The conflict of ambivalence begins to play its part in the infant's emotional life. Melanie Klein regards it as the nucleus of the infantile depressive position.

The infant begins to realize that when he loves and hates his mother, it is one and the same person whom he desires and attacks. He feels unhappy and guilty, he suffers from the pain which his destructive impulses inflict on her, and he fears that he will lose her and her love. These feelings concern also his internal mother.

Hatred against the loved object matters so much, because at this stage the belief in the omnipotence of evil outweighs the belief in the power of love. It is *depressive* anxiety which the infant now experiences. The 'infantile depressive position' represents the fixation point for later manic-depressive illness.

Normally the infant's depressive moods pass off quickly. Amongst the defences we distinguish a regressive type, the 'manic defence', which revolves upon denial and flight, and a progressive one, which consists of the drive for reparation and attempts at inhibiting destructive impulses, in particular, greed, in order to spare the mother.

Moreover, other factors which are implied in the many advances at this stage of development help the child.

This leads me to my main theme. When the infant begins to realize that his parents are persons, he also feels that they are not only objects for his needs and wishes, but that they have a life of their own, and with one another. With the widening of his emotional and intellectual orbit, the infant enters upon the triangular stage of his relation with his parents. He does not merely add the whole object to his part objects, it is also the relationship between his mother and his father which becomes a highly significant factor in his life. This first establishment of an emotional triangle with his parents is the beginning of the Œdipus complex. Increasingly the infant's emotions, impulses and phantasies, centre upon the parental couple.

This new focus of interest in his life, which stimulates and exercises his mental energies, operates as another means of defence against the depressive position.

The Early Stages of the Œdipus Complex

The beginning of the Œdipus complex coincides with the polymorphously perverse condition of the child's instinctual impulses. Excitations from all parts of his body are active, and because the erotogenic zones are also the seat of the destructive impulses, the child fluctuates not only between one erotic desire and another, but

also between libidinal and destructive aims. Such movements and fluctuations are characteristic for this phase.

The phantasies which accompany these excitations have specific contents. The child wishes to experience the gratification of each of his manifold urges by specific oral, anal and genital contacts with his parents.

Under the dominance of the libido the child's phantasies are pleasurable. He imagines the fulfilment of his polymorphous desires. But this holds only up to a point, and polymorphous wishes recur as polymorphous fears, not only because his parents do in fact frustrate many of his desires, but because the destructive components of his wishes, his cruel cravings, are in phantasy experienced as actions and lead to destroyed and destructive objects in his inner and outer world. At the beginning, the oral impulses lead in this orchestra of polymorphous urges, and, together with the urethral and anal zones, overshadow the genital for a time, so that genital excitations are in part linked with pregenital phantasies. In the second half of the first year, however, genital stirrings gain in strength, and the wish for genital gratification includes the wish to receive and give a child. In our observation a child of eleven months is not only capable of feeling rival hatred and jealousy of a baby brother or sister, as Freud described, but the child *himself* desires the baby and envies his mother. His jealousy is double edged.

It is to this phase that we attribute the origin of the unconscious equation of breast, penis, fæces, child, etc., and the infantile sexual theories, which Freud discovered and related to the child aged three to five years. In our view these equations and theories express the infant's phantasies at the polymorphous stage of instinctual development, when the excitations from all bodily zones and libidinal and destructive aims rival one another.

Thus the theory of parental intercourse as a feeding or excretory act, of babies being conceived through the mouth and born through the anus, show the overlapping of oral, excretory and procreative urges and phantasies. The notions of the 'primal scene', or of the castrating phallic mother, betray the fusion of libidinal and cruel impulses which is characteristic of early infantile genitality.

A three-year-old child is capable of verbalizing some of these phantasies, but the time at which he expresses them does not coincide with the date of their origin. The three-year-old child who has achieved a considerable degree of organization has largely overcome the polymorphous condition of his instinctual impulses.

Our clinical observations in the analysis of children and adults have shown us that the most crucial contents of the Œdipus complex, and the most severe conflicts and anxieties, relate to the primitive impulses and phantasies which form the early stages of the Œdipus complex.

In passing I would mention that, apart from dreams, we can see the phantasies of this early stage clearly in certain states of both normal and pathological regression. Adolescence normally shows the re-efflorescence of early infantile sexuality. When the adolescent in horror turns away from his impulses, it is not only because he discovers his incestuous object choice, the wish to sleep with his mother, but because he becomes aware that he is attracted and excited by perverse and cruel phantasies.

The regressed schizophrenic often expresses polymorphously perverse phantasies without any disguise and attributes his bizarre bodily sensations to his internalized parents and their intercourse.

After these general remarks I wish now to consider some features of the early Œdipus complex in more detail.

Melanie Klein holds that the boy and the girl, each begin the Œdipus complex in both the direct and the inverted form.

The Early Œdipus Complex in the Boy

The boy's 'feminine position' is due to several factors. The conflicts of the depressive position concern predominantly the mother and act as an incentive for seeking a new love object. In addition, he is in many ways frustrated by her, and particularly during weaning.

The loss of the external breast intensifies the identification with the mother which has been going on all along. In the triangular relationship with his parents this identification strengthens the homosexual component of the boy's bi-sexuality.

Predominant in his many desires for his father are the impulses for the father's *penis*, which at first is largely equated with the breast. The boy wants to suck, swallow and incorporate it orally, as well as through his anus and penis, which he treats as receptive organs. There are also active versions of such phantasies, the boy wants to enter with his own penis the father's body, mouth, anus and genital. In the latter

part of the first year the desire to receive a child from the father plays an important part.

These wishes represent the roots of male homosexuality. In his feminine position the boy is his mother's enemy and rival.

The man's envy of the woman, of her ability to bear and feed children, has been underrated in classical theory. Yet the analyses of fathers give ample evidence of such envy. Whilst the occurrence of the ' couvade ' has been acknowledged, the conclusion has not been drawn that this manifestation of the man's desire to be a woman has its origin in the infant's early inverted Œdipus complex.

Envy and hatred of the mother, which accompany the first homosexual impulses in the boy, form an important source of the man's fear of the woman. The familiar notions of the *vagina dentata* and the so-called cloaca theory bear witness to the infant's jealous attacks on the mother's genital, and specifically to those phantasies in which the attacks are carried out by teeth and excrements.

Phantasies of attacking the mother's genital may lead to inhibition of heterosexuality in both the boy and the girl. For the boy, the woman's genital assumes qualities which threaten his penis; the girl, who identifies her own genital with that of her mother, comes to regard it as a dangerous organ which she must not use with the man she loves.

The boy's feminine wishes for his father are in sharp conflict with his masculine desires for his mother.

In our view the infant assumes the existence of the vagina from his own genital sensations. His urge to penetrate is connected with phantasies about a corresponding genital opening in the mother's body. His primary libidinal desires for her are secondarily intensified by reparative tendencies. The drive to make amends to her by giving her genital pleasure and children contributes in the course of development a great deal to the establishment of the boy's heterosexual genitality.

These masculine impulses are associated with rival hatred against the father and with the corresponding fears of the father's retaliation.

In both his feminine and masculine position, the boy's desires are frustrated; and frustration is maximal when the infant witnesses or imagines that his parents are united in intercourse. The ' combined parental figure ' is the object of many phantasies in which libidinal and destructive aims are combined and opposed. Almost simultaneously, the infant aims at destroying both parents and at destroying only his rival, while he desires the other parent. These phantasies lead to severe anxiety, the fear being that he destroys the desired object, be this mother or father, in the same attack which is aimed at the other parent, and his anxieties are multiplied because, owing to his incorporation phantasies, he feels that this hated ' primal scene ' takes place inside himself as well.

Anxieties of this kind play an important part in the boy's phallic manifestations. Pride in his penis is not only derived from his unconscious knowledge of its creative and reparative function. Such knowledge, we find, is a strong incentive for libidinal phantasies of intercourse with his mother. The narcissistic pleasure he derives from masturbation, urinary games or exhibitionism is partly used as a defence against his fears of the mother's body which, as a result of his attacks, has become a battle ground, full of dangerous objects. And by his contempt for the female genital and denial of the vagina, he tries to escape from all notions about the inside of the body, his own as well as the mother's, because of the fears connected with internal persecutors. The sight of his penis and its functions gives him again and again the reassurance that all is well with him, and that he need not be afraid of persecutory objects in his own body.

In this connection I would remind you of Ernest Jones's lucid exposition of the factors which result in the ' secondary nature of narcissistic phallicism '.

Castration Complex

I have already described many of the anxieties which the boy experiences in connection with his early Œdipal impulses ; when these anxieties are taken into consideration, Jones's suggestion that it is *aphanisis* which is dreaded, and not merely the loss of the penis, gains in significance. As far as the specific fears for the penis are concerned, in the early stages the boy is afraid of both parents.

In response to his own oral and anal attacks he fears that his penis will be bitten off, soiled and poisoned.

After the establishment of the genital organization, his leading anxiety is castration by his father. This anxiety too has depressive as well as persecutory qualities; it is not only the fear of being deprived of the organ and power for sexual pleasure, but also the fear of losing the

means for expressing love, reparative and creative impulses. This depressive component is evidenced in the well known equation between being castrated and being completely worthless.

The Early Œdipus Complex in the Girl

To turn now to the girl: her position in the early stages of the Œdipus complex is in many respects similar to that of the boy. She, too, oscillates between hetero- and homosexual positions, and between libidinal and destructive aims and goes through the corresponding anxiety situations. She has the same motives for turning away from her mother, and in her case identification with the mother intensifies the hetero-sexual impulses.

I shall here consider merely the genital aspects of her early Œdipus phantasies.

Our observations are that vaginal sensations occur at this stage, not only sensations in the clitoris. Moreover, the clitoris has a conductor function and its excitations stimulate the vagina. Oral, urethral and anal impulses also lead to vaginal sensations and phantasies.

The phantasies associated with vaginal urges have a specific feminine character. The little girl wishes to receive and incorporate the father's penis, and to acquire it as an *internal* possession, and from here she soon arrives at the wish to receive a child from him. These wishes, partly because they meet with frustration, alternate with the desire to possess an external penis.

The masculine component of the sensations and phantasies connected with the clitoris can only be fully assessed, if the girl's conflicts and anxieties which follow from her feminine position are taken into account.

When jealousy stimulates phantasies of attacking her mother's body, these attacks recoil upon herself, and she feels that her own genital will be mutilated, soiled, poisoned, annihilated, etc., and her own internal penis and children stolen from her by her internalized mother. These fears are the graver, because she feels that she lacks the organ, i.e. the external penis, which could adequately placate or restore the avenging mother, and because she has no evidence that in reality her genital organs are unharmed. We consider that here there is a psychological consequence of the anatomical difference between the sexes which is of the greatest significance for the development of the girl.

We distinguish several sources for masculine drives in the little girl. Frustration of her feminine desires gives rise to hatred and fear of the father and drives her back to the mother. Anxieties related to her external and internal mother lead her to concentrate on phallic activities and phantasies. Her primary homosexual trends are thus most strongly increased by failure in her feminine position. She then comes to find that her male organ is inferior, that it is not a proper penis, that it cannot rival the father's penis. Because her phallicism is largely a secondary and defensive phenomenon, she comes to develop penis envy at the expense of femininity. She disowns her vagina, attributes genital qualities exclusively to the penis, hopes for her clitoris to grow into one and meets with disappointment. Devaluation of femininity underlies the overvaluation of the penis.

The familiar grievances of the girl against her mother for withholding the penis from her and sending her into the world as an incomplete creature are based on her need to deny her attacks on the mother's body and her rivalry with both parents. With her laments that she has come too short she protests that she never was greedy, never usurped the mother's position with her father, never stole the father's love, penis and children from her.

To say this does not mean that we underrate the girl's intense admiration for the penis, or her greed which makes her want to have whatever she regards as desirable. Nor do we doubt that penis envy plays an important part in female psychology. My point is that penis envy is a complex fabric of which only certain threads have been generally acknowledged.

The analysis of penis envy in a woman with pronounced rivalry with men shows us so clearly that it is built on the failure to master persecutory and depressive anxieties arising from her early femininity, and that these early anxieties lend the compulsive character to her demand that she must have a penis.

The conclusions from our work which I have here presented differ from Freud's view that there is a long period of a pre-Œdipal mother fixation in the girl. The phenomena which Freud described under this heading in our view represent the inverted form of the girl's Œdipus complex, which alternates with the direct Œdipus complex.

The girl who shows an exclusive attachment to her mother, and hostility against her father, has failed to cope with the frustration of her first feminine wishes.

Our observations also lead us to disagree with the view that the woman's wish for a child takes second place to that for possessing a penis.

The Role of Introjection

I have endeavoured to show that throughout his development the child internalizes his parents, and that his internal objects have both a good and a bad aspect for him. In relation to the good internal object, he experiences a state of well being, and in the earliest period the good internal object fuses with the self, whereas states of anxiety, of a persecutory or depressive kind, are connected with the bad or destroyed internal objects.

This relation between the child and his parents prevails throughout the early stages of the Œdipus complex, and therefore the development of the Œdipus complex is throughout influenced by his feelings about his internal parents, by fears of being persecuted by them and by guilt for harming them.

According to Freud the super-ego is the result of the child internalizing his parents at the *decline* of the Œdipus complex; the tension between the ego and the super-ego is experienced as guilt and fear of retaliation.

Melanie Klein holds that all processes of internalization enter into the formation of the super-ego and that it begins with the first internalized object, the mother's breast. In her view there is throughout an interaction between the development of the ego, the Œdipus complex and the super-ego.

Conclusion

In the light of Melanie Klein's work the Œdipus complex which Freud discovered, appears as the *final* stage of a process which begins in early infancy. Its roots are set in a crucial phase of development. The child makes the first steps towards recognizing the reality of other persons, the first steps towards establishing full emotional relationships; he encounters the conflict of ambivalence; in his first experience of the triangular relationship with his parents his instinctual impulses are polymorphously perverse, and he oscillates between a hetero- and a homosexual object choice.

In the early stages of the Œdipus complex the scales are weighted for the first time. Much of the way in which the child will enter and leave the final stage depends on the interplay of forces at this early period.

The understanding of the child's problems in the early infantile Œdipus complex makes us realize all the more the truth of Freud's discovery that the Œdipus complex is the *nuclear* complex in the individual's life.

APPENDIX

THE POLYMORPHOUS STAGE OF INSTINCTUAL DEVELOPMENT [1]

When I prepared my contribution to the Symposium on The Re-evaluation of the Œdipus Complex, I was compelled to think again, very thoroughly, about familiar matters. That is always a salutary experience, because it counteracts the tendency to use terms glibly instead of thinking afresh about the conditions and processes to which these terms refer. I then found that certain topics came up in my thoughts, and one of these I wish to bring forward here.

It concerns the problem of the instinctual stages. Melanie Klein's discoveries which have necessitated a re-evaluation of the Œdipus complex lead also to a re-examination of our views on the course of instinctual development.

In his *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* (1905), which are the foundation of psychoanalytic theories of infantile sexuality, Freud speaks of the polymorphously perverse disposition of infantile sexuality. I shall quote only one passage. In his summary [2] he says:

'Experience further showed that the external influences of seduction are capable of provoking interruptions of the latency period or even its cessation, and that in this connection *the sexual instinct of children proves in fact to be polymorphously perverse*; . . .' (My italics.)

Abraham in his *Development of the Libido* (1924) carried our knowledge of infantile sexuality further, mainly in three ways: (1) by showing the subdivision of the oral and the anal stages; (2) by correlating the different sexual stages with the development of object-

[1] Read before the British Psycho-Analytic Society, January 16, 1952, as an Appendix to the Congress Paper.

[2] *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*. Imago Publishing Co. Ltd., London, 1949, p. 111.

love; and (3) by stressing the development of the destructive strivings. As to this third point, I regard it as noteworthy that, although his book appeared four years after *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, Abraham does not refer to the death instinct. It seems to me possible to conclude that Abraham did not accept or perhaps had not yet accepted the theory of the death instinct, and this to my mind would explain why he maintained the idea that the first oral stage, the sucking stage, is free from destructive impulses, ' pre-ambivalent ', although in other connections he described the vampire type, i.e. the tendency to kill the object by sucking it to death. In passing I would repeat, what has often been pointed out before, that Melanie Klein's work does not endorse the view of a pre-ambivalent stage as Abraham describes it, but that her findings of the early splitting mechanisms which create an ideal and a persecutory breast represent an important modification of Abraham's concept of the pre-ambivalent stage. But this is only in passing, because my main interest in these short notes concerns the fact that in Abraham's scheme the notion of the polymorphously perverse disposition is not included.

As I have endeavoured to show in my Congress paper, in Melanie Klein's work this notion is of considerable importance. She has often pointed out that the trends from the diverse zones overlap, and that this overlapping characterizes the instinctual climate of the early stages of the Œdipus complex.

We can to-day define the notion of a ' polymorphously perverse ' disposition in more detail. The infant tends to experience in an unco-ordinated manner excitations from all parts of his body and to crave for their simultaneous gratification; further, he equally simultaneously experiences and seeks to satisfy libidinal and destructive impulses.

The polymorphously perverse disposition arises thus from the fact that the infant from the beginning of life is under the influence of the two primary instincts of life and death. Their derivatives in the form of self-preservative and libidinal impulses on the one hand and of destructive and cruel cravings on the other are active from the beginning of life.

Both primary instincts operate in the infant's contacts with his first object, and thus begin in the manner which Freud in respect of the libido called ' anaclitic '. Freud attributed erotogenetic qualities to all parts of the body. Melanie Klein's observations in the analyses of young children showed that there were also immensely cruel phantasies related to all parts of the body. It therefore follows from her work that Freud's statement about the way the libido operates has to be expanded to include the operation of the destructive impulses —a point which follows theoretically from the concept of the primary death instinct.

In addition, she has shown that the anxieties roused by the combination and opposition of the libido and the destructive impulses lead from the beginning to the development of ego-mechanisms, defence mechanisms.

The conclusion I wish to put forward here is that the transition from the oral stage to the anal one is not direct, but that there is interpolated a period in which the infant's polymorphously perverse disposition becomes actually manifest and dominant.

This polymorphous period or stage, occupying roughly the second half of the first year, could be regarded as one of the intermediate stations—in Abraham's analogy—which his time-table of the express trains does not mention.

I find it easy to bring the notion of this polymorphous period in line with Abraham's first anal stage, the stage in which the aim is to eject completely and annihilate the object. This tendency would appear as a kind of reaction formation against the turmoil which results from the simultaneous operation of so many inherently conflicting, inherently frustrating impulses with their corresponding anxiety situations. The developmental process which consecutively brings the different zones into a leading position implies a growing mastery by the ego of the instinctual urges and thus serves in part a defensive function. The aim of the first anal stage of ' relieving ' the self by the complete evacuation of the internalized parents, equated as persecutors with the infant's own fæces, can be appreciated as a reaction to the overwhelming impact of the first Œdipal strivings (during the polymorphous stage). The experience of eliminating and getting rid of a bodily substance would come to occupy a central position, because in addition to the organ pleasure—libidinal pleasure—there is an *emotional* experience of relief. Many clinical observations suggest strongly that anal interests and gratifications are secondarily heightened for defensive purposes.

As a result of further development in the various spheres of the ego this massive defence

by ejection is modified, and Abraham's second anal stage is established in which the predominant aim is to retain the object on the condition that it be dominated and controlled. The stronger the ego, the more can it deal with its sources of conflict intra-psychically and the less does it use the most primitive defence of expelling them.

Whilst I could connect the polymorphous stage easily with the next, the anal stage, I was confronted by difficulties when I tried to see its relation to the oral stage. What troubled me was the notion that if I thought of the polymorphously perverse condition of instinctual life, in which the Œdipus complex starts, as a *stage* extending for a certain time, if I thought that the oral stage does not proceed directly to the anal stage, I could not account for the powerful operation of the anal trends and mechanisms during the first three to four months of life, namely during the paranoid/schizoid position.

Ejecting — splitting — projecting: these are aims and mechanisms which are to be correlated to the anal function. Their nature is anal, even though there are oral and nasal forms of ejecting, such as spitting or breathing out. This accords with our clinical experience which shows that the phantasies underlying splitting and projecting are predominantly anal: the persecuting object is equated with fæces, the fæces are treated as internal persecuting objects. As long as I thought in terms of a direct transition from the oral to the anal organization I did not see a problem in accounting for the occurrence of anal elements in the stage of oral primacy. The two stages being neighbours, so to say, explained their making loans one from the other. But I then realized that the problem which baffled me was due to a mistake, an omission on my part. I had failed to distinguish between the operation of *trends*, in this case anal trends, and that of an *organization*, in this case the oral organization. This distinction, however, is decisive. And if it is appreciated the question of nearness or distance between organizations becomes irrelevant.

During the first, the oral organization, the oral impulses reign supreme, but, of course, they are not the only ones in existence. Because they are of supreme power, they subordinate the other instinctual trends to their own purpose.

The oral impulses are essentially connected with an *inward* direction, they are receptive. The oral aim is to acquire and incorporate the object on whom the infant depends: the good, feeding, gratifying breast. Ejection and annihilation are derived from the anal organ and function. Under the predominance of the oral organization these anal trends are used as a complementary technique to achieve the oral aim of maintaining the blissful relation with the good breast with whom the self fuses. The *cæsura* of birth is as Freud pointed out less sharp than superficial impression might suggest. The infant strives to continue or regain his pre-natal oneness with his mother with all the means at his disposal. The oral impulses with their inward direction are eminently suitable to achieve it: the good breast is incorporated, loved and treated as self. But the breast is not always good, the infant experiences a frustrating and persecuting breast and pain from the self, and against this painful experience the anal trends of ejection and annihilation are marshalled and put into operation. What is bad is split off, projected, eliminated, the predominantly oral aim of oneness with the good mother is preserved.

In an odd way, one might say, this aim of the oral organization, viz., to be one with the mother and to regain the pre-natal condition is even pursued in the realm of splitting and projecting, because these mechanisms amongst other consequences result in identification, though of a certain kind; projective identification. The mother into whom the infant projects what he does not want to keep within himself, by this very process again comes to carry him in her body. By means of using the anal trends and mechanisms in a complementary way the infant pursues the policy of a double insurance against loss and separation.

The fact that he does achieve this aim only to a limited degree and the complex *sequelæ* of his oral pursuits are beyond the frame of my present considerations.

The notion then that there is a 'polymorphously perverse' stage interpolated between the oral and the anal organization, is not in conflict with the theory of the oral organization of the instinctual impulses. If anything, the acknowledgment of this stage throws into relief how much it takes to undermine oral primacy.

Before I conclude I wish to refer very briefly to certain observations which can be better evaluated by the assumption that there exists a stage in which the polymorphously perverse

disposition is manifest and dominant. These observations concern patients whose mothers became pregnant during this stage of their development, whose siblings were thus younger only by fifteen to eighteen months or so. Whilst in many respects these patients differed in their personalities, they seemed to have in common certain inhibitions in their object-relations. They had the capacity for empathy and sensitivity, the readiness to help and understand the object, and well developed intellectual sublimations, etc., that is, genital character trends. But at the same time there was a very deep underlying resentment and an unforgivingness, an aggrieved attitude of 'I do not expect to be loved and cared for. I know I must consider mother and her baby. Not for me the good things in life—but I understand, that is how it has to be'; that is, they also had character traits derived from the oral and anal stages. Much of this attitude could be traced to the Œdipal conflicts of the polymorphous stage heightened by the mother's pregnancy.

I believe that in the older literature such phenomena were described as a discrepancy between the development of the libido and that of the ego. I find it helpful to think in terms of a too early accentuation of the genital trends during the polymorphous stage when the oral and anal impulses are not yet sufficiently mastered and therefore give rise to particularly strong depressive and persecutory anxieties.

I do not, of course, wish to suggest that a child whose mother is pregnant when he passes through the polymorphous stage of instinctual development must unfailingly develop disturbances in object relationship. I am mentioning my observations because they illustrate the significance of this phase for the formation of character traits and social capacities.

That this stage deserves to be closely studied is also suggested by observations concerning the perversions. But it is not my aim to embark on this vast topic in the frame of these short notes. It is interesting, though, to remember that Freud developed his conclusions about infantile sexuality from the analysis of the sexual aberrations of adults.

EARLY ANXIETY SITUATIONS IN THE ANALYSIS OF A BOY IN THE LATENCY PERIOD

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The material in this paper, selected to illustrate certain typical anxiety situations arising in early childhood, has been taken from the analysis of a boy which spread over a number of years. For a number of reasons no case history is given and the relation of the chosen examples to many other important aspects of the analysis cannot be indicated. Environmental factors contributing to the illness are also not dealt with here but entered into the material continually and were analysed.

My main purpose is to demonstrate how such early anxiety situations and the respective defences erected against them are uncovered and dealt with according to the findings and analytic technique of Melanie Klein. The examples were selected from a mass of material and the interpretations based on more evidence than could be included, the aim being to introduce just enough of the child's associations to make clear which particular type of anxiety was being dealt with at any one point. Such anxieties occur regularly in the analyses of children between eight to ten years of age and are familiar to many of my colleagues.

When the analysis started, school inhibitions were the main external sign of the boy's hidden difficulties, and he knew that his parents had sent him to the analyst for a resolution of his inability to take a normal part in the work and play of the school. For some time he avoided all references to his past and present life at school, but when he gradually and indirectly began to talk about it the emphasis was at first placed on the difficulty he experienced in making friends with other children. It was soon evident to me that there was massive projection at work in relation to them.

He spoke more easily of his sibling, a sister younger than himself by a few years, and he was conscious of a very ambivalent relation with her stretching back as far as his memory could go. This type of relationship was in strong contrast to his conscious attitude to his mother, for whom his love was never in doubt. It was only when we reached very early patterns of relationship with her, through the acting out of infantile memories in the transference, that we came upon severe disturbances in oral and anal types of behaviour towards her. He had dealt with these difficulties to a certain extent by shifting them on to father and sister, and also used a number of symbolic substitutes for the mother to keep her own person free from conflict, and the school was one of the main substitutes.

The boy's approach to his father was full of difficulty and bound up with early environmental disturbances created by the father's unavoidable absence overseas for several years, during which time the small boy had to face many of the war situations alone with mother and baby sister, both of whom he felt it his duty to care for as though deputizing for father. All conscious memory of the latter had faded before his return.

The general picture presented by the patient at the outset of analysis was one of imperturbable cheerfulness and friendly politeness, but he could not hide the look of terror in his eyes. He showed a constant desire to please and yet it was soon evident that, quite apart from the usual unconscious resistances, he was consciously planning to prevent the analyst discovering some of his well-guarded secrets. Alongside a superficial submissiveness was a strong negativistic attitude, coupled with ceaseless secret watchfulness against all kinds of possible control issuing from the analyst. Later on it emerged that he resorted to a number of magic controls over me, which often came into play as he approached the house and operated from a distance.

In so far as he could experience me as a friendly helper, he wished for and expected all kinds of extra-analytic contacts, such as visits to his home and school on the occasions when there were parties or functions, birthday and Christmas presents, the loan of money, instruction or helpful interference on his behalf in

external events. Within the analysis itself he either looked for some pronouncement by me of magic formulæ, which would suddenly put everything right, or expected methods of treatment similar to those experienced by him in physical medicine.

His attitude to the play-material was at first a very free one and he gave useful verbal associations, but as soon as he realized that the analyst could understand a number of things which he had no conscious intention of revealing, he became less willing to co-operate in this way and the same massive resistances appeared that characterized his behaviour at school. Something of the underlying acute anxiety came through when he asked me if I possessed ' second sight '. It was customary for him to cover up, whenever possible, every sign of the disturbances created in him by my interpretations, and yet an underlying co-operation was maintained, so that after the nature of some specific resistances had become clear he could bring new material, which often came through like an outburst of something long dammed up.

His necessity to placate the analyst and the parents who sent him to analysis caused him at first to play somewhat compulsively with the material provided and to make an effort to talk, so that when he became less afraid of our immediate intentions towards him he could show more of his dissatisfaction and defiance. In many sessions he never spoke at all and yet found ways of conveying when he was ready for more interpretation. Some of the silent phases represented a reproduction of important early pre-verbal relationships with the mother.

In the initial stages of establishing the analysis, persecutory anxieties hidden behind his placid exterior were frequently pointed out to him and I made it clear to him that I was aware of his terror of me and of analysis. We dealt with the element of secrecy and camouflage that entered into his superficial façade of good humour, placidity and politeness, and his use of projecting outside himself and into other people everything unpleasant and frightening. Fear was explained to him as the dominant factor in his need to express hostility indirectly and to maintain a secret control over us all.

As soon as he became less afraid of me through the interpretation of the deeper persecutory terrors, he was able to become more openly aggressive and disobedient both at home, at school, and in the analysis. Unlike most patients who can accept the analyst's ' no ', regarding certain activities which are impractical in the analyst's home, he continued defiantly to attack some of my private possessions.

Although dominated by persecutory anxieties the early material showed depressive elements and reparative drives and a sad expression would occasionally pass across his face, but it was only after the analysis was well established that the depression emerged. Again it came out at last as though long dammed up and consciously withheld. He admitted to me and to his parents a deep and lonely despair, the misery of which had gone together with self-accusations and suicide impulses. The latter he demonstrated in analysis as consciously thought out in a number of detailed ways. From this point onwards the analysis dealt continually with a mixture of depressive and persecutory feelings which tended to alternate. When the persecutory anxiety increased the work became temporarily more difficult, but the link between the two kinds of relationship with me was often found and resolved through the analysis of the projection on to me of an internal persecuting mother or father. The threat from this very primitive, cruel and implacable figure attacking his body and mind from within was so great that it could only be ignored or defied, in line with his behaviour of defiance towards me in the analysis. Although much of this type of material came in connection with bad male figures, whom he was delighted to see overthrown in pictures, jokes and tales, particularly if they were ridiculed and made to look silly, I found the very primitive nature of his super-ego to be an indication that his disturbances in ego-development had had their origin in early oral and anal difficulties in relation to the mother. This was confirmed as the analysis went on.

The uncovering of this mixture of depression, projection, and internal persecution led us on to the analysis of his states of confusion and to his conscious awareness of the abnormality of some of his mental processes. Very cautiously he began to test out the effect it would have on me, if he demonstrated his inability at times to do quite simple arithmetic. We played games together in which he kept our scores and he made lists from catalogues of the things he wanted to buy and then could not add up a small column of figures. The conflict between wanting me to see his difficulty and the need to try and hide the fact that he was hopelessly

confused usually ended in his giving up all attempt to carry on. But sometimes he voluntarily admitted that he could not go on talking because he had forgotten what he wanted to say, and he described an inability to remember what he learnt at school, etc. In speech with me he would mix up affirmatives and negatives, 'I' and 'you', 'he' and 'she', etc., sometimes noticing it and then trying to hide his mistake. To him confusion and such inabilities as these were closely linked with madness. He was consciously afraid of being mad but preferred to think that parents, teachers and analyst too would regard him as lazy and ungrateful rather than let them know of the frightful muddle in his head. In this connection he represented himself one day as a 'monster-calf' born with two heads and photographed in the magazine he showed me. He asked if it were true that such objects were called 'freaks'. At another time he conveyed to me that he was reading with avidity, but secretly, accounts in daily papers of a murderer who was described as a split personality, and then began to tell me of outbursts of uncontrollable rage which came over him at times, particularly in connection with other children.

In many places in her writings Melanie Klein has emphasized the central place among early anxiety situations occupied by the phantasied attacks on the internal contents of the mother's body, explaining how guilt and anxiety derived from these phantasies contribute to inhibitions in learning. She stated, in 1930: 'The child expects to find within the mother (a) the father's penis, (b) excrement, (c) children, and these things it equates with food.' And: 'The object of sadism at its zenith and of the epistemophilic impulse arising simultaneously with sadism, is the mother's body with its phantasied contents.' [1]

She described in the same paper how an analysis was started with Dick, a very inhibited and backward child, by her intepretation of his attempts to go into or towards places that stood for the mother's body and the associated fear of the aggressiveness in his penis.

In a paper [2] published the next year she described how John's fear of the inside of his mother's body, with which his own body was equated, made him unwilling to consider the nature of his own inside. His phantasied attacks on the young brother, while still inside mother, were bound up with his intellectual difficulties, and the resolution of his particular trouble with the word *FISH* was through an understanding of its connection with the things inside mother's body as well as with his own and father's penis. My patient had many anxieties and phantasies in common with Dick and John.

* * * *

The first example to be given in detail from my patient's material belongs to his relation with his mother and sister, and includes those early sadistic phantasies against the inside of the mother's body. His mother's babies were symbolized as tortoises and there was an interesting equation between the dental plate inside his own mouth and the tortoise as the baby in mother's womb. The material came after several sessions during which he didn't speak at all. He had been suffering some pain with the dental plate he had to wear, and which was introduced for the first time by the dentist after his analysis had been in existence for some months. Interpretations had frequently been made to the effect that he regarded me as the instigator of this torture. On the day in question he sat again silent, reading to himself, and I reminded him that the appearance of this pattern of completely silent sessions had set in at the time when the dentist arranged for his first plate. I suggested that at that moment he was experiencing the plate as a part of myself, pushed into him to act both as a punishment and as a lever to make him speak to me. This resulted in his telling me in great detail about an incident that had taken place a few days before and which had made a great impression on him:

A kind woman had been cheated by some bad men. She had bought a tortoise as a present for her little boy because she knew that he wanted a playmate but, when she got it home and when they had examined it together, they found that it had only one eye and was lame in one foot. He enquired if I knew how awful the conditions could be inside *SOME* of the boats which brought these tortoises from foreign countries. In this case the conditions had been so terrible that most of them died and of those that survived (including this very

[1] *The Importance of Symbol-Formation in the Development of the Ego*, 1930. *Contributions to Psycho-Analysis*, 1921–1948. The Hogarth Press.

[2] *A Contribution to the Theory of Intellectual Inhibition*, 1931. *Contributions to Psycho-Analysis*, 1921–1945. The Hogarth Press.

tortoise) most were ill or damaged. Nevertheless, he continued, the woman and her little boy would of course not send the poor tortoise away because, at the very first sight of it, they became fond of it. The woman, however, would undoubtedly take the matter up with the men who had cheated her, forcing them to repay her at least some of the money they had charged her.

Although I did not begin my interpretations at this point, it will help in the understanding of the material if we consider its meaning here. There is a reference to the birth of his sister, whom he regarded as castrated when he first saw her (he and his mother examine the tortoise together and find she has only one eye and is lame in one foot). He blames the bad men, standing for father, projecting his own aggressive attitudes. He believes all his mother's unborn children were killed inside her because of the terrible conditions there (inside the ship). His sister is one of the survivors, whom he and mother became fond of at first sight, partly because they pity her. But since he feels responsible, guilty and frightened, he has to hide from mother and from father (the bad men) what he has done, because he is sure mother will demand an awful penalty. What he has done has to be hidden from the sister too. He had often shown me how intolerant his anxiety and guilt could make him when his sister is ill, naughty, or in some way a failure, and he always begins to defend himself from the imputation of responsibility for it.

Having told the story, he suddenly asked me if I would like to see what it was that interested him, while previously reading in silence and picking continually at his dental plate. As he turned to find the right page, he said that the picture he had been looking at had reminded him of the woman and the tortoise. When he showed me the page, which turned out to be a series of small pictures, he announced that he would need my help in understanding what it meant, for he had had the feeling when he looked at it, that he might have missed the point. (Unconscious self-punishment like a mental castration, in identity with the castrated sister whose ' point ' is missing.)

In all the pictures there were little gnomes engaged in various sadistic activities, and each one had a long nose and peaked cap on his head. He pointed to one in which a gnome was standing threateningly behind another one, who with knife and fork in hand was bending over a tortoise on the ground before him. It was obvious to me that the tortoise was going to be cut up and eaten by the gnome in front and that the ' super-ego '-gnome behind his back showed the punishment coming to the one in front, when he had eaten the tortoise.

The patient asked me to tell him what I thought the first gnome was going to do, but I encouraged him to try and associate and he made great efforts to do so, returning to the picture several times, but unconscious resistances were too great. I asked him about the second gnome and he at once ventured a guess that ' the second gnome is going to hit the backside of the first.' He was quite despairing about understanding the real meaning of the scene, but was equally sure that I understood it very well and wished that I would tell him. This I did not do because the co-operation and trust coming from him seemed sufficient to cope with the frustration. Later it will be seen from the subsequent material that his difficulty was due to an inability to see the knife and fork, but I did not know this at the time.

He could give me no more associations, so I started to interpret along the lines indicated above, and added that the long nose and peaked cap of the gnome stood for the father's penis which he has acquired, but which he feels is to big for him. Both gnomes were shown to be aspects of himself (his ' split ' self), and the punishing half has been at work causing him to ' miss the point ' of the picture; that this punishing part is fused with the internal father, whom he feels threatens him with the stick; that in the same way he feels the dental plate hurts him like the internal mother punishing him together with father for aggression towards both breast and baby (the tortoise).

We left the problem picture still unsolved and he turned to another one. In the one he selected there were again two gnomes with the super-ego behind as before, and he showed me how this one had ' thrown a lasso towards the other '. The loop was in fact already around the neck of the poor gnome who looked extremely frightened. A smoker's pipe was falling from his hand and he had lost control of a basket of apples which he had been carrying. On his head there sat a duck, and it was significant that the patient asserted that the lasso was aimed at the duck only, denying the fact that the loop was lying around the gnome's neck. A recurrent fear, expressed again and

again in analysis, of being beheaded or hung as a murderer, lay behind his mis-seeing of the position of the loop. This was interpreted as belonging to his castration fears and linked with phantasied attacks on both mother and father, who have been robbed of so many things. The pipe (father's penis), and the basket of apples (mother's breasts and the contents of her body) are dropped in a desperate attempt to escape from the hidden figure attacking suddenly from behind. This super-ego figure was described to him as standing for the threatening internal parents, as his own conscience. The live duck seemed to symbolize the ultimate source of all the stolen things, i.e. the unique omnipotent breast and penis, the possession of which would give him the power to get anything he wanted. I interpreted his wish to believe that if he gives back the duck, he can still escape castration and death by hanging.

There was an important link too with his previous reports of outbursts of rage being connected with attacks coming suddenly from behind, even when playfully done by another child. I showed him that one factor in this was the splitting of himself into the two gnomes, with projection of the attacking gnome into another child. A further interpretation connected with splitting at last made it possible for him to return to the problem picture and deal with it successfully. It was of the split into two parts, one that can see and understand, and another that is stupid and blind, with the projection of the sensible effective part into me. This was the deeper reason of his conviction that it was *I* who saw the meaning in the picture, while he could do nothing about it. Only if I, (as one part) would make a communication to him (the other part), was there any hope of an understanding. When he looked again and saw the knife and fork held over the tortoise, he was amazed and told me that he had only at that moment noticed them. He now realized that since the gnome represented himself he had not been able to bear the sight of himself about to cut up and eat the tortoise, that he had been forced through unconscious guilt and terror to interfere with his perceptive powers and to land himself in a number of difficulties and that in this interference with his own mental capacities he had also actually punished himself by a kind of castration, since he could not 'see the point' without using 'his point' (equation between penis and head). He also understood with more conviction why he experienced my mouth and speech so often like a cannibalistic attack on his body.

After this phase in the analysis, during which other material of the same kind was worked through, his relations with his sister and with other children at school underwent a change. He began to see that he really believed intensely in the existence of the unborn babies (tortoises on the voyage in the mother-ship) who had either died inside mother, or had escaped in a damaged condition, and that he was always looking for these missing babies among the children he met at school, expecting them, of course, to be violently hostile to him.

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My second example illustrates still further the connection between his intellectual difficulties and phantasies of this kind. The session was on the first day of a new term at school. On coming into the room he began at once to hunt for spiders, and having found two he put them temporarily into a match box, while he set about constructing an elaborate structure of several match boxes fitted together in such a way that only one very small opening was left as exit. He made sure that I had noticed this hole and ordered me to keep watch over it, saying, 'I am going to put the two spiders into the pen and you must tell me at once if they discover any other way out, which I may have overlooked. Only if they are *VERY CLEVER* will they be able to find the little hole.'

He named the spiders Alfred and Billy, A being the initial letter of his own name, and he talked to them as an adult might talk to children, telling Alfred that he was the adventurous one and accusing him of many bad things. Signs of confusion soon appeared, particularly in his uncertainty about the identities of the spiders. The pair of spiders signified at one and the same time: himself and his sister (changed into a boy), the parents (changed into children), and the two contrary parts of himself (adventurous and naughty or alternatively quiet and stupid). His rivalry with his sister and the denial of his feeling of inferiority regarding her came into the play by the assertion that Alfred (standing for himself) was the adventurous one who dared to be naughty, whereas in reality the reverse is the truth. I could remind him that in a recent session he had described himself as a dull unenterprising spider, sticking in a corner all day by himself reading books in a way that

annoyed and disappointed his parents. Only by turning his sister into a younger brother can he believe in there being a chance for him to keep ahead of her, so relatively powerful does he think the female sex to be.

The rôles I had to play in the transference were first, that of mother in a conspiracy with him, the father, and secondly, that of sister, also in a conspiracy to shut up the parents after turning them into spiders (children), punishing them by a revengeful pattern of reversal. I explained to him the fear that lay behind this play, that seemed on the surface to be so enjoyable and amusing, telling him that I know how frightened he is in the treatment room and that when he often sits and reads by himself, he is secretly planning how to escape from the room and from analysis, that he is looking for the one small hole through which he can get away, and concentrates all his intellectual powers at times on this problem (the spiders must be *VERY CLEVER* to find the hole). On the whole he is more conscious of such fears at school or with me, because he tries to keep his home and parents less frightening by the use of displacement.

But I reminded him that he has sometimes shown me that he has ideas about running away from home, and that when he was very depressed he had talked openly of suicide, which is also to him like escaping through a small hole out of a world which he sometimes regards as too dangerous a place for him to live in. Symbolically the pen stood for the mother's body, into which the cruel parents put the two children, whom they have first hunted and captured, in accordance with a primitive birth-phantasy. But the outside world (from which the children have been taken and to which they try to return through the small hole at birth), is also equated with the inside of the mother's body, and the terrors he experiences of people and events in this world are partly in terms of a feeling that he is living inside a big mother, meeting the babies and innumerable versions of the father who he believes lives inside mother. From both babies and father-figures he expects hostility and attacks, as retaliation for his various aggressive attitudes to the pregnant mother and her contents.

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In the third example taken from the session of the following day this kind of play was elaborated still further. He stated that he was going to make a different type of ' pen ', which would be a copy of one that his father had recently made for their pet mice. It became my rôle, as son, to help the patient in the rôle of father just as he in reality had actually assisted his father. In the homosexual phantasy, father and son prepare a home for mother and her babies and thus express the patient's reparation impulses. But he voiced one of the inherent difficulties in such an attempt by remarking ' It is a pity that we can't have mice for our pen here, because they are really the right sort of thing. Never mind, we'll use ants instead.' Mice were standing at this point for real children and the ants for excrements, which are all that he can produce when he takes up the female rôle with his father, and tries to produce children. His ' never mind ' attitude showed a typical attempt at denying pain and frustration (manic defence).

He went on to tell me that the spiders he used yesterday were not as good as ants, the former being no good because they sit about in corners, hiding and doing nothing, whereas the ants are clever and industrious, running about very fast. This contrast referred mainly to the difference between girls and boys. After looking for a while in the corners and cracks of the room, which stood for his own inside, he gave up the search there and went out into my garden, where he had been very destructive on many occasions to my plants. This time he merely looked for ants, representing my excrements, the garden being the inside of my body, as mother. He found a few ants but his mood changed suddenly and he was unable to continue the play. Looking miserable and disturbed, which is very unusual for him, he sat down at the table and began to look in silence at the pictures in a magazine he had brought down to the treatment room from my waiting room. This was one of the first occasions on which his underlying depression began to break through the surface picture of indifference and good humour.

While interpreting the break-down of his reparative attempt to make good, with father's help, the harm done to the two females, mother and sister, I reminded him that when he was a small boy he felt deserted by his father, whom he thought had left him to carry on the task of looking after mother and sister alone and unaided. By leaving me alone when he went out into the garden, he reversed the rôles and now he ignored me, making no communication

at all, just as he felt the father became absorbed in his new interests and did not bother about the family. But since he looked unhappy and disturbed, he was showing that he now believes that father was unhappy as well as mother and children. I also pointed out that his reparative play had broken down mainly for two reasons: he and father as two males can't make real babies (the mice), and no substitutes (ants and spiders representing fæces) are of any use; secondly in order to get the babies or material to make the babies (ants, as fæces), he has to force his way into the mother's body (my garden) and steal the necessary things. On previous occasions I had checked him in his activities in my garden, telling him that it belonged to that part of my property which was not available for purposes of the analytic work. He envies his sister's potential capacity to produce real babies which she can offer to the parents as reparation.

His silence continued and after a while I interpreted my magazine as an alternative place in which to find my babies, less dangerous than my garden, because the people and things he took out of the magazine (my body) with his eyes (substituted for mouth and penis) were not real and could not therefore be hurt like the plants. At this point he pushed the book towards me, asking me to look at an animal with a big wound on the side of its neck, made by the spade that some men had used to dig it out of its burrow. His unusually worried and unhappy expression remained. I linked this picture with others that he had shown me in which it was always adult men who had done the damage, and I told him that it is because his own guilt and fear is so unbearable that he continually puts all the responsibility on to father-figures. Although the depression was more manifest in this session, the persecutory element was also very strong, and so I interpreted his identification with the hurt animal in reference to my analytic attempts to dig him out of his hole, when he is silent and uncooperative. The early training in cleanliness seems to have been rather strict and premature, so he felt also that I was digging his thoughts and words out of him, like a mother putting a dangerous spade into him to get out his excrements (his babies = animals). He showed that both he and the contents of his body have been hurt in consequence, and believed that analysis might really do him harm.

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The fourth example shows the relation between this kind of material, which in fact had to be worked through again and again, and his stealing tendencies. On many occasions after periods of great resistance, when he did not talk at all, he would suddenly stand up in order to clear out of his pockets an enormous collection of things which he placed on the table before me. One day he showed me a gold chain which he said he had stolen from his sister. He would give no associations beyond this bare statement and seemed to be testing out what I would do about it. I said nothing and he proceeded to demonstrate what he wanted the chain for. He selected two round bottles from his drawer and fastened them together with an elastic band, into which he fixed the gold chain and then made the bottles dance up and down in front of me. To summarize what came out of this play, we could see how he envied his sister's power to make the parents dance to her tune, through the use of her feminine charms and attributes, represented by a gold chain. Several times he pushed his finger through a small loop in the chain and thus dangled the bottles, showing that a sexual relationship with the sister gives him indirect control over the parents. This relationship with the sister is also felt to be stolen and gives rise to much guilt and fear.

At a deeper level, associated with an earlier time in his life, he is still jealous of the baby sister's possession of the mother's breasts (the two bottles). The close connection between penis and eye (penis = forefinger in this play), which had appeared very often in his analysis, was interpreted here as a link with his penetrating eye, trying to see through holes how the mother was feeding the baby. The mother's habit had been to keep such a sight away from him as far as possible, and this contributed to his feeling that what he saw as the ' peeping Tom ' either in fact or in phantasy was stolen knowledge. But another component of his guilt came from the use he made of knowledge, gained in this way to appropriate (in phantasy) the breasts of both mother and sister. Later on in the analysis we reached masturbatory phantasies connected with his own nipples. Also he often used his mother, in reality as well as in imagination, to exert her influence with father to get things for him.

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My fifth example which is also concerned with stealing is taken from a much later phase

of the analysis. Just before the incident he had deliberately and openly stolen money from me and had attempted to deny it. He now showed how confused he was about what he had or had not done. It was his custom to borrow magazines from the waiting room to look at during the session and always returned them to the waiting room before going away. He had been looking at some pictures in *Punch* with me and wanted to continue talking when I closed the session at the usual time. Instead of bringing the magazine out of the room he absent-mindedly locked it up in his drawer—and then for three weeks never went near the drawer again. On no occasion did I draw his attention to what he had done. When he at last opened the drawer again he looked genuinely surprised and horrified to see the magazine there. Only once before had I seen him blush and this time a crimson colour spread over face and neck, but he quickly recovered himself and brought the *Punch* to me, asking me to look at it with him. It was interesting to note that he selected, without realizing it, the very picture we had come to previously at the end of the session when he had no time to give his associations to it. His anger with me at the frustration and his subsequent method of retaliation had been completely covered up but now came out into the open, and was again linked with the old feeding pattern. A strong reparation drive was shown in his wish to bring the magazine to me at once and to continue where we left off. The unconscious decision to open the drawer again after three weeks could be interpreted to him as a sign that he had forgiven me for hurting him, when I stopped the session at the usual time. During the interval his behaviour and expression had been quiet and carefree, but underneath had been a conflicting turmoil of anger, guilt, fear and unhappiness.

The picture we now looked at was of an old lady in a museum looking at a model of a bee, and he said that he had been in that same museum and had also looked at the bee which ' was a beautiful bit of work and very realistic '. He laughed heartily at the old woman desperately covering the artificial flowers on her hat as she gazes with horror at the bee. I remembered that a few days before he had brought a tooth to show me, which the dentist had extracted because, in the words of the patient, ' it was an extra one coming on top of the other as though two teeth were trying to come through in the place of one '. He had used exactly the same phrase to describe this tooth, saying ' it was a beautiful bit of work '. I now reminded him of this and showed him the equation between tooth and bee. I pointed out that, although it was obvious that the old lady stood for myself and his mother, he had spoken of being in the same place as the old lady also looking at the bee and that, just before showing me the picture he had looked at the *Punch* magazine in his drawer with this same expression of frightened astonishment on his face. *Punch* therefore was also equated with the bee and the tooth, because he felt that the extra tooth was just as much stolen by him and put in his body as the magazine was stolen and put in his drawer.

It was possible to show him the projection on to us of his fears of the bee as a persecutor, and to draw his attention to the fact that he pictures us as stupidly afraid of his penis (and that of the father), when attacking us from outside but that his bee-persecutor is also the second tooth attacking him in his mouth, and that he regards this tooth as the father's penis punishing him because he has stolen it in imagination. His fears of being silly, which are always closely linked with madness, were also projected on to the old woman, because he cannot bear the realization that he is not sure what he has done in reality and what only in phantasy, what he has done consciously and what he has done in the same way as he took the magazine. The acute anxiety and guilt associated with his homosexual attitudes, which derived from this stealing of bodily parts interfered with the normal establishment of a good love relation with his father. Moreover, the use of his heterosexual powers in the mother-and-sister relationships for purposes of indirectly attaining love-gifts from father interfered with the normal development of his masculinity.

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In the sixth example we return to the earlier sessions which dealt with his sister's stolen chain. He began a session one day by telling me of a recent incident at school. A boy had taken and put in his pocket something which did not belong to him, and the cord attached to the object protruded from the pocket. A master ordered the boy to hand it up but the boy refused, and when the master thereupon pulled at the cord, the boy whipped out a pocket knife and quickly cut through the cord in defiance. I told him that he often experi-

enced me as this kind of figure, although he had to-day turned out his pockets voluntarily to show me stolen property; that on many occasions he does something similar to what the boy did at school, when he cuts off all connection with me and retreats into himself; that he is afraid of school, the dentist's surgery, and the analytic room as dangerous places, to which the parents send him in the hope that teachers, dentists and analysts will be cleverer than they in discovering and removing the stolen property. Such ideas make it difficult for him to co-operate with us. He then announced in a light-hearted way that the headmaster could not possibly expel the boy from school because the father was rich and the school needed his money. It was easy to see that he was dealing with his fears of being sent away from school and analysis, by resorting to the mechanisms of denial and reassurance, and this was pointed out to him. His fears concerned both the waste of time and money he causes us all, and his secret activities, which he judges to be so bad that expulsion or worse will follow their discovery.

The next day he emptied his pockets again and drew my attention to a match box. Having opened it, without speaking, so that I could see some insects and bits of grass within, he left the box open on the table in front of me and proceeded to unbolt the doors leading into my garden. Outside, he gathered some grass, and returned to moisten it under the tap before putting it in the box with the other grass. Still silent, he shut the box, where it lay before me, and then placed it in his drawer till the next day.

Although no interpretation of the play was given at this point, I could understand some of its symbolic meaning and its relation to the previous day's material. The drawer stood for the mother's body, containing among other things the match box as the womb. Through his vivid identification with his mother the match box was his imaginary womb, and the robbery associated with his homosexual and heterosexual attitudes, was expressed by the unbolting of the doors and forced entry into my garden to get the grass. The grass together with the water from the tap was the contribution of the father to the making of the baby, and in leaving the match box and its contents in the drawer undisturbed and without any comment, he identified himself with the parents, who observed a similar silence about their creative activities when the mother became pregnant.

He next took string from the drawer and began silently to twist it to make rope, which he knew how to do very efficiently, and for a long time was leaning up against me so that our bodies were in close contact. In this way he demonstrated his knowledge of the umbilical cord and of the close bodily connection between the baby (himself) and mother (the analyst). Later on in the session, when the work of interpretation began, we discovered that the rope (umbilical cord) represented also every type of affectionate bond possible between two human beings, including the expression of love through physical contact, but some of his difficulties arose from the fact that he considered only the most intense physical connection as sure proof of love, namely being as close as a baby is by means of the navel cord, etc. When he began to talk, it took the form of teaching me how rope was made. He then went on to describe the difference in structure and function between two contrasting types of rope. His voice and manner were gentle, and everything was explained very clearly as though he were a kind and patient teacher instructing a small child. I was standing for his sister, and he once again showed me what an advantage he feels she had over him by being the younger, because he had no elder brother to explain things to him in lieu of the parents, who observed a strict silence. His sister need not steal the information nor feel driven to be a Peeping Tom.

He told me that one rope was made for strength and durability, and gave window cord as an example, saying that it was the type in general use, but quite unsuitable for certain situations in which it might even be a real menace. A second kind of rope was necessary which should have reasonable strength and yet could be cut through easily and quickly with a sharp knife. If ships were caught in a terrific storm when tied up to a wharf or fastened together, they must be cut free to stop them banging about and being bashed in by bumping together. 'A good sailor would,' he said, 'always have a knife on him and hasten to cut the ship free.'

When interpreting, I pointed out that he had been obliged to show his knowledge, of the father's rôle in the making of a baby, by silent demonstration, partly because he wanted to indicate the way knowledge had come to him, partly because the fact of a woman's pregnancy is not usually referred to in general conversation, but also because his guilt and fear prevent

him talking freely to me about these things. A few weeks later after more work had been done along the lines of these two sessions, he called to me from the garden one day and asked me spontaneously and excitedly to come and look at two insects coupled together in the act of intercourse.

The lesson he gave me on the ropes was evidence of his growing awareness of the fact that such things as weaning are necessary and beneficial, and that his clinging to the more primitive bonds with the parents, as well as his demands for impossible forms of physical gratification are damaging and dangerous to himself and others. The knife which all good sailors have and keep sharp represented his penis, which if cherished and developed could be used to free himself from an overstrong desire for the mother's breast and father's penis, in real acts of incorporation.

Referring to the previous session with the quarrel between the schoolmaster and the boy who cut the cord, I showed him that his attempts to grow up and free himself and his parents from relationships of too great intimacy and overdependence were interfered with by his feelings of guilt and need to make reparation on account of his stealing tendencies; that at least from the mother's pregnancy onwards he had never felt that he could come really near to the parents emotionally, and that the insecurity of the relationship had increased his need to keep on trying to put right even the earliest forms of contact suitable to a very small child and its parents, but not suitable at a later age; that he was anxious to develop a loving and yet breakable type of bond between himself and his family (represented by the second type of rope); that the only people in the family between whom he felt the other unbreakable bond should and could safely exist now, were the parents (first type of rope): that the difference between affectionate relationships on the one hand and sexual ones on the other (suckling and genital intercourse) were shown in the play with the rope.

In his behaviour to me he had always shown an oscillation to and from almost complete withdrawal to an affectionate and confiding communicativeness, and in this latter mood he always ended up by making demands for further intimacy, which had to be refused, e.g. borrowing money (sometimes acceded to), invitations to birthday parties and to school functions, requests to have my cat or dog in the room, questions regarding my private life and finally the need to touch me in a way that gave direct sexual gratification. The same thing was also shown symbolically in a number of ways, for instance, in the request that he might open the lid of the anthracite stove (symbolizing my genital) in order to suspend inside it a very hard ball of plasticine (his penis), which he wanted to warm and soften before it was in a condition to be used creatively. He stated that to hold it outside the stove, even close up against it was not sufficient since the ball was so very hard.

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The seventh illustration brings his relation with his sister in the rivalry situation, where he struggled for a dominant place in the father's affections, and was brought to me in the analysis as some proof of an improvement in his way of dealing with envy and jealousy.

Their father's birthday was just ahead, and he told me that this year he would give him a joint present with his sister. It was to be a heater for the car to be placed close to the engine and left there all night to prevent it freezing up on cold winter nights. He explained that his father often had difficulty in the mornings to get the car started for his journey to work. There was also a reference to the mother's present to the father which, he said, was of course a much bigger one. Interpretation dealt with his growing realization of his father's need for the love of his children, as well as for that of his wife, to help him through the day's work by means of which he supported the family. In recent sessions there had been more manifest guilt regarding his lack of appreciation of the many gifts given to him at the cost of his father's hard work. I pointed out how the jealousy of both mother and sister, whom he felt could give father so much more than he, had interfered with his impulses to show affection to his father. I reminded him too of the ways in which he had previously described an alliance with the sister against the parents. The heater was also explained to him as representing mother's genital, which he wished to restore to father, whom he believed to have been deprived of it during nights of coldness, on account of his attempts to interfere with the parents' intercourse.

While I was speaking he settled down to read a serial story in a magazine which he had brought with him that day. It was a story he had read

in previous instalments in other sessions but without giving any associations. On this occasion his whole bearing and posture as he sat at the table reading was rather unusual for him. Instead of the more typical childish behaviour, with thumb-sucking, rhythmical rocking, picking of the nose, and body scratchings, etc., he sat upright and like an adult with one arm flung across the table and the other hand placed quietly on the open page. The impression he gave was of a child trying to copy a grown-up's position, probably his father's.

After a while he stopped reading and volunteered a resumé of the whole story up to date emphasizing the things which interested him most. It was about the daughter of a Red Indian chief and how she was discovered in an act of disobedience so bad that the father arranged for a public ceremony of expulsion. She was banished from the Chief's territory and the special badge worn as the chief's daughter was taken from her. With the loss of the badge went the special protection which had formerly been given to her as well as the deference paid to her by her subordinates. Memories of the sister's arrival and of the father's pride and pleasure in her had been stirred up by the preparations for the father's birthday, and the underlying death-wishes against the sister came out in this story in their earliest forms, namely, she was to be sent away never to return; she was to be starved and neglected. The tortoise story had expressed the opposite attitude of love and pity towards the new-born baby, and during this session he showed an attempt to deal with the underlying hostility shown in the story by an acceptance of the sister and a satisfactory association with her in the giving of a joint present.

Without going into any detail I will add that the actual misdeed of the girl in the story was one of which he had in fact been guilty himself, and this had been discussed in the analysis previously which made it possible to show him the connection and point out the projection of this aspect of himself into the sister. This projection had added to his need to get rid of the sister and increased his fear of her, while the depression connected with his feelings about being a very unsatisfactory and disappointing son added to his conviction that his father preferred his daughter.

The giving of presents on a birthday had stimulated his expectation of gifts to himself and his sister from the father, and he showed how the badge stood for a promise of the ultimate bestowal of the father's penis on one or other of the children, who would then rule in his place. In spite of demonstrating in many sessions his rejection of his masculinity and his grievance against the parents for assigning the male rôle to him and not to his sister, he shows here how much he wants to be able to identify with his father and keep the badge, his penis, using it in a predominantly friendly way.

The compulsive nose-picking, etc., which usually tormented him related to the need also to internalize the father in order to bring about the desired identification, but showed that he had not succeeded in establishing a good and helpful father within.

Castration anxiety came to the fore more strongly at this time, partly owing to his greater effort to maintain the masculine position. While talking to me about the story, he was continually pulling at the handle of the drawer in the table at his end. He kept on unscrewing it and then screwing it in again, and seemed unaware of what he was doing; so I interpreted his unconscious fear that his father would take his penis away from him in just that way, by catching hold of it and unscrewing it, linking this fear not only with his aggressive use of his penis, but also with the retention in his mind of infantile ideas about the male genital as a movable object, like a badge or a handle, which could be taken away, exchanged or replaced. I reminded him of the many different kinds of badges which he had made from varying materials during other sessions, and of the way he used to come at times with a large number of badges in the lapels of his coat. He had told me too that he sold some of these badges to other children at school. I indicated the reassurance value of these primitive phantasies and his retention of them therefore in order to allay a number of fears.

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In the eighth example, we can see some of his fears about the aggressive nature of his penis and the association in his mind between his father's genital and his own. The symbols used were a ruler, a pendulum, an engine, a puppy and paint brushes. The plasticine ball of which the pendulum weight was made has been mentioned in a previous example, but I will now add that at one stage in the analysis he had often swung the ball backwards and for-

wards, while holding it suspended with his hand in front of his genital, so that I could point out the equation he was making between his penis and a pendulum.

On this occasion he spent a long time at the beginning of the session making fruitless efforts to set up and demonstrate to me the nature and functions of a pendulum as taught recently at school. The objective reason for his failure to make it swing satisfactorily in the session was that he hung it from the curtain rod, which lay between two projecting parts of the wall around the window and the ball banged against them. It became obvious that he gradually realized the need for a horizontal support projecting at right angles to the window to bring the pendulum into a different vertical plane. Nevertheless he said that he was sure that, if he went on trying, he could make it work without introducing this support. Finally he gave up such an unrealistic way of approach to the problem (the pendulum also stood for his head, which he no longer banged against reality represented by the wall) and fetched from his drawer a much damaged ruler, which he had attacked with his penknife in an earlier session when expressing anger against school teachers and all other figures of authority. At that time we had talked of the ruler as representing the internal figures also, whom he experienced as an unpleasant conscience ruling him arbitrarily from within.

When in this session he could bring himself to give up his attempts to force the pendulum to work through his omnipotent control of it, he chose this very ruler for the necessary support, although other equally suitable pieces of material were available. Without detaching the string from the curtain rod he now passed the string along the ruler, inserting the latter between the window and the vertical part of the string pulled downwards by the plasticine weight, and he found that the pendulum swung freely in the new plane in which there was no obstruction. The analyst then got her lesson on the nature and use of pendulums, and this was followed by the work of interpretation, the main points of which will be summarized.

The ruler in the drawer was standing for the father's penis within him, felt to be within his body (the drawer) and in a damaged condition through his own attacks upon it. His reluctance to use the internal father to help him with his intellectual problems, and his rejection of the father's penis as an object to be placed within his own (along the string to support it), to give it the power of erection, was due mainly to his fears: (1) of the father and the penis being too damaged to function properly; (2) of their being hostile to him because he had hurt them; (3) of their being such implacable and dominating rulers that to come under their direction would involve the loss of all freedom of action. Fears derived from the opposite position which he had at first taken up were also pointed out to him, because he had shown that when trying to manage things alone he both ' banged his head against a wall ' and also continually came into conflict with people and things, banging and being banged by them.

He was soon talking about an old toy engine of his which he said ' has been very much knocked about by me, but it was given to me when I was much too small to know how to take care of it. I was only a kid so how could I help knocking it about! Sometimes I think of taking it to the toyshop to get it repaired but I never do, because I would be too ashamed to show it to the man there.' He had decided to ask the parents to give him a completely new and different type of engine and railway set instead.

While talking about the engine he had got out his painting book and went on with the painting of a puppy commenced but left unfinished some weeks before. It had been copied from a photograph of a puppy in one of my magazines and a careful drawing was made before any painting was attempted. Within a few minutes of going on again with the painting, he asked me if I thought I could provide him with two more brushes for his drawer, because ' with the two I already have I can't help making a mess of my painting. One is too small and the other too large.' He showed manifest anxiety about not being able to keep entirely within the lines of his drawing, and when the paint came very slightly over the edge, he said again: ' You see! I can't help spoiling the picture with these brushes.' I agreed to the need for intermediate size brushes and promised to provide them, but then took up the work of interpretation.

I pointed out that he was dealing with engine, puppy and paint brushes as part of the same theme shown in the pendulum-ruler play. The engine and puppy came in as damaged objects that he had not succeeded in protecting from his aggression through disturbances in his relation with the helpful parent figures within,

represented by the ruler and the paint brushes. I reminded him of an earlier account he had given of a puppy he had once owned, when a small boy, but could not keep because he didn't treat it properly. He at once repeated the remark he had made about his damaged engine, 'I was too small then to know how to behave.' To this I replied that he was not only describing his own failures but criticizing the parents (the paint brushes) and asking me to give him two new and different parents. Any conscious and direct criticism of his parents played a very small part in his analysis, and the unconscious criticisms, that had appeared before, were mostly in terms of sadistic triumph over them.

Although the request for new paint brushes might seem to indicate rejection of both parents and relate to the real external ones, I think that the main emphasis throughout the session was on the difficult relationship with the internal father and his penis. The drawer into which I was to put the new brushes had been standing for himself, and in my experience, too, any objects held in the hand during creative work stand predominantly for the internalized objects, with whom an intense emotional relationship is being experienced unconsciously while the work goes on. That the father and his penis appeared in duplicate (the two paint brushes) referred to substitute father figures who have played important rôles in the boy's life, when his own father was not available. After interpretations had been made along these lines, I added that he was now more able to try and sort out his own responsibility for these failures from the rôle played by the parents in creating difficulties for him. His criticism of them took the form of a complaint that they gave him gifts and forced him into situations when he was still too young and inexperienced to handle them satisfactorily.

I also suggested to him that through the equation between himself (and his penis) and his damaged objects he showed me that he felt too ashamed to show me his damaged head and penis, as he had been too ashamed to show his engine to the man in the toyshop.

The reparative element in drawing and painting is well known, and one can see here his imaginative recreation of the real lost puppy, as well as the repairing and bringing to life of the phantasy objects. He believed the puppy to have been destroyed on his account, when it was sent away after attacking a neighbour's chickens. Several weeks before this session we had been talking about the use he made of various objects for purposes of projecting his aggression, and the puppy had come into that discussion, so that the engine and the ruler could now be understood in relation to the puppy. Guilt towards the puppy, and towards all the objects symbolized in this session, was combined with acute anxiety lest a similar fate awaited himself or his genital, and this guilt and anxiety lay behind his inability to use his mental and physical powers. The fear of uncontrolled aggression had an inhibiting effect continually. I took it that by copying a puppy in one of my magazines he was not only asking me to help him find his puppy again but also to help in his efforts to recreate the puppy by explaining to him the structure of a dog's body, an exchange lesson for the many lessons he had given me in his sessions, e.g. the one on the pendulum. One of the tragic aspects of a child's attempt to repair and recreate damaged objects is his lack of knowledge, and this applies both to real and phantasy attempts to put things right. And when a child has had to separate himself from internal or external helping figures, his despair becomes very great. In this patient the hopelessness was shown in his inactivity which alternated with a manic assertiveness such as the statement that he could *MAKE* the pendulum work even against his common sense.

Another useful connection could be made in this session between the tortoise material, already described, and these other damaged objects, engine, ruler and puppy. He was wearing his dental plate but found it very troublesome and took it out several times. Once he said: 'I have to try to keep it in, but I am not forced to if it hurts too much.' I reminded him that the plate had been equated with the damaged tortoise, which had stood for an internal persecutor and that he now shows how strongly he feels that the lost puppy is within him hitting back, and biting him as it once bit the chickens. His assertion, displaced on to his remark about the plate, that he does not have to keep an internalized object within him, is a pitiful denial of the existence of the internal persecutor, and I interpreted both this denial and the use he makes of an accompanying psychic act of projection, whenever he removes the plate from his mouth.

He came to the next session as I had never seen him before. I found him sitting motionless in the waiting room in a dejected attitude, bent forward with his head in his hands. Even when

I spoke to him, he did not move for a while, and then looked up with a start to say: 'I did not know that you were there.' Downstairs in the treatment room he took up the same position and told me that he had slept badly and one could see that he had not brushed his hair. He wanted to go to sleep with his head on the table, but kept struggling against sleep, and I interpreted his fear of me as someone trying to put him to sleep as he believed 'the vet. put the puppy to sleep'. I pointed out also the confirmation he was giving me of my remarks about the dying and dead objects within him and of his struggle against a need to identify with them.

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Example 9. One of the psychic tasks all children are faced with, for the satisfactory attainment of a unified personality, is the bringing together in a stable union of the two internalized parents. Such a union is a step towards the assimilation of the parents, together with their good qualities, in successive identifications. A number of symptoms as well as inhibitions have their basis in the child's relation with this internal combined figure. My patient showed me in many different kinds of material that this combined figure was for him a strange and frightening one, disturbing his comfortable feelings about his own body and contributing to his hypochondriacal fears.

His conception of parental intercourse was that of a sadistic act in which he more often portrayed mother as the more powerful partner, being successful in gaining all the good things, which money symbolized. His mother's money bag was to him the womb in which she unfairly stored up an undue share of everything that could be desired. The strong identification with mother and sister was often expressed in the remark that the one and only thing he wanted to be was a millionaire. He announced that a millionaire could control anybody or anything and thereby get all he wanted, but went straight on to complain of the unfairness of the usual arrangment in marriage where the man was forced to have a job and earn money to support the woman. He brought money from his collection of coins to demonstrate his grievance against his mother, as Britannia. There were coins from all the reigns back to Victoria, and he sorted out those that had on them the heads of kings, but turning them over said to me: 'You see! It doesn't matter whether the coin belongs to a queen or a king, Britannia sits on them all!'

When interpreting this material in connection with his unconscious picture of the dominant female in a sadistic parental intercourse and his choice of the female for his predominant identification, I also spoke of the concreteness of his unconscious phantasies, according to which the king-and-queen-parents, as well as their excrements and genitals, were felt to be inside his body in the same way as the coins lay in his pocket. It was possible also in this session to explain to him some of the unconscious connections with his stealing tendencies which he had demonstrated by taking money from his mother's bag and from me. In the realm of phantasy he stole from mother and sister to fit himself out with the bodily parts needed to play a female rôle in relation to father, and much of his guilt and anxiety derived from these unrealistic imaginary activities. Through his identification with the bad Victoria-Britannia mother, he was also feeling himself to be dominating and sadistic in his homosexual attitudes.

His hatred and fear of the powerful robbing female caused him to employ his father, in his imagination, to carry out violent attacks upon her. Indirectly he brought conscious and unconscious memories of bombing during the war through a play in one session with marbles. He placed some on the floor and then from a considerable height tried to drop other marbles exactly on his targets. It became clear only a few days later that there had been a specific attack upon the females in this play. He drew my attention to some pictures of men filling up a number of planes with jelly-bombs, explaining to me that such bombs were used in warfare to drop with precision-bombing on the tops of certain buildings. He insisted that the poor pilots were *MADE* to go up with these bombs and drop them as directed by these bad men who were filling up the planes. So I interpreted in the first place his persecutory feelings about the bad father making him attack mother and sister, and his experience of bombing as though the absent father had sent the enemy bombers to search them out and kill them. But subsequently I pointed out the element of projection that always turns up in his material, when he draws my attention to what the bad men are doing, while the children (here represented by the pilots), are quite innocent.

The same theme of father and son attacking

the mother and sister was shown in a more genital form a few days later when he asked me if I knew about the two famous ships the *M—— I*, and the *M—— II*, the latter built to replace the former which he said 'had lived out her full span of life'. His mood was a very anxious one with more manifest anxiety than usual, and he showed a loving concern for the *M—— II* (obviously standing for his sister) when he told me that unlike the one whose place she took, she had been unable to weather a frightful storm during her maiden voyage and was smashed to pieces on the rocks. When I interpreted his great anxiety and concern for his sister, whom he feared would never become adult like her mother, he became very uneasy but was able to co-operate by turning to another picture, this time of ships in a canal. 'It is very dangerous,' he said, 'for a wooden ship like that to go into a canal, because in such places they are likely to get riddled with worms, which penetrate right into them so that in the end they become quite hollow and then the slightest bang and—down it goes!' My first interpretation was of the worms as the bad penises which he, and the father whom he controls, put into the sister like the bad men filling up the bombing planes to attack the buildings below. That the storm and rocks which wrecked the *M—— II* are also the weapons of the bad males. Mother has been able to withstand their attacks, but the sister will not have enough strength to resist. There was also a reference to previous material which had shown his concern lest his sister had been damaged in sexual play with him. But I also pointed out his anxiety concerning his own state as a female in the homosexual situation, for he has in imagination pushed the sister out and taken her place, only to find that he is full of anxiety about becoming more and more hollow, through his persistent incorporation of a number of penises in the passive homosexual experiences.

So great were his difficulties that he could only maintain his masculine identification with father for short periods and even then with accompanying partial inhibition. The aggressive nature of the penis, his and father's, was one important reason for his failure and the impoverishment of his personality and lack of energy were exemplified by the hollow ship ready to collapse at the slightest bang on its sides. The identification with either mother or father, or both, as internal sexual figures meant being involved in a sadistic dangerous act. One of his main defences was regression to an identification with an earlier undifferentiated parent figure in which mother and father, male and female entities were confused and mixed up with each other. This confusion in the internal figure added to the strangeness of his feelings about himself and also made him fear and try to avoid an identification with it. This regression was also to oral contact with the object and involved important displacement from the genital-urethral-anal parts of the body up to the head. Nose, mouth, eyes and ears became burdened with the functions derived from these other organs, and this affected his concept of the bodies of the internal parents, turning them as well as himself into distorted monstrosities.

Denial of his anxieties was a very strong and well established defence, and he sought to prove to me that this loss of function in some of his organs and doubling of function in another part of the body was a very great advantage, and in fact quite an achievement. With great enthusiasm he described a man whom he had known intimately during early childhood. It was a long story and I am only using one point in it here. The man had been involved in a bad accident that was nearly fatal, and on recovery it was found that, through damage to his nose, the sense of smell was permanently and hopelessly lost. It was when my patient was describing the wonderful way in which this man dealt with his loss that the maximum amount of affect appeared in voice and facial expression. The man made no trouble at all but rather rejoiced in the acquisition of a strange new power, for he developed the capacity to smell with his eyes and this power never failed him.

I explained to him his internalization of this man and identification with him in the displacement from damaged nose (the penis) to the eyes (standing for the vagina) which also involved for him displacement from the genital up to the head, and in the use of cheerful good humour for purposes of denial. That he spends so much time at home and in his sessions reading was explained as a retreat from masculine to feminine activity, and that the kind of reading he fears is of this type, because he feels that he becomes full of the wriggling worms, which make his head hollow and empty of knowledge which can't be acquired by using his head and eyes in a penetrating masculine activity. I showed him how strong this

attitude of denial and indifference was and how he maintains superficially a superior feeling about himself and other males, who deal with their illness and impotence by asserting that a homosexual male is an improvement on a normal male. But I also reminded him that he does occasionally reveal how unhappy and frightened he is about his condition and about the strangeness and abnormality of the internal parents with whom he is identified.

One day he asked me to look at some of the illustrations to a serial story that he had read at home and now read again during his session. The pictures he selected all contained a centaur and the title of the story was 'I don't Wanna be a Hoss.' As usual his laugh covered up underlying anxiety. He undertook to give me a summary up to the incidents illustrated in these pictures. The sheriff of a town in America had passed harsh judgement on an Indian for ill-treatment of his horse, to which the Indian responded by vindictively offering the sheriff something to eat which turned him into a centaur. My patient was delighted with this and clearly identified himself with the Indian, showing me that the sheriff stood for the father who blames and punishes him for ill treating his mother and sister, who are turned thereby into mere beasts of burden. The horse appears very frequently in children's symbolic representations as the mother, but it is usually a very special aspect of the mother that is emphasized by the use of a four-footed animal. It appeared in this case, for the mother is thought of as containing the father and making therefore one of the early forms of the combined parent figure. The identification with this kind of mother eliminates the sexual father in the sense that the combined figure is not of the two parents in the act of intercourse (fused with each other from the outside of their bodies); the father and his penis have been completely incorporated by mother. My patient felt a superior homosexual identification with what to him was a more powerful and frightening figure. The identification is really expressed by the centaur, and it became clear as we went on with the work that the sheriff stood unconsciously for my patient, who experienced his homosexual condition as a punishment and as a shame which he sought to hide.

In the story, the centaur-sheriff was terrified lest his ridiculous condition should be discovered, and he was driven to a number of humiliating expedients to hide the lower part of his body from the public, so that he might continue his functions as sheriff. He was helped in his adventures by a young nephew upon whose goodwill he became utterly dependent. From one point of view this nephew stood for his sister with whom he has wanted to change places and imagines there has been an exchange of genitals, and in many accounts of their joint reality activities he emphasizes unconsciously his great dependence on her initiative, though superficially he speaks of her condescendingly. From another point of view the nephew is linked with different boys with whom he has been friendly. He showed me a picture of a blindfolded blacksmith shoeing the centaur, while the nephew stood on guard covering the blacksmith with a loaded gun. His explanation of this picture was that the nephew had concocted a wonderful trick to help the uncle. He had led the blacksmith on to boast that he could shoe any horse blindfolded. My patient looked straight at me at that moment and said how awful it would be if the bandage happened to fall from the blacksmith's eyes. I told him that he felt as though he were the centaur sitting in the analyst's room as a blacksmith shop and that in imagination he had a friend of his (the nephew) in the room covering me with a gun. If I should understand what lay behind his being the centaur, I was in danger of being killed by the nephew, and he felt that I did not know what danger I ran through undertaking and going on with his analysis. On another occasion he had told me that he had a real friend slightly older than himself, who possessed a gun and a licence to shoot. He himself had come to different sessions armed with weapons, sword, gun, arrow, and knife, once jumping out at me from behind the waiting-room door saying: 'Your money or your life.'

One of the reasons why I was in such danger was because he thought of me as one who would kill him or the nephew (one of his friends), if I discovered their secrets. He was also afraid that he might betray those represented by the nephew, who might then shoot him. After one session when he took no notice of me throughout the whole time, he spoke at last on the doorstep when outside the house, saying: 'I am going straight from you to the dentist, to be murdered, you know.'

It was part of the work of the analysis to help him in sorting out the anxieties and guilt that had their connections with real external

happenings and those that were primarily derived from phantastic situations. The analysis of real happenings uncovered realistic elements of danger to himself and others which were at times exaggerated and confused with irrational fears, and at other times were denied and underestimated also. The analysis of the centaur material was very much fuller than can be given in this paper. The centaur was dealt with as a representation of the real parents too, and some of the links worked out between his contribution to their appearing in his inner world in this unsatisfactory and humiliating union and the factors that he felt derived from the limitations and difficulties of the real parents.

* * * *

Example 10. To conclude, I will draw attention to the fact that when the more persecutory aspect of his anxiety situations diminished as a result of analytic work he could show for a while a mood of true depression, with more acceptance of responsibility and more trust in me. His birthday came soon after the sessions with the centaur, and he celebrated it by bringing me an analytic present. He arrived with his stamp collection and asked for help with the large number of stamps waiting to be fastened into his stamp album. He said he had been too lazy to deal with it before, a favourite defensive explanation of states of inhibition due to unmanageable acute anxieties. He estimated that he had a very large collection for a boy of his age, but said that it was in a disgraceful state because he took no trouble to fasten the stamps into the book.

He was chiefly interested during this session in the difference between countries with monarchies and those with republics and got confused between the two. He passed a stamp over to me, asking me to identify the country to which it belonged, that we might then classify it in these terms. 'Republique Française' was very clearly written on the stamp, so I passed it back and said it must be standing for something else he wanted me to examine inside him, since he could obviously read it for himself. He smiled and read out the French words with correct pronunciation and then said the stamp had become so dirty that he was not sure about seeing it correctly. A minute later he handed me another stamp and with a very anxious look on his face said 'That republic is the one that has just been wiped out, isn't it?' Before I started to interpret he had added that he now had the chance to have his father's stamp collection, but was not going to accept the offer yet, because he was still unable to take care of things. While fastening some stamps which he said were very good ones into his book he made a sudden sound of disgust and pulled off one of the attachment slips saying: 'that's a disgusting one and no good.'

My interpretations were along the lines of the book being himself, the stamps (like the coins he had brought previously) being the internal mothers and fathers, internalized at different ages in his life (the different reigns). Different people (the countries) have different internal organizations, some choosing republics and others the monarchy (the earliest type of internal world for the child). The stamps he doesn't look after sufficiently well are the parents, and their children, inside him. Some of them have become so dirty through his attitudes to them that he can't bear to look at them and can't even recognize them. If his method of producing a republic inside is by the destruction of the King and Queen he feels that he, as the republic, will be wiped out in revenge. His internalization processes have been held up (sorting out and placing stamps in the album) not so much because of laziness, which is his frequent substitute explanation, but more because he fears that his inside is a place in which they cannot be kept alive. His fear of externalizing his aggression drove him to turn it inwards and added to the devastation within. The adhesive label for the stamp was his own penis and that of the father (hand, head, etc.) which must be used to join the King and Queen together and to join them to himself. Pulling it off and throwing it away, as too disgusting, expressed his dissatisfaction with the penis, which still caused him at this stage in the analysis to retreat again and again from the genital position.

SUMMARY

The main purpose of the paper is to demonstrate in the case of a boy-patient how certain early anxiety situations are uncovered and dealt with according to the analytic technique of Melanie Klein. The reason for which he came to analysis was the parents' concern about severe inhibitions at school in work and play. At the outset of analysis this attitude of non-co-operation was not shown in the transference situation but appeared as soon as the

patient's need to placate the analyst had diminished.

Depression and persecutory fears, open aggression and defiance, as well as passive negative attitudes of great strength began to emerge both at home and in the analysis. The patient was able later on to reveal conscious concern about such symptoms as mental confusion and hypochondriacal fears which he had been trying to hide.

The following examples were taken from his analysis which lasted for several years. The first three dealt with anxieties relating to phantasies of attacks made upon the inside of the mother's body.

Example 1. The mother's babies were symbolized as tortoises and as the dental plate in his mouth, which he experienced as a persecutory object. His companions at school were equated with the mother's unborn children.

Example 2. The connection between such anxieties and intellectual inhibition was shown and their effect upon his relation with his sister.

Example 3. Spiders and ants were captured in the treatment room to be placed in pens constructed during the session. The picture of a damaged animal in a magazine was used together with the spiders and ants to represent the objects as he imagined them to be inside the mother.

Example 4. Stealing tendencies were shown in connection with his envy of the female functions. He demonstrated the material by means of dancing bottles suspended from a gold chain stolen from his sister.

Example 5. Dealt with stealing in relation to the analyst, and led to the discovery of important links between conscious and unconscious thefts. Confusion arising from uncertainties about the separation of real and imaginary theft was also discussed.

Example 6. Describes the bringing to analysis of some of the stolen property. Fears of schoolteachers, the dentist and the analyst were connected with the idea that we were searching for the things stolen in phantasy as well as for those objects which he had really pilfered. Stolen knowledge about the parents' sexual functions, and about the facts of birth were shown to contribute to his difficulties in learning.

Example 7. Described something of his rivalry with the sister for a dominant place in the father's affections, and was brought to analysis at the time of the father's birthday, when the children decided to give a joint present. Some of the material was given in the form of a summary which he made for me of a serial story he had read during several sessions. The story was of a Chief's daughter who lost her badge and was banished by her father for disobedience.

Example 8. Showed some of his fears about the aggressive nature of his penis and the association in his mind between his father's genital and his own. He set up a pendulum and explained to me how it worked, introducing a broken school ruler as part of the arrangement. Other symbols of the penis used in the session were a toy engine, a puppy and paint brushes.

Example 9. Illustrated the importance of the internal figure of the combined parents, which the patient showed as a strange and frightening figure disturbing his good relation with his body. One form of it was shown as a centaur in another serial story read during the sessions.

Example 10. Described his reactions to his own birthday and showed how a mood of depression could appear and be worked through after some severe persecutory anxieties had been partially analysed. The parents appeared as kings and queens on coins and stamps.

NOTES ON THE PSYCHO-ANALYSIS OF THE SUPER-EGO CONFLICT OF AN ACUTE SCHIZOPHRENIC PATIENT

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In analysing a number of acute and chronic schizophrenic patients during the last ten years, I have become increasingly aware of the importance of the super-ego in schizophrenia. In this paper I shall present details of the psycho-analysis of one acute catatonic patient in order to throw some light on the structure of the schizophrenic super-ego and its relation to schizophrenic ego disturbances. I also wish to discuss the controversy about methods of approach to acute schizophrenic patients.

The Controversy Concerning the Approach to Schizophrenic Patients by Psycho-Analysis

In discussing the value of the psycho-analytic approach to schizophrenia, we have to remember that psychotherapists with widely different theories and equally different techniques claim success in helping the schizophrenic in the acute states of the disease. The attempt to concentrate on producing a quick therapeutic result in the acute schizophrenic state, irrespective of the method of approach, may be temporarily valuable to the individual patient and gratifying to the therapist; but the more difficult problem is to deal with the chronic mute phase of the disease.[1] The method of approaching the acute schizophrenic patient is important for several reasons. First, we must be sure that we are using a scientific method of investigation and treatment so that we can assess our psychopathological findings correctly. Secondly, our method should be one which can be used in treating a variety of cases, so that it is possible to teach it to our students. Thirdly, our method of approach must also help, not hinder, the treatment of the chronic phase of schizophrenia which follows the acute one. Psycho-analysts have satisfied themselves that psycho-analysis is a method of investigation which serves both treatment and research in neurosis. There is, however, disagreement as to whether psycho-analysis can be used in the treatment of acute schizophrenia. Most American psycho-analytical workers on schizophrenia, for example, Harry Stack Sullivan, Fromm Reichmann, Federn, Knight, Wexler, Eissler, and Rosen, etc., have changed their method of approach so considerably that it can no longer be called psycho-analysis. They seem all agreed that it is futile to regard the psycho-analytical method as useful for acute psychosis. They all find re-education and reassurance absolutely necessary; some workers like Federn go so far as to think that the positive transference has to be fostered and the negative one avoided altogether. He also warns us against interpreting unconscious material. Rosen seems to interpret unconscious material in the positive and negative transference, but he also uses a great deal of reassurance, a problem which I shall discuss later on in greater detail. A number of English [2] psycho-analysts, stimulated by Melanie Klein's research on the early stages of infantile development, have been successful in treating acute and chronic schizophrenics by a method which retains the essential features of psycho-analysis. Psycho-analysis in this sense can be defined as a method which comprises interpretation of the positive and negative transference without the use of reassurance or educative measures, and the recognition and interpretation of the unconscious material produced by the patient. The experience of child analysts may help us here to define in more detail the psycho-analytic approach to acute schizo-

[1] Eissler (1951) suggested the terms: ' acute or (first) and mute or (second) phase of schizophrenia '. He pointed out that the acute phase may last many years and the illness may take its course entirely either in the first or in the second phase. Eissler's contention is that the whole question of the psycho-analysis of schizophrenia can be decided only in the second phase.

[2] There may be a number of workers in the U.S.A. and South America such as Kaufman and Pichon Rivieré who have treated schizophrenic patients by psycho-analysis. They have, however, not described their clinical approach. (Pichon Rivieré's papers on schizophrenia are only theoretical.)

phrenics, because the technical problems arising in the analysis of acute psychotics are similar to those encountered in the analysis of small children. In discussing the analysis of children from the age of two and three-quarter years onwards, Melanie Klein has found that by interpreting the positive and negative transference from the beginning of the analysis the transference neurosis develops. She regards any attempts to produce a positive transference by non-analytical means, like advice or presents, or reassurance by various means, not only as unnecessary but as positively detrimental to the analysis. She found certain modifications of the adult analysis necessary in analysing children. Children are not expected to lie on the couch, and not only their words but their play is used as analytical material. Co-operation between the child's parents and the analyst is desirable, as the child has to be brought to his sessions and the parents supply the infantile history and keep the analyst informed about real events. In the analysis of children as described by Melanie Klein, however, the fundamental features of psycho-analysis are fully retained.

All these experiences can be used for describing the guiding principles of the analysis of psychotics, particularly acute schizophrenic patients. If we avoid attempts to produce a positive transference by direct reassurance or expressions of love, and simply interpret the positive and negative transference, the psychotic manifestations attach themselves to the transference, and, in the same way as a transference neurosis develops in the neurotic, so, in the analysis of psychotics, there develops what may be called a ' transference psychosis '. The success of the analysis depends on our understanding of the psychotic manifestations in the transference situation.

With acute schizophrenic patients we scarcely ever use the analytic couch, and we make use not only of verbal utterances, but also of gestures and play as analytical material. Close co-operation between the analyst and parents or nurses is essential. Another important question is how often and how long at a time the patient should be seen. I have found that acute schizophrenic patients have to be seen at least six times a week, and often the usual 50 minutes' session has seemed to be insufficient. In my own experience it is better not to vary the length of time of the particular sessions, but to give the patient, if necessary, a prolonged session (1 hour 30 minutes) regularly. It is also unwise to interrupt the treatment for more than a few days while the patient is still in the acute state, because it may cause a prolonged setback in his clinical condition and in the analysis.

The analysis of schizophrenic patients has many pitfalls and the inexperienced analyst may find himself unable to cope with the problem analytically. It is in my opinion the very nature of the schizophrenic process which not only makes the analytic task a difficult one but is one of the reasons for the controversy about the possibility of an analytic approach. The answer to the controversy can only be found in practice: namely, by showing that a transference analysis of acute schizophrenic patients is possible; and by examining the nature of the schizophrenic transference and other central schizophrenic problems and anxieties.

I have the impression that the need to use controlling and reassuring methods is related to the difficulty of dealing with the schizophrenic super-ego by psycho-analysis. Milton Wexler (1951) has contributed to the understanding of this point in his paper ' The Structual Problem in Schizophrenia '. In criticizing the view of Alexander, who denies the existence of a super-ego in schizophrenics, Wexler says: ' To explain the schizophrenic's conflicts (hallucinations and illusions) wholly as expressions of disorganized instinctual demands that have lost their interconnection, is a travesty of the clinical picture of schizophrenia which often reflects some of the most brutal morality I have ever encountered. Certainly we are not dealing with a super-ego intact in all its functions, but a primitive, archaic structure in which the primal identification (incorporated figure of the mother) holds forth only the promise of condemnation, abandonment and consequent death. Though this structure may only be the forerunner of the super-ego which emerges with complete resolution of the Œdipus situation, its outline and dynamic force may be felt both in young children and schizophrenic patients, and if we do not see it (the super-ego), I suspect it is because we have not yet learned to recognize the most archaic aspects of its development.'

While fully recognizing the importance of the archaic super-ego, Wexler has, however, deviated considerably from psycho-analysis in his clinical approach. Apparently he did not attempt to analyse the transference situation. He tried to identify himself deliberately with the

super-ego of his patient by agreeing with the patient's most cruel, moral self-accusations. In this way he established contact with his patient which he had failed to do before. The treatment continued while the therapist was taking over the rôle of a controlling and forbidding person (for example, he forbade the patient any sexual or aggressive provocations which threatened to disturb the therapeutic relationship). Wexler made it quite clear that he also acted in a very friendly, reassuring manner towards his patient.

The patient who had been distinctly helped by Wexler's method was a schizophrenic woman who had been in a mental hospital for five years. The theoretical background of his approach is the attempt of the therapist to identify himself with the super-ego of the patient. As soon as he has made contact with the patient in this way he feels that he has succeeded in his first task, and he (the therapist), then begins to act as a controlling but friendly super-ego. He claims that in this manner a satisfactory super-ego and ego-control is gradually established which brings the acute phase of schizophrenia to an end.

Rosen (1946) described a technique in approaching acute, excited, catatonic patients who felt pursued by frightening figures. He established contact by 'deliberately assuming the identity, or the identities, of the figures which appeared to be threatening the patient and reassured the latter that, far from threatening him, they would love and protect him'. In another case, Rosen (1950) directly assumed the rôle of a controlling person by telling his woman patient to drop a cigarette which she had grabbed. He also controlled her physically and told her to lie still on the couch and not to move. But towards the end of the session he described, he changed his attitude by saying, 'I am your mother now and I will permit you to do whatever you want.' In Wexler's and Rosen's case it is clear that the particular approach aims at a modification of the schizophrenic super-ego by direct control and reassurance. Wexler suggests that Knight's and Hayward's success in the treatment of their schizophrenic patients must have been also due to their taking over super-ego control. It seems likely that all these methods which use friendly reassurance have a similar aim, i.e. the modification of the super-ego.

Indeed, from this critical survey, it would seem that all these psychotherapeutic methods are aimed at a direct modification of the super-ego. But I should add that none of the workers I have quoted have so far made clear whether they tried to approach the acute schizophrenic patient by psycho-analysis and if so, why they failed.

Some Psycho-Analytic Views about the Super-Ego in Schizophrenia

Freud (1924) said: 'A transference neurosis corresponds to a conflict between ego and id, a narcissistic neurosis to that between ego and super-ego, and a psychosis to that between ego and outer world.' This formula seems to suggest that he did not think the super-ego could play any rôle in schizophrenia. But earlier, in 1914, he pointed to a parallel between delusions of observation and the hearing of voices in paranoid diseases, and the manifestations of conscience. He suggested that 'the delusion of being watched presents the conscience in a regressive form, thereby revealing the genesis of this function'. He then proceeded to link the ego-ideal with homosexuality and the influence of parental criticism. Later on in the same paper (1914) he said that in paranoid diseases the origin or 'evolution of the conscience is regressively reproduced'. These statements of Freud (1914) imply that he did appreciate the importance of the super-ego in schizophrenia. He seems also to hint that the analysis of regressed schizophrenics suffering from auditory hallucinations might help to explain the origin of the super-ego. E. Pichon Rivieré (1947) stressed the importance of the super-ego in schizophrenia. He suggested that the psychoses (including schizophrenia) as well as the neuroses, are the outcome of a conflict between the id on the one hand and the ego at the service of the super-ego, on the other. He says: 'In the process of regression there arises a dissociation of the instincts and that of aggression is channelled both by the ego and the super-ego, thus determining the masochistic attitude of the former and the sadistic attitude of the latter. Tension between the two instances originates anxiety, guilt feelings and the need for punishment . . .'

Pious (1949) stated that he 'became convinced that the fundamental structural pathology in schizophrenia most probably lies in the formation of the super-ego'. He believes in the early development of the super-ego, but only stresses its positive aspects. He says: 'The super-ego develops from several loci, the earliest

of which is the introjection of the loving and protecting mother image. I believe that the development is jeopardized by prolonged privation and by hostility in the mother.' In his opinion the schizophrenic has a defective super-ego, but the structure of this defective super-ego is not explained.

Numberg expressed his views on the super-ego in schizophrenia in 1920. His patient who suffered from an extremely severe feeling of guilt, claimed that he had destroyed the world; and it became clear that he believed he had done so by eating. Numberg says: 'In his cannibalistic fantasies the patient identified the beloved persons with the food and with himself. To the infant the mother's breast is the only loved object, and this love, at that stage, bears a predominantly oral and cannibalistic character. There cannot yet exist a feeling of guilt.' Numberg, however, suggests that certain feelings and sensations of the oral and anal zone, which cannot yet find expression in speech, 'form the emotional basis for the development of that ideational complex known as the guilt feeling'.

Reading Numberg's description of his patient, we are surprised at his statement that 'there cannot yet exist a feeling of guilt' at the oral stage. For his case suggests that guilt feelings and a super-ego exist at a pre-verbal period and seems to show that the sensations of the oral tract to which he refers are related to phantasies of consuming or introjecting objects.

Melanie Klein [3] has contributed most to our understanding of the early origins of the super-ego. She has found that, by projecting his libidinal and aggressive impulses on to external objects, which at first are his mother's breasts, the infant creates images of a good and a bad breast. These two images are introjected and contribute both to the ego and the super-ego. She also described two early developmental stages corresponding to two predominant early anxieties of the infant; 'the paranoid-schizoid position', which extends over the first three to four months of life, and 'the depressive position', which follows and extends over most of the remaining months of the first year. If during the paranoid-phase, aggression and therefore paranoid anxieties become increased through internal and external causes, phantasies of persecutory objects predominate and disturb the ability to maintain good objects inside on which normal ego and super-ego development depend. In such cases the core of the primitive super-ego will have a persecutory character. Another point should be considered. It is characteristic for the paranoid phase that objects are split into good and bad ones. There is an inter-relationship between these good and bad objects in that if the bad objects are extremely bad and persecutory the good objects will become extremely good and therefore idealized. The idealized objects make their contribution to the super-ego, and in many chronic and borderline schizophrenic patients both the idealized and the persecutory objects seem to have some super-ego functions. The highly idealized good object increases the severity of the super-ego, and because of its impossible and exacting demands it is often felt to be persecuting. In the analysis of *acute* schizophrenic patients we can often only observe the persecutory objects functioning as super-ego. This may be due to the extreme demands of the idealized objects, which make it so difficult to differentiate them from the demands of the persecutory objects. The contribution of the good and the idealized objects to the super-ego of the acute schizophrenic can only be detected by the analyst at a time when the persecutory anxieties diminish, which coincides with the appearance of depressive anxieties. As the infant during his normal development moves towards the depressive position, the persecutory anxiety and the splitting of objects diminishes, and the anxiety begins to centre round the fear of losing the good object outside and inside. After the first three or four months of life, the emphasis changes from the fear that the self will be destroyed by a persecuting object, to the fear that the good object will be destroyed. Concurrently there is a greater wish to preserve it inside. The anxiety and guilt about the inability to restore this object inside, and secondly outside, then come more to the fore and constitute the super-ego conflict of the depressive position. The normal outcome of the depressive position is the strengthening of the capacity to love and repair the good object inside and outside. But if there is a failure in the normal working through of the depressive position, regression to the schizoid-paranoid position becomes reinforced.[4]

This may explain why one often observes in

[3] I do not attempt to present here a detailed description of Melanie Klein's views, I only try to concentrate on those points which are relevant to the theme of my paper.

[4] Melanie Klein: '*Notes on Schizoid Mechanisms*', p. 105.

an acutely regressed schizophrenic patient a super-ego which contains a mixture of persecutory and depressive features. At any time one might clinically see a 'struggle' with a predominantly persecutory super-ego changing into a struggle with one containing more depressive characteristics,[5] and, after a failure to deal with the internal conflict at a depressive level, one would observe a return of the earlier persecutory struggle.

The investigation of the psychopathology of schizophrenia has also shown the importance of certain mechanisms, which were named by Melanie Klein 'schizoid mechanisms'. They involve splitting of both the ego and its objects. Melanie Klein described the splitting of the ego caused by aggression turning against the self and by the projection of the whole or parts of the self into external and internal objects—a process which she has called 'projective identification'.[6]

In the clinical material I am presenting I wish to show that a primitive super-ego exists in an acute schizophrenic patient, that the origin of the super-ego goes back to the first year of life, and that this early super-ego is of a particularly severe character, which is due to the predominance of persecutory features.

I cannot discuss in this paper all the mechanisms of ego splitting, but I will draw attention to some of the relations of the super-ego to *ego splitting*.

Discussion of Certain Aspects from the Psycho-analysis of an Acute Schizophrenic Patient

Diagnosis. When I saw the patient for the first time he had been suffering from acute schizophrenia for about three years. He had always responded for a short time to electric shock or insulin comas, of which he had had at least ninety. There was a query whether the patient was hebephrenic, because of his frequent silly giggling, but, in spite of some hebephrenic features, practically all the psychiatrists who saw him diagnosed a catatonic type of schizophrenia of bad prognosis. Leucotomy was suggested to diminish his violence and to help the nursing problem, but at the last minute his father decided to try psycho-analysis.

History of Patient. The patient was born abroad in 1929, after a difficult forceps delivery. He was the eldest child (a brother was born four years later). He did not do well at the breast and after four weeks was changed over to the bottle. Difficulties over taking food were present throughout childhood and the latency period. A change occurred several years before the beginning of his illness when he suddenly developed an enormous appetite. He cried for hours as a baby because the parents were advised not to pick him up. He had frequent attacks of nervous vomiting from childhood onwards. Other symptoms were disturbing sensations like deadness and stiffness in his arms and legs, and a feeling in his tongue that it got twisted. He could never stand being hurt, and when he had pain he often tried to pinch his mother as if he were angry with her about it. He was popular at school and had a number of friends. There was a period of exhibitionism between nine and eleven years of age. When he was about sixteen, a disturbing incident occurred during the holidays when he and his brother occupied a bedroom next door to that of his parents. His mother saw him standing on the parapet of the balcony, which was on the fourth floor, and thought he was about to commit suicide by throwing himself to the ground below. She managed to stop him and he 'broke down' and accused his father of not telling him the facts of life. Apparently the patient had had an intense period of masturbation before this episode. At seventeen he fell in love with a ballet dancer. She jilted him and soon afterwards he had his first schizophrenic breakdown.

Parents of the Patient. His mother had not felt well during her pregnancy, and, after her confinement, developed asthma and could not look after the baby, who was handed over to a nurse. It is very difficult to assess clearly the relationship of the mother[7] to the patient;

[5] According to Melanie Klein's views, the super-ego of the depressive position among other features, accuses, complains, suffers and makes demands for reparation, and, while still persecutory, is less harsh than the super-ego of the paranoid position.

[6] For the more detailed study of these mechanisms I refer to Melanie Klein (1946) and Rosenfeld (1947).

[7] In some papers on schizophrenia particularly by American writers like Pious and Fromm-Reichmann the mother's hostile and 'schizophrenogenic' attitude has been stressed. The mother in this case seems to have been unconsciously hostile to the patient and the patient's illness increased her guilt feelings. But we ought not to forget that in all mental disturbances there is a close interrelationship between external factors acting as trauma and internal ones which are determined mostly by heredity. In our analytic approach we know that it is futile and even harmful to the progress of an analysis to allow a patient to *blame* the external environment. We generally find that there exists a great deal of distortion of external factors through projection and we have to help the patient to understand his phantasies and reac-

but it seems that she preferred the younger boy. When the patient grew up he frequently quarrelled with his mother, and got on much better with his father. When he fell ill, his mother would not have him at home, and it was clear later on that she was strongly opposed to his having psycho-analytic treatment. His father was an emotional man, very fond of his eldest boy, but undecided and unreliable.

The Treatment. At the time when I first saw the patient he was socially withdrawn, suffered from hallucinations and was almost mute, and sometimes he was impulsive. The first fortnight he was brought by car from a mental nursing home where he was looked after. Later on I saw him there and he had two private male nurses. For the first four to five weeks of the treatment he was at times dangerously violent. From then on the violence lessened a good deal and he became much easier to handle until the time when the nurses and I, and so, indirectly, the patient himself, began to realize that his parents, particularly his mother, intended to stop the treatment. From that moment he became progressively more violent, but till then he co-operated with me in negative and positive states, and never attempted to attack me.

Technique. I saw him regularly for about one hour and twenty minutes every day, with the exception of Sundays. When he spoke he rarely used whole sentences. He nearly always said only a few words, expecting me to understand. He frequently acknowledged interpretations which he felt were correct, and he could show clearly how pleased he was to understand. When he felt resistance against interpretations, or when they aroused anxiety, he very often said 'No', and 'Yes' afterwards, expressing both rejection and acceptance. Sometimes he showed his understanding by the clarity and coherence of the material he produced after an interpretation. At times he had great difficulty in formulating words and he showed what he meant by gestures. At other times, in connection with certain anxieties, he altogether lost his capacity to speak (for example, when he felt that everything had turned into fæces inside him), but this capacity improved in response to relevant interpretations. Later on in the course of treatment he began to play in a dramatic way, illustrating in this manner his phantasies, particularly about his internal world.

The Problem of Case Presentation

In presenting certain aspects of an analysis like this, it is impossible to reproduce all the material given by the patient and all the interpretations. It has also to be remembered that, with such a severely ill patient, the analyst cannot understand everything the patient says or tries to say.

However, I hope that I shall be able to show that this deeply regressed patient, who had great difficulty in verbalizing his experiences, conveyed his problems to me not only clearly enough to make a continuous relationship possible, but also in a manner which gave a fairly detailed picture of his guilt conflict in the transference situation, and the ways and means by which he was trying to *deal with it.*

As I am mainly concerned with describing my verbal contact with the patient, it is necessary to discuss the significance of verbal interpretations, as there are some analysts, such as Eissler, who deny the importance of interpretations in acute schizophrenia. Eissler stressed the schizophrenic's awareness of the primary processes in the analyst's mind, and it is these primary processes on which, in his opinion, the result of treatment depends and not on the interpretations. I understand this to mean that the schizophrenic is extremely intuitive and seems to be able to get help from a therapist who *unconsciously* is in tune with his patient. Eissler seems to regard it as unimportant and leading to self-deception to consider whether or not the psychotherapist consciously understands the schizophrenic patient. He writes: 'I did not get the impression that in instances in which interpretations were used during the acute phase there was a specific relationship between interpretation and clinical recovery. It may be assumed that another set of interpretations might have achieved a similar result.'

In my opinion the unconscious intuitive understanding by the psycho-analyst of what the patient is conveying to him is an essential factor in all analyses, and depends on the analyst's capacity to use his counter-transference [8] as a kind of sensitive 'receiving set'. In treating schizophrenics who have such great

tions to external situations until he becomes able to differentiate between his phantasies and external reality.

[8] Compare Paula Heimann (1950): On Counter-transference. She writes: 'My thesis is that the analyst's emotional response to his patient within the analytic situation represents one of the most important tools for his work. The analyst's counter-transference is an instrument of research into the patient's unconscious.'

verbal difficulties, the unconscious intuitive understanding of the analyst, through the counter-transference, is even more important, for it helps him to determine what really matters.

But the analyst should also be able to formulate consciously what he has unconsciously recognized, and to convey it to the patient in a form that he can understand. This after all is the essence of all psycho-analysis, but it is especially important in the treatment of schizophrenics, who have lost a great deal of their capacity for conscious functioning, so that, without help, they cannot consciously understand their unconscious experiences which are at times so vivid. In presenting the following material, I would therefore ask the reader to remember that I had continuously to watch for the patient's reactions to my interpretations, and often to feel my way until I could be sure of giving them in a form that he could use. For example, I was surprised to find that he could follow without much difficulty the interpretation of complicated mechanisms if I used simple words.

Even so, it was at times obvious that he was unable to understand verbal communication, or at least that he misunderstood what was said. We know from the treatment of neurotics that the analyst's words may become symbols of particular situations, for example, a feeding or a homosexual relationship; and this has to be understood and interpreted. But with the schizophrenic, the difficulty seems to go much further. Sometimes he takes everything the analyst says quite concretely. Hannah Segal (1950) has shown that if we interpret a castration phantasy to the schizophrenic he takes the interpretation itself as a castration. She suggested that he has a difficulty either in forming symbols or in using them, since they become equivalents instead of symbols. In my experience I found that most schizophrenics are only temporarily unable to use symbols, and the analysis of the patient under discussion contributed to my understanding of the deeper causes of this problem. This patient had certainly formed symbols, for instance his symbolic description of internalized objects was striking. But whenever *verbal* contact was disturbed, through the patient's difficulty in understanding words as symbols, I observed that his phantasies of going into me and being inside me had become intensified, which led to his inability to differentiate between himself and me (projective identification). This confusion between self and object, which also led to confusion of reality and phantasy, was accompanied by a difficulty in differentiating between the real object and its symbolic representation. Projections of self and internalized objects were always found to some extent, but did not necessarily disturb verbal communication. For it is the quantity of the self involved in the process of projective identification that determines whether the real object and its symbolic representation can be differentiated. Analysis of the impulses underlying projective identification may also explain why the schizophrenic so often treats phantasies as concrete real situations and real situations as if they were phantasies. Whenever I saw that projective identification had increased and interpreted the impulses of entering inside an object in the transference, the patient's capacity to understand symbols, and therefore words and interpretations, improved.

The Progress of Treatment

Before describing certain stages of the treatment which gave me some detailed and inter-related material about my patient's super-ego problem, I will sketch briefly the first four weeks of treatment, during which time he co-operated particularly well. In the first few sessions he showed clear signs of a positive and negative transference. His predominant anxieties were his fear of losing himself and me, and his difficulty in differentiating between himself and me, between reality and phantasy, and also between inside and outside. He talked about his fear of losing and having lost his penis: ' Somebody has taken the fork away '; ' Silly woman.' He was preoccupied with being a woman, and he had a wish to be re-born a girl: [9] ' *Prince* Ann.' By analysing material like ' The Virgin Mary was killed ', or ' One half was eaten ', and ' Bib (penis) was killed ', we began to realize that he attributed his dangerous, murderous feelings against his mother, and against women in general, to his male half and his penis. We also understood that his phantasies of being a woman were greatly reinforced by his desire to get rid of his aggression. When he began to understand this method of dealing with his aggression, his wish to be a woman lessened and he became more aggressive.

Sometimes his aggression turned outward and

[9] Compare Rosen who described the frequent re-birth phantasies of schizophrenic women wanting to be re-born as boys.

he attacked nurses, but frequently it turned against himself. He then spoke of ' Soul being killed ', or ' Soul committing suicide ', or ' Soul being dead '; ' Soul ' being clearly a good part of himself. Once when we discussed these feelings of deadness, he illustrated this turning of his aggression against himself by saying ' I want to go on—I don't want to go on—vacuum—Soul is dead ', and later astonished me by stating clearly ' The problem is—how to prevent disintegration.' I had never used that word in talking to him, and it is interesting that the turning of the aggression against the self has been described as part of the splitting process causing disintegration in schizophrenia (Klein, 1946; Rosenfeld, 1947). A very predominant anxiety in the analytic situation, which the patient on rare occasions was able to formulate, related to his need for me. My not being with him on Sundays seemed at times unbearable, and once on a Saturday he said, ' What shall I do in the meantime, I'd better find someone in the hospital.' On another occasion he said, ' I don't know what to do without you.' He stated repeatedly that all his problems were related to ' *Time* ', and when he felt he wanted something from me it had to be given ' instantly '.

Whenever he attacked somebody physically, he re-acted with depression, guilt and anxiety; and it gradually became clear that when his aggression did not turn against himself, but against external or internal objects, a guilt and anxiety problem arose which in fact occupied most of the time in the analysis.

I will now give some detailed material which followed an attack on Sister X four weeks after the beginning of his treatment. A few days before the attack, he seemed preoccupied with phantasies of attacking and biting breasts and with fear of women (' witchcraft '). He was inarticulate and difficult to understand. He talked about ' three buns ', which probably meant three breasts, but it was not clear at the time why there were three. He attacked Sister X suddenly, while he was having tea with her and his father, hitting her hard on the temple. She was affectionately putting her arms round his shoulders at the time. The attack occurred on a Saturday, and I found him silent and defensive on Monday and Tuesday. On Wednesday he talked a little more. He said that he had destroyed the whole world and later on he said, ' Afraid.' He added, 'Eli ' (God) several times. When he spoke he looked very dejected and his head drooped on his chest. I interpreted that when he attacked Sister X he felt he had destroyed the whole world and he felt only Eli could put right what he had done. He remained silent. After continuing my interpretations by saying that he felt not only guilty but afraid of being attacked inside and outside, he became a little more communicative. He said, ' I can't stand it any more.' Then he stared at the table and said, ' It is all broadened out, what are all the men going to feel? ' [10] I said that he could no longer stand the guilt and anxiety inside himself and had put his depression, anxiety and feelings, and also himself, into the outer world. As a result of this he felt broadened out, split up into many men, and he wondered what all the different parts of himself were going to feel. He then looked at a finger of his which is bent and said, ' I can't do any more, I can't do it all.' After that he pointed to one of my fingers which is also slightly bent and said, ' I am afraid of this finger.' His own bent finger had often stood for his illness, and had become the representative of his own damaged self, but he also indicated that it represented the destroyed world inside him, about which he felt he could do no more. In saying that he can't do it all, he implies a search for an object outside. But what kind of object relations do we find in the transference situation? I immediately seemed to become like him and was frightening. I interpreted to him that he put himself and the problems he could not deal with inside me, and feared that he had changed me into himself, and also that he was now afraid of what I would give back to him. He expressed an anxiety that I would stop treatment, and also a hope that I would continue seeing him.

I shall now examine this material from the theoretical point of view. After the attack on the Sister, the patient felt depressed and anxious. His behaviour, gestures, and the few sentences and words he uttered, showed that he felt he had destroyed the whole world outside, and he also felt the destroyed world inside himself. He makes this clearer later on in the analysis; but it is very important to realize at this stage that he felt he had taken the destroyed object, the world, into his ego. The guilt and depression were related to the task of restoring this inner world, which acted as a super-ego, but his

[10] ' It is all broadened out ' refers also to the world which is destroyed; but his ego is included in the destroyed world and this seemed to be the relevant factor to recognize.

omnipotence failed him. He also felt persecuted by the destroyed world and was afraid. Under the pressure of both the overwhelming guilt and the persecuting anxiety, which were caused by the super-ego, his ego began to go to pieces: he could not stand it any more and he projected the inner destroyed world, and himself, outside. After this everything seemed broadened out and his self was split up into many men who all felt his guilt and anxiety. The pressure of the super-ego is here too great for the ego to bear: the ego tries to deal with the unbearable anxiety by projection, but in this way ego-splitting, and so ego-disintegration, takes place. This is, of course, a very serious process, but if we are able to analyse these mechanisms in the transference situation, it is possible to cope analytically with the disastrous results of the splitting process.

The patient himself gave the clue to the transference situation, and showed that he projected the damaged self containing the destroyed world into me, and changed me in this way. But instead of getting relief through this projection he became more anxious, because he was afraid of what I was going to put back into him, which had the result that his introjection processes became severely disturbed. One would therefore expect a severe deterioration in his condition, and in fact his clinical state during the next ten days became very precarious. He began to get more and more suspicious about food, and finally refused to eat and drink anything. He became violent, and appeared to have visual hallucinations and also hallucinations of taste. In the transference he was suspicious of me, but not violent, and in spite of the fact that he was practically mute we never lost contact entirely. He sometimes said 'Yes' or 'No' to interpretations. In these I made ample use of previous material and related it to his present gestures and behaviour. It seemed to me that the relevant point had been his inability to deal with his guilt and anxiety. After projecting his bad, damaged self into me, he continuously saw himself everywhere outside. At the same time, everything he took inside seemed to him bad, damaged, and poisonous (like fæces), so there was no point in eating anything. We know that projection always leads again to introjection, so that he also felt as if he had inside himself all the destroyed and bad objects which he had projected into the outer world: and through coughing, retching, and movements of his mouth and fingers, he indicated that he was preoccupied with this problem. The first obvious improvement occurred one day when the male nurse had left some orange juice on the table which he (the patient) viewed with great suspicion. I went over previous material and showed him that the present difficult situation had arisen through his attempt to rid himself of guilt and anxiety inside by putting it outside himself. I told him that he was not only afraid of getting something bad inside him, but that he was also afraid of taking good things, the good orange juice and good interpretations, inside as he was afraid that these would make him feel guilty again. When I said this, a kind of shock went right through his body; he gave a groan of understanding, and his facial expression changed. By the end of the hour he had emptied the glass of orange juice, the first food or drink he had taken for two days. There was a distinct general improvement in his taking food from that time, and I felt it was significant that a patient, in this very hallucinated state, was able to benefit by an interpretation which showed him the relationship of the acute hallucinated state to his guilt problem.

The analytical material and the mechanisms I have described here are not just an isolated observation. They seem to be typical of the way an acute schizophrenic state develops. I have stressed that it is the inability of the schizophrenic patient to stand the anxiety and guilt caused by his introjected object or objects, representing the super-ego, which causes the projection of the self, or parts of the self containing the internalized object, into external objects. This results in ego splitting, loss of the self and loss of feelings.[11] At the same time a new danger and anxiety situation develops which leads to a vicious circle and further disintegration. Through the projection of the bad self and all it contains into an object, this object is perceived by the patient to have changed and becomes bad and persecuting itself, as the clinical material above indicated. The persecution expected after this form of projection is a forceful aggressive re-entry [12] of the object into the ego. During this phase therefore introjection may become inhibited in an attempt to prevent the persecuting object from entering.

The most important defence against the re-

[11] In my paper 'Analysis of a Schizophrenic State with Depersonalization' I have dealt in greater detail with the problem of ego splitting, loss of self and loss of feelings.

[12] This process has been described by Melanie Klein in: '*Notes on Schizoid Mechanisms*' (1946).

entry of the objects into which projection has taken place is negativism, which may show itself as a refusal to have anything to do with the world outside including the refusal of food. Such a defence is, however, rarely successful, as almost simultaneously with the projection of the self into an external object, the external object containing the self is introjected also. This implies that the object exists in phantasy externally and internally at the same time. In the process the ego is in danger of being completely overwhelmed, almost squeezed out of existence. In addition, we have to remember that the whole process is not stationary, because as soon as the object containing parts of the self is re-introjected, there is again the tendency to project which leads to further introjection of a most disturbing and disintegrating nature.

Clinically and theoretically it is important to consider the process from at least two angles: first the projection takes place to safeguard the ego from destruction, and may therefore be considered a defensive process which is unsuccessful and even dangerous because ego splitting, and therefore ego disintegration, takes place; secondly there is also an object relation of an extremely primitive nature connected with the projection, because the introjected objects and parts of the self are projected *into an object*. This is important to understand because the strength of the persecutory fears about the re-entry of the object depends on the strength of the aggressive impulses pertaining to this primitive object relationship. In a previous paper (1951) I have described this object relationship in greater detail, so I only want to repeat here that there is evidence that, apart from the relation to the breast, the infant from birth onwards has libidinal and aggressive impulses and phantasies of entering into the mother's body with parts of himself.[13] When there are phantasies of the self entering the mother's body aggressively, to overwhelm and to take complete possession, we have to expect anxiety, not only about the mother and the entering self being destroyed, but also about the mother turning into a persecutor who is expected to force herself back into the ego to take possession in a revengeful way. When this persecutory mother figure is introjected, the most primitive super-ego figure arises which represents a terrible overwhelming danger to the ego from within. It is most likely that the inability of the schizophrenic ego to deal with introjected figures depends on the peculiar nature of this early object relationship.

In the clinical material I have described above I have not explained why the patient attacked Sister X. So I want to add here that at a later date I had more material about the incident, and after I interpreted that at the moment when Sister X put her arms around him he feared her possessiveness, and that it aroused a phantasy that she might force herself into him, he shuddered violently and made a movement with his arm as if to ward off an imaginary intruder.

I shall now report material which occurred about a fortnight later. Before I saw the patient on the Monday I learnt from the male nurse that, on the previous Sunday, he seemed tense and had been about to make an attack on him. The attack did not materialize, but the patient turned very pale and said ' Hiroshima '.

When I approached him the following Monday, he received me by saying ' You are too late.' His limbs were trembling and he jumped in fright when the nurse sneezed in the room next door. He later said ' I cannot look ', and he repeated several times, ' I can't do anything.' He mentioned death several times and then became silent. He opened his mouth as if to speak but no words came out. I said that he could not speak because he was afraid of what he felt inside and what would come out of him. He replied ' Blood.' In my interpretations I told him that he had missed me over the week-end and had felt very impatient. He felt that he had killed me inside himself, and thought that as an external person I was too late now to do anything to help him and to help myself inside him. He was afraid to look at the destruction inside, and his difficulty in speaking, and his fear that blood might come out of him, showed how real this murderous inner attack had felt to him. On the Tuesday, he said, ' We have to stop, I can't do it any more.' He again showed his bent finger, mentioned death and blood, and shrugged his shoulders. After I had again stressed how real and concrete his inner, killing attack on me had been, and that he could do nothing to make me alive, he pointed to a certain part of the hospital and said, ' I want to have shock treatment.' When I asked him what shock treatment meant to him, he replied without the slightest hesitation, ' Death.' I said that having killed me, he now felt that he ought to

[13] These impulses and mechanisms have been described by Melanie Klein in her paper '*Notes on Schizoid Mechanisms*.'

be killed as a punishment, to which he agreed. What is significant in these two interviews is that he was more aware of having made an attack on me as an internal object. By greeting me on my arrival with the words: 'You are too late', he was recognizing me as an external object and had to some degree differentiated this external me from the internal murdered me (blood). He was struggling to repair the damage he had done, but felt quite unable to do so. He felt less persecuted and more guilty, and his desire to have shock treatment expressed his need for punishment to relieve his guilt. However, the process did not stop here. As before, under the pressure of guilt, the splitting process temporarily increased. When I saw the patient on Wednesday, he looked very confused. He asked, 'Can I help you?' He looked round all over the floor as if he were searching for something he had lost, and he picked up imaginary bits and pieces. I interpreted that he felt himself to be confused with me as a helpful person, that he had put himself inside me for help because he could not deal with his inner problems any more, but that he now felt split and all over the place, and was therefore trying to collect himself. He made a movement with his shoulders as if he wanted to say, 'Of course, what else can I do?' After this he made eating movements and I interpreted that he was eating me up to get something good inside himself, and also to swallow back the self he had put into me. He immediately stopped, and said, 'One can't go on eating. What can I do?'

The patient's response to my interpretation gives the impression that he took my interpretation that he was eating me up as a reproach. This is a very common occurrence in treating psychotic or even pre-psychotic patients. I think that it implies that the interpretation has been taken concretely, and that the patient feels the analyst is saying: 'You are in fact eating me up and you must not do it!' From the technical point of view one may attempt to interpret to the patient that he has taken the interpretation simply as a reproach and that he felt attacked by this interpretation. This may be sometimes helpful but a more effective approach is to understand the deeper causes for the misunderstanding. When I discussed the temporary inability of the schizophrenic to use symbols (on p. 117), I suggested that when projective identification is reinforced the patient loses some of his capacity to understand symbols and therefore words, and he takes interpretations very concretely. I feel that the projection of the internal object (the super-ego) into me, leading to projective identification, was in this instance the essential factor, on which I concentrated in my interpretations. So I again explained to the patient that he had put himself into me as an external object because he could not deal with his guilt about having killed me inside himself. As a result of this interpretation he now seemed to reverse the process, he said, 'Blood and death', and then he talked about Eli in an attempt to find an omnipotent solution of the conflict which we had previously discussed. Then he looked more relaxed and said, 'My son, my son', in a friendly, loving way, and added, 'Memory.' I showed him that he had been able to revive the memory of a good relationship with his father and so with me, and that he had begun to realize that the good feelings and memories about his father and myself were helping him to deal with his hatred and guilt. During this interview the patient repeated a method of dealing with his guilt by projecting himself into an external object—a process which I have described in discussing earlier sessions (after the attack on Sister X). The projective identification was at both times accompanied by confusion and splitting, but this time, following the interpretation, he was able to reverse the process and attempted other means of dealing with his guilt.

I will attempt to explain some of the differences between these two guilt situations, which both ended in projecting the guilt and parts of the self into an external object. In the first instance the patient did attack an external object, Sister X, and he felt he had destroyed the whole world. It appeared that he felt the destruction outside and inside. After the projection of the guilt situation into me he felt that I had been changed and had become persecuting. In the second instance (when the patient said 'Hiroshima') he must have felt violently aggressive and his description afterwards of what he experienced inside himself emphasized that he felt he had killed an object inside (blood, death), but at the time of the violent anger he managed to control himself and did not attack a real person. Later, when he projected his guilt and his self into me, he did not think that he had changed me into his bad self, but he felt that he had changed into me and so had become the helpful person whom, on this occasion, he felt me to be.

A Few Days Later. The following interview

showed another variation of the patient's attempts to deal with his super-ego. At the beginning of the interview he touched my hand several times, looking at me anxiously. I interpreted that he wanted to see if I was all right. He then asked me directly, ' Are you all right? ' I pointed out that he was afraid of having hurt me, and that he was more able to admit his concern about me as an external person. He then said ' chicken '—' heat '—' diarrhœa '. I replied that he liked chicken and that he felt he had eaten me like a chicken and his diarrhœa made him feel that he had destroyed me as an inner object in the process of eating me up. This increased his fear that he had also destroyed or injured me as an external object. He now became more concerned about his inside. At first he said ' movement ' and ' breath ' which I interpreted as a hope that I was alive inside him. But afterwards he kept his leg rigidly stiff for several minutes and on being asked what this implied, he said ' Dead.' This I interpreted as a phantasy and a sensation that I was dead inside him. He then said, ' Impossible '—' God '—' Direct ', which I interpreted as meaning that he felt that I should be all-powerful like God and do something directly to make this impossible inner situation better. He then said, several times, ' frightened ', and he looked very frightened indeed. Suddenly he said ' No war '. He got up and shook hands with me in the most amiable manner, but while he was doing so he said ' Bluff.' I said that he felt at war with me inside after having had the phantasy of eating me up and killing me, and that he was now afraid of my revenge from inside and outside. He wanted to be at peace with me outside and inside, but he felt no real peace was possible, that it was only ' bluff '. I related this to his past life, to his feeling that his good relationship with people outside had been built on bluff, but also that he had felt that his coming to terms with his guilt and anxiety had often been based on bluff and deception.

In considering this session I suggest that my patient tried to make it clear that his guilt and fear were related to an introjected object which he believed he had killed by devouring. He showed that his relationship to this internalized object was a mixture of concern and persecution; when the fear of the persecution by the dead internal object increased, the only solution, apart from an omnipotent one, seemed to be to appease the persecutors, which also represented his super-ego. This he felt to be bluff.

In the following sessions the patient discovered a different method of helping me to understand his inner relationship to me, and so his super-ego conflict. When I approached him he was sitting very quietly on a chair, looking intently at his hand, at first examining it from the outside. Afterwards he stared fixedly at the inside; it looked as if he imagined that he was holding something there. I asked him what he saw, and he replied ' Crater '. I then asked whether there was anything inside the crater. He replied, as if to put me off, ' Nothing—empty '. I now interpreted that he was afraid that I was in the crater, and that I was dead. Later he closed his hand and squeezed it tightly. I interpreted that he phantasied that he imprisoned me inside his hand and that he was crushing me. He continued squeezing his hand for some time, looking withdrawn. Suddenly he got up, looked round in a frightened way, and escaped from the treatment room, which was not locked. The nurses brought him back, and he sat down again without any struggle. I pointed out to him that, while he was phantasying holding and squeezing me inside himself, the room had suddenly turned, for him, into a dangerous prison from which he tried to escape. I interpreted also that he had identified himself with me, because he felt guilty about what he was doing to me inside him. While I was interpreting the fear of the room, his anxiety seemed to lessen, and he returned to squeezing his hand.

This hour had an interesting sequel. The next day the nurses reported that the patient had become very frightened during a walk. He had suddenly stopped, staring at the ground. He would not go any further. On questioning him the nurses found that he heard voices threatening to punish him with death. He stopped walking because he saw an abyss in front of him. After some time he calmed down. Later on he had what seemed to be two cataleptic attacks in which he suddenly fell forward as if dead. The nurses were sure that he was not unconscious during this attack. I used this information next day with the patient, as he made no reference to it himself, and I explained this frightening experience as a continuation of what we had been discussing during the previous session. I related the abyss to the crater and interpreted that not only did he feel that he had killed and destroyed me in the crater, but also that he felt he had changed me into a retaliating object which was threatening him with punishment and death. The cataleptic fits represented both his own and

my death. The striking feature about this experience is the distinct connection between the threatening super-ego voices and his own aggressive phantasies against me. The super-ego is here again persecuting and threatening him on the talion principle.

So far we have seen that the patient was mainly preoccupied with me as an internal object, which he had killed. Once he felt he killed me by devouring; another time he attacked me inside himself when he was longing to be with me as an external object. In surveying these sessions it seems that he felt guilty and persecuted by this internal object which, particularly in its persecutory form, had a super-ego function.

He showed various methods of dealing with this frightening super-ego. He attempted to expel it by projecting it into an external object. But this did not lead to a clinical improvement, because in projecting the super-ego he also projected parts of his self. In the first instance (after the attack on Sister X), where there was a stress on projecting the bad self into an external object in an aggressive manner, not only the splitting but also the persecution from without increased. In the second instance of projection (Can I help you?), the super-ego was also projected, but the emphasis was on projecting the good self into an external object. This also produced splitting but not external persecution. The projection of goodness led to a depletion of goodness in the self, and therefore to an increased oral greed in an attempt to recapture the good self and a good object by eating it up in phantasy.

These two instances illustrate the relation of the super-ego to ego splitting, and I suggest that, as methods of dealing with the super-ego, they commonly occur in acute schizophrenic states with confusion.

The other methods shown by the patient in this material are the desire for punishment and the appeasement of persecutors: the two cataleptic fits [14] seem to imply a complete masochistic [15] submission to the killing super-ego, and the same explanation applies to the need for punishment in asking for electric shock (death) treatment. In the latter case the masochistic submission, however, was not to the internal super-ego, but to an external object. This, incidentally, throws some light on the psychological importance of electric shock treatment,[16] which subjects a patient to the experience of death without actually killing him. The appeasement of the persecutory super-ego by bluff, as illustrated by my patient, is a very common mechanism, particularly in chronic schizophrenics. It also plays a considerable part as a defence against an acute schizophrenic state. Moreover, the strengthening of the appeasement mechanisms may bring about a remission of an acute attack; but from the standpoint of the psycho-analytical approach, recovery by this means is unsatisfactory, because it completely stifles any development of personality.

The 'Helpful' Super-ego. In the following session (which I shall refer to as (a)) we learnt to understand more of the positive relationship of the patient to his super-ego. In the beginning of the session he was looking for something in his pocket. He could not find it and it turned out that it was his handkerchief he wanted. I interpreted that he was not only looking for his handkerchief but also for the part of himself which helped him to control himself, but which he could not find. I pointed out to him that he had frequently lost himself and his inner control because he felt he could not stand the anxiety and guilt inside himself. He then looked at me very rationally and said 'The problem is how to feel the fear'. I interpreted that he wanted to feel the fear which meant anxiety and guilt inside because he realized his need of control. He then looked out of the window where a man was trimming the hedges.[17] He was watching him in a fascinated way, without apparent fear. I pointed out that this man was trimming the hedges, and was in this way keeping them in shape, and in control, without damaging them. That was the relationship he wanted to feel with me inside himself; a helpful control without feeling damaged. The patient's remark 'The problem is how to feel the fear' is significant because it implies his realization that he had always avoided

[14] These attacks resembled a catatonic stupor. The psychopathology suggested here may also contribute to our understanding of the catatonic stupor.

[15] Compare here H. Garmes (1931) and Pichon Rivieré's (1946) theory of the masochistic ego and the sadistic super-ego in schizophrenia.

[16] In submitting the patient to electric shock treatment at the time when he asked for it, his guilt conflict would have been temporarily alleviated, and very likely he might have had a remission of the acute state which still persisted, but this would have meant abandoning further psycho-analytical understanding of his conflict.

[17] One might of course think that the man with the shears aroused his castration anxiety. But I think this was only indirectly important at the moment, because only through the lessening of the persecution by his super-ego could his castration anxiety become bearable and acceptable.

the experience of guilt and anxiety and so was without an inner means of control. The nurses reported that after this session he was rational for the first time since he had been in hospital. He was able to converse with doctors and nurses. This state lasted for several hours, and recurred almost every day for about three weeks. The improvement coincided with a greater capacity to acknowledge the need for an internal object as a helpful, controlling figure, and a lessening of his persecutory anxiety. During the next session (b) he became more able to verbalize his super-ego conflict. I found him sitting in a rigid position. It took more than twenty minutes before the rigidity lessened. He then said, ' No energy '—' Struggle ', and later on ' I am wrong '. He sighed and continued, ' Worn out ', ' Hercules '. Later during the session he said ' I can only do my best, I cannot do any more.' (He was looking very tired.) He also referred to religion but without explaining details. I interpreted that I realized that he was trying to face his sense of guilt which was a struggle, that the demands of his conscience were so enormous that he felt quite worn out, and that he thought he would have to be a Hercules to do all that he felt he ought to do. At the end of the session he opened a black box which stood in a corner of the room where I was treating him. This box contained human bones, used for teaching students and nurses.[18] Almost every time from now on he opened the box once or twice during or at the end of a session, until, at a later date, he gave a full illustration of what this skeleton in the box (his super-ego) seemed to be like.

The development of the analysis ought to be assessed here from various angles: The patient became more willing to accept and face his super-ego. He did not regard it, during this hour, as something threatening to kill him, but he feared its overwhelming exhausting demands. Clinically, this progress was accompanied by greater depression. The opening of the box emphasized the patient's greater willingness to look at his inner object, his super-ego; but the fact that it was represented by dead bones showed that it was still a dead object with which he was preoccupied. The main problem which the analyst had to have in mind, and which varies and changes a great deal all the time, is whether the dead internal object, the super-ego, is persecuting, or whether there is an attempt to deal with it on the depressive level, that is, whether the patient can face the guilt at having destroyed a good object and the exhausting demands for reparation.

Primary Envy. During the next session (c) the patient was preoccupied with envy and how to get rid of it. In the session after that (d) he sat silently on a chair, looking anxiously at the outside and inside of his hand. I asked, ' What are you afraid of? ' He replied, ' I am afraid of everything.' I then said he was afraid of the world outside and inside, and of himself. He replied ' Let's go back,' which I took to mean that he wanted to understand the early infantile situation in the transference. He stretched out his hands towards me on the table, and I pointed out that he was trying to direct his feelings towards me. He then touched the table tentatively, withdrew his hands and put them into his pockets, and leaned back in his chair. I said that he was afraid of his contact with me, who represented the external world, and that, out of fear, he withdrew from the outer world. He listened carefully to what I said and again took his hands out of his pockets. He then said, ' The world is round ', and continued clearly and deliberately, ' I hate it because it makes me feel burnt up inside '. And later he added, as if to explain this further, ' Yellow '—' envy '. I interpreted to him that the round world represented me felt as a good breast, and that he hated the external me for arousing his envy because his envy made him feel he wanted to kill and burn me inside himself. So he could not keep me good and alive inside himself, and felt he had a bad and burning inside. This increased his envy and his wish to be inside me, because he felt I had a good inside. At the end of the session (d) he touched the burning hot radiators in the treatment room and the wooden shelf over them.

This session (d) is particularly significant because it throws some light on the patient's fundamental conflict with the world, and his deep-seated envy of the good mother and breast.

In the analyses of neurotic and pre-psychotic

[18] The hospital unfortunately had no proper consulting rooms. I had several times to change the room where I treated the patient, and in the end the superintendent thought that I would be least disturbed in the lecture room. One day the patient discovered the black box with the bones. I had no knowledge of its presence beforehand. I decided not to have the box removed but to analyse the patient's interest in it. But I want to stress that I was in this room only by force of external circumstances, not by my own choice.

patients this early envy has frequently been described. It is, however, interesting that this inarticulate, regressed patient should so stress his envy and jealousy in his earliest infantile object relationship with his mother. Sometimes he referred it to the beginning of life, repeatedly stressing birth and envy, and it was clear that the jealousy of his brother, which was also frequently discussed, was not the problem he had most in his mind. It seems that some of the earliest aggression, starting from the separation of the infant from his mother at birth, is experienced as envy, because everything that makes the infant feel comfortable seems to belong to the outer world—the mother.

This conflict became manifest in the transference situation when I was equated with the good mother and the good breast. Historically the patient had had a short, unsatisfactory time at the breast, and his mother was unable to look after him because of her asthma. Previously he had shown that he hated me when I was absent, but in this session (d) it is his envy of me which makes it difficult for him to take good things from me.

The envy of the good mother and her good inside also increases the impulses to force the self inside the mother, because, if the mother has all the goodness, the child wants to be inside her. But the envy and jealousy with which the child enters in phantasy the mother's body creates images of a destroyed mother. At the end of the hour, the patient touched the hot radiators which burned his hand, and afterwards he touched the wooden shelf, which would imply that he feared that by entering me he changed me, so that my inside was as burning as his own.

Another interesting feature is the way the patient, through the gestures of his hands, showed whether his cathexes were directed to external or internal objects. If he turned his instinctual impulses towards an external object, he took his hands out of his pockets, and indicated by the movement of his fingers that he was trying to make contact with the external world. When he withdrew the cathexis from the outer world, and directed it towards what was going on inside him, he put both his hands back into his pockets. When his feelings were directed outside and inside simultaneously, he kept one hand in his pocket and laid the other one on the table.[19]

During the following session (e) he looked inside the box with the bones and again touched the radiators. Then he took some crumpled up paper out of his pocket and tried to straighten it out, but soon he looked frightened again. He walked past me and looked out of the window. At the next session (f) he emphatically said, 'My own birth.' He kept looking inside his hand and repeated several times, 'Birth-Time and Jealousy.'

I suggest that the patient was trying to indicate the connection of birth and envy. It is the birth situation which starts the envy of the mother and her good inside. The patient's looking out of the window was probably an expression of his being inside me.[20] I pointed out before that when an object is introjected, which through projective identification has been identified with parts of the ego, a particularly complicated situation arises: here the patient was trying to deal with an internal object but he also felt himself to be inside this object.

During this period he again seemed to have difficulties in understanding my interpretations correctly, because he took everything I said very concretely. For example: When I interpreted to him during session (g) that he felt jealous of me, he suddenly got up and moved away from me. He then went to the box and took a bone from it, showed it to me and put it back again. After this he seemed to get more frightened of me, and tried to get out of the room, but again the nurses brought him back. Then he sat on the radiator, at a distance, and laughed at me in an aggressive and challenging manner. Afterward he walked about the room, ignoring me, and looking contemptuous; he made movements with his legs as if he were dancing. His attitude to me had changed after my interpretation of his jealousy. It seemed that he felt that by my interpretation I had made an attack on him, blaming him for his impulse. His taking a bone from the box here emphasized the concreteness of his experiences: namely that he identified me with whatever the bone meant to him; probably a threatening super-ego. His dancing suggested that he had killed me and that he felt triumph and contempt. He was treating me like dirt. This concreteness of

[19] I do not want the reader to think that I would always interpret the play with hands in this way, but this interpretation seemed true for this patient at this particular stage of the analysis.

[20] In my experience with other schizophrenic patients the looking out of the window frequently meant that the patient felt he was inside the analyst.

the patient's experiences continued after the session. The nurses reported that after I had left he had a large bowel motion, and used at least five times as much toilet paper as usual to cover it up. When I arrived the next time (session h), he sat in his usual chair. In front of him on the table were two little heaps: one little heap of half-burnt cigarette tobacco and cigarette paper was on one side, next to it there was a little heap of grey ashes. The tobacco and the paper looked like a miniature fæcal mess and paper. The patient kept his eyes fixed on the heaps for some time. He came very close to it with his mouth, then he moved away again. He repeated this several times. He did not show that he noticed my presence. I interpreted that the heap which looked like a bowel motion represented me. I added that he felt he had changed me into a motion last time. The little heap of ashes seemed to represent those parts of himself mixed up with me, which he also felt were burnt up and destroyed. He continued staring at the heaps, making eating movements. I interpreted that he felt he had both burnt up and destroyed me and himself, and that he wanted to take me and himself back again by eating. He was now picking up different bits and pieces and trying to sort them out, but they all dropped again into the mess. After the looking and mouthing, the touching and playing with the heap became much more intense. His playing with the mess seemed to be an unsuccessful attempt both to differentiate himself and me and to restore us. After the play he looked first at his hands, which were dirty, and then, for a little time at a whitish spot on the table. I pointed out that he seemed to get mixed up between playing with his fæces and playing with his penis, because the glistening spot on the table seemed to be connected with masturbation (emission). When his confused look lessened I gave him a more detailed interpretation, showing him in detail how the present situation had arisen. I also linked it with the past, particularly with the earliest relations to his mother.

From the material presented, it may be difficult to see why I referred here to my patient's masturbation phantasies, but as I explained before, it is not always possible in an analysis such as this to show all the reasons for giving an interpretation. My patient had never during his breakdown really played with fæces, or eaten fæces, but he masturbated a great deal. He seemed to me confused, and he probably felt as if he were quite concretely in the muddle which he showed me in his play. So the interpretations had to be given in a way that helped him to recognize that his impulses differed from one another, and also to differentiate between himself and the object with which he felt confused.

These last two sessions (g and h) are related to the earlier sessions (' after the attack on Sister X ' and ' Can I help you? ') in which the patient had projected his self and his super-ego into me as the representative of the external world. In the earlier instance he had refused food, and he probably at that time had phantasies that he was forced to eat fæces—poison—representing his own bad self and persecuting objects. In the later one he had tried to recapture himself and me, as a lost good object through eating. In the present instance (g and h) he illustrated his experience in play, and made it clear that the fæces represented me as the accusing super-ego which he tried to expel and destroy. The mix-up, or the confusion, of his self with his object was clear to me as an observer. At this stage of the analysis he was by no means able to keep his super-ego inside: he still expelled it when persecutory anxiety increased; but his phantasy of eating the heap of fæces, and his playing with and sorting out the heap, seemed to indicate an attempt to deal with his conflict on the depressive level.

I would like to refer here to Abraham's (1924) observation on coprophagic phantasies in melancholia. Abraham suggested that the coprophagic phantasies of his patient turned out to be the expression of a desire to take back into his body the love object which he had expelled from it in the form of excrement. Abraham thought that ' the tendency to coprophagia seems to contain a symbolism which is typical for melancholia '. He continued describing impulses of expelling (in an anal sense) and of destroying (murdering): ' The product of such a murder—the dead body—became identified with the product of expulsion—with excrement.'

My experience with this schizophrenic patient would seem to confirm the view that the coprophagic phantasy can represent a depressive mechanism of re-incorporating a lost object identified with fæces. But then the question has still to be answered: Why is coprophagia and playing with fæces in the adult typical for schizophrenia? I would like to suggest a tentative answer: The schizophrenic is trying to take back not only the

object he has lost but also the parts of his ego which are mixed up with the object. Moreover, the actual eating of fæces is a sign not only of regression but also of having lost the capacity for symbolic representation. It depends on the concreteness of his experience whether the schizophrenic can differentiate between phantasies of fæces as a destroyed object and fæces themselves.

In his inner experience during this session the patient comes dangerously near to losing his ability to differentiate between symbol and actual object, because of the intensification of the projective identification process, which I had not sufficiently interpreted in the first (session g) of the two sessions (g and h). In the session (h) where he played with the heap, I took care to help him to differentiate again.

During the same session (h) the patient had difficulty in talking, but the nurses reported that afterwards he talked rationally and did not seem confused. But it must be remembered that his rational periods never lasted more than a few hours.

In the next session (i) he began by looking away from me and remaining silent, but he looked eager and rational so I decided to go over the last sessions with him, showing him in detail in what way he was repeating experiences and phantasies of his early relationship with his mother and her breasts. I connected his silence with his anger and with the jealousy of the breast. I spoke of the roundness which at first represented the world to him, and of his difficulties in feeding from the breast because of his anger and his feelings of being burnt up inside. I reminded him of his feelings that the breast inside him had turned into fæces, and was threatening him; that, as we had seen last time, he wanted to free himself from this inner persecution, but that he could not bear to lose this internal breast even if it had turned into fæces, and that he was pre-occupied with taking it back as he wanted an object he could love. I said he refused to have anything to do with me because of his fear of attacking me as an external object representing the breast, and that he was so angry and jealous because I was separate from him and not his own possession, his own self. After this interpretation he held his head in his hands. I interpreted to him that he wanted to hold me and have a good relationship with me outside and inside himself. He agreed, but very soon withdrew his hands into his pockets, which seemed here to indicate a withdrawal of libidinal cathexis from the outside. I interpreted that the aggressive feelings had become stirred up in him against me as an external object representing the breast, and that he was afraid of his aggressive, biting, mouth. That was the reason why he had turned away from me. He at first said, 'I can't do anything.' Then he got up and went slowly to the black box and looked into it intently. He then took out a lower jaw bone (mandible). I asked him whether he knew what kind of bone this was. He did not answer but turned to me and held the bone in the position of his lower jaw to show me that he knew. He then put the bone back into the box and repeated the behaviour of session (g), only this time he showed more clearly that he was frightened of me, and he walked quickly away from me. I interpreted that he was afraid that I would attack and bite him, because he thought that I had changed into an attacking mouth. Then he came towards me and gave me a very slight punch (which obviously was not meant to hurt but was part of the dramatization of the situation). After this he walked up and down the very large room in a most peculiar manner, with hunched-up shoulders, and a fierce expression. He moved his legs as if he had hallucinations that bodies were lying on the floor and that he had to step over them. He looked so much like a wolf, who was running up and down in a cage, that I called out to him, 'You behave like a wolf in a cage.' He agreed under loud laughter, and went on running up and down, and twice he tried to get out of the room.

During the next session (k) he was much more rational. He asked me how all this related to the past, to fears at night, and to me, which we discussed in detail. Then he said again, 'I am wrong', which suggested to me that he felt that all we had been working over together during the last sessions (g to k) was related to his guilt feelings. He said, 'Lupus', 'Brown cow', 'Yellow cow'. After this he took a match out of his pocket which he broke into three pieces. He asked, 'How are there three pieces?' I said that he showed me that at present he felt his conscience was divided into three pieces: 'Lupus', 'Brown cow' and 'Yellow cow'. And I explained to him that he had shown this to me during the last few days. He had dramatized 'Lupus', the wolf, last time, after taking the lower jaw bone from the black box. The jaw bone represented the

internalized breast which he had attacked like an aggressive, hungry wolf, and which in his phantasies had turned into an aggressive, biting mouth. The Brown Cow seemed to be the breast he felt he had destroyed and changed into fæces; while the Yellow Cow seemed to be a breast which he had changed through envious and urinary attacks, and which had also become bad and threatening. The super-ego was here divided into three different objects, and seemed to correspond to the match divided by him into three bits. The number three had previously appeared when he talked about three buns, which seemed to represent three breasts. But he also sometimes talked about the third penis, and at a later date he referred to the third man. So it appears that the three also represented the Œdipus situation, but at the time when the analysis was stopped the later Œdipal conflict had not clearly appeared in the transference situation.

It is, of course, impossible to clarify all these details, but I thought it was clear enough that the patient used the box containing the bones to illustrate phantasies and sensations of internal objects representing his super-ego. In particular, these were dramatically represented by ' brown cow ', the destroyed breast which had turned into fæces, and ' lupus ' representing the persecuting, internalized, attacking mouth (the biting conscience). ' Yellow cow ' referred to the times when he talked about envy, birth and yellow, which I had linked with phantasies of entering the mother. But these phantasies were probably more difficult to represent in a dramatic way.

During the next few weeks the patient was more depressed, and seemed less hilariously excited or persecuted. He was eager during the session, showed in words and actions that he was trying to bring things together inside, and felt he wanted to give the good things up to God and me. There was sometimes a distinct desire to be guided by me, but there was also a fear of giving everything back to me lest he should have nothing left himself. To guard against this he played a game in which he kept something hidden from me. For example, he held something in one hand while he allowed me to see only the other one. During this period he once said to the nurse that he had a great deal to worry about, but he felt it would be all right in the end. At times he still projected his depression, with parts of himself, into me; and at such times he was again more occupied with being inside an object rather than with the objects inside himself. For example, he expressed this by smoking a cigarette, dropping ashes on the ground while walking, and running back to search for the ashes; or by saying, ' How can I get out of the tomb? ' In projecting a part of himself and his depression into me, I became the tomb, and he also lost a part of himself which he then tried to recapture. But at other times, when in his depressed state, he seemed entirely preoccupied with attempts to restore a good, idealized object inside. He sat quietly and thoughtfully, and when I asked him what he was doing, he replied that he was ' rebuilding Heaven '. During this period the depressions lasted longer, and the periods of excitement were shorter. Since the early stages of his analysis when he had been acutely excited and refused food altogether, there had been a steady clinical progress which was clearly noticed by the nurses and the hospital doctors.

About the time of the arrival in England of the patient's mother, he ceased to co-operate so well as he had done hitherto, and it was obvious that there were still considerable difficulties to overcome. It is very hard to assess how far the expected arrival of the mother was related to the worsening in the patient's co-operation, which might be considered a temporary difficulty. But it is quite clear that when she did arrive, and showed her disapproval of psycho-analysis, asked for further opinions, and considered leucotomy, he became rapidly violent and uncontrollable.

However, before this problem arose, he had co-operated with me so well, in spite of the severity of his condition, that I felt the progress of the analysis, and the understanding derived from it, could be considered in its own right. We have to remember that, in treating acute psychotic patients, we are in the same position as the child analyst treating a young child. There is no way of preventing parents from interfering with, or stopping the treatment, should they so wish.

The improvement, which was as yet not stable, was gradual. It seems to me, however, that the analysis, incomplete as it had been, had distinctly diminished the patient's persecutory anxiety and that the processes of splitting the ego had also decreased. As a result of this, depression was more clearly coming to the surface, which coincided with a lessening of the persecutory character of the super-ego.

I wish here to stress that in severe schizo-

phrenic patients fluctuations in their condition have to be expected, even if the psycho-analysis is making good progress. But nevertheless the points which I have discussed just now can be considered as criteria by which the progress in the psycho-analysis of a schizophrenic patient may be judged over *prolonged* periods: stable improvement depends on a gradual lessening of persecutory anxiety and ego splitting, and greater capacity to deal with conflicts on the depressive level, which would imply a greater capacity to maintain good objects outside and inside. These changes also affect the super-ego so that positive features of the super-ego become more noticeable.

Conclusion

In this paper I have approached the problem of the super-ego in schizophrenia by illustrations from the analysis of one acute schizophrenic patient. This is, however, no isolated case, and in all the schizophrenics I have treated, I encountered a particularly severe super-ego of a persecutory nature.

Usually it takes a long and deep analysis to follow the development of a super-ego of this kind to its source in early infancy. In treating an acute regressed schizophrenic patient, however, we get a direct glimpse of early infantile processes near the beginning of the analysis, which may give us a certain amount of confirmation of the theories and concepts which have gradually been built up from the deep analysis of neurotic and psychotic adults and children. I found Melanie Klein's concepts most valuable because they enabled me to understand the varying and difficult problems which one meets in such cases, and my experience fully confirmed her views.

Analysts who are anxious to treat schizophrenics must remember that they will be faced with a great number of difficulties which at first appear insurmountable, but which yield to deeper psycho-analytical understanding. If we abandon the psycho-analytical approach, because of these difficulties, we give up the hope of further psycho-analytical insight. In watching the development of the super-ego conflict during an analysis such as I have described, one may often be tempted to change one's approach. Some American workers may argue: Why not cut right across the super-ego death-theme by saying to the patient, ' I am not dead, I am not going to kill you, I love and protect and control you '? Rosen has shown that such an approach often works. We do not know why it does, and we cannot answer this question until we have had the opportunity to analyse a schizophrenic patient who has had this kind of psychotherapy. Nevertheless, I should like to refer to the session where my patient said ' No war ' and where he most amicably shook hands with me, saying ' Bluff '. Was his previous adjustment based on successful bluff? If so, a forceful reassurance may again build up a more stable bluff situation. I have had the opportunity of analysing a chronic schizophrenic who had an acute schizophrenia many years ago. During the acute state and afterwards for about twelve years, he was treated by a great deal of reassurance and friendliness by a therapist who was very interested in him. The patient had made a better adjustment, but had developed other very disturbing symptoms. When we analysed the super-structure of his illness, it became clear that his improvement and co-operation was due to a terror of the outer world, and that he was continually appeasing phantasied persecutors. The friendly doctor was a persecuting figure to him, and the previous treatment, and the first part of the treatment with me, was dominated by continuous appeasement and bluffing. It took several years to break through this attitude which had been reinforced by reassurance. This patient is practically a normal person now after a long analysis and has remained well since the treatment ended in 1947.

I do not think there is a central bluff situation in all schizophrenics, but I think it is very common. In judging the success of reassurance methods one has also to remember that every schizophrenic patient repeatedly projects himself and his super-ego into the therapist. The fact that the therapist does not alter, and remains friendly, is important both for the psycho-analytic and the psycho-therapeutic situation. The psycho-therapist who uses reassurance relieves the patient's anxiety temporarily about his dangerous super-ego and his dangerous self. When the therapist says: ' I love you and will look after you ', he implies: ' You are not bad and I will not retaliate ', and also: ' You can put all your badness into me; I will deal with it for you.' This may work, and the therapist's unconscious understanding and acceptance of the feelings of his patient is necessary for the reassurance to be effective, but it is doubtful whether such a patient can ever become independent of the therapist, and

whether he can ever develop his personality. In the psycho-analysis of schizophrenia, we have also to accept the fact that the schizophrenic patient has to put his super-ego and himself continuously into the analyst, but the analyst interprets this situation and the problems connected with it, until the patient is gradually able to accept both his love and hate and his super-ego as belonging to himself. Only then can we consider that the analysis of a schizophrenic has been successful.

Summary

I have recorded a part of the analysis of this severely ill patient, not to claim a therapeutic success, but to help and encourage all those analysts who aim at treating schizophrenics by analysis, and who want to understand more about the psychopathology of schizophrenia. A detailed conscious understanding of the psychopathology of schizophrenics is, in my opinion, so important as this enables one to make full use of one's unconscious understanding of their utterances and behaviour in a transference analysis.

The problem of the super-ego and its development and origins is not only important for schizophrenia, but for the neuroses as a whole. Melanie Klein's research on the early origins of the super-ego, and the earliest anxieties, has been accepted by many but by no means all analysts. Some of the doubts they have about her view that these origins are to be found in earliest infancy arise from their difficulties in assessing the developmental period to which certain material belongs. It has frequently been suggested that the analysis of very young children, and of severely regressed schizophrenics, may help to throw further light on this problem.

I have tried to show that a transference analysis of a deeply regressed schizophrenic is possible, and that it can throw light on the earliest introjected objects and on their super-ego functions.

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CLINICAL NOTES ON INTERNALIZATION AND IDENTIFICATION

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In this paper I am concerned with the theme of internalization and identification as demonstrated in the analysis of a man of thirty-one years of age, an actor by profession. He presented a picture predominantly neurotic in character with compulsive features, but persecutory and depressive anxieties were present from the beginning. The analysis was incomplete, comprising seventeen months of analytic sessions, but extending over three and a half years. It was terminated for external reasons beyond the patient's control.

Melanie Klein has shown that from infancy onwards continuous processes of internalization take place leading to the building up within the subject's unconscious of an inner world peopled by objects. These are in part derived from real objects and in part from the subject's impulses and phantasies concerning them. Internalization is followed by identification. However, the nature of the identifications made by the subject are dependent upon a number of interacting factors of which anxieties, and defences against those anxieties, pertaining to the internal objects and their inter-relationship play a fundamental part. The depressive position is the central point in the ego's history and the way in which this is met determines the success or failure with which a whole, as opposed to a part, object is installed. It is my intention to show how the later identifications made by this man were determined and affected by the character of the early internalization of his first object, his mother.

The patient was married and had, at the time of his first visit, three children. A fourth child had died a few days after birth. For the first eighteen months he came on twelve separate occasions and only thereafter started a regular analysis. His behaviour during this earlier period varied; sometimes he would sit silent for the greater part of the hour, staring fixedly out of the window at the drain pipes of the opposite house; sometimes he would express himself in an extravagant manner that was characteristic of him. Thus, he said, at the outset and repeatedly throughout the analysis, he believed that in allowing himself to be seduced into marriage by his wife and being made the means of having brought four children into a brutal and war-stricken world, he had committed a crime of such magnitude that there was nothing to be done but to kill them all and himself. In this crime he had repeated, in spite of frequent self-warnings, the sins of his parents. There was a greater source of anxiety, over and above murder and suicide, and that was that he would become mad. Of one thing, he said, he was certain; he was sexually impotent and always had been. So uncompromising was this belief that it amounted to a delusion in view of the fact of his intercourse and the birth of four children. He could not for eighteen months bring himself to decide to have an analysis. He would ask me whether it could do him any good because after years of self-analysis he did not think so. He supposed he would have to be psycho-analysed in order to be psycho-analysed.

So preoccupied was he with these compulsive ideas that it was difficult to get an account of his history; he was also so confused that he could hardly remember his past. The history here outlined has been put together from details obtained during the analysis. He was the fourth of his mother's five children, and was born at the beginning of the 1914–18 war. The history of his early feeding, handling and training was not known. During this time his father was in the army but got leave soon after his son's birth and returned periodically throughout the next four years. When he was one year old his mother became pregnant again and miscarried. At four years of age his father was demobilized and his mother became pregnant for the sixth time. Soon after the birth of the baby, a boy, the family emigrated to Australia. On arrival, the patient was boarded out with a

foster-mother, his own nurse and mother being engaged in looking after the new baby, who was difficult. As the latter developed it appeared that he was mentally defective. To this brother the patient gave considerable kindness and devotion until his death at the age of eighteen.

When the patient was five he returned from the foster home to his family. During the next year his sister died suddenly and his mother deserted her husband and children, leaving home with a lover. Thereafter his father, with the help of the old nurse and a servant, looked after the four boys. My patient felt himself to be odd man out, for the two elder boys had a relationship which did not include him, and the mentally defective child was no companion. His schoolfellows treated him as a foreigner, so that he spent much of his time alone and in imaginative play acted all the rôles of his self-created characters.

When he was ten the family returned to England and he was sent to a Public School. There were similar difficulties here with his new school fellows; in addition, he was always in conflict with himself because of his wish to succeed in work and play. For by now he was very afraid of his capacity for violence and preferred to fail or be defeated rather than succeed at the cost of hurting someone; success, in his phantasies, being achieved by sadistic violence. He always felt himself older and stronger than his contemporaries. On the whole, however, success outweighed failure. The choice of career was attended by similar conflicts, chiefly with his father, who had very definite ideas as to his son's future. After several attempts in the fields of his father's choosing —medicine and architecture—he took up a training for stage work. Once more he achieved some success but was never able to enjoy himself. He had just begun work with repertory companies, when he met a girl for whom he was sorry because of the unkindness of her parents, but at the same time he was terrified of getting married. However, she became pregnant by him and he married her just before the 1939 war. Conscription presented him with a severe conflict because of his views on violence, so he became a conscientious objector, assuming he would go to prison. He found that nothing happened, and for the whole of the war he remained at home, having given up his work on the stage. He spent his time being nurse to his children, maid-of-all-work to the household, and midwife to his wife.

For eighteen months after the war he came for consultations and during this period three significant events took place. His wife became pregnant for the fifth time and he brought her with him on one occasion, wanting to have her pregnancy terminated on the grounds that *he* was psychologically unfit; eventually a son, his first, was born. The second event was the arrival in England of his mother, whom he had not seen since he was seven. Thirdly, after her arrival, his father died suddenly. It was following these events that he made the decision, hitherto impossible, to leave home, live in London, get work on the stage and start analysis.

He could remember little of his mother but thought protectiveness came into their relationship. He had always thought of her in an idealized way until her return, when he found her litigious and grasping.

While devoted to his own children and especially the second little girl, he hated and was intensely resentful towards his wife. He maintained she was a seductress who, having inveigled him into making her pregnant and then playing upon his pity and compassion, had forced him into the position of repeating the sins of his parents. She was, moreover, so determined to have children that she had managed to get him to make her pregnant five times. As a result of her behaviour, he said, she had prevented him from marrying—or he had shown himself unworthy of the love of—some nebulous, good and beautiful woman of his own choosing. Indeed, he would avoid women's company to the extent that he would run away should such a desirable woman appear. As regards his sexual life, information was not forthcoming for a long time and then was accompanied by many denials and obscurities. He insisted that he had no sexual life, in spite of his son having been born six months previously and his wife's fidelity being unquestioned. He then maintained, that if there was intercourse, he was impotent and this turned out to mean that he had no wish for intercourse and had no pleasure in it. It was not only painful but terrifying, indeed, he had no part in such an act.

He felt men, and his father in particular, were so loathsome in their appetites and so brutally destructive in their behaviour that he did not wish to be a man or to associate with them. He felt women were their victims and he was distressed on their behalf. Actually he had a man friend in whom he confided and men

colleagues who appreciated his work and liked him. He was at the same time deeply ashamed of not working and being unable to take his place as a man amongst men.

On his return to London he lived by himself and then slowly resumed his theatrical contacts, which culminated in his being offered work to his amazement and temporary delight. The impression he gave at this time was of someone engaged in a task which needed titanic struggles to undertake and carry through. He had, what was striking in an actor, a curious rigidity of posture, absence of gesture and inflection of voice. His moods varied from depression with severe self-reproaches and despair to hypomania. The latter was most rigorously controlled, but showed in his account of the appearances of coincidences, signs and portents auguring the solution of his difficulties in a magical way which would bring him success beyond his dreams. There were many hypochondriacal symptoms for which he would consult various male specialists ; from these he received treatment concurrently with analysis.

Suspicion of myself, because of his hostility and fear of women, was constantly present, though it varied in intensity from lack of confidence to paranoidal outbursts, when he would accuse me of the intention to drive him mad. He would also complain of being haunted by a Malignant Fate and by a Jester mocking him from the Wings (of the theatre). He said he was a good actor because ' he lived a life of his own inside himself '.

When, in analysis, he tried to give an account and an explanation of this life inside him he would become confused, disorientated, incapable of action and mute. It was at this point that his fear of madness would arise. On one occasion he gave up in despair and said, ' It's like a trial scene where both counsel for the defence and for the prosecution know each other's briefs; where there is no judge, or the judge is in the witness box and is the accused.' Of the disorientation, he said: ' I feel I am like a child's top being spun by enormous and unseen figures.' Of the madness: ' I shall no longer behave like a human being and will find myself in prison for sexual assault or murder, or in a lunatic asylum gibbering like an ape.' Murder, suicide and madness were recurrent fears throughout the analysis.

The confusion was the consequence of anxieties which were persecutory and depressive in character. Because of his hostility to and fear of women he could not sustain his masculine position. His equally strong condemnation of men precluded his identifying with them, while his homosexual fears of men's violence and brutality towards women made his feminine position an equal source of danger. At the same time he strongly resented his compulsion to tend his family and was furious at his inability to achieve a career as a man. He felt he was forced against his will to play the very rôles he despised. Thus, on the one hand he wished to deny all sexual wishes and be sexless, on the other he was behaving as though he was a man and a woman.

Paula Heimann (1942) described how a patient phantasied her inner life as moving and living dramas, of which the protagonists were the subject and her objects (mother, father and their later substitutes). For my patient it was as if he was acting in a play, in which he was constrained to play the parts of both a man and a woman, neither rôle being of his own choosing and each rôle forcing him to do what his parents had done. That is, he was enacting a phantasy that his parents were inside him and forced him to play their parts, while he was but the stage upon which they acted. His own sexuality did not exist, he was neither male nor female. The explanation of his words that he must be psycho-analysed in order to be psychoanalysed, was that he had brought his internal world and its objects to be analysed, and this had to be done before he could be analysed himself. The father inside was felt to be violent and destructive, while he, the patient, was trying to control him by imprisonment, castration and even by murder. The internal mother was, on the one hand, felt to be the victim of his father's attacks and, on the other, a terrifying seductress. It is of interest that he was neither successful nor satisfied in his initial training in medicine or architecture; he said that he did not want to heal or to build, but he did want to bring to life. He said he believed that the stage held great possibilities for showing men what they were like in the deepest and hidden parts of themselves. It became clear in the analysis, the stage stood for his inner world, his mother's inside and his ego. In his real acting he drew extensively upon his internal figures, but, because of their dominance and the attendant anxieties, the compulsion to act out interfered in such a way that his performance was uneven. Thus, where the rôle and the character of an internal figure coincided, his performance was

intensified, and where they were contrasted, it was inhibited. He maintained that it was because he was jealous that he could play Othello, and because of his murderous feelings that he could play Macbeth. Closer examination of his acting showed that his stage characters were the personifications of particular characteristics rather than personalities. He did not play that complex being, Macbeth, but the personification of a greedy ambition which attains its ends by murdering its rivals. This suggested that there was an impairment of his reparative impulses, and that his stage characters were only apparently whole, being derived from internal figures not fully integrated.

During a Friday interview, when he had been speaking about his acting, he ended by saying: 'I want to be many people.' On his arrival for his Monday interview, he did not lie down but sat staring fixedly into the room, though at nothing in particular. He was silent for about five minutes, then speaking with great difficulty, said: 'I do not know how to start, analysis is hopeless, there are so many things, I am confused.' I reminded him of his wish to be many people and said that he felt these people were inside him all wanting to speak at once. He said that he had been at a party on Saturday at which he had nearly fainted. It was an overwhelming party because everyone was sleeping with someone else. I said, he wanted to be all these people; not only the men and sleep with the women, but also the women and sleep with the men. These men and women were felt to be inside him having intercourse and overwhelming him in such a dangerous way that he felt as if they were killing him (the fainting). I said, he was afraid to lie down on my couch because he could not hope for help from me against these powerful people. Referring to previous weekends during analysis and their significance as a separation from me, I said that he had been stimulated by the party to think I might be sleeping with someone else. He wanted to be both me and someone else. At this point he protested that I was complicating the already existing confusion in his life and would drive him mad. He was deceiving himself about the rightness of his wanting to become an actor, and his wife was right in trying to prevent him being analysed. I said that he had tried to deceive himself and me about the sexual wishes which were concealed behind his desires to be an actor, and that he was afraid of the consequences to himself of my knowing. There was also the danger of the analysis being a deception, which he now felt his wife recognized, and that I was not what I seemed. He was afraid I might become the terrifying seductress or the victim of his brutality and force him once more to repeat the sins of his parents. I further pointed out that these feelings about me derived from those for his mother and 'someone else' in the past. I assumed that, what he had meant by everyone sleeping with someone else at the party, was that the women were not with their husbands (to which he agreed) so that they represented for him his mother and her lover. He replied that whenever he tried to think of that time when his sister was alive and his mother still living at home, he became confused.

The next morning he rang up to say that he had a septic throat, and as he could not speak he would not come for his interview.

On the following day he returned and reported that he had had a pain in his stomach after leaving on Monday and had become feverish. In the middle of the night, when he was thinking anxiously about his daughter, his wife had rung up. She wanted to know about the ration books he had with him and asked him when he was coming home. He had lain in bed with his heart thumping. The next morning he had lost his voice. 'I thought suddenly of my sister dying of something in her throat, and thought I am being like her. I remembered that at the party, though I knew it was mad at the time, I drank from a dirty glass into which John (the man who gave the party) had poured some milk. That's how I got the septic throat.' He then recalled that one night his sister had woken up crying for mother. He had told her to shut up because mother who, he believed, was in bed with her lover must not be interfered with. The next day his sister was seriously ill with a throat infection and died in a few days. He said, 'I never cried, but afterwards my relations with women were hypocritical. I worshipped them from afar, but was always suspicious when in their company. Next year when mother went away with her lover, I felt nothing.' He became deeply moved at this point and said, 'I must have been the accomplice in my mother's infidelity and responsibile for my sister's death'.

I showed him how his actual septic throat was linked with his recollections of his sister's throat infection. I reminded him of the conscious reason for missing the interview that he had given on the telephone and of his inability to speak on Monday because of the many

people inside him. We could now see that one of these many people was his sister. She was not only crying for her mother, but also retaliating for his imposition of silence upon her by forcing him to be silent, and to miss his interview with me. She further retaliated by making him ill (his septic throat) and threatening him with death (his faintness at the party). He was, I said, re-enacting the past. Under the pressure of guilt he identified himself with his sister and suffered as he felt he had made her suffer.

He listened to my interpretations without comment, but indicated by his behaviour that he wanted me to continue.

I said there were other determinants of his symptoms. He had attributed his septic throat to drinking from the dirty glass into which his host had poured the milk. I reminded him that the people at the party had stood for his mother in bed with her lover and myself with my lover and of his wish to be in our position. His drinking the milk was the expression of his childhood wish to be like his mother in bed with her lover. I drew on other associations, not given here, to show that he had regarded the lover's penis as a source of milk and phantasied intercourse as a drinking from the penis. His stomach pains after the Monday interview expressed his fear of the consequences of what he had done. I showed him how guilty he felt and how afraid he was of his mother, whom he had regarded as a sexual rival, and whom he wanted to separate not only from her lover but also from her child. His wife, who rang up in the night asking for the ration books, and wanting to know when he was coming home, stood for his injured mother demanding the return of her lover's penis and her child. When he said, his wife was right in wanting him to give up analysis, he expressed his guilt and fear concerning his homosexual wishes. I was felt as a revengeful mother who would make an overwhelming sexual attack upon him, castrate him and make him mad. We were both aspects of his internal mother, and the basis on which he made an identification with her was one of sexual rivalry.

Subsequent interviews, which I do not propose to give in detail, were devoted to the working through of this material. We came to understand that in his marriage intercourse had become a terrifying, revengeful act by his wife, standing for his mother, wherein he had to surrender his masculine position and allow the penis and babies to be taken from him. We also saw that his need to make amends to his sister, which was expressed in his anxious concern for his daughter in the night, linked with his devotion to his own children and to his mentally defective brother in childhood. This was again achieved by giving up his masculine position and identifying with a mother who never left her children.

Usually such a state of confusion, muteness and disorientation, as described at the beginning of the Monday hour, would be followed by an episode of conflictful behaviour outside the analytic room: such as drinking the milk, though he thought it a mad thing to do. The patient consciously wanted to do a certain thing, but was unable to follow his plan by being driven to act in a contradictory way. He felt that his behaviour was not true of himself, and he reacted with increasing rage and violence, with impulses to smash up his room, smash up my room, strangle his wife or kill himself. Ultimately he became profoundly distressed and exclaimed in despair that he was behaving just like a particular member of his family. In the subsequent analytic session he usually produced associations and memories concerning that person, as in the Monday hour which I described. The analysis of such situations showed that he felt identified with his mother, to such a degree, that he had to reproduce her pregnancies and her intercourse with his father. The confusion—compulsion to act in a manner he could not identify with himself, violent despair and the emergence of the identity of the object who possessed him—whilst overdetermined, essentially represented phantasies of pregnancy and parturition. We came to see that these episodes were attempts at reparation, attempts that failed and therefore had to be repeated. It will be remembered that the patient felt his marriage was an exact reproduction, against his will, of his parents' marriage, and that at the time of his wife's fifth pregnancy he demanded an abortion on the grounds of *his* being unfit for the pregnancy to go to full term. Identified with his mother and acting out his relation with her in his marriage, his need to procure an abortion for the fifth pregnancy was, amongst other motives, determined by the fact that his mother's fifth pregnancy ended in a miscarriage, and that the next, her youngest child, was mentally defective.

The period of his life, which was most clearly referred to at the time of his septic throat, was that when he was five years old, but the way in

which he explained it, namely as the result of drinking milk, points to early infantile material and links with earlier internalizations. The later internalizations were thus dominated by oral impulses. The analysis was not continued long enough to determine what the early feeding situation was like, but there was ample material from later life to indicate that severe anxieties existed concerning his greed. For instance, when he first came to analysis, he maintained extremely ascetic standards. He refused to drink anything alcoholic, or to smoke; he would not go to parties or even, at first, eat in company outside his own family. He described himself as an extremely greedy child, frequently being humiliated by sickness after especially delectable and greedily eaten meals. Once, when he was adolescent, his brother had invited a girl to tea and had bought a cake for the occasion. The patient was very attracted to the girl and jealous of his brother; moreover, he was not to have his tea with them, though he was to be allowed one slice of cake. In his jealousy and greed he could not wait for tea-time and ate his slice immediately. To his horror he found that he had eaten the whole cake. While retracting nothing of his hostility to his brother, he was appalled by what he had done and set about making amends by buying another identical cake and covering up his crime by cutting and eating another slice. Thus he felt that by eating the cake he got possession, not only of what belonged to him by right, but also of what belonged to his brother and the girl, who stood unconsciously for his brother and sister and for his father and mother. In the last analysis, the cake represented the breast and the contents of his mother's body, father's penis and babies.

In the fourth month of analysis, his brother who was engaged in winding up his father's estate, sent the patient a letter written by his mother to her eldest son shortly after she had left the family. It described her husband's behaviour at the time of the patient's birth and during his first year, presumably for the purpose of accounting for her deserting him five years later. The relevant facts were that father was in the army at the time of the baby's birth, but got leave shortly afterwards. He was extremely dictatorial and, says the mother, responsible for the baby's jaundice on that occasion and for screaming attacks during subsequent leaves. When she was next pregnant, he had become so exasperated with his screaming son, then aged one, that he threw him violently back to his wife and caused her to miscarry. (She made no reference to the likelihood of her husband having been disturbed by war experiences.)

The receipt of the information in this letter by my patient was followed in the analysis by confusion which, he said, was like a war on two fronts. He had been attempting to deal with his anxieties concerning his mother, and now he had to deal with fresh anxieties from another direction. The confusion was followed by an episode of conflictful behaviour which I shall describe in some detail.

After the morning session, he intended going by tube to meet a man friend at a theatre and see a play, which was relevant, from the point of view of technique, to both of them as professional actors. He found time was short, so in order not to keep his friend waiting, he ran down the emergency stairs to find the train in and the nearest door blocked by passengers. He ran to the next door and, as it was shutting, forced it open and got inside. However, the train did not start. After some delay, everyone was told to get out, and the train then moved off with all its doors open because the mechanism had been broken. He became overwhelmed with anger at himself, saying that in the attempt to consider his friend, he had not only failed him, but also had frustrated himself and inconvenienced two hundred other people. ' Here ', he said, ' was Malignant Fate in action '.

Though his despair which followed was great, so that he nearly gave up his project, he did continue and arrived at the theatre after the play had started. He told the usher that he did not wish to create a disturbance, but, in the discussion of the matters of programme and seating, a great deal of noise was made, and once more people were upset. In his mortification and depression he could barely watch the play, and at the same time felt weak and ill. The performance was a Charity Matinée, to be followed in the interval by an auction conducted by an actor whom he loathed. Unexpectedly, to his delighted surprise, this actor did not appear; in his place came an actress who represented all that was charming and beautiful. He suddenly was stirred by many conflicting feelings; he felt endowed with enormous strength and seemed to have grown to a giant's height. He said, ' I hardly knew how to contain myself. I, who am usually so tired and weak, felt a tremendous urge to tear up the front row of the stalls. I decided, if I was capable of such destructiveness, I must give up acting as a career.'

Further upsetting events occurred in the evening when playing in his own theatre in the rôle of courtier. He had to stand in the way of a prince and murmur his resentment, but he did so with such a degree of feeling that the actor playing the part of the prince complained afterwards that the offensive muttering had quite 'unmanned' him, he had forgotten his lines and his act was spoilt. At this point the patient experienced what he described as 'an icy hand clutching at his genitals'. He was profoundly remorseful, because this was an actor whom he admired and did not wish to offend in any way.

When it is remembered that the stimulus of this day's behaviour was the information in the letter relating to his earliest experiences of his father—the father who came on leave from time to time during his first year—it can be seen that he was acting a phantasy centering upon that father. He experienced this as if something stronger and larger than himself dominated him and made him violent and destructive. Thus, in forcing open the train door, thrusting himself inside and turning out the other people, he was acting a phantasy of his father throwing his son at, or into, his mother and causing the miscarriage. He was angry with his father, but, in so far as this anger was directed towards himself, it showed that he felt that he had internalized this father and was identified with him. Malignant Fate, then, stood for the persecuting internal father forcing him to carry out the violent attacks on his mother and her child. On the other hand —owing to splitting—there was a loved father, represented by the friend, whom he had failed and towards this father he felt guilt and remorse. Later in the analysis we came to see that his behaviour in this episode also represented what he himself felt as a baby during his first year. That is, when his mother was having intercourse and later was pregnant, the patient felt a jealous desire to force himself in a destructive way into his mother and to turn out his father and kill her baby. Malignant Fate thus also represented the personification of his own destructive impulses. He found himself both the agent and the victim of destruction. At the matinée, this situation was repeated, the same destructiveness occurred and the same helpless despair prevailed as in the train incident.

It was the unexpected appearance of the highly idealized, charming and beautiful actress, instead of the loathed actor, which changed the situation. He felt as if his mother, whom he believed to have been destroyed and lost, was now miraculously alive and whole, and as if the hated and persecuting father had left. Released from the despair of having been the agent and victim of the destructive father, he experienced a surging up of libidinal desires, which ended, for the time being, the identification with this father. His own aggressive impulses were now directed towards the obstacles in his path and his rivals therein. However, his anxiety concerning his capacity to do damage prompted him to a symbolic castration, namely the suggestion he should give up his career.

In the evening, when acting in his own play, his unconscious rebellion against his father, represented by the leading actor—the prince—was much more clearly shown. Making use of the lines of the play he expressed his resentment with such force that he succeeded in symbolically castrating the actor: 'unmanning' him, making him forget his lines (making him speechless) and spoiling his act. Not only did the external father figure protest, but also the internal father retaliated by castrating his son—the icy hand which clutched at his genitals. As in the first episode of the day, there is evidence of the splitting of his father, but to a lesser degree. For the actor in this case was an admired figure whom he did not wish to harm. While predominantly persecutory in character, the pain in his genital was also the expression of his own guilt for attacking the admired father.

Throughout the week following the day described, the patient felt himself assailed by what he called 'fits' or 'mad behaviour'. After one evening performance he rushed into the dressing room, tore open his upper clothes, stuffed in a pullover to make one shoulder appear humped, twisted his built-up nose into a hook, and prowled round the room with an ape-like gait. This caused simulated terror in the members of the cast and real fright in one of the dressers. He was profoundly depressed after each 'fit', because of his helplessness to control his madness and his guilt for the terror he inspired in others. The internal father he was presenting, while containing grotesque and terrifying characteristics, was also a figure of fun. He was not the damaging father of the train episode; one dresser was frightened, but the actors were amused. The patient was here employing humour within a manic defence. With these 'fits', he repeated the games he used

to play as a child, and in the context of his actual life we came to understand these games as an attempt to cope with his internalized father by acting-out.

At the end of the week, the patient had a dream which ran as follows: 'I was in a bathroom with my genitals detached from my body and loose in my hands. There was no pain or blood or mess of any sort. I washed them in the bath, which contained dirty bath water, and then put them back on myself.' He commented that it was a mad dream, but strangely free from fear or distress. His associations were that it was in the bathroom that he usually felt most despairing, because he had to look at and handle his penis and was forced to recognize the criminal things he had allowed to be done with it in marriage. He had also to observe, what he had noticed on other occasions in his life, that his genitals were miserably small and flabby, compared with those of other men. The outcome of these thoughts was that he would be better without his genitals.

Following these associations a memory of his father returned. Apparently his father suffered from a bladder condition which necessitated the use of a catheter, and each morning he would come to the bathroom, where his son was bathing, to wash his catheter in the bath. It had always been a matter of great anxiety to the patient whether the bath water soiled by him would infect the father's catheter, or whether the father's catheter would infect him. These were not the only occasions for anxiety, for the vital significance of his father's catheter intruded repeatedly during his life; for example, he saw father crawling upstairs in agony to get the catheter to relieve his distended bladder; and once during a visit to the theatre the patient was sent back urgently across London to fetch the forgotten catheter. It was clear he partly equated his father's penis with the catheter. The detachable nature of his own genital in the dream refers to the catheter and points to the equation between his own genital and that of his father.

Another memory was evoked in association to his sensation of ' the icy hand clutching at his genitals '. His foster mother, with whom he lived on his arrival in Australia at the age of four, was friendly with a doctor. The patient visited his house from time to time and derived considerable pleasure from the company of this kindly man. He was free to play in his study with his collection of Indian trophies. On one of these visits the foster mother asked the doctor, in his professional capacity, to examine the little boy's penis. The patient remembered that, while he was shown a dried snake skin, the doctor seized his penis and pushed back the fore-skin. The pain was intense and the feeling of betrayal by the kindly man so great that he would never go to his house again. At the time when he attempted to develop his relationship with a friendly and stimulating father figure, his fear of the violent and castrating father was revived. He lost his trust in a good father figure and once more internalized a bad father.

In the light of this material, the rigidity of posture, absence of gesture and inflexion of voice, which was observed in this patient, could be interpreted as the representation of himself with his father's catheter inside him. The catheter stood for the castrated or dead father and was also the means used by the patient to control the violent father; he substituted a catheter for the penis (the detachable genital in the dream). His fixed staring at the drain-pipes during the initial interviews reflected his need to keep constant watch on his father inside him. At the same time he was desirous of being in his father's position and of having possession of his powers, as the incidents at the theatre showed: he had gone to learn something of the technique of acting, he behaved as if he were the rival of an equally violent father and, at the end of the day, found himself attacking an admired actor-father and experiencing the same pain as he had with the loved doctor-father of his childhood. His punishment for these rivalrous and destructive wishes was the loss of his own sexuality and the substitution, in phantasy, of an internal catheter for a penis. The concern for his real father's disability was based on his guilt for his castrating impulses towards him and the knowledge, from his own experiences at the hand of the doctor, of the pain they could cause. In this context the rigidity stood for the preservation of father by retaining the catheter which was vital to him and the means of relieving his agony. It was as if he had to bear the controls he imposed upon his violent father, the punishment for the guilt of his own destructive wishes and the pain from which his loved father suffered.

His conscious feelings about his father, as he remembered him from the age of six, were that he was a very repressive man. He was known by his sons as ' The Dead Hand ' because of his habit of imposing his authority on their

initiative and interests. Where my patient's acting abilities were concerned, he was successful in such rôles as Moltan Barrett in *The Barretts of Wimpole Street* because, as he said, he had only to think of father in order to be able to play that part. Moreover, he said he never could play the part of the lover, because he never could imagine his father in such a rôle. For his father had not only a bladder complaint, which the son regarded as a sign of castration, but he also could not keep his wife's love and eventually lost her to another man. Thus, whereas the father of his earlier experiences was seen as brutally destructive, his father, on his return from the war, was predominantly sexually impotent.

Turning to the account given of his reactions to his mother's being in bed with her lover, he had declared that he must have felt himself to have been her accomplice. That is, he was not only identified with her in the feminine position, but he acquiesced in the lover's right to be undisturbed. He did not fight for his place with mother, nor did he fight on behalf of his father. Both he and his father were impotent and without rights. This attitude was the outcome of his guilt for his earlier triumph over his father. For, however assertively the latter had behaved during his leaves, he had ultimately to go, relinquishing his place with his wife to his baby son. My patient felt he had been responsible for turning father out and winning mother for himself. He had, moreover, succeeded in triumphing over the next baby, because his mother's pregnancy ended in a miscarriage, and it was not until he was four years old that another child took his place. Then the upheaval of the emigration and his subsequent boarding-out made his loss of a place with mother more severe, especially so as his attempt to find a substitute love object in a new father figure was shattered by the attack upon his penis. He was turned out as he felt father had been turned out by him, and his guilt for this determined his acceptance of the rôle of the outcast. He identified himself with his rejected and impotent father on the one hand and took up the identification with his mother and thus a feminine position on the other. In this position he could make amends to father by taking him inside him. Returning to his state of rigidity, this represented also an identification with the mother who contained his father's impotent and rejected penis in her body.

The complexity of these identifications was reflected in some of his childhood games and, later in his analysis, in his dreams. These were concerned with the problems of which side he took in civil wars, or in wars between Red Indians and white settlers. Each, he felt, had rights to the country, but each was capable of cruelty and destruction. That is, he could not decide who had the right to the mother, the original inhabitant or the invader, and which of these stood for himself, the baby, and which for father. As well as representing mother, the country stood for his own inside, his unconscious.

As Melanie Klein (1940) has shown, the relationships between the objects in the inner world and the subject determine whether this world is predominantly one of harmony and peace or otherwise. In the case of my patient it was a confused, brutal and war-stricken one. Within him his mother and his father were felt to exist as a number of different characters, a few only of which have been described. That is to say, as each internal figure represented one aspect of an original object, and as these aspects were in conflict, his relationship to the whole object involved him in a number of incompatible demands and so interfered with his ability to make consistent identifications. Thus, in relation to his mother, his greedy wishes for her and the contents of her body led, on the one hand, to the appearance of a persecutory mother, as he felt his wife to be, who extorted from him in the masculine position the penis and babies. On the other hand, there was a damaged mother, whose restoration required that he should adopt the feminine position and house her deprived husband and babies. This he showed in his behaviour during the war, when he gave up his career, became a conscientious objector and spent his time tending his wife and children. His murderous rivalry led, as the analysis of his rigidity disclosed, to the identification in the masculine position with a violent father who had to be controlled by imprisonment, castration and murder, and at the same time with an impotent outcast in pain, whom he wanted to relieve by surrendering to him his masculinity, and to restore by assuming the feminine position. Given these difficulties, it can be appreciated that any attempt to bring his father and mother together intensified the already existing confusion. The parents who persecuted both each other and himself, and the damaged parents who had to be restored, led him to a form of omnipotent behaviour whereby

he had to be mother to father and father to mother, and both parents to their children. Any reparation on this manic basis was bound to fail, and he found himself repeatedly faced with persecutory and guilt-arousing figures; in his despair he felt driven to murder and suicide.

Another factor in the confusion was that he projected upon, and so dissipated among, his internal objects his own impulses and emotions, that is, parts of his ego, with the result that he never could experience the feeling of doing anything in his own right. This was particularly so as regards his good impulses. It was a matter of great distress to him that his good intentions and concern for his good objects could never be expressed adequately or sincerely. He was unable to employ his aggressive impulses in their service, by fighting their enemies. The most he could accomplish was to contain them but do very little to protect them from his bad objects and his own bad impulses.

I considered that my patient's confusion strongly resembled the emotional state which Melanie Klein described as the infantile depressive position. As has been shown, my patient experienced persecutory fears both for himself and for his good objects because of his internal persecutors, and at the same time distress on behalf of his good objects' suffering. There was a failure to integrate his objects and a consequent lack of integration of his ego. His inability to make constant identifications and maintain his masculine position interfered with his object relationships and with his sexuality. The strength of his anxieties concerning his aggressiveness so dominated him that his love capacities were weak, his reparative drives ineffective and his sublimatory activities restricted. Melanie Klein (1940) shows how, in experiences of loss, the early infantile depressive position is reactivated, and says that the common factor in the abnormal mourner and the manic-depressive is their failure to establish their internal good object and to feel secure in their internal world. The traumatic events between the ages of five and seven of the death of his sister and the departure of his mother, constituted for my patient a severe loss. It was not followed by mourning, but by a manic response with denial of loss. In response to these losses he internalized his objects in the way that has been described. Their existence inside him, in an unsynthesized state and in a world of confusion, points to his failure to overcome the earlier depressive position by the establishment of a good internal mother, his first object.

It was during the analysis that we came to an understanding of the means the patient had used to combat his first loss. The pattern of behaviour I have described earlier in this paper—confusion leading to the appearance of a particular figure in his associations—gave the clue. It seemed as if he was enacting a phantasy of pregnancy and parturition, and that at the time of his mother's going he had taken her place, identified himself with her and internalized her husband and children. By working through the material in the transference the patient became able to distinguish one particular figure from his other internal figures, the phantasies concerning that figure from the real object and free himself. There would be initially great rage and almost overwhelming desire to smash up my room, standing for mother's inside, or his own flat, standing for his inner world, but as the work proceeded and projection mechanisms and denial lessened, he began to experience strong feelings. These were particular to himself and distinct from previous emotions, which he had felt had been imposed upon him by his objects. Painful though these emotions were, he derived great satisfaction from them, feeling for the first time that he had something of his own. The degree of satisfaction was a measure of the impoverishment there had been of his ego. Improvement always followed each repetition of this pattern, but in spite of interpretations pertaining to the loss of his mother in childhood and infancy, very little progress was made towards appreciation of that loss directly.

We then began to understand from the analysis of new material that he was identified with his mother filled with bad fæces, rivals and enemies and also pregnant with babies and father. Each repetition of the pattern represented both a sadistic tearing out from the mother of the bad things and a parturition, by means of which her children and husband were brought to individual life and given birth. It was not until every member of his original family in all their aspects were given independent existence that he could relate himself to his mother as her baby. As he said at the beginning of the analysis, he would have to be psycho-analysed in order to be psycho-analysed; his internal objects would have to be restored before he could approach his own original experiences with his first object, his mother. It seemed that in infancy he had internalized her and

her objects as an undifferentiated totality and had identified himself with this mother. In this way he had been able to deny that there had been any loss and so avoid any pain and grief. Mother and baby had never been parted, they were still one. Consequently later in childhood he had recourse to the same phantasy and the same identification; he was his mother and all her objects. No loss had occurred and so no grief need be felt. Freud (1927), speaking of a person having to give up a sexual object and the ensuing modification in the ego by the reinstatement of the object therein, says: 'It may be that, by undertaking this introjection, which is a kind of regression to the mechanism of the oral phase, the ego makes it easier for an object to be given up or renders that process possible.' But this means of dealing with loss imposed severe limitations for, being unable to free himself from this identification, he could not have an independent relationship with his mother in his own right.

The explanation of his need to protect himself against loss was bound up with the nature of the mother first internalized. She was a collection of objects—father and children—and part objects—penis, fæces, milk and urine—rather than a whole object or person. This phantasy was derived from the aim of his greedy desires to get *via* the breast all the contents of her body for himself. At the same time, probably accentuated by the sudden appearance of his father on leave and the accompanying turmoil, it may be surmised that his genital desires, dominated by his sadism, were stimulated and aimed at destroying those contents then seen as his enemies and rivals. The ultimate disappearance of father from the scene and the miscarriage of the next baby strengthened his belief in the effectiveness of his attacks. His mother, who was internalized as a collection of objects which were potentially persecutory or destroyed, could only be maintained intact by his acting as a container himself, Thus he could only be a container of objects and not a person. The anxieties attendant on this identification were expressed in the reactions preceding and accompanying the emergence of each one of his internal figures during the analysis. Over and above the significance of each figure as a whole and particular person it stood for an essential part of mother. His muteness meant his fear that in giving anything out he was in danger of losing parts and so failing to maintain the precarious intactness of mother and himself. That is, it was a defence against the disintegration of her and so of himself. The rage and desire to smash up was the expression of the acutely persecutory feeling that his internal mother was taking everything from him and that he was being driven to murder her, or that, where his guilt was overwhelming, he must kill himself and give her everything. This theme was also present when reparative drives were active towards a particular figure; the profound depression which followed could be seen to express the feeling that, although he was making good towards one object, he was at the same time taking away an essential part of mother and so losing her and the good parts of himself.

The effect upon his subsequent development of this means of dealing with his first loss of mother, that is, by a denial of that loss and an internalization of her as a collection of objects and not as an integrated person, was considerable. Later identifications, under the stress of anxieties both persecutory and depressive, proceeded in both a masculine and feminine direction. In so far as his first object was neither firmly established nor integrated, his identifications were not stable nor was his ego integrated. Subsequent losses in the patient's life, such as the death of his sister, were reacted to in the same way and could only be met by internalization and identification of the lost object as part of the mother, since loss of that part of her threatened the loss of her as a whole. The outcome of the work of analysis, which I am summarizing, was that by differentiation, integration and restoration of each member of his family, a corresponding part of his internal mother was restored. As he became able to tolerate and experience his own emotions and to recognize his own impulses to his objects, he became able to relate himself in a more realistic way as an individual towards his mother as a person. She became, as shown in the transference and in his relationships with women, a more real and human person for whom he could feel and maintain love and affection. As his whole internal world had stood for his mother, then concurrently with the restoration of that mother a better kind of integration of his ego ensued.

The outcome of the analysis, ended for reasons beyond the patient's control, was that he was able to join in the company of men and women both at work and on social occasions, and sexual intercourse became

pleasurable. In the theatre he was playing subsidiary rôles in repertory companies and understudying the principals in order to gain experience in his craft. He felt he was moving towards a position where he could, by his greater ease in acting and capacity to give a richer performance, express his grateful indebtedness to his parents of whose qualities he was now making good use.

In considering the personality structure of this patient, account must be taken of the traumatic experiences of the first year with difficult and divided parents whose behaviour was highly dramatic, interacting with his own greed and sadism. Yet his use of identification to overcome separation and loss was highly specific and laid the foundation for his individual development. He might be said to accumulate identifications rather than integrate them into his ego. Their presence and the anxieties they aroused compelled him to employ acting-out from an early age, involved him in compulsive repetition of the past, and interfered with his object relations and sublimations. On the other hand his capacity for internalization and identification allowed him to develop considerable empathy which, when united with his dramatic talents, enabled him to give vivid and alive performances on the stage. It suggests that it is not so much the early identifications in themselves, but the particular way in which they are made and used that determines individuality.

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AN OBSESSIONAL MAN'S NEED TO BE 'KEPT'

By BERYL SANDFORD, London

The patient about whom I am writing, and whom I will call Mr. A, seemed, at the beginning of his analysis four years ago, to suffer from practically every known neurotic symptom. And, since he produced analytic material as lavishly as he produced symptoms, I have had some ado to condense this paper to a reasonable length and, at the same time, make it comprehensible.

He is a typical obsessional with marked paranoid and agoraphobic features, and with a neurosis of such long standing that it gives the impression of having become part of his total personality. In this paper I am going to discuss one particular aspect of his case, and that is his need to be 'kept'. This does not mean that he cannot work; it means that he cannot work for money.

Mr. A, who is a Clinic patient, comes from a superior working class family, and is now aged forty-one. Before the war he had had three years psychotherapy, but this had to be stopped because of the outbreak of war. Mr. A was exempted from all forms of National Service because of his mental illness.

He is a fine figure of a man, about six foot tall and broad in proportion. His hair is black and brilliantined. He has a magnificent speaking voice, and used to lie on the couch declaiming flamboyantly as though acting in Victorian melodrama.

Everything about him, both mental and physical, seemed to give the impression of being a little larger than life. He talked in rounded periods. He alluded to anyone who was hard up as being 'financially embarrassed'; if he owed someone eighteen-pence he talked of a 'pecuniary obligation'; and anyone of average intelligence was always said to have a 'brilliant intellect'.

His mother, who is still alive, was a children's nurse before she married. She appears to share many of her son's contamination fears. His father, who was a builder, died of Tb. at the beginning of the war. Mr. A is the youngest of three children—his sister and brother being twins, two years older than he is. Both, according to Mr. A have 'brilliant intellects'. The brother, who is married but childless, is a chartered surveyor earning good money; the sister is married to a factory inspector and has four children.

The twins went to a secondary school, but Mr. A himself had only attended an elementary school, where he was considered lazy and was, he said, always a year or two older than the average of his class. His comments on school work were significant: he could not bear history because it was 'all about kings losing their heads'; he could not bear geography because it was 'a great bore going into the ins and outs of countries'.

When he started analysis Mr. A had been married for ten years. He is childless. He lives on a housing estate in one of the outer suburbs on the Bakerloo Line. His wife, who is now forty-four, is a pretty woman and appears bright and intelligent. Nowadays she has a job as secretary but, during the first two years of Mr. A's analysis she was suffering from varicose ulcers and could not work. They were both receiving sickness benefit, he 13*s*. and his wife 8*s*. a week. Their combined fares to the Clinic five times a week came to more than this, and they were living on money borrowed from Mr. A's brother. Under these circumstances, it seemed to me to be unreasonable to expect Mr. A to pay more than the very heavy fare to the Clinic, and I therefore agreed that he should pay nothing for treatment until times were better. It soon became apparent, however, that his need to be dependent was so great that unconsciously he was using Machiavellian methods to make sure that times did *not* get better.

Superficially Mr. A appeared to be collaborating in every way, but his prompt attendance, his flow of pre-arranged associations, his protests of always telling the truth and his apparent insight were all part of a magnificent façade. Hidden behind this obsessional façade were psychotic features.

Mr. A's obsessional symptoms go right back into early childhood, when he used to go through various rituals and touching ceremonials at bedtime, such as going in and out of the door so many times, carrying a glass of water in a special way, and knocking on the floor after he went to bed to make sure his parents were alive.

He alleges that his mother continually thwarted any sort of activity on his part. First, she would refuse to allow him to do whatever it was he wanted to do, and then she would say, ' Very well, please yourself—but you'll be sorry.' She appears to have been extremely over-anxious about cleanliness and forbade the children to use any lavatory except the one at home. According to Mr. A she hated people visiting her house on the grounds that it was not good enough. One of her methods of punishment was to refuse to eat until ' he was good again '.

When he started his analysis with me in November, 1946, he was quite unable to go out of the house alone. His wife brought him to the Clinic each day and waited to take him home again. His anxiety was so great after each session that he could not go out into the street for perhaps an hour or longer, and he and his wife would wait together in the Clinic waiting-room until he felt equal to leaving. The three-quarter-hour journey took them about three hours each way, sometimes longer. Mr. A could never satisfy himself that he had not damaged the passers-by—for example, knocked them down area stairs—and it was necessary to stand, sometimes for half an hour or longer, and watch people safely out of sight. He was quite incapable of coping with such a busy station as Baker Street, and so they came to Regent's Park. It took them nearly an hour and a half to come from Regent's Park to Gloucester Place. I once left the Clinic and saw him and his wife standing at the corner of York Street; when I returned nearly three-quarters of an hour later they were still there; and this was on one of those dreadful days in the winter of 1947 when it was snowing hard and the ice was inches thick on the roads. How his wife bore it I cannot imagine, as she was at that time suffering from severe varicose ulcers. One can only conclude that it satisfied some masochistic tendencies in herself, and I am sure that unconsciously she still encourages his dependence.

Most of his contamination fears are typical. The majority of these fears still exist but they have diminished considerably in intensity. He felt his house to be contaminated and no one, and in particular his mother, was allowed inside it. The house was full of what he called ' pockets of resistance ', that is to say, large heaps of ' contaminated objects ' which he had not had time to clean, and which must not be touched by anyone. No dustbin could be emptied until he had sifted the contents; no envelope or piece of paper thrown away until thoroughly examined again and again and yet again, probably ending up in a ' pocket of resistance ' as being too dangerous to throw away. After having intercourse with his wife, the sheets had to be changed; they both had to wash from top to toe and everything they had touched or might have touched had to be washed. When he first came to analysis he was washing almost continuously all day; if he took his hands out of the basin clean they would be contaminated by the towel, and the whole business started all over again. He was also afraid of swallowing dirt while he was asleep and had, he said, trained himself not to swallow all night. Conversely, he felt that whatever came out of him was dangerous and he was extremely constipated, and had bad pains in his stomach. He very rarely had dreams.

He derived enormous satisfaction from writing letters, particularly to well-known politicians; for example, he once showed me a very long and very rude letter which he had written in a very neat hand to Mr. Attlee. He did not post these letters; he put them in a cupboard until it was ' overflowing with them ', and when there were too many he burnt them. It transpired later that when he was a boy he used to masturbate into a handkerchief and then, terrified of contaminating someone with the handkerchiefs, he used to put them all into a suitcase, where they remained for years until he burnt them.

He got his first job, that of office boy, at the age of sixteen, and lost his first week's wages on the way home. Later he had various clerical jobs, but was forced to give up work as book-keeper and agent in an insurance company fourteen years ago, soon after he got engaged, owing to the increasing severity of his obsessional symptoms. Mr. A says that the contamination symptoms became insupportable from the moment he touched his future wife's genitals.

Since that time he has been quite unable to do any paid work, with the exception of one job which he held down for eighteen months during the war. This was at a corn-merchant's, selling

animal food stuffs. Gradually, however, he became more and more anxious about the stuff they were selling; he was convinced that the grain being sold was damaged and full of broken glass, and that it would be his fault if hundreds of animals died. He finally had to give up the job, and for the next eighteen months, until he started analysis with me, he shut himself up in one room in his house. His fear that hundreds of animals had died through his fault was now extended to human beings. It became delusional in character, and he soon really believed that he was the cause of all the starving people in Europe. He dared not listen to the wireless for fear of hearing about starving people, and when he first started coming to analysis he had to sit in the train with his eyes shut, to prevent himself reading anyone's newspaper and learning that the whole world was in a state of chaos and destruction, caused by him.

During the early months of analysis he lay rigidly on the couch crying or bullying me. He told me exactly how I was to conduct the analysis. I was not, he said, to stick too closely to what he called ' The Freud Handbook '. He hated transference interpretations, and at the end of the first week he said firmly that those were the sort of interpretations he was not going to allow, adding kindly, ' But all others are welcome '.

He did his best to infuriate me and I must admit that there were times when he almost succeeded. He bullied, hectored, cried, whined and hurled insults at me. He always tried to force me into being the opposition; he wanted me to disagree with him so that he could argue and win the argument. This need for opposition was—and still is to a certain extent—of immense importance to him. He has to surround himself with people who will frustrate him. If they do not frustrate him, he soon sees to it that they do, crying out the whole time that he is persecuted beyond endurance but that he will get the better of his persecutors.

The reason for this became clearer towards the end of the first year of analysis, during which time he produced a mass of material showing his terror of his unconscious oral and anal sadistic phantasy attacks on his parents. It is this terror which leads him to seek the satisfaction of knowing that the parents are able to control him and stop him destroying them. Also, he enjoys repeating the process of getting them to fight him in order to prove to himself that he can win the fight. This pattern of being controlled by the parents and then proving to himself that he can control them is being worked out in all his activities.

He always fought hard to keep the analysis on an intellectual level, but gradually more and more phantasies began to come to light. He unconsciously equated talking with defæcating and was, therefore, in constant terror that he had completely destroyed me with his outpourings, which were certainly copious. At the same time, he used talking as a method of defending himself; as long as he was continually pouring fæces into me he felt that he was preventing me pouring fæces into him.

He was terrified of the results of masturbating and of having sexual intercourse. His ideas on these subjects were almost delusional. He insisted that he believed that semen contained millions of live babies and he feared that, when he masturbated he would cause the death of these millions of babies, since when spilt out they would die of starvation. He said that he was sure that these dead babies turned into fæces and produced V.D. He felt intercourse to be ' a filthy business like going to the lavatory '. When his wife became pregnant some years before the analysis started, he was so frantic with anxiety that he alleges he made her produce a miscarriage by getting her to take doses of castor oil. He said to me: ' Don't blame me—you know as well as I do that I couldn't have filthy babies crawling all over the floor of my house '. Nor could he bear ' sparrows coming into his house, messing and pecking at everything with their beaks '. Nor could he bear his mother coming into his house. The analytic material produced at this time showed clearly his unconscious terror that he himself would be broken into, and attacked orally and anally by his mother who, he feared, would do to him what he in phantasy had done to her.[1] After many months working through this fear of retaliation by his mother, he did allow his brother to come into his house. This was the first time that anyone had been allowed in since he was married. He can now allow friends to come into the house, but his mother is still forbidden admission.

At the end of eighteen months or thereabouts, he began to talk more freely about his childhood and youth. He said that he stopped mastur-

[1] See Melanie Klein, *The Psycho-Analysis of Children* (1932) and *Contributions to Psycho-Analysis* (1948).

bating at the age of fifteen because the Vicar terrified him by telling him that 'self-abuse' would send him mad. He also described playing what he called 'dirty games' with his brother and sister, when he was about six. This game consisted in sticking their fingers up each others' anuses. The twins, however, finally decided that they preferred to play this game alone. After this, he used to shut himself up in the W.C. and push up his anus large rusty screws which he found in his father's tool-box. He would then screw them into the wall and fear that the wall was for ever contaminated. He would also go out to the chicken run and amuse himself by sticking his finger up the hens' anuses in an attempt to extricate the eggs.

He had many ideas about twins; he felt very much his lack of a twin, and this has a bearing on his need for his wife to go everywhere with him. He imagined that he once had a twin but that this twin was left dead inside his mother. As a child at home he was always the solitary one; mother had father, the girl twin had the boy twin, but he had no one and felt surrounded by enemies in duplicate.

Towards the end of the second year of analysis there was some decrease in the severity of the obsessional and agoraphobic symptoms. He was much freer in his movements; he had cleared up many of the 'pockets of resistance' in his house and made life more comfortable at home; he occasionally visited friends and could allow himself to read the newspapers and listen to the wireless. But with the reduction in the obsessional symptoms there was an increase in the paranoid features.

In July, 1948, his sickness benefit was raised to 26*s*. a week and soon afterwards his wife was well enough to start work as a shorthand-typist. From now on, for some months, analytic material was brought in the form of tirades against the Government, the Social Services and the Clinic. He wrote long and acrimonious letters—which were no longer relegated to the cupboard but were actually sent—in connection with his sickness benefit. If the money was a few days late he really believed that he was being specially selected for this type of treatment. Unconsciously he was afraid that he had drained the good breast dry and was being punished for his oral greed.

He was in constant terror that the Ministry of National Insurance would summon him to go before a Medical Board to judge whether his 26*s*. should be continued or not, and in the Autumn of 1948 this dreaded thing happened. He had never been able to stand a medical examination because of his obsessions, and ordered me to write to the authorities and tell them that he was too ill to attend. For about a week he behaved like a terrified child in a tantrum. He felt that he was at the mercy of omnipotent parents who would strip him and force their way into him and find inside him the breast destroyed by his oral greed, and the penis stolen from father, his rival. After this interpretation his anxiety diminished somewhat and he decided to write to the Ministry himself and explain his difficulty. The letter began in a well balanced manner but ended with a blatantly paranoid outburst. The result was that a 'Ministry psychiatrist' visited him at home and told him not to worry but to continue with his analysis and rest assured that his 26*s*. would continue indefinitely.

Mr. A, however, continued his complaints against me and the Clinic for not intervening between him and the Medical Board. He threatened to report us to the Minister of Health who, he said, would not only 'bring us down into the mud' but would 'flood us with inspectors who would kick up a stink and blow us sky high'. At the same time he proceeded to worry his mother trying, much against her will, to instal a gas stove in her house. He shouted: 'I'll see to it that she has gas in her house.' I linked this with his threats about the inspectors who were to blow us all sky high, and I interpreted his attempts to force his way into his mother and myself in order to control us omnipotently from within with fæces and flatus. After this he gave up the gas stove project and concentrated on getting a pension for his mother, who was living on an allowance paid to her by her elder son. Mr. A got into contact with the Ministry of Pensions and, by a long and complicated process which I need not go into here, he managed, not only to make his mother less well-off than she might have been, but he succeeded in stopping his brother paying her the allowance and thus did him out of some Income Tax rebate.

In stopping his brother from paying this allowance, Mr. A was expressing his jealousy of his mother's relationship to the brother, here identified with father; and also his jealousy of the twins' relationship to each other. He was putting a stop to the parents' intercourse and to the twins' 'dirty games'. The sum he finally

obtained for his mother was 26*s.* a week, the same as he himself receives as sickness benefit.

By the spring of 1948 he was making the journey as far as Baker Street alone, but he still needed his wife's help from there to the Clinic. He had been to the theatre for the first time in twelve years; went shopping for his wife; visited friends and attended local whist drives. Again, as the obsessions and agoraphobic symptoms decreased, the paranoid anxieties increased and we entered on a new and very turbulent phase.[2]

A big cemetery was to be built near Mr. A's house. He was terrified at the idea and he made up his mind to attend a Protest Meeting of the Residents' Association and, if need be, to make a speech denouncing the plan. His fear of talking to strangers had very much diminished in the past year, but he had never before made a public speech. However, he went to the meeting which was attended by the local Mayor and Councillors and their legal adviser, and he got up and made a long speech. His speech was a great success. He admitted to me, however, that he had made a curious mistake in the speech and during the discussion afterwards. He had insisted that he would be able, from his bed, to see all that went on in the cemetery. When he got home he went up to his bedroom to verify this and found that he could hardly see anything at all, even by leaning out of the window. Nothing at all could be seen from his bed. However, he would be able to see the ' big black hearses ' going by, and the thought made him shudder. He was told at the meeting that the cemetery would be hidden by trees and bushes, but this was no comfort to him. He said ' Just think of the horror of going through the dark damp alley-ways, through the bushes, to arrive in the midst of all those dead and decaying bodies.' This, he said, ' would be a terrible psychological shock for any little children running up and down the dark alley-ways and penetrating the bushes '. Children running up and down alley-ways were a source of great anxiety to him. He complained bitterly of the ' dirty little brats ' who, he said, rushed to and fro screaming and making an ' unholy mess ' in the path which joined his house to his neighbour's; he was also terrified of crossing the railway bridge at his local station, where children were always playing. Also, as I have said, he could not manage, without his wife's help, the short but crowded walk which joined Baker Street to Gloucester Place. On the one hand his fear of the dark damp alley-ways, leading to the cemetery full of dead and decaying bodies, reflected his phantasy of forcing his way into his mother and destroying everything inside her. On the other hand, the bridge and the walk from Baker Street and the alley-ways all represented the parents' genitals joined in intercourse, and he identified himself with the children making the ' unholy mess,' in other words, attacking the parents' genitals with fæces.

By insisting that he could see the cemetery from his bed, and publicly protesting against it, he was, on the one hand, proving how innocent he was of sexual curiosity about the parents and, on the other hand, expressing his terror of seeing father and mother having intercourse that was lethal as the result of his own projected sadistic wishes. He had slept in his parents' room until he was about five years of age and remembered once when about three years old hearing his father moaning in pain and his mother crying in the night. He had cried too and tried to get into their bed, but he was not allowed to, and he remembers thinking to himself, ' That is because the bed is dirty.'

His success at the meeting, which really appears to have been considerable, led to an invitation to become a member of the Committee of the Residents' Association, followed by an invitation to join the Committee of the Conservative Association. This delighted him as he was, in his own words, an ' ardent Conservative ', though I think he would always be ' ardent opposition ' no matter who was in power. He was made Chief Canvasser of a big district during the General Election, and was doing continuous full-time voluntary work, making public speeches and being honorary treasurer of one organization and honorary secretary of another. But he made no attempt to get any paid work.

His new-found gift for public speaking now shows every sign of becoming a good sublimation of his oral and anal sadism, but at the time of which I am writing, his manic reactions were very disquieting. At analysis he lay on the couch shouting over and over again that he was surrounded by enemies who whispered and plotted, but insisting that he knew he could vanquish them all. He cried triumphantly:

[2] For a discussion of the link between obsessional symptoms and paranoid anxieties see: Melanie Klein, *The Psycho-Analysis of Children* (1932) Ch. IX.

'I'll pick them off one by one, like Hitler did.' He felt he was at the mercy of the attacking, avenging, omnipotent parents, and all his energies were given to the work of proving that he also was omnipotent and could control them.

Whenever I could manage to make myself heard, I interpreted the transference implication of all this, that is to say, his terror of me and his need to control me. I was the breast which was being drained dry; I was the combined parents; I was the cemetery and the hearse; and I was the house full of contaminated objects soiled and torn to bits by himself, the pecking sparrow. He felt he could never put me together again, and he was in a state of despair and terror; despair that I was damaged beyond repair, and terror that I would force my way into him as he in phantasy had forced his way into me.

At the end of a few months, there was some reduction in the persecutory fears, but the pattern of his activities remained the same. He would manage somehow or other to get himself at cross purposes with the Chairman and Secretary of the Conservative Association. The Chairman was a man and the Secretary was a woman, and he invariably accused them of being 'up to dirty tricks' behind people's backs. He would quarrel with them in Committee and then enjoy giving the impression that he was the one who was losing the fight. Then, having fostered this situation carefully for a few weeks he would 'drop his bombshell', as he called it, by bringing infallible proof that he was in the right, and the Chairman and Secretary in the wrong. In doing this, he was repeating an anal phantasy in which he retained the fæces as long as possible and then had the satisfaction of using them in one tremendous attack on the parents and the twins, in order to stop the parents' intercourse and the twins' 'dirty games'. This pleasure in retention was also expressed by his occasional promises to send a vast cheque to the Clinic in the distant future. Needless to say, I was identified with the Chairman and Secretary who got 'up to tricks' behind people's backs.

More material in connection with his inability to work for money now began to come to light. He had, as I have already said, managed to get his mother a pension; he had collected considerable sums on behalf of the Conservative Association; he made a good sum of money for a charity fête; but money for himself or for his analysis was not forthcoming. He decided that I, like his mother and himself, was to be paid by the State. I was to become a National Health Analyst, and he was the one who was going to force Aneurin Bevan, whom he both hated and admired, to nationalize the Clinic. On the one hand, he was trying to relieve his guilt about not paying for his analysis; while on the other hand, by getting the Government to pay for his mother, for himself and for me, he would be safeguarding himself from a frightening castrating father, and this was a way of coping with his Œdipal fears. Not only did he preserve himself from being castrated by a bad dangerous father by ceasing to be a rival, he also became, by identification with his mother, the one who was loved and protected by the good father.

Last year, when he first started coming to my consulting room instead of the Clinic, he talked of the dangers of 'opening up new channels' and wondered what he would find 'in my private place'. He feared that a dark, frightening man would open the door and that the house would be dark and full of hostile people. He wondered whether people would hear what he was saying; he was sure my telephone was tapped. 'Coming into my private place' meant exploring into my inside and finding there an angry father and many pairs of hostile twins all plotting against him and waiting to attack him. He still cannot open his eyes in my room. This is in order that he shall not see the death and destruction which he imagines he has caused by his entry; it is also a method of shutting out persecutors. Another reason for shutting his eyes is that he feels that if he cannot see others, they cannot see him.

His need for his brother to be his protecting twin, and his efforts to force me into the rôles of protecting twin and father, came to the fore when, about six months ago, he started trying to get paid work. He applied to the Rehabilitation Department of the Labour Exchange, but he announced that nothing would induce him to give up his 26*s*. a week. He was, therefore, only asking for £1 a week even if he did full-time work, since he was not entitled to earn more than £1 so long as he received sickness benefit. He said angrily that I should arrange for him to have occupational therapy for which he could be paid £1 a week. I asked him what he meant by occupational therapy and he said, 'Oh, you know, weaving and so forth; after all I am quite incapable of doing real work.' I pointed out that he was doing full-time unpaid

real work and had been doing so for months; what he could not do was to work for money.

At the same time that he was demanding that I supply him with occupational therapy, he was also trying to get his brother to find him work, with the same stipulation that he earned only £1 a week. He said, however, that he knew that his brother would never help him to get a job. He said: 'My brother's afraid that I'll get a bigger job than he's got. He has always kept me out of everything. All he will do is to lend me money.' All the material brought at this point expressed his fear of getting the bigger job, the bigger penis, and thus being at the mercy of a castrated and envious brother, with whom I was identified. After some weeks of shilly-shallying he finally refused as unsuitable a job offered to him by his brother. He also refused two jobs offered to him by the Labour Exchange on the same grounds. It is true that the jobs offered were not suitable for someone with his obsessional symptoms, but I am sure that he managed to get himself offered the wrong type of job.

In the end he asked his brother to lend him some more money for his keep, which his brother did. In this way, by keeping his 26*s*. a week and achieving the loan, he satisfied his need to be kept by his father and brother, and, by paying nothing for his analysis, he was satisfying his need to be kept by me. Whenever I interpreted this 'need to be kept' in terms of homosexual wishes towards his father and his brother, he became confused, developed eye-ache, got ear-ache, went deaf and said he had not heard a word. On this occasion it was followed by an attack of hæmorrhoids, and a change in the pattern of his voluntary work. There was less of the 'bombshell'; the accent was now on 'kudos'. He saw to it that *he* did all the work and that others finally got all the kudos. He was at this time made organizer of a big charity fête in aid of the Conservative Association. He wrote a forty-page report on how a fête should be run. He was complimented by the Chairman and Secretary of the Association, who said that it was a valuable piece of work. From that moment Mr. A began unconsciously to arrange things in such a way that, in the end, he would get no kudos at all for the success of the enterprise. He said, 'I shall resign from the Association when the fête is successfully over. I shall just pack up and fade out.' I told him that the long and successful report was the erect penis. He wanted to display it but he feared that he would be attacked by the parents if he did so. This was because he never really felt that the penis was his own to display; it was father's penis stolen from mother's inside and, in stealing it, he felt that he had deprived both parents. Therefore, he had to hand back the penis to the parents in the same way as he handed back the 'kudos' to the Chairman and Secretary. I told him that although he blamed those around him for getting the kudos that should be his, in reality he was all the time deliberately divesting himself of it and forcing others to accept it.

He then told me about an incident in his childhood which, he said, he had vowed to himself never to divulge. When he was three years old, he and the twins were given cricket bats. The twins' bats were real ones, good and solid; his was made of matchwood and broke the first time he used it. Ten years later, his school was entered for a local sports competition. He made up his mind that he would win the first prize, which was a magnificent cricket bat and real leather ball. He said: 'I was determined to bash my way to victory'. What actually happened was most significant. He won every event outright until the finals of the high jump. He then did a five-foot jump which made him equal with the other competitor and, although he had often jumped higher than that without any strain, he collapsed on landing and lay there quite unable to move. He has no memory of feeling at all ill; he remembers thinking to himself that he must 'fade out' for a bit. He was at once examined by the doctor who was attending the sports, and he was forbidden to jump again. And so this particular event was a tie. He had, however, won all the other events and the cricket bat and ball were his. Naturally his schoolfellows crowded round him cheering, ready to carry him in triumph on their shoulders. But he crept away to his mother, and to quote his own words, 'I buried my head in her; I just blotted myself out and clung to her with my eyes shut all the way home.' He felt that he must not even *see* the cheering crowd of schoolboys, and added: 'You see I was about a couple of years older than they were.' He never used the bat or ball; he packed them up carefully and put them in a cupboard and has not unpacked them to this day. He said: 'The bat must be cracked and dry and quite useless by now, and the leather ball must be rotten.'

This closely guarded reminiscence is, ob-

viously, rich in meaning. Firstly, by tying equal in the high jump, he is expressing his wish to identify himself with the twins. But the moment he becomes the twins, he feels himself to be in danger from those who are two years younger than he is, since he has endowed these younger ones with his own hostile feelings towards the twins, who are two years older than he is. He replied to this interpretation by being surprised that he had said 'two years'. He admitted that he had made a mistake; the other competitors were actually only a few months younger. He also said that now he came to think of it, it was extraordinary how often he tied equal with other children, not only in sport but in lessons.

He told me that he 'warned' the headmaster of his school that he was going to win that cricket bat and ball and the headmaster said: 'Good, go ahead, but I doubt if you'll win the high jump.' The high jump represents the erect penis and is followed immediately by the symbolic castration implicit in the collapse on landing. But, not only has the headmaster-father warned him that he will not achieve the erection, the doctor-father comes along and forbids him to try again. He identifies himself with his mother, 'blotting himself out in her' while he tries to protect himself from the attacks of his rivals by shutting his eyes.

Secondly, this incident expresses his intention to 'bash' his way into his mother and, omnipotently, to possess and control from within the breast and father's penis—the good leather ball and the magnificent cricket bat. But the cricket bat, once he possesses it, becomes cracked and dry, and the good leather ball goes rotten, both victims of his oral greed, and he must keep them hidden in the cupboard for ever, that is to say, inside himself where he feels them as destroyed and persecuting objects. After telling about the sports, the pains in his stomach did actually become very acute and he felt as though there were a hard lump and 'something stretched out to breaking point' inside him.

There was some change in his behaviour at this time. He could now be surprised at the way he had reacted to a local newspaper report of the Sports. The report had said that the day was 'marred' by the collapse of the young hero of the day, who had been overwhelmed by his efforts in winning the championship. Mr. A had translated this as meaning that he had completely destroyed everyone there, and had himself been destroyed. He could never use the word 'marred' again because it filled him with such horror. He detested the newspaper-man who wrote the article and who, he he felt, accused him of such wholesale murder, and it was only now, more than twenty-five years later, that he suddenly realized that the article was a sympathetic one.

Mr. A's fears, when out in the street, have changed somewhat; instead of being afraid that others will fall under buses and down area stairs, he now fears that he himself will do so. The material connected with the fear of falling to his death, which includes the fear of being hanged—referred to by him as 'the biggest drop of all'—suggests that the collapse after the five-foot jump was not only a castration but a symbolic suicide. While relating the story of the high jump he showed, for the first time in analysis, real grief, and since then the feelings of persecution have begun to give place to feelings of depression. The pompous façade crumbled and I found myself face to face with a desperately unhappy little boy.

A change which suggests that he is feeling more integrated is that he no longer isolates one session from another. He can now remember material from one session and carry it on to the next. Also, he can admit that certain improvements in himself are due to the analysis; for years he completely denied that any changes could have been caused by the treatment. To admit that my interpretations had in any way helped would mean that I had succeeded in penetrating inside him, and he felt that that would be tantamount to disaster.

Melanie Klein in her 'Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms' wrote: '. . . introjection may be felt as a forceful entry from the outside into the inside, in retribution for violent projection'. The process of forcing the self into another object has also been discussed by Joan Riviere in her 'Remarks on Paranoid Attitudes', and by Herbert Rosenfeld in his paper on Homosexuality. In my opinion, anxieties attached to phantasies of violent projection and introjection are at the root of Mr. A's inability to earn and to spend. To earn means to him that he is forcing his way inside an object to rob it with violence; to spend money or give a present of any kind means that he himself is being penetrated and robbed with violence.

In opening the cupboard door and letting me in to see the cricket bat and ball, Mr. A was showing that he felt introjection to be less dangerous than before. A few days after

telling me this story, he was able, for the first time in fourteen years, to allow the window cleaner to come in through the back door to clean the windows, and to allow the dustman to come in through the back door to collect the dustbin. He had, at the same time, begun to earn a little money.

It is, I think, of interest that he is earning this money as an insurance agent persuading people to take out policies against burglary. He has also started making plans for paying his debts. The idea of a vast cheque for the Clinic in the dim and distant future is giving place to more realistic plans for payment in the present. Naturally, his obsessional make-up, which causes the insight of to-day to become the obsession of to-morrow, makes progress difficult; but there are, I think, definite signs that he is gradually relinquishing his great need to be ' kept '.

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EXAMINATION ANXIETY WITHOUT EXAMINATION

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1. *Introduction*

Examination anxiety has mainly been investigated in patients who had difficulties in examinations. These difficulties may be excessive anxiety, inability to study, or repeated failure in examinations. But the same patients also complain of similar anxiety in situations that are far removed from examination proper. For example, Sadger's patient, in discussing a dream, gave the following description of his sexual difficulties: ' Each attempt at sexual intercourse appears to me as an examination . . . in my imagination a fear of the new examination remains: this means that every fresh attempt at intercourse is an examination for the unconscious and I am unable to solve this problem. Therefore I must try to deceive the woman by feigning passion which I do not feel. In the dream, I do not succeed in the deception.' [1]

In the following I shall describe an anxiety reaction which I found in a number of patients who did not complain of examination anxiety. One patient came to analysis for impotence, others for depression, or phobic reactions. But the analysis revealed that the patients had impotence, or frigidity, in common and that they showed a marked readiness to react with anxiety resembling examination anxiety.

Although these patients had not been aware of the form of their anxiety reaction, they were ready to acknowledge it after they had experienced it in the transference situation. It is one of my points that I do not deal with symptoms of which the patient had originally been aware, but of signs which became manifest in the analytical situation and could be analysed there, and then acknowledged by the patient as a reaction also occurring outside the consulting room. But I hope that this discussion may also throw light on the nature and psychopathology of examination anxiety proper.

2. *Examination Anxiety and Castration Fear*

The analytic work on the subject has been summarized by Flugel, who, however, omitted Sadger's paper.[2] Flugel, following Rank and others, dealt with examination from the historical and anthropological point of view as an initiation rite. From this point of view, *which is mainly that of the examiner*, the examinee appears as someone who, willingly or unwillingly, has to submit to the procedure of examination.

In contrast to this point of view, the present paper deals with *that of the examinee*, or more precisely with that of persons who feel as if they were examined; the accent of interest lies on their reaction, one may say on their demand for an examination.

So far as examinations are derived from puberty rites, and puberty rites from the ritual castration of the younger generation by the ' fathers ', the examinee's point of view should not be difficult to understand. It is that of someone threatened with castration. In the classical analytic literature, this is how his anxiety has always been explained.

Stengel [3] was perhaps the first to see some difficulties in this approach. For how could it account for examination anxiety in women? But, as he was not prepared to admit that the theory might be inadequate, he was forced to assume both that there were no puberty rites for women, and that only women who competed with men could be anxious in examinations, at least in those conducted by a male examiner. ' Often ', he writes, ' the interference of instinctual demands, which in the case of a man disturbs the work of the ego in the situation of examination, can be used by the woman as a help: there the father-daughter relationship plays a part. But the more the identification with the male colleague, the greater the danger of neurotic failure by the female examinee.' In view of the presence of examination anxiety in many women in whom the masculine component is by no means stressed, the argument seems rather weak. Moreover, the assumption that all initiation rites symbolize castration, and that

[1] J. Sadger (1920). ' Über Prüfungsangst und Prüfungsträume '. *Int. Z. Psychoanal.* **6.**

[2] F. C. Flugel (1939). ' The Examination as Initiation Rite and Anxiety Situation ', *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, **20.**

[3] E. Stengel (1936). ' Prüfungsangst und Prüfungsneurose ', *Z. f. psychoanalytische Pädagogik*, **10.**

therefore there can be no such rites for women is disproved by the existence of such rites. Those in Africa are well known. In short, the link between initiation and examination, and between castration anxiety and examination anxiety, deserve to be re-explored.

In the analytic literature, from the earliest time, these links have been repeatedly stressed. Freud,[4] in his *Interpretation of Dreams*, confirms an interpretation by W. Stekel that the ' Matric-dream ' refers to a test of sexual potency, but he also sees in examination dreams a mixture of consolation (you need not be afraid of an examination in the dream as you have succeeded in reality), and of self-reproach (although successful you still indulge in infantile play), the examiner taking the rôle of the critical (castrating) father. Sadger [5] lays stress on the castration element in the examination situation.

A later paper by Blum [6] emphasizes the significance of all levels (birth phantasies, anal, overt aggression and Œdipus situation) for the reaction to the examination. This shows how the development of our understanding of examination anxiety has followed similar lines to those of the psycho-analytical theory of castration anxiety. Freud described castration anxiety in the analysis of the phobia of a five-year-old boy, which is experienced as a punishment for infantile sexual activity or wishes. The later development of psycho-analytic theories traced this type of anxiety to pre-genital levels. Ernest Jones [7] considered the removal of fæces as the precursor of castration anxiety, and A. Stärcke [8] showed that weaning from the nipple causes an anxiety analogous to castration anxiety.

At the same time another development proceeded. Ernest Jones [9] recognized that the threat of castration is only a ' partial threat, however important a one, against sexual capacity and enjoyment as a whole. For the main blow of total extinction (of the power of sexual enjoyment) we might do well to use a separate term, such as the Greek word " aphanisis ".' Meanwhile, Melanie Klein [10] investigated small children and found that their phantasied attacks against the mother's body and the objects inside it (particularly the father's penis) were experienced in their projected form as threats of attacks on the child's own inside. In other words, the precursor of the (genital) castration anxiety is the fear of total extinction, not only of the sexual capacity as in aphanisis, but of the person as a whole. Here Melanie Klein [11] does not follow Freud in tracing the fear of death to the fear of castration.

3. *Clinical Material*

I will now give some parts of a case history on which I base my own conclusions:—

The patient was a man of early middle age who complained that he was impotent, and that all his love relationships came prematurely to an end. He was at times quite able to make preliminary contact with women, but as soon as he felt that they were interested in him he had to break off. His impotence in the sexual sphere could easily be linked with other situations in his life. For instance, he was very fond of music in which he had reached a certain standard of accomplishment, but could not play in public, or before his friends. He noticed that through the anatomical connection of the extensor tendons to the third, fourth and fifth fingers, their movements were not as independent of each other as he would like them to be for his piano playing, and he conceived the idea that an operation might help to make these two fingers more independent of each other. (It is interesting, not only that a patient should conceive the idea of improving his piano playing by an operation, but also that he was able to find a surgeon willing to perform it. This has a particular significance at a time when surgeons venture into as problematic a field as ' psycho-surgery '.) There is no doubt that his handicap in piano playing and his impotence were intimately related to each other, and in particular his inability to play in the presence of another person. It was an inhibition similar to those more common inhibitions in writing, the symbolic meaning of which is well known.[12] But my patient was skilful with his fingers in other ways; he took interest in machinery and

[4] S. Freud. *The Interpretation of Dreams*. Transl. by A. A. Brill, London (1942) p. 266 and 290.

[5] J. Sadger. *Loc. cit.*

[6] E. Blum (1926). ' The Psychology of Study and Examination ', *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, **7.**

[7] Ernest Jones, ' Cold, Disease, Birth ', *Papers on Psycho-Analysis*, 5th ed., Chapter XV.

[8] A. Stärcke (1921). ' The Castration Complex ', *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, **2.**

[9] Ernest Jones, ' Early Development of Female Sexuality ', *Papers on Psycho-Analysis*, 5th ed., Chapter XXV, p. 440.

[10] Melanie Klein, ' Contributions to Psycho-Analysis ', 1921–1945, The Hogarth Press, London.

[11] Melanie Klein (1948). ' A Contribution to the Theory of Anxiety and Guilt ', *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, **29.**

[12] See Melanie Klein, ' The Rôle of the School in the Libidinal Development of the Child ' (1923), reprinted in *Contributions to Psycho-Analysis*, p. 68, 1948.

enjoyed putting broken machinery together, mending cars, etc.

So far, I have said nothing to suggest that his inhibition could not be explained solely in terms of castration anxiety. But behind this lay other fears and dangers, and these became clearer when he was faced with a situation which came very close to an examination. He applied for a new post and had to face an interview. This roused great anxiety, and more than once he thought of withdrawing his application, because he felt unable to face his interviewers and to answer their questions.

The analysis of this anxiety covered several sessions, and shortly before the interview he spoke of an incident in which he heard someone delivering a lecture. The speaker had an impediment in his speech, and listening to him was agony. He constantly put himself in the speaker's place. He experienced the situation both as a member of the audience and as the speaker himself. Another incident was associatively connected with this: the farewell speech of the Duke of Windsor had been transmitted in the interval of a public concert, when a man sitting next to him made an uncomplimentary remark about the Duke. In both these incidents the relationship between the speaker and audience is strained. When he suffers agony by identifying himself with the speaker who is handicapped by the impediment, he reacts to what he expects the audience to feel about the speech. In other words, the audience is hostile to the speaker, because it is dissatisfied with what it is receiving from him. In this incident the material showed that the speaker is representing the patient as an impotent man. The second incident shows a frankly hostile reaction of the audience. Both have to be taken as illustrations of his unconscious phantasies about the coming interview. In that coming interview he would be the speaker, and the interviewers would be the audience undoubtedly felt to be hostile. He was particularly afraid of certain questions which would reveal what he considered to be his black record, although, from the reality point of view, there was very little black in his record.

A dream which he reported in one of these sessions throws light upon the nature of this black record. A patient consulted a doctor complaining that he was feeling red spiders crawling in and out of his anus. The doctor, who examined him, could not find anything wrong and told the patient that he was unable to see anything wrong with him, to which the patient replied: 'Doctor, you may not see anything, but they are there all the same.' Here the patient expresses his conviction that he harbours bad objects (red spiders) and even the doctor's opinion cannot shake this conviction. The associative link between 'black record' and 'red spiders' shows the anal significance of his 'black record'. He himself is afraid of these objects against which he, like the man in the dream, asks for help. This help must be based on a recognition of these objects and not on their denial; in other words, it should help him to control them. We are dealing here with a feeling of persecution by bad internal objects. From this point of view many of his statements become comprehensible. The lecturer with the impediment of speech with whom he identified himself is his impotent and clumsy self, and the hostility of the audience which he felt when listening to the lecture was, among other things, his own reaction to his bad and impotent self. Knowing the patient's link between the 'black record' and the 'red spiders', we may add, that the hesitant speaker was also experienced as full of bad objects. We are therefore led to assume that the patient connected the impediment of speech with the presence of bad internal objects, or applying this to himself, that he connected his impotence with his sense of internal persecution by bad (black) internal objects. That a sense of internal persecution may lead to an inhibition (stammer or impotence) can be understood; it is an attempt at controlling an internal danger.

His further complaint that he has to withdraw from women as soon as they show interest in him becomes also comprehensible if we accept the patient's feeling that they might discover, what is constantly apparent to him, namely his own badness. In the lecturer with the impediment of speech he gave a description of his anxieties about women. The audience also represents women who will become hostile when they recognize the speaker's, that is his own, badness. Therefore, so far as women are concerned, the patient prefers to withdraw before they become hostile, that is, as soon as they show any interest in him.

The analysis of the patient's fear that he harbours bad objects in himself was accepted with great relief. As the result of it he could, for the first time, recognize that there might be something good in himself. Whatever his own feelings were, the interviewers might also recognize certain things in his favour. At this

point, he remembered that for some time he had not given me fresh infantile memories in his associations. These infantile memories stood for good and helpful objects because he felt his analysis could not progress unless he was able to remember incidents of his childhood. Apparently good objects could not be produced side by side with bad and dangerous ones, of which the ' red spiders ' were representatives. As he had to control the bad objects, he had to suppress the good ones at the same time, and he was thus left with a feeling of emptiness.

4. *Relation to Feeling of Unreality*

An interesting outcome of the difficulty of maintaining good and bad internal objects side by side is a feeling of pretence or deception. For instance, Sadger's patient complained that he had to feign passion to deceive the woman. In a similar way one often hears patients say that, although they gave the right answers in their examination, they really did not know the matter, so that success could not have any value for them in raising their self-esteem. In these cases the good object is partially denied and felt merely as a pretence and thus loses much of its reality. Depersonalization is an example of this process when it is applied to the ego and its introjected objects.

5. *Relation of Impotence to Homosexuality*

As Melanie Klein pointed out, a sense of ' the possession of " good " contents in the body, and with it, on the genital level, the possession of a " good " penis are a pre-condition of sexual potency.' [13] This pre-condition was lacking in the patient described and as a result he became sexually impotent.

A very similar anxiety situation may lead to homosexuality in men, who, in defending themselves against their own internal bad objects, project them into the woman's body. Consequently women appear frightening. But, in contrast to an impotent man, the homosexual maintains a belief in his ' good ' penis. To quote Melanie Klein [14] again: ' This significance is extended by his narcissistic choice of object to the penis of another male, and his penis now serves as a counter-proof against all his fear concerning the penis inside him and the interior of his body. Thus in homosexuality one mode of mastering anxiety is that the ego endeavours to deny, control . . . the unconscious by overemphasizing reality and the external world and all that is tangible and perceptible to consciousness.' In contrast to this defence mechanism the impotent man loses the ' good ' penis in his attempt at controlling and denying his bad internal objects, which in turn leads to a feeling of emptiness and to inability to restore ' mother's dangerous and endangered body '. It is obvious that this outcome is closely related to depression, and clinically depression and impotence are often found together. But the suppression of the bad, and the concealment of the ' good ' internal objects are combined with other defence mechanisms, such as the externalization of internal persecution, i.e. the ' hostile audience ' is the reflection of the internal threat. Something similar entered my patient's love relationships; as soon as his partner became interested in him, he had to break off for fear of having his internal badness exposed, which made his partner appear hostile.

6. *Anticipation and anxiety*

Similar anxieties may arise before almost every session, and any analytical interview may be experienced as examination. Another of my patients, for example, wondered if the analyst realized what patients feel before they come to a session, and how frightened they are. This leads to a further element in examination anxiety, as it often arises before the examination, that is, in anticipation. E. Stengel [15] mentions this aspect, and relates it to the masochistic impulse. He says: ' It is as if the masochistic impulse is better satisfied in phantasy, in the same way as the libido is often more easily satisfied in the masturbatory act.'

One of my female patients with a marked difficulty in speaking in analysis threw light on this point. Her difficulty in speaking was much more pronounced at the beginning of the session and could be overcome, and dissolved, when I was able to understand the nature of the anxiety at this particular moment. She admitted that it was much worse before coming to analysis. Once in the consulting room, it was already better. Apparently she experienced her greatest fear in anticipation, because her anxiety was unmitigated when she was faced with her phan-

[13] Melanie Klein. *The Psycho-Analysis of Children*, 3rd edition, p. 344, 1949.

[14] Melanie Klein. *Loc cit.*, p. 345.

[15] ' Es ist, als ob die masochistische Triebregung sich mehr in der Phantasie absättigen würde, wie manchmal die Libido im onanistischen Akt.' E. Stengel, *loc. cit.*, p. 313.

tasy life uncontrolled by the effect of reality testing. When she was alone, and before the event, she was faced with the full amount of internal persecution which she was unable to control.

But not all anxiety reactions can be mitigated by reality testing. Patients with phobias have other defences; they try to avoid situations that precipitate anxiety.

7. ' *Internal bad objects* ' *and persecution*

The same patient said that, were she able to speak freely, she might say things which she did not want to say. She had marked anxiety when she felt that she had to say things which she wanted to conceal, and it is obvious that there must be a close link between the anxiety of this patient and that described by the first one, who was afraid of his ' black record '. As the analysis of the frightening phantasies concerning bad objects of the first patient showed that we were dealing with anal objects, it is not surprising to hear that the second one was not only afraid of the things she would have to say, but of the things she would have to ' pass '. She produced dreams in which she was afraid that she would not control her urge to pass water, and she admitted that she was afraid of wetting my couch. In another dream she felt there was something coming out of her which was not real urine but a dangerous acid. When she looked at her clothes she saw that they had been burnt by this dangerous fluid. Like the first patient she felt herself to be full of bad and dangerous material which resulted in anxiety about what would happen in the analysis. In the transference situation I appeared sometimes as a dangerous persecutor and sometimes as the good object that is endangered by the bad things that may come out of her. It was often difficult to say whether she was more afraid of the positive or the negative transference situation.

Patients who create situations similar to examinations are those who feel strongly persecuted internally, and who try to cope with these situations by various defences : either they feel stigmatized by their internal persecutors, in the words of the first patient, by his black record or dangerous ' internal objects ' which he felt to be evident to others so that he would rather withdraw (flee) than face exposure, or they project the sense of inner badness and feel threatened by hostility and external danger.

8. *Summary and Conclusions*

Looking back on the material, the main distress of these patients is their conviction either that they are unworthy, or bad, or that they are unable to do what is expected of them. The main point of my argument so far is that this sense of incompetence, no less than the sense of badness, is the result of an unconscious feeling that there are bad and dangerous objects in them. The question now arises as to the origin and meaning of these objects. There is no doubt that this feeling of having bad objects is ultimately the result of the patient's own aggression. Blum's case and also the case I quoted have many things in common. Both have difficulties in being loved. Blum's patient said: ' It seems to me that it was not right that my parents were so nice to me yesterday.' [16] This was related to her hostile attitude to her mother which she described at length and which, in a different form, was dealt with in a dream. In this dream her sister threatened her with the removal of her liver, which, I think, stands for an attack on her inside (fear of castration). The meaning of the attack on the inside becomes clearer when this dream is compared with a second one, in which the patient was forced to eat an object that appeared as a woman's head, or a small fœtus and which reminded her of the facial features of her own mother. In the words of the patient, ' she had to eat it from hatred of her sister.' [17] At the same time a characteristic of this patient was her persistent denial that she had, or was allowed to have, anything. ' She was not allowed to do anything; she was not allowed to *know* anything.' [18] For the knowledge which she was not allowed to possess represented the object which she was ' forced ' to eat. The incorporated mother is a damaged and hated object which she could not admit to possess during examination. In other words: she had to deny that she had eaten objects, and had stolen knowledge from her mother.

Blum sums the situation up in these words: ' Not to eat, not to incorporate the mother, not to become a woman, not to be born, not to go in for the examination.' It is noteworthy that at this stage the patient, for the first time, became conscious of examination-anxiety which previously had been unconscious, and now experienced the analyst as a mother figure in the transference situation.

Blum's case appeared of particular interest

[16] E. Blum (1926). *Loc. cit.*, p. 461. [17] E. Blum. *Loc. cit.*, p. 464. [18] E. Blum. *Loc. cit.*, p. 463.

because he showed so clearly the early pregenital elements which caused the difficulties. This patient, like my own, to whom a dangerous object (red spiders) seemed to be attached, felt bad and full of guilt; both imagined themselves to be full of bad objects.[19] They and others like them continuously try to deal with their bad objects, which are felt to be not only dangerous to others but also to themselves (e.g. the acid fluid in the dream of one of my patients), either by projection outside (they are then faced with external persecution), or by denial which has other disastrous results. These may be manifold: apart from anxiety and depression it may lead to inhibition of initiative culminating in impotence and frigidity, and to a feeling of unworthiness or emptiness and even depersonalization (by denial of the good internal objects), as well as to a sense of persecution. But, reparative elements are also always to be found, for example, in the preoccupation of one of my patients in repairing machinery, which represented his attempt to restore the damaged object.

It can be seen that these patients will use any situation which contains elements of a test as a means of dealing with the dangers threatening from their internal world. The anxiety they feel is not only a reaction to the test. They also use the experience of the test to diminish their anxiety; for, in it, they can make an internal danger become external, and convert a universally bad internal object into something specific and so limited. An examination may lead to failure, but a failure in one situation, not in every situation. To fail in everything is, of course, the deepest fear. Here the sexual failure is of paramount importance. Failure in sexuality is not a failure in one situation—it is experienced as a general failure. In that sense examinations, in success or failure, are means of dealing with the sense of impotence, and in particular are attempts at limiting, or providing counter-evidence against it.

Appendix

Since writing this paper I was able to analyse a case of examination anxiety before a real examination which further illustrates some of the paranoid mechanisms which, I think, are always involved. It has been my point that the main source of examination anxiety is the internal threat by ' bad internal objects ' representing aggressive tendencies. When these are made conscious the friendly aspects come to the fore; this can also be seen in the following case, which I do not describe in full.

The patient is a woman of thirty-four. She has been in analysis for several years on account of severe hysteria. Paranoid traits were prominent in her clinical picture. Symptomatically she improved very much, and is now again in full employment. She developed an acute anxiety state when she received notification of the date of her examination which was due two weeks later. This state began with over-activity and insomnia. During the first interview after she knew the date she spoke without cessation and felt that everything was well. But this maniacal reaction did not last long; a few days later she showed signs of exhaustion and depression. At the same time she voiced paranoid ideas which seemed to her to be justified by the personality of her examiner whom she pictured as an enemy. She walked about my room touching every conceivable object as if she wanted to test the room in every detail, and while doing so explained that she would have to go through her own work and read it with the eyes of the examiner to find the questions which the examiner might ask. She also mentioned certain imaginary answers which she proposed to give; all of them were exceedingly aggressive and based on the assumption that the examiner was a sadistic attacker. In the transference she felt that I also was a sadistic attacker and, in fact, she experienced the whole situation of examination in the consulting room; and finally she hid in a corner of the room so that I might not see her.

The examination was to be conducted by a woman and by a man examiner; she felt that the woman was the principal attacker while the man would not defend her. This followed closely her picture of her childhood world in which her father appeared weaker than her mother. The essential part of the analysis of her examination anxiety was completed in the session the day before her examination. During that session she left the room after twenty minutes, as she used to do at the beginning of her analysis a few years ago. But this time she returned after about ten minutes and then started to speak, and told me of a colleague who

[19] Both patients have the wish to have the ' bad internal object ' removed. It will be remembered that Blum's patient dreamt that her liver (bad object) was being removed while my patient came to be analysed after leucotomy had been suggested.

got through a similar examination by cheating while she herself was convinced she would fail. From the context, and from what I knew of her early history, it was clear that this colleague represented her sister who is two years her senior. This sister was, as a child, more successful than she, and she accused her of having gained her mother's affection by ' tricks '. At the same time, it became clear that she used the examination as a weapon with which she intended to dominate her surroundings; in this way she revealed her unconscious wish to prevail over her sister who appeared as her successful rival. Her guilt about these unconscious wishes was very great. She attempted to clear herself of it by projecting her sadistic feelings on to her examiners, who thus became punishing and persecuting figures. This interpretation gave her great relief and she was able to give me, for the first time, a more friendly notion of her world. She told me the following incident: she had been doing some work in which she was rather bad when a friend came into her room who was an expert in that particular work. Seeing her struggling, he took over from her and completed her work brilliantly in a very short time. She did not feel ashamed but grateful to him. This memory, given in the last few minutes of the session, heralded a complete change in her attitude as a result of which she was able to revise her own work in the few remaining hours before the examination—a revision which she had unsuccessfully attempted during the last fourteen days.

THE UNCONSCIOUS PHANTASY OF AN INNER WORLD REFLECTED IN EXAMPLES FROM ENGLISH LITERATURE

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The inner world which in our unconscious phantasy each of us contains inside ourselves is one of those psycho-analytical concepts that most people find especially difficult to accept or understand. It is a world of figures formed on the pattern of the persons we first loved and hated in life, who also represent aspects of ourselves. The existence even in unconscious phantasy of these inner figures and of their apparently independent activities within us (which can be as real, or more real and actual, to us in unconscious feeling than external events) may seem incredible and incomprehensible; it might therefore perhaps be useful to approach the problem from the opposite end, as it were, that is from the conscious level. My aim in this contribution is essentially to forge a link between certain conscious experiences, which will be familiar to most people, and the proposition that phantasies of our containing other persons inside ourselves, though deeply unconscious, do exist. For this purpose I have selected some relevant passages from literature. Before discussing these, however, I will consider shortly the question why this proposition of internal objects seems so difficult to accept.

It was of course Freud who first recognized the existence of the 'introjected object' as a regular phenomenon, a normal part of the personality, namely, in his formulation of the mental institution he called the super-ego, mainly based on the person of the father and represented consciously in our minds by what we call the conscience in each of us. Melanie Klein, however, in her explorations of unconscious phantasy through her work with very young children, has pursued this theme and brought to light much more concerning the persons in the inner world whom each of us individually has felt or feels to be part of himself. There is a difference between Freud's super-ego, a single differentiated function of our mental make-up, modelled though it may be on the personalities of parents, and the 'personal relations', however primitive and fantastic, we have had with the figures who people our inner worlds. When Freud published his *Ego and Id* his concept of the internalized parent as the super-ego did not rouse much resistance; it is true that it had already been introduced in a more acceptable form under the title of ego-ideal. Nevertheless, before very long an emotional reaction to the concept of the super-ego was manifested in a new view of analytic therapy; a move for the 'dissolution of the super-ego' was even initiated by Alexander at the Salzburg Congress, 1924, and found considerable support at the time. (This view is to be distinguished from the general recognition that the curative effects of analysis are in part attributable to a reduction of the severity of the super-ego.) The point I wish to recall here is the emotional enthusiasm greeting Alexander's idea which virtually stigmatized the independent internal object in the self as something morbid. In the enthusiasm for this view, which Freud himself did what he could to discourage, we had, I think, the first flicker of the suspicion and intolerance often enough manifested against the concept of internal objects.

The 'inner world', like other psychoanalytical concepts, meets with a two-fold resistance; on the one hand, the incapacity to understand it, and on the other a direct emotional rejection of it as an unwelcome suggestion which is hardly rationalized by serious discussion. Emotional rejection is an acute reaction which arises, as experience teaches, from an acute anxiety; arguments and explanations have little influence on it. When anxiety is not too overmastering, however, one means of allaying it consists in obtaining control of the alarming phenomenon by knowledge and understanding. The urge to master the terrors of superstition and so to find and to make life and the world safer for ourselves was un-

doubtedly one main source from which scientific curiosity sprang.

The debatable point in question here is that we all had originally and still have in some form an emotional relation with persons felt to exist inside ourselves. When this proposition meets with an intense emotional rejection there is clearly a direct association in the hearer's mind of this idea with danger, as though anything inside one which is not 'oneself' pure and simple is and must be dangerous—or pathological; in fact the association of such an idea with madness is often conscious. Less acute reactions can yet be seen to have a similar quality even when the objects inside are not directly imagined as dangerous, but are felt to be *unknown* and therefore alarming. This condition is similar to the common experience of looking into a medical book with drawings of internal organs and feeling extremely repelled—and in effect alarmed—at the sight of things which we 'did not know' were inside us. This tendency to fear the unknown [1] plays its part in our difficulties in forming a conscious idea of the internal objects which unconsciously have so much reality to us; on this line of feeling any such unknown relation to objects inside one must be morbid and dangerous. There is, nevertheless, another quality of feeling in us towards such figures, one entirely distinct from this apprehensiveness or suspicion about them. From this other angle these internal figures represent what we most love, admire and crave to possess—they constitute the good properties and aspects in our lives and personalities.[2] The value and beneficence of these figures in us is usually even less in evidence consciously than their bad aspects, since in their good aspects they do not give rise to fear reactions which then become noticeable.

Freud formulated the pleasure-pain principle, but the degree to which it rules our lives often seems overlooked. Melanie Klein's work has emphasized a fact that sounds like a platitude in its obviousness, yet seems not fully recognized in all its simplicity. The life of the emotions which is continuously active in us from birth to death is based on a simple pattern: fundamentally everything in it is either 'bad' or 'good', nothing is neutral. Events, circumstances, things, people, everything we have to deal with in life and above all our own feelings and experiences are felt in the depths as essentially bad, i.e. disappointing, alarming, sad or painful; or good, i.e. satisfying, reassuring, hopeful, happy. Less fundamentally we may be aware of experiences and of our own feelings as mixed good and bad; but offhand and spontaneously, as it were, things in us and about us seem to split naturally into 'good' or 'bad'. One day 'all's right with the world', another day 'all's wrong'; instinctively there are often no half-measures. I am not to be misunderstood to mean that apparently normal adults are consciously in a mental state approximating to a manic-depressive condition—though that may be less uncommon than is generally supposed. I am saying that there is always a general undertone of feeling even consciously in normal adults, which can be defined as predominantly good or bad, although the condition will be by no means entirely dependent on external causes, or even appropriate to the external situation of the person at the moment. There is, however, less conscious awareness of feelings of contentment and satisfaction (unless they arise suddenly from changes for the better) than of unpleasant feelings, because satisfying feelings are taken for granted as our right, whereas an unpleasant state tends to rouse a reaction of protest immediately.

This brings me back to the inner world: good inner objects are to some extent taken for granted. Unless their presence has to be emphasized unconsciously and demonstrably insisted on (e.g. as in people who are continually needing praise and recognition—unconsciously *about* their internal goodness), the good things within us do not excite attention and remain unconscious. This state of things again has its corollary in our relation to our physical bodies; so long as our digestive or other organs are functioning well and are in a 'good' condition, we take them for granted and either remain unconscious of them, or, it may be that in so far as we are aware of pleasurable bodily sensations they are frequently felt consciously to be self-ordained and self-induced and thus suggest no connection with any other agency internally. It is especially when such sensations are 'bad' in some way or may become so that we pay them much attention and recognize their existence; thus it happens that when we are required to recognize the existence of anything inside us, we may almost automatically

[1] The tendency discussed by Freud in 'The Uncanny', *Collected Papers*, **4.**

[2] Cf. Freud on the good, protective, tender aspects of the super-ego in 'Humour', *Collected Papers*, **5.**

expect it to be bad and think of it as bad. Along with this expectation there goes as a corollary a constant claim by us that all should be perpetually well and giving no trouble within us, namely, that everything in us should be ' good '.[3]

At first sight there appears to be no connection between the proposition that we imagine ourselves to contain within us other persons and the sharp differentiation in feeling just described between good or bad states of mind or body which colour all our emotional experiences. But in fact the connection is simple: the people we unconsciously feel to be within us, parts of ourselves or alien to ourselves, are not neutral, they also are felt as either good or bad. They are essential parts of ourselves and as such we require them to be ' good '—perfect, in fact; all our vanity and self-esteem is disturbed if they are not. Melanie Klein's work has clearly shown that the phenomenon of narcissism—one's relation to oneself—is unconsciously bound up with the inner world, the relation one has to the figures inside one and their relation to oneself. But if we feel wrong, guilty and bad, then one of the purposes for which we need or use our internal objects is that of attributing our own badness to them inside us. Thus our narcissism is relieved and enabled to escape blemish in some degree. This demand that we should have everything in perfection and without pain or effort of course extends beyond our own persons and internal economy to what is outside us, to our external needs, circumstances and belongings ; obviously, our narcissism requires that we should have the best of everything outside us as well as inside, e.g. our possessions, reputations, or, say, our children particularly, should have no flaws. The demands of external reality, however, the pressure of Necessity, to quote Freud's phrase, train us to inhibit or modify these egoistic claims in the external world to some degree and at least superficially; whereas in our inner worlds we tend to maintain our infantile assumption of autocratic intolerance of all interference with our self-satisfaction and well-being.

It is not my aim here to give a description of the inner world of unconscious phantasy, still less to give a theoretical exposition of how or why this phenomenon occurs. The work of Melanie Klein and Paula Heimann contains such accounts. But it seems that the following illustrations, which may help to bridge the gap between a difficult concept and conscious understanding, should be prefaced with a few provisos to obviate misunderstandings.

Although in psycho-analysis we speak of the inner world, it must be remarked that this phrase does not denote anything like a replica of the external world contained within us. The inner world is exclusively one of *personal* relations, in which nothing is external, in the sense that everything happening in it refers to the self, to the individual in whom it is a part. It is formed solely on the basis of the individual's own urges and desires towards other persons and of his reactions to them as the objects of his desires. This inner life originates at least at birth and our relation to our inner world has its own development from birth onwards, just as that to the external world has. Our relation to both worlds is at first of an extremely primitive character, based on bodily needs such as sucking at the breast; this relation comprises also the emotional elements, the love and hate, springing from our two main instincts—desire and aggression—at first felt only in relation to such limited objects as the nipple or breast. (But to the baby this one and only object is to begin with the be-all and end-all of existence.) The bodily sensations of taking in and containing are accompanied by the emotional corollary of pleasure, or of pain when frustration occurs, in varying degrees.

These early experiences of taking in, with their accompaniment of emotional pleasure, constitute the foundation and prototype of the phantasy-process of internalization, which persists throughout life in more developed forms as a main feature of our mental functioning. The inner world of our instinctual objects in its primitive form is thus first peopled with our mother and father or the parts of them internalized at this time, e.g. by the sucking

[3] The words ' good ' and ' bad ' are obviously used here in the simplest possible sense—in fact, much as a small child would use them—as expressing the quality of feeling concerned and unrelated to any other standard. Moral judgements, for instance, as to what is good or bad do not necessarily coincide with what is spontaneously felt by the person in himself to be so—often quite the contrary. The same applies to matters of health, of pleasure, of taste; the sole criterion is the pleasure-principle. In the cradle we were all originally in the condition of the despised person who ' knows nothing about ' any external criteria but ' simply knows what he likes ', namely, what gives him pleasure or unpleasure; and however much the forms taken by our pleasures may alter as life proceeds, it is fundamentally always on that same principle that our good and bad experiences arise.

act or by looking, perceiving and registering within; and those two persons remain as the prototypes of all our later developed reactions with other persons. In later life, moreover, these objects, external or internal, no longer need be exclusively persons, but may be represented by non-human, inanimate or abstract interests. To the infant in particular, in whom life is governed by pleasure and pain, both his own feelings and the objects to whom they refer are never neutral; both his feelings and his objects are either pleasurable or painful, good or bad. For the infant, moreover, it is especially characteristic that his own bad painful sensations and impulses may be projected internally and attributed to his inner people or parts of them, which to some extent he feels are not himself, thus helping to relieve his fears about inherent or uncontrollable evil or danger in himself. The sway of pleasure or pain diminishes with growth and the course of later development progresses beyond the stage at which the internalized figures are so much needed in their original primitive forms; we can become less dependent on our objects, both external and internal, less subject to the crudely violent forces felt both in our own spontaneous impulses and in the good and bad objects whom we love and hate. As we gradually assimilate and work over into components of ourselves the good and bad properties we recognized in our loved and hated parents, or with which we endowed them, their nature as distinct and separate entities in ourselves alters, recedes and diminishes. The residue of these primitive figures in us, formed so largely on our own primitive characteristics, will ultimately consist mainly of qualities or characters in our personality which still retain and crystallize the strong charges of emotional feeling once attaching to the original persons from whom they are derived.

Nevertheless, in the depths our loving or hating relationships to the good or bad mother and father remain—an experience in our past life which is unconsciously indestructible and which on occasions becomes reactivated and relived, re-established in reality. At moments such as these in adult life, poets and writers have become aware of this reality in the depths and have sometimes been able to transmute it into convincing expression.

In my first example a poet describes his inward possession of his beloved who in the outside world is far away, while he nevertheless has her clasped within himself.

> Absence, hear thou my protestation
> Against thy strength,
> Distance and length;
> . . . . . .
> To hearts that cannot vary
> Absence is presence;
> Time doth tarry.
>
> My senses want their outward motion,
> Which now within
> Reason doth win,
> Redoubled by her secret notion;
> Like rich men that take pleasure
> In hiding more than handling treasure.
>
> By absence this good means I gain,
> That I can catch her,
> Where no one can watch her,
> In some close corner of my brain:
> There I embrace and kiss her,
> And so enjoy her, and none miss her. [4]

These lovely lines express with matchless simplicity a happening that no one who has ever loved can have failed to experience—undisclosed and unconsidered though it may ordinarily be. It constitutes a feature of human experience, part of the human heritage. We should find allusions to it in most of the famous love-letters of history; but a poet alone can bring such an experience out into full daylight.

Yet the description given in this poem of a relation to another person inside oneself confirms the proposition of the existence of an emotional inner world only to a special and limited extent. It relates to only one person contained within the speaker—his beloved—and she and his relation to her are in the highest degree ' good '—in fact, they are idealized, as is typical in a highly developed love-relation. This idealization of the loved one is achieved, as we know, by the process of divesting him or her of all unwelcome or evil associations and locating them elsewhere; a splitting into two, good and bad aspects, of the original single object of both love and hate has taken place. A strong denial is then set up that the pair, the good and bad figures, can have anything in common; they are kept at opposite poles. The denial or banishment of all ' badness '—pain, deprivation or danger—in the relation to the

[4] John Donne, 1573–1631.

loved one is very explicitly represented in the poem quoted. Its message consists in a denial, a 'protestation' against the plain emotional fact that the absence of the loved one is painful, and this denial it is which produces the idealization of the situation and also results in its fantastic quality.

The driving force behind the poetic creation reveals itself, though in the setting of an adult love-relation, as one of the simplest, if not the most primordial of all human reactions—namely, fear of the loss and the craving for possession of something outside oneself, here another person, on which one's life seems to depend. The inevitable reaction to this need must be the drive to obtain possession of such an object, to acquire it, absorb it and make it one's own. Food would be the evident prototype of such a desire and need; and the earliest experience in life of such a longing, and of the joy expressed in the poem, must be the infant's craving for his or her mother along with the life-giving breast she represents, and the phantasy of taking her into the self in order nevermore to be without her. This primordial human phantasy belongs of course to the order of instinctual impulses classed as cannibalistic, although the overmastering intensity of the love-longing and the terror of loss which are inherent elements in it were not originally appreciated by those psycho-analysts who first recognized the existence of such impulses in all human beings.[5] It is through Melanie Klein's work that we are now able to understand the common meaning and origin of what appear to be two such totally unrelated human experiences of incorporation as that of the poem and those cannibalistic acts which take place in dreams or in savage rites. Yet there is again an undeniable link between the two in the physical impulse that often becomes conscious in the intensity of sexual passion to incorporate the loved one by biting and absorbing, as well as by clasping and embracing. Devouring with the eyes, too, is perhaps the commonest, because the least prohibited, of all activities between lovers.

In all these forms the wish to incorporate a desired object is manifest and conscious; as such it cannot be denied. What is denied, however, to conscious recognition is that all these and many similar manifestations are but varied expressions of a major human tendency. Each of such examples can be treated as an isolated phenomenon, belittled as unimportant or without significance; the associations between them which build them into a whole are kept unconscious, so that the inevitable inferences are ignored. In referring above to the infant's earliest experience of this desire to incorporate whatever is intensely craved and needed, I quoted the fear of its loss as one great incentive. This fear is in fact an indissoluble element of the wish; desire on the one hand, and fear of frustration, still more of total deprivation of desire's fulfilment on the other, are but two aspects of *one* emotion. Now the superficial disregard of the intensity and significance of human impulses to possess and incorporate operate largely by admitting the wish to some extent, it is true; though denying it any 'meaning'. But it operates still more by total denial and exclusion of the great factor of *fear of loss* from which so largely springs the dynamic process of this wish to possess. The fundamental connection between the two is plainly manifest in one universal human response, namely, in the reflex action of hugging and embracing, clasping and clinging to a person (or a thing) which one has regained after a parting or loss. Because it is regarded as so natural the significance of this quite unequivocal expression of a desire to incorporate what has been (and therefore may be again) lost remains unrecognized.[6] In my view it is our rejection of and blindness to our dread of total loss and deprivation of good objects which results in the lack of understanding of these manifestations and the failure to recognize that in the vast field of human life this dynamic causation is a constant force.

In the poem I have quoted this fear is actually expressed, though the main content of ecstatic joy in it almost entirely outweighs the allusions in it to fear. 'To *hearts that cannot vary*, absence is presence; time doth tarry': it is clear that the pain which is being extinguished by the thought of the beloved's secret presence inside himself, her 'secret notion', is not that merely of her absence, but of the fear that her heart may vary; if she is not with him she is loving and giving herself to another, *she has left him*, not merely in the flesh but with her love, and he has *lost her finally*. It is hinted at

[5] Cf. Freud, 'Mourning and Melancholia', for the relation between loss and incorporation of the object.

[6] The relation between the symptom of kleptomania and experiences of deprivation in early life has been to some extent recognized.

too in the last verse, where he insists on the secrecy of his possession, as if he would have lost her if she were known to be his. Those who are familiar with Donne's love-poems will know how constant and repetitive in them, despite their wealth of unique imagery and the varied forms of love-relation described, these two themes are: the rapturous union of the lovers is yet invariably shot through with the dread of loss of her and her love. A few of the poems consist simply of the certain expectation of this loss, or of his absolute conviction of it and his own intense despair.

I will digress here from my main point for a moment to refer to the middle verse of the poem in question:

> ' My senses want their outward motion
> Which now within
> Reason doth win,
> Redoubled by her secret notion
> . . . . . '

In the poem's plainspoken description of the incorporation of an object it is interesting to find direct illustrations of the following themes: a withdrawal of cathexis from external objects leading to the reinforcement of narcissistic pleasure (Freud); compensation for disappointment by an external object by turning to the internal counterpart object (Klein); the suggestion contained in it that narcissistic well-being depends on or is greatly augmented by the existence of good internal objects (Klein); and the ' manic ' quality (Klein) of the idea that the phantasy of inward possession of the loved one ' redoubles reason '. Even if ' Reason ' in the seventeenth century did not mean exactly what it connotes to us to-day, the prevalent split between reason and feeling was already well established; no doubt it was born or reborn in the Renaissance. Was Donne's peculiar melancholy and tendency to despair, which epitomizes one aspect of the Renaissance spirit, perhaps an expression of grief and mourning for the coming degradation in Western life of the status of feeling and the foreseen victory of intellect and objectivity over feeling and subjective experiences? And is his use of the word ' reason ' here a flat repudiation of the truth that he does *not* possess the objective person of the beloved, and a direct assertion that the omnipotence of his subjective experience can override and arrogate to itself the omnipotence of external reality? ' Time doth tarry! '

To revert to my theme: that the fear of loss is a dynamic factor in the need to possess and incorporate. There is much to be understood about this fear of loss, and the more so by reason of our blindness to it and refusal to take it into account. Why should we unconsciously have such an ' unreasoning ' expectation and terror of loss? To begin with, all terrors are to be regarded as fears of some kind of loss. Freud regarded castration as the greatest fear in man (and woman) and that consists of the loss of the penis. This view did not satisfy everyone. Ernest Jones found a deeper and broader explanation of anxiety in his suggestion that it is rooted in the fear of ' aphanisis ', the loss of the capacity for experiencing pleasure in life, ultimately sexual pleasure. Finally, the work of Melanie Klein has shown that whereas both these roots of anxiety are true and valid, there is a yet deeper source of fear—fear of the loss of life itself.[7] All fears are intrinsically related to the deepest fear of all: that in the last resort any ' loss ' may mean ' total loss '; in other words, if it persists or increases, loss may mean loss of life itself and unconsciously any loss brings that fear nearer. All fears come back to the fear of death: to the destructive tendency that might be called the capacity for death in oneself, which must be turned outward in aggression if it is not to work out in and on oneself. Yet in turning this destructive force outward the loved and needed objects become its target and so the danger of their loss arises. Faced with the loss of them and their death, as a result of one's own destructiveness and hate, one's own death appears imminent; thus the fear of ' total loss ' takes shape. It is ultimately the fear of death which is behind our cravings to acquire, possess, and incorporate, behind our greed and sadism and the predatory aspects of our modes of life.

And why should this fear be so acute in humans and lead to so many differences between us and the rest of animal life? Here I think Freud gave us an answer, though he did not explicitly link it with the craving to possess and acquire: Freud was always impressed with the lengthy period of immaturity which humans alone are subject to, with the long condition of dependence and helplessness of our early years. He clearly felt that it had fateful con-

[7] See her papers, especially ' Anxiety and Guilt ', Chap. VIII, also ' Notes on the Life and Death Instincts ', Chap. X, by Paula Heimann, in *Developments in Psycho-Analysis*. Hogarth Press, 1952.

sequences on our psychical development, even if he did not altogether succeed in formulating them.[8] Thus, as I see it, the helplessness and dependence of human children must, in conjunction with their phantasy-life, presuppose that the fear of death is even part of their experience. They cannot maintain themselves; absence of the parents, the means of life, entails loss of life. Even to-day in this country children die of neglect by the parents; older children see it happening. Many people have conscious memories of their terror as small children of being turned out by their parents to starve, as it might be. The small child's ego is quite sufficiently rational to appreciate its dependence on adults, and in addition in its phantasies the angry and revengeful parents threaten it with starvation, exposure and all the terrors of death at their hands, which the child has willed that the parents shall undergo. It may well be that the id, which represents the mental expression of life and death instincts in fusion, cannot experience their total defusion and the extinction of life until bodily death ensues. But the ego, of which there is some nascent core from the very beginning of life, must have some capacity in that direction, since self-preservation is its primary function. To the unconscious of the child the worst terror, as Freud recognized, is that of the loss of the parents' love; and that loss means loss of all their needed goodness and in its place incurring their hate and revenge, so being alone and destitute with death as the consequence. This frightful thought is plainly dealt with by many and various methods of defence, among which denial of any such possibility or any such fear will be one of the first. Such an idea thus becomes inaccessible and taboo.[9]

We cannot escape the conclusion that an intense fear of dying by active aggression or passive neglect is a fundamental element in our emotional life, is as deeply-rooted in our unconscious minds as life itself and is barricaded off from conscious experience by every known mechanism of defence.[10] My thesis is that this fear is one fundamental source of the danger and terror giving rise to the drive to *incorporate* whatever is longed for and needed and the loss of which is dreaded. But in what sense does life depend on security in the love and possession of loved and needed persons, so that they must be internalized and kept alive within? It is true that people as well as animals are known to pine away and die when their loved ones vanish. We are not concerned here with material realities only; death is not only a matter of whether the breath leaves the body and the heart ceases to beat. That is one item of the experience of death, it is true; but is that all that death means to us? It is probably the most important factor in death because it is irrevocable, and thus all else that death means becomes irrevocable: namely, the cessation, the disappearance, so comparatively sudden, of a living existence, an entity, a person, a personality, a most complex and composite structure of attributes, tendencies, experiences, memories, idiosyncrasies good and bad, as well as the body they belong to. It is all this which disappears; from one moment to the next it was here and it is gone. So when one fears one's own death, it is all that which one will lose, one's ' life '—in both senses—one's present breath of life, and one's ' past life ' out of which one's identity is constituted. And evidently it is to the loss of the latter, bound up with the death of the body, that the fear of death largely relates; the belief in the immortality of the soul even points to the wish that the death of the body might be negligible if only the personality could survive.

This complex personality of ours, unique in every individual, then is what we cling to in life.[11] And now I must consider what this personality consists of, how it is composed. We tend to think of any one individual in isolation; it is a convenient fiction. We may isolate him physically, as in the analytic room; in two minutes we find he has brought his world in with him, and that, even before he set eyes on the analyst, he had developed inside himself an elaborate relation with him. There is no such thing as a single human being, pure and simple, unmixed with other human beings. Each

[8] Freud's decisive rejection of the possibility of an unconscious fear of death evidently played its part in this. Even if this view represents an aspect of truth, it appears to be only a partial one.

[9] I mention these objective factors in their bearing on a child's feelings and phantasies, not because I believe them to be a first cause of the fears in question, the root of which lies in a child's own instinctual endowment, but because such factors and their influence is denied and ignored by adults.

[10] I cannot here discuss the point further, but would refer the reader to recent papers on the topic by Melanie Klein and Paula Heimann, notably Chapters VIII and X, in *Developments in Psycho-Analysis*. Hogarth Press, 1952.

[11] The fear of the *loss of one's own identity*, by the disintegration and splitting of the ego, can be seen to be one of the most acute and painful anxieties accompanying or underlying schizophrenic disorders.

personality is a world in himself, a company of many. That self, that life of one's own, which is in fact so precious though so casually taken for granted, is a composite structure which has been and is being formed and built up since the day of our birth out of countless never-ending influences and exchanges between ourselves and others. They begin with heredity and are succeeded by every emotional experience undergone as the days of life pass; and every one of these emotional experiences is bound up in feeling with one or more other persons in our lives, with 'loved and hated objects'. From the earliest and simplest infantile situations of receiving or giving pleasure, of receiving or giving frustration and pain, of love of power, of hatred of authority or necessity, of fear of losses—from life itself to loss of the imperatively claimed, needed and desired persons on whom and on whose life our life depends—from these ultimates have expanded all our experiences, memories, qualities and idiosyncrasies which form our own identity—our loves and hates, our likes and dislikes, our habit of mind, our tendencies and reactions—every one of which is ultimately founded on experiences with other persons in our lives and every one of which is an integral part of our personality. These other persons are in fact therefore parts of ourselves, not indeed the whole of them but such parts or aspects of them as we had our relation with, and as have thus become parts of us. And we ourselves similarly have and have had effects and influences, intended or not, on all others who have an emotional relation to us, have loved or hated us.[12] We are members one of another.

All this, which must be theoretically well known and obvious to any analyst, still seems to be insufficiently appreciated by us emotionally. We cling to the fiction of our absolute individuality, our independence, as if we owed nothing to anyone and nothing in us had been begged, borrowed or stolen. I will not go into the motives which create and maintain this fiction—the deep-rooted egoism, omnipotent self-importance, the denial of debts which demand to be repaid; I will only point in passing to this attitude as another facet of the lack of comprehension of—resistance against—the notion of other individuals being within us and yet parts of ourselves. Nevertheless, there are moods and there are moments when we can be and are deeply conscious of the extent to which our lives and our being are interwoven with those of others. Everyone realizes at times, and normally with strong feeling, how much his life and his experience, if not his character and personality, is or has been enriched by a relation with other men and women (whether or not consciously he includes his parents among them). One thinks of the phrase 'To have loved her is a liberal education.'

Now it is not without significance that such moments most commonly occur in two particular situations: on the one hand, it is characteristic that the awareness of boons and benefits derived through the relation with another is part of the state of being in love, and especially when the love is returned; the other situation in which such emotions are typical is that of mourning the death or loss of someone whose value to one has been very great.[13] When, however, the awareness of all that one has gained in experience and personality from other people is connected with their loss this recognition of what such a person has meant to one is manifestly bound up with conscious *memories*. It can be said perhaps that the nearest a normal person, at any rate in the Western culture, comes to conscious realization of his own inner world is through the processes of memory. When we think such a thought as 'I shall always have him or her with me wherever I go', what we consciously mean is that our memory of the person is so vivid and established so firmly in us that it is part of ourselves and cannot be lost. We can see them with 'that *inward eye* which is the bliss of solitude', as Wordsworth says.

The experience and functions of 'memories' in the life of the emotions is a large subject, not yet adequately explored. Memories have perhaps been awarded a somewhat back-handed evaluation in psycho-analysis. To begin with, Freud credited them with being the origin of neurotic symptoms, after which we all expected to unearth traumatic incidents in the childhood of our patients. Since those days other factors in ætiology have come into the foreground, and

[12] As will be seen, what I have here attempted to describe in non-technical terms is something of the operation of introjection and projection in the formation of the personality, though excluding arbitrarily for the moment the dynamic instinctual forces behind their functioning.

[13] It would seem to be worth remarking that they are both situations in which a measure of defusion of instincts has taken place; for the time being either Eros or Thanatos has gained some victory and the equilibrium which balances on so many compensatory denials has given way.

we hear far less of ' memories '. But this is too superficial a description of what has happened. Analysis is not now seen so much as the process of recovering the memory of certain specific early events, but as a process in which every significant *relation* to others throughout life, whether permanent, constant, temporary or incidental, has to be recalled and realized; all the important emotional experiences of one's life comprise the ' memories ' which the analysis of to-day finds it necessary to recover and these important experiences consist, as we know well, as much or more of feeling and phantasy in reference to other persons as of real occurrences in which they figured. What matters is what we ' did with them inside ourselves ' (a phrase used by a patient) ' in our own minds ', usually much more than what happened with them outside in ' real life '. The memories to be recovered in analysis consist so much of these inner happenings, to which external events such as we consciously call memories are often not much more than labels or signposts—in a sense but ' screen-memories '. As such nevertheless they have their great emotional importance to us; just as a person's name, which is but a label, can represent his whole being to us.

I will now illustrate this significance of past memories in our lives with another verse—a more familiar and, because it expresses such a universal experience, even a hackneyed one.

> . . .' At moments which he calls his own,
> Then, never less alone than when alone,
> Those whom he loved so long and sees no more,
> Loved and still loves—not dead, but gone before—
> He gathers round him.' [14]

The meaning which is conveyed to us consciously by these lines is that the poet, when alone, becomes so deeply immersed in his thoughts and memories of those whom he has loved and lost by death that they seem to him to be still alive as they were in the past and their death and absence is thus for the time annulled. We recognize this to be a natural and familiar experience and so we attribute this meaning to the poem. In fact, however, the poet does not say this at all; he says nothing whatever about memory or the past. He simply says that when he is alone loved ones whom he no longer sees can be called to him and he is then not alone for he has them round him. His words are based on the assumption that they are *still present* and available to him; his words contradict the supposition that his relation with them lies in the past and can be enjoyed no longer. Yet it is incontestable that what this poetic phantasy relates to in external reality is his acts of absorption when alone in thoughts and memories of his *past*. The contradiction which is so remarkable here between past and present is to be resolved only in one way, namely, by the realization that the two opposites, past and present experience, are one and the same thing—two aspects of *one phenomenon*. It represents very much more than the banal fact that memories are always present with us to be called up when required. The appeal of these lines to so many thousands rests on their forthright statement that all those who have been emotionally important to us are still with us and inseparable from us—the unconscious truth behind the words being that they are *in us* and part of us and therefore inseparable and available to us. Memory, relating to external events and to the corporeal reality of loved figures as beings distinct from ourselves, is one facet of our relation to them; the other facet is the life they lead within us indivisible from ourselves, their existence in our inner worlds.[15]

I will digress here to give a significant instance of these two facets of a relation to another, past and present, coming to expression in one and the same breath, as it were. R. L. Stevenson was a writer whose mind was unusually open to the idea that other persons can be contained in

[14] Samuel Rogers: *Human Life*.

[15] It will be seen that in the lines from *Human Life* the poet does not actually state in words that these men and women are alive *in him*. The phrase he uses is that they can be gathered ' round him '. The content of the poem, however, states that they are not dead but are *still present to him*, and it is of interest to find that he chooses the idea that they are ' round him ' to express this thought since it is one of the most frequent symbols for internal objects. As Melanie Klein has mentioned in *Contributions to Psycho-Analysis*, p. 303, also p. 333 fn., a house, a car, a train or whatever contains people commonly represents the inner world; and conversely, whatever is closely round a person or on top of him (close but invisible) may represent his internal objects. Another aspect of the inner world, its mysterious, inaccessible quality, is also commonly represented symbolically by *far away*, by *looking into space*, both not tangible, incapable of exploration; again, by *farthest away*, equivalent to nearest, one's own inside; by *looking into a mirror*, into one's own inside; or by *the sky*, *heaven high above*, inaccessible, unknowable and again *above*.

In the lines quoted the explicitly omnipotent character of the poetic phantasy, together with the speaker's *solitude*, are further indications of inner world phantasy-manipulation.

oneself, whether for good or ill; such stories as *Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde* and *The Bottle Imp*, for instance, are evidence enough. In his essay, 'The Manse', he gives a picture of his grandfather's house and the grandfather himself, as he saw him and remembered him from his own childhood—silver hair, pale face, aloofness, the solemn light in which he was beheld in the pulpit, a somewhat awful figure. He wonders what of himself derives from this old minister, and would like to have inherited his noble presence.

'I cannot join myself on with the reverend doctor; yet all the while, no doubt, and even as I write the phrase, *he moves in my blood, and whispers words to me*, and sits efficient in the very knot and centre of my being.'[16] The whimsical R.L.S. then goes on most sensibly and plausibly to describe the converse: not only is the grandfather alive in him now, but he, R.L., was alive (part of him) in the grandfather when *he* was young, and went to school in him and was thrashed perhaps by Dr. Adam, and fell in love and married a daughter of Burns's Dr. Smith, and heard stories of Burns at first hand. 'I have forgotten it but I was there all the same.' So his past memories of the actual grandfather he knew in his childhood slide imperceptibly into his present phantasies of containing his grandfather alive in him now and of being alive in him before he himself was born. Time doth tarry in this inner world, indeed.

The two poems I have quoted represent first and foremost the psychological truth that other persons can exist within us; besides expressing this thought more or less unequivocally, however, both these poems at the same time refer manifestly to situations of the loss of loved objects in external reality by death or absence. I tried to show in these two cases the special compensatory connection between external loss and internal acquisition or possession. This particular causative connection does not, however, exhaust the functions or significance of internal objects in our minds; and though I am not inclined to suppose that this dynamic element can ever be entirely inoperative during life, there are other and equally important factors at work which create and maintain our inner worlds.

It is an essential element in these poems that the persons inside, or spoken of as 'round', the speaker are exclusively those he feels great love for. Not only is there no question in these instances of any alarm or revulsion at the idea of alien entities existing within the self; on the contrary, it is precisely the assurance that 'good', loved and loving, ones are present that serves to ward off alarm in the speaker's mind and recoil from thoughts of loneliness, sadness and despair. In the case of Donne's poem about *Absence* I pointed to the extreme idealization in it as an inherent feature of the phantasy-situation: the implied idealization and perfection of the beloved herself has radiated and extended into the ecstasy of possessing her which the poet actually describes. In the lines from *Human Life*, too, there is a strong idealization of the man's relation with the dead men and women from his past: there is in it the asseveration that nothing but love is felt for them or by them. What is assumed in the first poem is explicit in the second, that it is the presence of the *love*-feelings between the speaker and those he can recall and possess that gives rise to the happiness, the fulfilment, reassurance and peace they express and constitutes the effective barrier against the depression, loneliness and alarm more natural at such a time.

It appears therefore that these two poems would have had no meaning and served no purpose without their content of strong predominating love-feelings: anything indifferent or antagonistic in the speaker's relation with those within him must be totally excluded. And it is equally clear that just as it is the strong accentuation on possessing love which successfully excludes the thoughts of loss, so the emphasis on the loving relation between those concerned just as effectively averts the thought of any hostility, hurtfulness or pain between them. What is explicitly denied in the poems is the experience and the fear of loss, as I commented to begin with; what is implicit in the poems is that the loss feared and denied is specifically of the *love* in the relation with another human being. Thus we see, what as analysts we already know, that the loss and absence of loved ones can be equivalent in our unconscious to *lack of love*, hostility, hate, even malevolence, in them to us and in us to them. Donne's poems betray the failure of love, the tendency to cynicism and despair, behind which lies the dread of hate, in his jealous expectations of losing the beloved. The second poem, about those who have died, cannot fail to remind us that the dread, guilt and hate felt towards the dead in the unconscious, and the projected hate they feel for us,

[16] *Memories and Portraits* (my italics).

which psycho-analysis recognized so early, inevitably play their part here, and that the essential impulse prompting the verse is to dispel this fear. If love is not present there will be hate, there must be hate. Deep in the dynamic reservoir of instinctual forces, in the id, Eros the life and Thanatos the death force are in never-ending strife, one always aiming at ascendancy over the other. Whether in absence, or in death, or in other situations of estrangement, the intolerable fear rises that it is our own deadly hate which brings about the loss; and the greater is the love, the more hate is feared.

This brings me back to the split between love and hate, and between loved and hated, good and bad, objects, which I discussed to begin with; the simple ' good or bad ' pattern of our emotional life. I referred to the prevailing expectation we have that anything unknown, ' not oneself ' and alien inside us must be bad and dangerous, and to the corresponding claim and assumption that everything belonging to and part of us *must* be good—in itself a denial of the fear that it is not. I have further tried to show that our loving and hating of others relates as much (and more crudely) to their aspects inside us as to those outside us. In our earliest days, but later in life too, when the self within feels full of ruthless egoism or hate, destructive and painful, intense anxiety arises, both for ourselves and for the endangered objects; the violence of the fierce greed and hate raging within, and felt to be uncontrollable, is unutterably terrifying. It is then omnipotently denied and dissociated from the self, but is attributed instead to the persons inside who are the objects of the hate or greed, and are then felt to have provoked hate by their hate. It is they who are felt as bad: envious, robbing, ruthless, murderous. Thus it happens that a good helping person or part of a person, who was needed and craved, changes shape and turns into a terrifying and dangerous enemy inside one; one is felt to be ' possessed of a devil ' inside.

The bad objects within thus take their origin from our own dangerous and evil tendencies, disowned by us; characteristically therefore they are felt as ' foreign objects ', as an incubus, a nightmare, an appalling gratuitous and inescapable persecution.[17] This phantasy-situation takes particular symptomatic form in hypochondriasis, in which the feelings about the evil persons who are parts of oneself are replaced consciously by feelings about various organs or parts of the body supposed to be diseased and dangerous.[18] Thus the persons outside us whom we once needed and depended on as life-giving come to be taken into us in phantasy; as they then become attacked and hated for further satisfactions they come to represent our own evil, until they are at the opposite pole and personify death-dealing influences. Then a defence against this danger will be sought by externalizing them again, projecting and finding them outside in the external world, in the effort to rid the self of them again.

The projection of persecutory phantasies concerning the inner world has manifestly found its most widespread expression in the myths of frightful and horrible forms of existence, e.g. as in nether worlds, notably in the Hell of medieval times. Such regions are explicitly of an ' inner ' description, circumscribed and contained, and the inmates are immured *within* them; their underground siting links, among other things, with the inner depths of the unconscious and the ' bad ' inner world.[19] Hell is a mythological projection of a personal region within the individual in which all one's own ' bad ', cruel, torturing and destructive impulses are raging against the ' badness ' of others and *vice versa*; the fires of Hell too symbolize the guilt and shame, not felt by the persecuted as part of them and arising spontaneously but as attacking them aggressively. Dante's *Inferno* is the classic portrayal of this inner life.

Apart from descriptions of such terrible regions, there are in literature of course innumerable instances of less generalized representations of the bad inner world, transposed into the external world. Modern poetry abounds in them; such, for instance, as in T. S. Eliot's *Waste Land*, and also in his *Murder in the*

[17] The classical and emotionally most significant example of these unconscious phantasies of inner activities with and by inner objects is that of the primal scene, the parents in intercourse, typically of a monstrous and unutterably terrifying character, inside one. By the child originally they are felt as enacting what one set of urges in him is aiming at with each of them, but these aims are denied as his own and transferred on to them.

[18] For a study of hypochondriasis, see *Developments in Psycho-Analysis*. Hogarth Press, 1952. Chap. IV. By Paula Heimann.

[19] The symbolic association between the *lower* parts of the body and the ' lower ' aspects of human nature with the deep internal regions of Hell and the sadistic-anal and genital allusions in this context have long been recognized by psycho-analysis.

Cathedral, where the action takes place in the innermost sanctuary *inside* a sacred building. The cathedral represents both the person of the thinker in his most precious and valued aspects, his highest aspirations and capacities—love, truth, nobility and so on—as well as the inside of the idealized mother's body. In the depths, nevertheless, the bloody outrage happens with its accompaniments of desecration, ruin and corruption. The idealization of creative love and goodwill breaks down and the persecution by evil, in the murder of the father by the son, resurges within it.

The fears of malevolent and dangerous beings inside us unconsciously representing those we love, desire, hate, misuse and treat despitefully, and thus by our own persecution of them transform into persecutors of us, are, moreover, bound up in a particularly complex and specific way with the actual phantasies relating to the act of their incorporation. I have already attempted to give some general idea of the way our lives and personalities are interwoven with those of others and how we become integral parts of them and they of us. I shall now quote a passage from a love-story which puts into words something of the emotion belonging to the act of incorporating another and even expresses some details in the process which are part of the underlying unconscious phantasy itself.

In this story, a man who believes his beloved to be far away comes back unexpectedly at night to a house where he and she had once spent much time, but actually he discovers her there. They talk; and then after a silence:

'What are you thinking of?' she said.

'Can I think of anything but you?' I murmured, taking a seat near the foot of the couch. 'Or rather, it isn't thinking; it is more like a consciousness of you always being present in me, complete to the last hair, the faintest shade of expression, and that not only when we are apart but when we are together, alone, as close as this. I see you now lying on this couch, but it is only the insensible phantom of the real you; the real you is in me. How am I to know that the image is anything else but an enchanting mist?

'I will tell you how it is. When I have you before my eyes there is such a projection of my whole being towards you that I fail to see you distinctly. I never saw you distinctly till after we had parted and I thought you had gone from my sight for ever. Then you took body in my imagination and my mind seized on a definite form of you for all its adorations—for its profanations too.' [20]

Not only does the writer give us here an absolutely explicit description of one human being's act of incorporation of another, but he tells us of several accompaniments of the process. There is again the association of it with parting and loss which I have dwelt on already. There is the statement that the other whom he has within him is *more real* than the woman outside him, thus bringing into the foreground the connection between the directness and immediacy of the experience and the unconscious instinctual sources of our being, the *reality* of sensation, emotion and the surges of instinct in us being so much more actual and vivid than any perceptions of the external world. It is here that lies the origin of the mystical tendencies in human nature, bound up as they are with immediate experience of body and mind; their explanation is found in phantasies of bodily incorporation, union, fusion and inner possession.[21] In the quotation above there is, further, a direct statement of the phantasy of self-*projection* into the object which appears to be bound up and simultaneous with the process of *introjection* of the object; this is a most remarkable direct intuitive emergence into the author's conscious thought of the deepest unconscious processes which only through the work of Melanie Klein have now been uncovered and recognized in a scientific sense. Finally, and most important is the last sentence in the passage: 'you took body' in me and my mind 'seized' you, 'for its adorations *and its profanations too*'.

This final utterance it is which completes the picture; with this nothing is left out. In spite of the intensity of the love which infuses the speaker and his words, the phantasy of incorporating another person is not here bound up, as it is in the other cases quoted, with an idealization of the lover's feelings. Ruthless and egoistic impulses towards the woman are scarcely veiled in his speech and purely antagonistic hate and revenge are almost manifest in it. The egoism of the lover and his hate of

[20] Joseph Conrad: *The Arrow of Gold*, p. 283.

[21] These phantasies of 'projective identification' are the kernel of the 'cannibalistic' stage of development, already mentioned; they accompany the earliest oral phase of breast-feeding, the former being in any case an offshoot of impulses and phantasies belonging to the latter.

the frustrating object are here felt by him *as part of his love of her* and are recognized by him as such. There is a differentiation of his motives indeed in 'adorations and profanations', but here it does not develop fully into the split between love and hate, good and bad, the split of idealization *versus* persecution, with the persecutory aspects denied and obliterated; in this passage the fundamental truth of their co-existence is laid bare. The open admission of intense love, longing, craving for possession, hand in hand with the impulse to profane—to maltreat, abuse and degrade—is almost unique and it yields the solution to all our problems about the inner world. Those whom we love and crave for—first the mother, and later the long procession of all who come after her—who 'take body' in us, whom we seize, devour and immure, we have not only loved, not only yearned to be fed by and to feed, not only longed to satisfy and delight, but have craved to engulf and possess for ourselves and to use for our own ruthless purposes, in total disregard of their needs, and have wreaked on them the greed and savage impulses that are inherent in us along with our capacity for love. These savage impulses gain ground when love and desire are frustrated; they spring from the forces of death in us which are reinforced when love fails, and the fear of such danger to the self within impels us to direct them outward on to the other. In its primitive form perhaps the impulse to possess and incorporate the desired object can be regarded as a sort of half-way process, a manifest fusion of Eros and Thanatos, a compromise between loving and killing, in which both have a share but neither prevail and by means of which the life of both subject and object is felt to be secured. Nevertheless, in one of its aspects it entails the imprisonment, subjection and torture of the loved, desired and hated objects, and from that circumstance spring the torments and agonies suffered by them and by us in our inner worlds. Thus it is that one and the same figure in our inner worlds can bear two different aspects, can be felt as ideally perfect, without a flaw, or as vile and monstrous, as bounteously loving and protecting or as terrifying and persecuting.

Now to conclude I will come back from the theme that good and bad cannot be isolated, that all life and therefore ourselves contain them both in varying degrees, to the corollary of this that none of us can be isolated, that each of us is a company of many, and that our being is contained in all those others we have been and are occupied with as we live, just as they are contained in us. The following translation of verses by a French poet expresses this aspect of life with the peculiar realism of such phantasies.

The stream of life went past me and I looked for my body there
All those who followed on and on and who were not myself
Were bringing one by one the pieces of myself
There I was built up piece by piece as one erects a tower
The men and women piled up high and I appeared —myself
Who had been made of all the bodies, all the stuff of man

Times past—passed out—ye gods who made me
As you lived, so I, in passing only, live
My eyes averted from the empty future
Within myself I see the past all gaining growth

Nothing is dead but what is yet to come
Beside the luminous past to-morrow is colourless,
And shapeless too, beside what perfectly
Presents at once both effort and effect.[22]

My attempt has been to convey some introductory idea, as it were, of the phantasies we all unconsciously create of harbouring others inside ourselves. I have scarcely touched on what they are, what we feel they do with us or we do with them.[23] I have wished to show that even the *conscious* phantasy of other beings existing within us is not in the least uncommon in the imagination of man, and is far from being an outrage on human nature or a sign of derangement. The understanding of the part played in our lives by the *unconscious* phantasy can only come through the widening knowledge of psycho-analysis.

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[22] Le cortège passait et j'y cherchais mon corps
Tous ceux qui survenaient et n'étaient pas moi-même
Amenaient un à un les morceaux de moi-même
On me bâtit peu à peu comme on élève une tour
Les peuples s'entassaient et je parus moi-même
Qu'ont formé tous les corps et les choses humaines

Temps passés Trépassés Les dieux qui me formâtes
Je ne vis que passant ainsi qui vous passâtes
Et détournant mes yeux de ce vide avenir
En moi-même je vois tout le passé grandir

Rien n'est mort que ce qui n'existe pas encore
Pres du passé luisant demain est incolore
Il est informe aussi près de ce qui parfait
Présente tout ensemble et l'effort et l'effet.

Guillaume Apollinaire: *Alcools*, p. 57, 1920.

[23] In my paper on 'The Inner World in Ibsen's *Master Builder*' this Journal p. 173 some pathological aspects of the activities of internal objects are illustrated.

THE INNER WORLD IN IBSEN'S *MASTER-BUILDER*

By JOAN RIVIERE, London

In my paper 'The Unconscious Phantasy of an Inner World reflected in Examples from English Literature'[1] I brought together a few instances from poetry and prose in which a conscious awareness of containing other persons inside them, and of themselves existing in others, is more or less directly acknowledged by the writers. Here I have chosen a different kind of illustration of this theme, one in which conscious awareness of having beings inside one is not quite directly expressed, although it does appear in a special guise; nevertheless the whole meaning and content of the work has this and can have no other significance. It is a play; and the allusions in it to what is happening in the inner world are not occasional and transitory, nor are they elaborately overlaid by a realistic pattern of everyday life. The whole action and even the characters belong so predominantly to the inner world that the entire drama is a representation of that world; and moreover, to such a degree is this so that from the standpoint of external life the story seems to have no apparent motivation, and to some has even appeared ridiculous. The play is Ibsen's *Master-Builder*, whose meaning and message remains as mysterious to-day as it was when first performed more than fifty years ago, when nearly all the critics reacted to it with contempt.[2] In spite of its insoluble and fantastic story, however, the play has from the beginning had a profound appeal, drawing audiences and moving them by powerful emotional forces in it which yet defy precise definition.

A full psycho-analysis of Ibsen's *Master-Builder* would be of great interest; here I shall give only a sketch of it and deal chiefly with the references in it to the inner world. The story is that of a builder, Solness, who has reached the pinnacle of success in his profession and has apparently attained everything or almost everything that life has to offer. In spite of being supreme, however, with his whole environment at his service, he is revealed as moody and unreasonable, overtly or tacitly harsh to all and preyed upon by anxiety. In particular he has intense feelings of insecurity in regard to the future, dread of being superseded by 'the younger generation', and he is haunted by the past. Alongside the story of his fears and his final fate, there is woven into the play the theme of daemonic forces influencing and impelling him both for and against his will. More than once Solness recounts solemnly, with awe and some uncertainty, that something he had 'wished and willed—silently and inwardly—' had come to pass; for instance, when he first met the young woman who was betrothed to his assistant he silently wished very ardently to attract her to him, to make a 'helper and server' of her—a phrase which is constantly on his lips—so as to keep the young man under him by her means; and then the next day she appeared, assuming she was to work for him as his book-keeper! In these connections casual references are made in the play to hypnotism or thought-transference, but no weight attaches to them. The weight of feeling lies in Solness's personal experience that some power in him which is not fully himself, but which he is responsible for, is at work on people round him. Conversely, he himself is restrained or impelled by an inner force, 'held back as by a hand' from some actions without understanding or strength to resist, driven and lured on to others.

[1] See p. 160.

[2] This play was written by Ibsen in 1892; the English translation by Edmund Gosse and William Archer was published by Heinemann in February, 1893. The play was put on in the same month by Elizabeth Robins and Herbert Waring. In a preface to the translation, dated May, 1893, Edmund Gosse refers to the 'delightful want of proportion between the scorn of the British critics on the first appearance of the book and the excessive and sustained curiosity of the public itself.' The critics, with few exceptions, 'explained to us at once that the *Master-Builder* would fall still-born from the press and would not be tolerated an hour upon the stage'. It was pronounced 'fantastic balderdash devoid of the slightest interest'; 'a bewildering farrago of tiresome rubbish'. Admittedly, Gosse says, *what it all means* is of course the crux; he also admits that 'the faith of the two translators in the play's acceptability for the stage was at times far from robust', until the enthusiasm of Elizabeth Robins relieved their minds.

The major action of the play takes place between the Master-builder and a young girl, Hilda, a remarkable character; with her appearance the daemonic forces advance into the foreground and are treated between him and her almost as real, at first playfully, later in all seriousness. They are named and defined; the major power is the 'troll' or daemon; there is also another category of minor beings, less magical and great than the daemon, who work for his ends, to carry out good tasks or evil acts for him. They are 'his good or bad spirits', 'black or white devils', and they are aligned with the helpers and servers in the real world, such as the book-keeper, whom he puts his spell upon and uses to do his will. Although this feature of the drama no doubt contributed to the scorn originally cast on the play by the English critics, the gravity and depth of feeling which invests these mysterious forces in the minds of his characters is in fact conveyed to the reader or spectator with inescapable conviction by the masterly power of Ibsen's art.

The play opens by introducing us to the Builder's past, the effects of which are persecuting and troubling him now. Solness began as a poor boy from a country village, worked his way up as a builder and has had astounding luck. When an old firm of architects became bankrupt he took the owner and his son into his office and exploits their experience and abilities to offset his own lack of training on the technical side of building. Now this old architect is worn out with illness, hate and despair, and is very near death, though still working in an effort to prevail on Solness to allow the son some recognition and some work on his own account, so that he may attain the independence and success he deserves before the father dies. Solness's persecutory dread of being ousted by the young makes it impossible for him to agree; he refuses brutally and insists on the young man remaining as his assistant. To achieve this end we see how he has been impelled even to exert his powers of fascinating women over the book-keeper in his office who is betrothed to the young architect, so that she becomes enslaved by him and is in this way secretly used to keep his hold on the young man and maintain his supremacy.

This situation contains the play's most realistic aspect; there is nothing incomprehensible in it. And unconsciously it is virtually an Œdipus situation; the builder is the son who unconsciously forced himself into the father's place, ruined and enslaved him; now the young couple represent the parents who would ruin him in retribution if they could be united and defy him. But he still decoys the woman, prevents their marriage, makes her no return, and by his secret use of her love and her misery keeps the man in his power. As the play develops, this aspect of the story which deals mainly with external reality, and predominantly with the man's relation to his father, recedes into the background, and the matter becomes more and more fantastic. We regress, as it were, from the genital Œdipus position to the man's primary relation to his mother, and with that the forces of the inner world begin to emerge into the picture.

The Master-Builder's success had also been greatly assisted in the past by another piece of 'luck'. Twelve years before, soon after his marriage, the gloomy old family mansion inherited by his wife from her parents, in which he and she lived, was burnt to the ground and the insurance compensation obtained from it enabled him to extend his business very substantially. But this advantage was accompanied by a tragedy; his young wife had given birth to twin sons just before the fire, and the shock and effects of the catastrophic destruction of her home and of her removal with the babies during the fire had disastrous consequences for her and them. She lost her milk; the babies died and she was thrown into a depression from which she will never recover. We see her now as a withdrawn and depressed figure, almost without contacts, either sunk in melancholy, self-reproaches and regrets or mechanically occupied with her 'duty' in small household tasks; alongside these aspects, moreover, she manifests penetrating suspicion and jealousy of Solness's relations with younger women, such as to begin with the book-keeper. The unconscious significance of this past trauma in the hero's relation to his wife and her possessions is clear; it represents the child's pregenital sadistic relation to his mother. The fire—it transpires that he had imagined and wished for a fire to abolish the dreary old mansion of her family and to supply him with funds for his own building—the fire represents his attack on the mother's body; it destroys her breasts, the children in her, as well as her parents inside her, represented by their house. He is left with the ashes, the sterile lifeless wife and pile of fæces, the gold—and with his terrors, of the 'younger generation', those

murdered children breaking in as avengers in place of the parents.

The Master-Builder's own emotions and morbid fears and phantasies are soon expressed, when he tells the family doctor that his wife's suspicions of his affairs with young women have no basis in fact, but that still he does not relieve her mind about them. Her suspicions are a 'salutary self-torture' to him; to endure them 'is like paying off a little bit of a huge immeasurable debt; he can breathe more freely for a while'; it relieves *his* mind that she should *doubt* him. He goes on with an access of paranoid feeling: the doctor has been 'set on by his wife to draw him out; the wife believes he is crazy—mad—and the doctor is to detect it'. Then his 'fear of his luck turning' bursts out in panic: 'It terrifies me—terrifies me every hour of the day. Sooner or later my luck must turn. I know it—I feel the day approaching. One of the younger generation will come knocking at the door, saying "Give *me* a chance" and all the rest will come clamouring after him and shouting "make room for us, make room, make room" . . . Then there's an end of Halvard Solness! It means retribution.' Since his guilt is rooted in his unconscious relation to his father and mother, Solness never defines the crime for which he expects this retribution. In external life there are no sufficient grounds for it; the doctor laughs at his fears, expostulates at his talk of madness, reminds him of his success. He is guiltless in fact of the actual fire that destroyed his wife's happiness and health. Even his hidden tyrannical and dishonourable exploitation of the father and son and the son's bride would not give grounds for anticipating such a calamity. It is evident that such anxieties derive from his inner world; clearest among its characters is his 'sick conscience', the super-ego, which in him is not an integrated ego-ideal guiding and controlling him, but a horde of pursuers terrifying and persecuting him, spectres of his own id, the inner unconscious greed and ruthless egoism of his own youth.

The action of the play now moves suddenly from past to present. There is a knock at the door and a young girl walks in, and with her Solness's inner world and his relation with those in it comes to the fore. Hilda is a completely fantastic and unique creation; she exerts a magnetic attraction on some and in some she produces a revulsion. Solness yields to her spell; although she is not a 'good figure' in the ordinary sense of the word, she is the best, the only 'good' that Solness can entertain. His first reaction to her is his invariable one; she is another piece of 'luck' which he can use for his own ends. But we see that she is not, like the hapless real human beings, his to exploit and enslave; she is a daemonic force herself and becomes at last the antithesis of his luck. She proves to be his doom; in her daemonic struggle to enslave and exploit *him*, she forces him to a virtual suicide and he is killed before her eyes. So the younger generation in the person of one young girl, instead of the many young men he feared, carries out the retribution Solness had so mortally dreaded.

None of this is apparent on the surface. As I said, the meaning of Hilda and Solness's relation to her is the enigma of the play. We see dimly that her influence over him is finally disastrous; we feel a catastrophe impending, but we do not know how or why. Hilda's other-world origin, her personification of Solness's inner self and inner objects is not hinted at directly; although she herself and the nature of her acquaintance with him are, if not incredible, exceedingly unusual.

Ten years before Solness had built a church with a high tower on it in Hilda's native town and she as a child of eleven had watched the celebrations at its completion, when he had climbed to its pinnacle by the scaffolding and had hung a wreath there. The little girl was intoxicated by the excitement of the incident, cheered and sang among the loudest, afterwards waylaid him in her father's house, evoked such a response in him that he kissed her ardently, promised her to come back 'like a troll' for her in ten years' time, make her a Princess and give her a kingdom. It is ten years to the day when she walks upon the stage and says she has come for her kingdom!

She is life, youth, vitality personified, blooming health, above all, independence, self-assurance and fearless daring. She comes alone, walking with a pack from her home miles away, indifferent to ordinary feminine concerns; there is more than a hint of masculinity in her. What she lives for is dangerous excitement; she will defy everything for that. The episode ten years before when she saw Solness court danger and overcome it, even with the added danger of her wild shouting, intoxicated her, filled her with an infatuation for him which was sealed that evening by the excitement of his sensual responses and his

glittering promises to the little girl. The craving for dangerous excitement in her so fully roused that day has possessed her all the ten years since then; she has waited in the assured belief that this hero-father of her dreams will fulfil her hopes and raise her beside him to the dizzy pinnacle of her ' kingdom '.

With her entry, two poles of an emotional state become personified in her and the Master-builder: where life offers him only a decline into gloom and danger she incarnates sunshine, youth and promise; he is uncertain, irascible, full of torment, while she is gay assurance and determination that she can gain her ends. She is thrilling with daring and defiance against any opposition, in contrast with the shuddering dread of madness, the torturing terror of retribution that we catch clear sight of in him. She can be gentle and understanding to his unhappy wife, while he alternates between agonies of remorse and harsh intolerance towards her. In the heart of his house the cold empty rooms of the dead children still remain; in the heart of Hilda is the vision of her castle in the air, the Princess enthroned over all.[3]

When Hilda arrives, Solness is first amused with her, regarding her as of no importance, and then he attempts to make use of her—in the office. Her contempt for this suggestion has its effect and he is gradually impressed by the totally forgotten incident of his promise to her years before and by the insistence of her demands on him to fulfil it. When she proudly declares that ' no one but he should be allowed to build at all ', she is ' not such a child as he thought '. He cannot do without her; she shall be his ally; with her he will triumph over his fears. She too is the ' younger generation ', as he has yearned for it, however, and not as he feared it. He will pit her against the generation he dreads; it shall be ' youth marching against youth '. ' He needs her '; he even feels he ' called her to him '; he has been ' torturing himself trying to remember something he had forgotten ' and he ' never had the slightest inkling what it could be! ' His inner daemon has stood between; the ' hand has held him back '. He will no longer be the ' half-mad, crazy man ' he is, ground down by the daemon of his super-ego, with his ' terrible burden of debt ' to his wife. He tells Hilda the story of the fire and the dead children: ' And now I am chained alive to a dead woman—I who *cannot* live without the joy of life! ' But to look at Hilda is ' like looking at the sunrise ', ' like the dawn of day '.

The meaning, unconscious or not, of Hilda's phantasy of the Princess and the kingdom is plainly to capture for herself the hero-father who had so entranced her in her identification of him with the high tower he had built up and climbed up. But in her too, as in Solness, the genital relation to the love-object cannot develop fully. She shows womanliness and goodness at moments, but they struggle with the aggressive greed in her and are lost. The woman's oral greed towards the man and his penis, the urge to seize and absorb them sadistically, to become fused with them in masculine identification and to triumph in possession of them ' on top of the world ', is insuperable; Hilda cannot surrender fully to love for a man. To the audience the tension of the drama consists largely in the question whether the need of Solness and Hilda for each other will or can develop normally, at any moment whether they will or will not fall into each other's arms. Though they know and refer to the possibility of that, they avoid it. It does not happen. Instead we see repeatedly how ' the hand holds them back '—one of the forces of the other world, the internal daemon in one of his shapes, always interposes. There can be no happy ending to their story.

They avoid thinking of the future; they talk of the past, for the inner forces which inhibit their relation are figures from the past, from their *pre*-genital existence. Hilda diagnoses the ' sick conscience ' in Solness; she yearns for a ' strong, radiant, robust conscience, for then one *could dare* to do what one would '. She talks of Vikings, who captured and carried off the women they desired; Solness says there is something of the bird of prey in her and she bursts out ' Why not? Why shouldn't *I* carry off the prey I want, get my claws into it and do what I want with it! There are daemons in women as well as in men.'

They talk about the daemon, and the black and white spirits. The daemon shows one the vision, the illusion, ' the *impossible* '! which yet beckons and calls, attracts and allures irresistibly. One has a faculty, says Solness, for desiring, craving, *willing* a thing so inexorably that it *has* to happen; and the good and bad spirits and devils, the helpers and servers, must

[3] There could not be a plainer representation of the manic defence personified in Hilda, as against the depressive and persecutory anxieties which are overwhelming the Builder.

play their part too if it is to come out right; but they must be *called*, they never come of themselves. The fire happened because he never stopped thinking of a fire and never mended a chimney which might have caused a fire.[4] So those who *did* cause the fire were merely his helpers and servers, his black or white spirits; and so it *is* his fault that the children died and his wife's life is ruined. 'That's what people call having all the luck; but what does this kind of luck make you feel! It's like a great raw place here on my breast, and the helpers and servers keep flaying off pieces of flesh from *other* people in order to heal my wound—but still it never heals—never, never!' He created homes, happy homes, with the money from the fire; but the terrible price he had to pay for it; he had to forego for ever the home *he* might have had, 'with a troop of children, and a father and mother too!' The ruin of his wife's home and her illness have destroyed it. 'The daemon within me has drawn all the life-blood out of her; and the spirits too do it for *my happiness*!' 'All I have done and succeeded in has to be made up and paid for with *other* people's happiness—over and over and over again—for ever!' 'The fight I am fighting has cost heart's blood enough. And I'm afraid the helpers and servers won't obey me any longer. Retribution is inexorable.'

Hilda cries out at this: 'Do you want to take from me what is more than my life?' (what is that?) 'The longing to see you great, to see you again with a wreath in your hand, high, high up upon a church-tower.' For her, life consists in her illusions, her phantasies. Where Solness tried to escape from necessity and frustration by imposing his will on reality and forcing it to his pattern, she tries to escape them, and guilt and persecution too, by denying reality and living in idealized dreams, as she did for ten years in dreaming of her Master-Builder's return. The factor of illusion, the snares and the trickery of the daemon, along with his compulsions and denials, in a sense constitutes the major theme of the play. Indeed, such is the capacity of both Solness and Hilda for illusion that in this analysis it might seem that their grandiosity merits nothing but ridicule. But in the play itself, under the hands of Ibsen, we are moved to much compassion by their pitiful struggles. Solness describes how he had first built his churches out of a pure and heartfelt devotion to God and his glory; but he 'found he was tricked'; God wanted more and more for Himself. *God* put the daemon into Solness and made him able to lord it over everyone, gave him the devils to burn his home down, but all so that Solness should build more and more for *His* glory. So the Builder swore he would be even with God, he achieved the impossible, in spite of his terror of heights; one day, when Hilda saw him, he climbed the tower he had built and defied God. Thenceforth he would build no more churches, only happy homes. But that was all delusion too—God's turn came again. 'Happy homes are not worth a straw, Hilda. Now I *see* it. People don't want their homes—not to be *happy* in! I shouldn't have been able to enjoy it if I'd had one.' It is all a delusion: 'Children and parents cannot be and don't want to be happy together' is what he means. So, he says, nothing, nothing comes of it all. 'Castles in the air is all one *can* build.' Everything is trickery. At one moment of miserable indecision he says 'O, there are innumerable devils that you *never see*. If only you could always tell if it's the white or the black ones that have got hold of you!'

A new tower on a new house he is building is to be finished that evening; Hilda has been insisting that he must climb it and again set a wreath on the height; he must grant her that pleasure 'to see him great again'. His wife, who knows his dizziness and mortal dread of heights, is in terror at the thought. But as Hilda sees her kingdom on earth with Solness fade further and further off, with the figure of the broken and helpless wife coming ever more and more between them, she takes her last refuge in this desperate throw. Castles in the air are what they *shall* build; the Master-Builder *shall* place the wreath on the tower to-night, and silently he accepts her will. He climbs to the top, but as he waves to her and she to him, he falls. The beginning of his story was tragedy and the end must be so, for them both: disillusionment and dispossession for her, retribution and death for him.

* * * *

And who and what then precisely are the people of the inner world who appear, as I claim, so plainly in this play? The inner

[4] The devil who held his hand back was his own greed which meant to have a fire and profit by it, and also his father or mother whom *he* had thought so greedy.

world starts to be formed in us along with our perceptions of the outer world; the prototypes of its inhabitants consist therefore in our earliest instinctual objects: mother, father, and the family, and the figures who are their successors in later life. It is these figures in the guises they wear in the inner world whom we find dramatized and effecting the action in the play. Superficially, the daemon and the white spirits or black devils are not to be taken seriously; that is so, but though they are imaginary personifications and names, they are names given by Solness to something that is serious and is real, that has actual power and directs the lives of the real bodily persons with far stronger influence than any rational motives do.

The daemon, who is the king of this underworld, is not difficult to identify. He is a figuration of that part-object, the great penis, the essential source of life and death, of magic power for good or evil. Though this magic penis is a separate entity, it originates as the father's penis and is always related to him. The father-figure himself in the Builder's inner world is clearly represented by two figures: one the old architect whom he forces into his service, whose ability and whose young son (both representing the father's potency) Solness grinds down and keeps in slavery for himself. The other father-figure is represented by God, in the story of Solness's first delusional belief that he was building for God's glory and not his own; in that way cheating God and himself and secretly robbing Him; and then in finding projectively that the father-figure had turned deceptive and grasping against *him*, so that he, Solness, was being defrauded of glory. Then the fight between himself and God came out into the open. Solness *did the impossible*, climbed the tower, and arrogated the magic penis, the power over life and death, to himself. After that *he* would be the Creator God, creating happy homes, happy families, and cut out churches and God. But God triumphed; Solness's home and his family were ruined and came to nothing—dead ashes.[5]

The mother-figure of the Builder's inner world is, one could say, almost conspicuous by her absence. True, she it is whom he is for ever creating and recreating anew in his churches and homes; but that relation is far from the simple direct one to a mother. It is largely a reversal of the original relation to his mother, and it is much complicated by his relation to the father. There is no woman in the play who is actually a mother, or any reference to one. The relation to his mother in Solness's inner world is plainly outlined in broad strokes, however, in the figure of his wife, who seems all but dead, who is *not* a mother, and who had suffered, at his hands as he feels, the loss of all her love-objects and treasured possessions, all that should have made life worth living to her as a woman and mother. She is there, but as little more than a negation of a woman; she cannot live or enjoy anything in life, at best she can only do her duty. She has, however, one aspect which is not a negation, one in which she seems to the Builder alive, namely, her persecuting side. Her jealousy of the younger women and her suspicions of Solness torment him and reproach him frequently; but (as Melanie Klein has shown us is typical) he maintains these suspicions in her because they relieve his guilt. He is not in fact sexually unfaithful to her; and, further, the torment she causes him expiates the guilt he does feel. Externally Mrs. Solness is the dead, ruined, 'depressed' love-object, and with some persecutory features, as always. Yet there is a moment in the play when she speaks as a person in her own right, and is not merely the Builder's mother-figure. There is a wonderful conversation between her and Hilda about the dead children she had had, in which her rôle as mother is seen from the inside, from the side of *her* inner world. The 'dead', mute, self-effacing woman then talks freely, with terrible emotion and tears; but it is not her actual babies she is grieving for! They are better in heaven, she says, where they belong; her suffocating grief is for her home that was burnt and all her beloved things that had belonged to the family for generations, the portraits, the old dresses, the lace and jewels—but above all, *her dolls*. The nine dolls she had kept hidden away and cherished, had gone on 'always living with' even after her marriage—all were burnt. 'You see,' she says to Hilda, 'there was life in them too. They were always with me; I carried them under my heart, like little unborn children!" The children of the inner world it was whom she loved, her phantasy-

[5] The Builder has no confidence in a good father-figure in himself; for he had denied, attacked and stolen the goodness of his father, as shown in his relation to God; lacking a good inner father as part of himself, therefore, he cannot himself live the life of such a person in reality. And because there is no such good human figure, the daemon rules in his inner world.

children and phantasy-parents, and it was the daemon of this love and grief that wrecked her relation to her real children and caused their death.[6]

I will continue this theme of the children in the inner world before taking up the other aspect of the Builder's inner relation with his mother in the character of Hilda. I do not know if Ibsen was an eldest son, but I would swear that Solness was. His whole setting in the story shows him like a big boy dominating, bullying and coaxing the group of weaker mortals, most of whom are his willing helpers and servers, though one or two younger brothers only sullenly obey. The old architect-father's son who is kept in subjection by the Builder is one of these 'younger ones'; his fiancée the book-keeper is a sister-figure who has had a close relation with the younger brother but has been seduced away from him secretly by Solness, the elder. The black and white devils or spirits, too, little gnomes, are clearly the younger children, devoted servers of the gang-leader at one moment, but invisible mischievous rebels against him at the next, and always liable to betray him to the daemon father.

The Builder's feelings about real children of his own are highly ambivalent; he appears indifferent to the death of his sons in reality and to feel their loss only as his wife's. When we remember that the babies died because their mother's breasts dried up, we understand why Solness is indifferent![7] There is a curious detail in the play which adds not a little to its obscurity for the lay reader, but which has much meaning psycho-analytically. There are *three* children's rooms still in his house, although only twin boys were born, and there are again to be three children's rooms in the new house he is building for himself and his wife, although they can never have children again. When Hilda arrives, however, she is given one of the empty children's rooms—'the *middle* one', says Solness. So we see that the twin younger brothers (or two parents) are to be dead, but in his inner world the Builder means to create a fair daughter and instal her in the centre of the house, in place of the rest of the family—father, brothers, ruined mother—and so possess a virgin mother at last for himself alone.[8]

Hilda's own relation to children is very inhibited. The hints that she desires children by the Builder are extremely slight, hardly to be detected. Her penis-envy of the man is intensified as a defence against her own anxieties about her capacity for maternal love and devotion. In the inner world this anxiety proceeds from her own attacks on her parents' intercourse and then from the embargo laid by the persecuting parents on her wishes to become the mother. These inner persecutory figures do not appear in the play, i.e. this conflict is not faced by her; it is only seen in displacement externally, e.g. in her response to the story of the fire and the dead children when told by Solness. 'Was anyone burnt?' she says excitedly. When Mrs. Solness tells her about the fire, Hilda grieves for her about the dead babies, again too about the dolls when that grief comes into the open. Hilda understands that there can be *no* living children for them. Her hate and jealousy of brothers and sisters, however, is manifest; she can hardly endure the book-keeper and the young assistant whom Solness exploits. Since the hate is largely conscious, however, she is able to overcome it enough to help them and tries to help the Builder to do them justice.

The other aspect, besides that to his wife, of the Master-Builder's inner relation to women, ultimately to his mother, is of course portrayed in Hilda and his responses to her. Whereas his wife is the mother he destroys, Hilda is the longed-for, radiant and young woman, unhurt, full of life, hope and promise. She corresponds to the churches or the houses he created, just as he 'created' the vision of the future and the assurance of her happiness in her by his promise to return. Can he be assured that he can recreate the destroyed mother, all will be well; he can live again. But the old greed is behind this hope; almost as soon as he sees her,

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[6] The actress who plays the part of Mrs. Solness needs a fine intuition and deep feeling. If, as does happen, this comparatively small part is portrayed as nothing more than a suspicious, jealous wife, the play loses greatly in emotional impact on us. Her grief for the dolls should touch a note 'of such helpless sadness that it beggars all pity', as one of our finest critics said.

[7] His greed towards his mother, and his hate of her for having other children beside himself, caused him in phantasy to attack her breasts, so that they wither and her children starve.

[8] This detail is highly over-determined. Hilda here also represents the feminine side of Solness, his wishes to rob his wife and mother of children by coming between the parents (twins) in intercourse. His envy and rivalry of the mother and frustrated wish to 'build' babies himself impels him to force himself as Hilda into his wife's nursery (mother's body)—where the wife in fact is no mother.

he wants her, but in order to *use her for himself*, to obtain a new lease of life from her, not to give her life. He will make her a helper and server; he will turn her against his foes and his fears and she shall fight for him, shelter and protect him; while his wife and others accuse him, she shall defend and support him. He alone shall possess the mother in the home. In this he cannot succeed. Hilda's own daemon interferes too in various ways. The greed in Hilda which could respond to this aim is not sufficiently unmixed and direct to enable her at any price to take what she can get. But Solness is aware of it in her and also afraid of it; he calls her a bird of prey. Nevertheless, her greed is infused with very great love, and it is idealized to the point where the greed seems almost outweighed. Much as she hates 'the other children' who have claims on the Builder, the young assistant and the book-keeper, and the old man, she cannot take her prize at the cost of their destruction. She must attempt, instead of supporting him against 'the younger generation', to make Solness restore them their due. Neither can she face a final and utter death-blow to Mrs. Solness by taking him, who is all she has left in life, from her. But Hilda's love and her greed on the oral pattern are almost indistinguishable, largely moreover, because they are highly idealized. The aggression and hate in the greed are too much denied and split off and the illusory idealization enables them to break through and to overthrow the love. We see Solness unable to resist her; half of him surrendering to the magic of his recreated mother's belief in his power to achieve the 'impossible', half of him surrendering the power of life and death again to the father God, though his life is lost in the act. To Hilda it seems that it is solely in love for him that she must 'see him great and free once more', not bound by the shackles of earthly obligations. From behind this mask her devouring love for her father, her abiding envy of his magic powers, and her buried hatred of the father who disappointed her in infancy, well up and annihilate him utterly. After he falls, she is left alone on the stage, still gazing upward, but suddenly she cries out '*My—my* Master-Builder!' She has lost the man himself, but in her inner world of illusion she seems to have gained him at last.

ASPECTS OF SYMBOLISM IN COMPREHENSION OF THE NOT-SELF

By MARION MILNER, London

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Psycho-analytic Concepts of the Two Functions of the Symbol

Much has been written by psycho-analysts on the process by which the infant's interest is transferred from an original primary object to a secondary one. The process is described as depending upon the identification of the primary object with another that is in reality different from it but emotionally felt to be the same. Ernest Jones and Melanie Klein in particular, following up Freud's formulations, write about this transference of interest as being due to conflict with forces forbidding the interest in the original object, as well as to the actual loss of the original object. Jones, in his paper, ' The Theory of Symbolism '(1916), emphasizes the aspects of this prohibition which are to do with the forces that keep society together as a whole. Melanie Klein, in various papers, describes also the aspect of it which keeps the individual together as a whole; she maintains that it is the fear of our own aggression towards our original objects which makes us so dread their retaliation that we transfer our interest to less attacked and so less frightening substitutes. Jones also describes how the transfer of interest is due, not only to social prohibition and frustration and the wish to escape from the immanent frustrated mouth, penis, vagina and their retaliating counterparts, but also as due to the need to endow the external world with something of the self and so make it familiar and understandable.

The identification of one object with another is described as the forerunner of symbolism, and Melanie Klein, both in her paper ' Infant Analysis ' (1923) and in the ' The Importance of Symbol Formation in the Development of the Ego ' (1930), says that symbolism is the basis of all talents. Jones describes this identification as a process of symbolic equivalency through which progress to sublimation is achieved, but adds that symbolism itself, in the sense in which he uses the word, is a bar to progress. Leaving aside for a moment this difference over the use of the word symbol, there is one point about wording which, I do feel, requires comment. Jones describes the process of identification that underlies symbol formation as being, not only the result of the forbidding forces, but also a

result of the need to establish a relation to reality. He says that this process arises from the desire to deal with reality in the easiest possible way, from ' the desire for ease and pleasure struggling with the demand of necessity '. It seems to me that this way of putting it is liable to lead to misunderstanding. The phrase ' desire for ease and pleasure ' set against the ' demand of necessity ' gives the impression that this desire is something that we could, if we were sufficiently strong-minded, do without. The phrase reflects perhaps a certain puritanism which is liable to appear in psycho-analytic writing. Do we really mean that it is only the desire for ease and pleasure, and not necessity that drives us to identify one thing with another which is in fact not the same? Are we not rather driven by the internal necessity for inner organization, pattern, coherence, the basic need to discover identity in difference without which experience becomes chaos? Actually I think Jones himself implies such an idea when he says that this confounding of one thing with another, this not discriminating, is also the basis of generalization; and he indicates the positive aspect of this failure to discriminate, in relation to discovery of the real world, when he says:

' . . . there opens up the possibility . . . of a theory of scientific discovery, inventions, etc., for psychologically this consists in an overcoming of the resistances that normally prevent regression towards the infantile unconscious tendency to note identity in differences.'

This was written in 1916. In 1951 Herbert Read writes:

' The first perceptions of what is novel in any science tend to assume the form of metaphors—the first stages of science are poetic.'

Jones quotes Rank and Sachs when they make a distinction between the primary process of identification which underlies symbolism and symbolism itself. He quotes their description of how the original function (demonstrable in the history of civilization) of the identification underlying symbolism was a means of adaptation to reality, but that it ' . . . becomes superfluous and sinks to the mere significance of a symbol as soon as this task of adaptation has been accomplished '. He quotes their description of a symbol as the ' unconscious precipitate of primitive means of adaptation to reality that have become superfluous and useless, a sort of lumber room of civilization to which the adult readily flees in states of reduced or deficient capacity for adaptation to reality, in order to regain his old long-forgotten playthings of childhood '. But they add the significant remark that what later generations know and regard only as a symbol had in earlier stages of mental life full and real meaning and value.

Jones goes on to quote Rank's and Sachs' statement that symbol formation is a regressive phenomenon, and that it is most plainly seen in civilized man, in conditions where conscious adaptation to reality is either restricted, as in religious or artistic ecstasy, or completely abrogated, as in dreams and mental disorders. Here it seems to me that a valuable link has been made between symbolism and ecstasy, but the context in which these two ideas have been brought together leaves out, in respect of the arts, what Jones has described in respect of scientific invention: that is, that it may be a regression in order to take a step forward. Thus Rank's and Sachs' statement does not draw attention to the possibility that some form of artistic ecstasy may be an essential phase in adaptation to reality, since it may mark the creative moment in which new and vital identifications are established. In fact Rank and Sachs do not here allow for the possibility that truth underlies the much quoted aphorism that Art creates Nature; and so also they miss the chance of indicating an underlying relation between art and science.[1]

I think some of the difficulty arises here from lack of a sufficiently clear distinction between the two uses of the process which has been given the name of symbolization. Fenichel (1946) has made this distinction more clear. He says:

' In adults a conscious idea may be used as a symbol for the purpose of hiding an objectionable unconscious idea; the idea of a penis may be represented by a snake, an ape, a hat, an airplane, if the idea of penis is objectionable. The distinct idea of a penis had been grasped but rejected.'

But he then goes on to say that symbolic thinking is also a part of the primal prelogical thinking and adds:

' . . . archaic symbolism as a part of prelogical thinking and distortion by means of representing a repressed idea through a conscious symbol are not the same. Whereas in distortion the idea of penis

[1] Rank, in his later work, does in fact take a much wider view of the function of art.

is avoided through disguising it by the idea of snake, in prelogical thinking penis and snake are *one and the same;* that is, they are perceived by a common conception: the sight of the snake provokes penis emotions; and this fact is later utilized when the conscious idea of snake replaces the unconscious one of penis.' (The italics are mine.)

A distinction between two uses of the word symbol has also been described by a non-analyst. Herbert Read (1950) says:

' But there is a very general distinction to be made between those uses of the word which on the one hand retain the sense of a throwing together of tangible, visible objects, with each other or with some immaterial or abstract notion, and those uses which on the other hand imply no such initial separation, but rather treat the symbol as an integral or original form of expression. A word itself may be a symbol in this sense, and language a system of symbols.'

The similarity between this second use of the word symbol and Fenichel's second use of it, is clear; although Read says earlier that he feels that it is a pity that he and analysts have to use the same word to describe different things.

The Rôle of Illusion in Symbol Formation

It is the use of symbolism as part of what Fenichel calls prelogical thinking that I wish to discuss here. In particular I wish to consider what are the conditions under which the primary and the secondary object are fused and felt as one and the same. I want to study both the emotional state of the person experiencing this fusion and what conditions in the environment might facilitate or interfere with it; in fact, to study something of the internal and external conditions that make it possible to find the familiar in the unfamiliar—which, incidentally, Wordsworth (1798) said is the whole of the poet's business.

When considering what concepts are available as tools for thinking about this process of fusion or identification, the concept of phantasy is obviously essential, since it is only in phantasy that two dissimilar objects are fused into one. But this concept is not quite specific enough to cover the phenomenon; the word illusion is also needed because this word does imply that there is a relation to an external object of feeling, even though a phantastic one, since the person producing the fusion believes that the secondary object *is* the primary one. In order to come to understand more about the meaning of the word illusion I found it was useful to consider its rôle in a work of art. I had already, when trying to study some of the psychological factors which facilitate or impede the painting of pictures,[2] become interested in the part played by the frame. The frame marks off the different kind of reality that is within it from that which is outside it; but a temporal spatial frame also marks off the special kind of reality of a psycho-analytic session. And in psycho-analysis it is the existence of this frame that makes possible the full development of that creative illusion that analysts call the transference. Also the central idea underlying psycho-analytic technique is that it is by means of this illusion that a better adaptation to the world outside is ultimately developed. It seemed to me that the full implications of this idea for analytic theory had still to be worked out, especially in connection with the rôle of symbolism in the analytic relationship.

In considering the dynamics of the process the concept of anxiety is clearly needed. Melanie Klein has laid great stress on the fact that it is dread of the original object itself, as well as the loss of it, that leads to the search for a substitute. But there is also a word needed for the emotional experience of finding the substitute, and it is here that the word ecstasy may be useful.

There is also another ordinary English word, not often used in psycho-analytic literature, except to talk about the perversions or lack of it in neurotic states, and that is the word concentration. I wish to bring it in here because, in analysing children, I have found myself continually noticing the varying moods or quality of concentration shown by the children, and have tried to understand the relation of these variations to the kind of material produced. These observations have not been confined to the analytic situation; I have often noticed, when in contact with children playing, that there occurs now and then a particular type of absorption in what they are doing, which gives the impression that something of great importance is going on. Before becoming an analyst I used to wonder what a child, if he had sufficient power of expression, would say about these moods, how he would describe them from inside. When I became an analyst I began to guess

[2] This study was published under the pseudonym of ' Joanna Field ' (1950).

that the children were in fact trying to tell me, in their own way, what it does feel like. And I thought I recognized the nature of these communications the more easily because I had already tried for myself, introspectively, to find ways of describing such states, most particularly in connection with the kinds of concentration that produce a good or a bad drawing.

Before going on to present and discuss some clinical material there is one other concept which I think needs clarifying; and that is, the meaning of the term primary object. Earlier psycho-analytic discussions of symbol formation most often emphasized the child's attempts to find substitutes for those original objects of interest that are the parents organs. But some also emphasized the aspect of the child's attempts to find his own organs and their functioning in every object. In more recent work these two views tend to be combined and the idea develops that the primary 'object' that the infant seeks to find again is a fusion of self and object, it is mouth and breast felt as fused into one. Thus the concept of fusion is present, both in the primary situation, between self and object, and in the secondary one, between the new situation and the old one.

Case Material: A Game of War between Two Villages

Moments when the original 'poet' in each of us created the outside world for us, by finding the familiar in the unfamiliar, are perhaps forgotten by most people; or else they are guarded in some secret place of memory because they were too much like visitations of the gods to be mixed with everyday thinking. But in autobiographies some do dare to tell, and often in poetry. Perhaps, in ordinary life, it is good teachers who are most aware of these moments from outside, since it is their job to provide the conditions under which they can occur, so to stage-manage the situation that imagination catches fire and a whole subject or skill lights up with significance. But it is in the analytic situation that this process can be studied from inside and outside at the same time. So now I will present some material from child analysis which seems to me to be offering data about the nature of the process.

The patient is a boy of eleven who was suffering from a loss of talent for school work. During his first school years, from four to six, he had been remarkably interested and successful and always top of his form; but he had gradually come to find himself very near the bottom, and at times had been totally unable to get himself to school at all.

The particular play that I wish to discuss had been preceded by a long period in which all the toys had been set out in the form of a village, full of people and animals; the boy would then bomb the village by dropping balls of burning paper upon it, my rôle being to play the part of the villagers, and try to save all the toys from actual destruction. The rules of the game were such that this was often very difficult, so that gradually more and more of the toys were burnt, and from time to time I had replaced them by new ones. (This boy had, in fact, lived through part of the blitz on London, and had started this play sometime after my own house had been damaged by blast; and he had shown delayed interest in the extent of the damage when he came to my house for his analysis.)

In the session which I have chosen to describe, he begins by saying that we are to have two villages and a war between them, but that the war is not to begin at once. My village is to be made up of all the people and animals and houses; his of toy trucks, cars, etc., and 'lots of junk and oddments to exchange', though I am to have some oddments as well. He begins by sending along a truck from his village with half a gun in it, and takes various things in exchange. He then brings a test-tube and exchanges it for a number of objects, including a little bowl, bits of metal, a ladder, etc. When I comment on the amount taken in exchange he says: 'Yes, the test-tube is equal to a lot'; but on the return journey to his own village he adds: 'I think those people were a bit odd, I don't think I like those people much, I think I will give them just a little time-bomb'. So he takes back his test-tube, sticks some matches in it, and drops it over my village. He then drops a whole box of matches on my village, and says the villagers have to find it and put it out before it explodes. But then I have to come and bomb his village, and when I drop a flare, instead of putting it out he adds fuel to it. Then he says: 'You have got to bring all your people over to my village, the war is over.' I have to bring the animals and people over in trucks, but at once he says they must go back because they all have to watch the burning of the whole stack of matchboxes (which he has bought with his own money). He makes me stand back from the blaze, and shows great pleasure.

He now decides that his ' people ' (empty trucks) are to call on mine ; his are explorers and mine are to think his are gods. The trucks arrive, my people have to be frightened. He tells me to make them say something; so I make the policeman ask what they want; but he replies: ' You've forgotten, they think it's gods.' He now borrows the ' Mrs. Noah ' figure from my village and stands her in one of his trucks. Then, in a god-like voice, he commands that the villagers go into their houses and prepare food.[3] It is now the end of the session and while I am beginning to tidy up he plays with some melting wax, humming to himself the hymn-tune ' Praise my soul, the King of Heaven '. He smears some wax on both my thumbs and says he is double-jointed, and asks if I am too.

At first I saw this material in terms of his bisexual conflict and I tried to interpret it in that way. I told him that I thought the war between the two villages was expressing his feeling that I, as the mother, the woman, have all the human values, while he has only the mechanical ones. This interpretation linked with earlier material in which he had spent weeks making Meccano models with sets that he brought to the session, and had continually shown me the models illustrated in the handbook assuring me that ' You can make *anything* with Meccano '; but this play had stopped suddenly after he had tried to make a mechanical man, as specified in the book, and it had failed to work, *i.e.* move. And I had told him then how disappointed he was that he could not make a live baby out of his Meccano. So, in this village play, I pointed out how he had now attempted some rearrangement and exchange in which I was to be given some of the maleness (gun and test-tube), and he was to have something of the femaleness (ending up with getting the ' Mrs. Noah ' figure). I explained also how this compromise had not entirely worked, since jealousy had broken through, as was shown in his attempt to justify his impending envious attacks by saying ' I don't like these people ': that is to say ' I am not guilty because they are bad anyway, so it doesn't matter hurting them.' Also I told him that by burning his own village he was not only punishing himself, but at the same time expressing (externalizing) the state of anxiety in which he felt full of explosive fæces which might at any moment blow up his own body; and added that he had returned to the attempt to avoid the cause of jealousy by trying to mitigate the absoluteness of his split between ' mechanised ' male and ' human ' female. I suggested that he was trying to tell me how he could not stand the empty depersonalized gods (trucks), so effected a compromise by borrowing the good mother figure to fill the empty truck. I pointed out how, after this, he could tell me that he was double-jointed; that is, he combined both positions, and he hoped I could too.

In the next session immediately following this one, he spent the whole hour mending his satchel, a job that he said ordinarily his mother would do for him. Here I interpreted that the two villages were also mother and father, and that he felt he had succeeded in bringing them together inside him.

Certainly he did seem to be working out his conflicts about the relation between father and mother, both internally and externally, and trying to find ways of dealing with his jealousy and envy of his mother in what Melanie Klein (1928) has called the ' femininity phase '. Considered in this light, his mechanized village then also stood for his feeling about his school. For at this time he was constantly complaining how utterly uninteresting and boring his school work was, and he frequently brought material to do with waste lands and desert places: this being in marked contrast with the early school years during which he had been interested and successful. Thus one way of trying to describe the situation was in terms of the idea that the school, the place in which he must seek knowledge, had become too much identified with the destroyed mother's body, so that it had indeed become a desert; for the game of attacking and burning the village had been played throughout the period of his most acute school difficulties. But at the same time it was also too much identified with the desired mother's body, for such material certainly also pointed to intense conflict in the direct Œdipus situation, as well as in the ' femininity phase '; and for a long time it had seemed to me that the school

[3] I have had to omit some of the play in the middle of the session for reasons of space. It was connected with the theme of the previous months, in which there had been only one village, which he had continually bombed and burnt. I had interpreted it as partly an attempt to gain reassurance about his attacks on his mother's body, by acting them out in this comparatively harmless way and with my approval; I had also linked it with the aggression he had actually shown when his mother was pregnant.

difficulty was being presented largely in these terms. Thus the entry into the world of knowledge and school work seemed to be identified with the entry into the mother's body, an undertaking both demanded by the schoolmaster-father figure but forbidden under threat of castration by the sexual rival father. In fact one could describe the situation here in terms of the use of symbolism as a defence, and say that because the school had become the symbol of the forbidden mother's body this was then a bar to progress.

The defence against the anxiety aroused by this symbolic identification took the form of a reversal of rôles in his play with me, he himself became the sadistic punishing schoolmaster and I had to be the bad pupil. For days, and sometimes weeks, I had to play the rôle of the persecuted school boy: I was set long monotonous tasks, my efforts were treated with scorn, I was forbidden to talk and made to write out ' lines ' if I did; and if I did not comply with these demands, then he wanted to cane me. (When asked if he were really treated as badly as this at school he always said ' no '; he certainly was never caned, and the school, though of the conventional pattern, did try most generously to adapt to his difficulties.) Clearly then there was a great amount of resentment and fear to be worked through in the Œdipus situation, but I did not feel this was the only reason for the persistence of this type of play. It was other aspects of the material which finally led me to see the problem as also something to do with difficulties in establishing the relation to external reality as such.

One of these was the fact that he frequently adopted a particularly bullying tone when talking to me, even when he was not playing the schoolmaster game, but he always dropped this tone as soon as he began imaginative play with the toys. This observation suggested that perhaps this boy could drop the hectoring tone, during this kind of play, because it was a situation in which he could have a different kind of relation to external reality, by means of the toys; he could do what he liked with them, and yet they were outside him. He nearly always began the session with the bullying tone and insistence that I was not ready for him at the right time, whatever the actual time of starting; but as soon as he had settled down to using the toys as a pliable medium, external to himself, but not insisting on their own separate objective existence, then apparently he could treat me with friendliness and consideration, and even accept real frustration from me.

The Receptive Rôle of the Toys

This observation set me wondering about the exact function of this relation to the toys, and in what terms it could be discussed. I noticed how, on days when he did play with the toys, there seemed to develop a relationship between him and them which reminded me of the process I had myself tried to observe introspectively when doing ' free ' drawings (1950). I thought that there was perhaps something useful to be said about the actual process of playing with the toys as compared with, on the one hand, pure day-dreaming, and on the other, direct expedient muscular activity directed towards a living object. In the play with the toys there was something half-way between day-dreaming and purposeful instinctive or expedient action. As soon as he moved a toy in response to some wish or phantasy then the play-village was different, and the new sight set off a new set of possibilities; just as in free imaginative drawing, the sight of a mark made on the paper provokes new associations, the line as it were answers back and functions as a very primitive type of external object.

About two months after the war-of-the-villages play something occurred which seemed to offer a further clue as to what was happening when he played with the toys; for the bullying tone suddenly vanished for four days, beginning with a day when he told me about something that had happened at school which clearly gave him great pleasure. For many weeks before he had been intensely preoccupied with a photography club that he and his particular friends had organized in their out-of-school hours; now he reported that their form master had given them permission to hold their meetings in school, during a time set aside for special activities, and had even given them a little room in which to work.

This sudden disappearance of his dictatorship attitude gave me the idea that the fact of his spontaneously created activity being incorporated in the framework of the school routine was a fulfilling, in external life, of the solution foreshadowed in the war between the villages play. What he had felt to be the mechanized soulless world of school had now seemed to him to have become humanized, by the taking into its empty trucks of a bit of himself, something that he had created. But what was

particularly interesting was the fact that he had only been able to respond to the school's gesture at this particular moment; for there had been many efforts on their part to help him before this, such as special coaching after his continual absences. One could of course say that it was because of the strength of his own aggression and his anxiety about it, that he had not been able to make more use of the help offered; but it seemed to me that these earlier efforts on the part of the school had not had more apparent effect also because they had not taken the particular form of the incorporation of, acceptance of, a bit of his own spontaneous creation. Now the school, by being receptive, by being in-giving as well as out-giving, had shown itself capable of good mothering; it was a male world which had become more like his mother, who had in fact been a very good mother. Much earlier he had foreshadowed this same need by one of his rare dreams, in which his mother had been present at school in his Latin class, Latin being the bugbear of his school subjects.

This view of the meaning of the villages play as partly to do with problems of this boy's whole relation to what was, for him, the unmitigated not-me-ness of his school life, threw light on one of the elements in the original situation when his difficulties first became apparent. Not only had his father been called away to the war just at the time when his baby brother had been born and when London was being bombed, but he had also lost his most valued toy, a woolly rabbit. As the analysis advanced I had come to realise how significant this loss had been, for it became more and more clear that one of my main rôles in the transference was to be the lost rabbit. He so often treated me as totally his own to do what he liked with, as though I were dirt, his dirt, or as a tool, an extension of his own hand. (He had never been a thumb sucker.) If I was not free the moment he arrived, even though he was often thirty minutes early, I was reprimanded or threatened with punishment for being late. In fact it certainly did seem that for a very long time he did need to have the illusion that I was part of himself.

Play and the Boundary between Inner and Outer

Here I tried to review the various psychoanalytic concepts of mechanisms that can be forerunners of or defences against object relations, and see which might be useful to explain what was happening. Certainly he split himself and put the bad bit of himself into me when he punished me as the pupil. Certainly he used threatening words which were intended to enter into me and cow me into doing what he wanted and being his slave. Certainly he tried to make me play the rôle of the all-gratifying idealized phantasy object; he once told me that he did feel himself quite special and that the frustrating things that happened to other people would not happen to him. I thought that this did mean that he felt at times that he had this marvellous object inside him which would protect and gratify him. And this linked with the fact that he would sometimes hum hymn tunes, such as ' Praise my soul, the King of Heaven ', although he explicitly expressed great scorn for religion. Certainly also he found it very difficult to maintain the idea of my separate identity; in his demands he continually denied the existence of my other patients or any family ties. The way he behaved could also be described by saying that he kept me inside him, since he continually used to insist that I knew what he had been doing or was going to do, when I had in fact no possible means of knowing. Yet I did not feel that these ways of talking about what happened were entirely adequate; for all of them take for granted the idea of a clear boundary, if I am felt to be inside him then he has a boundary, and the same if a bit of him is felt to be projected into me.

But there was much material in this analysis to do with burning, boiling down, and melting, which seemed to me to express the idea of the obliteration of boundaries. And I had a growing amount of evidence, both from clinical material and introspective study of problems in painting, that the variations in the feeling of the existence or non-existence of the body boundary are themselves very important. In this connection Scott (1949) restates Winnicott's view (1945, 1948) about how a good mother allows the child to fuse its predisposition to hallucinate a good situation with the earliest sensations of a good situation. Scott then describes this as an ' oscillation between the illusion of union and the fact of contact, which is another way of describing the discovery of an interface, a boundary, or a place of contact, and perhaps at the same time is another way of describing the discovery of " the me " and " the you " '. He goes on to say ' But I think only a partial picture of union and contact is given by discussing the good situation. Equally important

is the evil union and the evil contact and the discovery of the evil me and the evil you.' [4] He also talks of the extremes of the states in which all discriminations and interfaces are destroyed as in what he calls ' cosmic bliss ' and ' catastrophic chaos '. And these extremes relate I think to behaviourist observations that can be made, both in and out of analysis, of the variations of facial beauty between extreme beauty and extreme ugliness. I had, for instance, a child patient of six who would at times show an extremely seraphic face, and it occurred in connection with great concentration on the use or lack of use of outline in painting. I also observed a schizophrenic patient (adult) who would at times have moments of startling physical beauty counterbalanced by moments of something startlingly repellent.

One could certainly think of this phenomenon in terms of complete union with a marvellous or atrocious inner object, with the obliteration of inner boundaries between the ego and the incorporated object. But there was also the question of where the actual body boundary was felt to be, did it mean that the skin was felt to include the whole world and therefore in a sense was denied altogether? Certainly the introspective quality of what have been called oceanic states seems to include this feeling, as does also the catastrophic chaos that Scott refers to. For the schizophrenic patient described above constantly complained that she could not get the world outside her and that this, rather than being a source of bliss, was agony to her. Certainly there is very much here that I do not understand. Also the whole question of beauty appearing in analysis, perceived by the analyst, either as a varying physical quality of the patient, or as a quality of the material, has not been much discussed in the literature, though Sharpe (1937) does mention dreams that the patient describes as beautiful. When perceived by the analyst it can clearly be described in terms of the counter-transference, and used, just as any other aspect of the counter-transference can be used (Paula Heimann, 1950), as part of the analytic data. Thus in trying to understand all that this boy was trying to show me I had to take into account the fact that at times there was a quality in his play which I can only describe as beautiful: occasions when it was he who did the stage managing and it was my imagination which caught fire. It was in fact play with light and fire. He would close the shutters of the room and insist that it be lit only by candle light, sometimes a dozen candles arranged in patterns, or all grouped together in a solid block. And then he would make what he called furnaces, with a very careful choice of what ingredients should make the fire, including dried leaves from special plants in my garden; and sometimes all the ingredients had to be put in a metal cup on the electric fire and stirred continuously, all this carried out in the half darkness of candle light. And often there had to be a sacrifice, a lead soldier had to be added to the fire, and this figure was spoken of either as the victim or the sacrifice. In fact, all this type of play had a dramatic ritual quality comparable to the fertility rites described by Frazer in primitive societies. And this effect was the more striking because this boy's conscious interests were entirely conventional for his age, he was absorbed in Meccano and model railways.

Æsthetic Experience and the Merging of the Boundary

The fact that in this type of material the boy's play nearly became ' a play ', in that there was a sense of pattern and dramatic form in what he produced, leads to many questions about the relation of a work of art to analytic work,

[4] Winnicott, in a private communication, states that he does not entirely agree with Scott's restatement of his view, as quoted above. He adds the following modification:

' I agree with Scott's comment only if he is looking back at early infancy, starting from the adult (or child). Regression is a painful and precarious business partly because the individual regressing goes back with experiences of forward emotional development and with more or less knowledge in his pocket. For the person regressed there must be a denial of " evil union " and of " evil me " and " evil you " when an " ideal union " between " good self " and " good mother " is being lived (in the highly specialized therapeutic environment provided, or in the insane state).

' This begs the whole question, however, of the earliest stages of an individual's emotional development studied there and then. For an infant, at the start, there is no good or bad, only a not yet de-fused object. One could think of separation as the cause of the first *idea* of union; before this there's union but no *idea* of union, and here the terms good and bad have no function. For union of this kind, so important for the founding of the mental health of the individual, the mother's active adaptation is an absolute necessity, an active adaptation to the infant's needs which can only come about through the mother's devotion to the infant.

' Less than good enough adaptation on the part of a mother to her infant's needs at this very early stage leads (it seems to me) to the premature ego-development, the precocious abandonment of illusion of which Marion Milner writes in this paper.'

which are not relevant here. But the particular point I wish to select for further consideration is that he seemed to me to be trying to express the idea of integration, in a variety of different ways. Thus the fire seemed to be here not only a destructive fire but also the fire of Eros; and not only the figurative expression of his own passionate body feelings, not only the phantasy representative of the wish for passionate union with the external object, but also a way of representing the inner fire of concentration. The process in which interest is withdrawn temporarily from the external world so that the inner work of integration can be carried out was, I think, shown by the boiling or melting down of the various ingredients in what he called 'the fire cup', to make a new whole. And the sacrifice of the toy soldier by melting it down both expressed the wish to get rid of a bad internal object, particularly the cramping and cruel aspect of his super-ego, and also his sense of the need to absorb his inner objects into his ego and so modify them. But in addition to this I think it represented his feeling of the need to be able, at times, to transcend the common-sense ego; for common sense was very strong in him, his conscious attitude was one of feet firmly planted on the ground. For instance, when he did tell a dream, which was rarely, he usually apologized if it was at all nonsensical. And formerly also this boy had told me that he was 'no good at art' and he was extremely tentative in any attempts at drawing. But later this changed. For he told me one day, with pride, that he was good at both science and art, which he felt was not very usual amongst his school fellows; though he was still inclined to be apologetic about his æsthetic experiences. When he told me of the delight he took in the colours of the various crystals he had studied in his chemistry he added 'It's childish to like them so much'.

Although an important factor in this development of his capacity to feel himself 'good at art' was his growing belief in his power to restore his injured objects, this is not the aspect of the material that I wish to discuss here; for I am concentrating on the earlier problem of establishing object relationships at all, rather than on the restoration of the injured object once it is established. Granted that these two are mutually interdependent and that anxiety in the one phase can cause regression to the earlier one, there is still much to be said about the earlier phase as such. Thus a central idea began to emerge about what this boy was trying to tell me; it was the idea that the basic identifications which make it possible to find new objects, to find the familiar in the unfamiliar, require an ability to tolerate a temporary loss of sense of self, a temporary giving up of the discriminating ego which stands apart and tries to see things objectively and rationally and without emotional colouring. It perhaps requires a state of mind which has been described by Berensen (1950) as 'the æsthetic moment'.

> 'In visual art the æsthetic moment is that fleeting instant, so brief as to be almost timeless, when the spectator is at one with the work of art he is looking at, or with actuality of any kind that the spectator himself sees in terms of art, as form and colour. He ceases to be his ordinary self, and the picture or building, statue, landscape, or æsthetic actuality is no longer outside himself. The two become one entity; time and space are abolished and the spectator is possessed by one awareness. When he recovers workaday consciousness it is as if he had been initiated into illuminating, formative mysteries.'

Now I think it is possible to add something to my attempts to describe what happened in this boy during the play when his whole behaviour to me changed, and to link this with what an artist or a poet does. For observations in analysis suggest that experiences of the kind described by Berenson are not confined to the contemplation of works of art, but that art provides a method, in adult life, for reproducing states that are part of everyday experience in healthy infancy. Sometimes poets have explicitly related such states to their early experience, for instance, Traherne, and also Wordsworth, in his note on 'Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Early Childhood'. Thus Wordsworth says that as a child he was unable to think of external things as having external existence, he communed with all he saw as something not apart from but inherent in his own immaterial nature; when going to school he would often grasp at a wall to recall himself from the abyss of idealism. I suggest that it is useful, in child analysis, to look out for the ways in which the child may be trying to express such experiences, when he has not yet sufficient command of words to tell what he feels, directly, but can only use words or whatever other media the play room offers him, figuratively: for instance, as this child used candle light and fire and the activities of melting and burning, as well as the actual toys. And I think it may be

useful also to bear in mind that if, when talking about this state one uses only those concepts, such as introjection and projection, which presuppose the existence of the organism within its boundaries in a world of other organisms within boundaries, one may perhaps distort one's perception of the phenomenon. Thus it is important not to forget the obvious fact that we know the boundaries exist but the child does not, in the primal state, it is only gradually and intermittently that he discovers them; and on the way to this he uses play. And later, he keeps his perception of the world from becoming fixed and no longer capable of growth, by using art, either as artist or as audience; and he may also use psycho-analysis. For, as Rank (1932) says, art and play both link the world of 'subjective unreality' and 'objective reality', harmoniously fusing the edges but not confusing them. So the developing human being becomes able deliberately to allow illusions about what he is seeing to occur; he allows himself to experience, within the enclosed space-time of the drama or the picture or the story or the analytic hour, a transcending of that common sense perception which would see a picture as only an attempt at photography, or the analyst as only a present day person.

The Need for a Medium between the Self-Created and External Realities

What I want to suggest here is that these states are a necessary phase in the development of object relationships and that the understanding of their function gives a meaning to the phrase 'Art creates Nature'. In this connection a later phase in the transference phenomena shown by this boy is relevant. It was after he had become deeply interested in chemistry that there occurred in analysis, for several weeks, a repeated catechism. He would say 'What is your name?' and I would have to say 'What is my name?' Then he would answer with the name of some chemical, and I would say 'What is there about that?' And he would answer 'It's lovely stuff, I've made it!'; and sometimes he would give me the name of the chemical which is used as water-softener.

Here then is the link with the artist's use of his medium, what the *Concise Oxford Dictionary* defines as an 'intervening substance through which impressions are conveyed to the senses'; and this pliable stuff that can be made to take the shape of one's phantasies, can include the 'stuff' of sound and breath which becomes our speech. (This boy would sometimes tell me that I was a gas, or that he was going to dissolve me down or evaporate me till I became one.) So it seemed that he had become able to use both me and the playroom equipment as this intervening pliable substance; he had become able to do with these what Caudwell (1937) says the poet does with words, when he uses them to give the organism an appetitive interest in external reality, when he makes the earth become charged with affective colouring and glow with a strange emotional fire.

As regards the use of the medium of speech,[5] there was a stage, after the war of the villages play, when it was very difficult to get this boy to talk. He would play, but silently, and when he did talk it was always to try and teach me something; sometimes it was the language of chemistry, but usually to teach me German, which he knew and I did not. And this I think expressed the need of the artist in him (and also the scientist, for he soon became determined to make science his career) to have a bit of his own experience incorporated in the social world, just as he had been able to have his own club incorporated in the world of school. For, as Caudwell points out, the artist is acutely aware of the discrepancy between, on the one hand, all the ways of expressing feeling that are provided by the current development of speech and art, in our particular culture and epoch; and, on the other hand, our changing experiences that are continually outstripping the available means of expression. Thus the artist wishes to cast his private experiences in such form that they will be incorporated in the

[5] Unfortunately I was not able, before writing this paper, to read Susanne Langer's (1942) detailed discussion of the nature and function of symbolism, as it was not yet published in England and I could not obtain a copy. Had I been able to obtain the book in time I would have made specific reference to some of Langer's statements about speech and symbolism. Particularly relevant to my problem is her emphasis on the advantages of small sounds made with part of one's own body as a medium for symbol formation. One of these advantages is the intrinsic unimportance, in their own right, of these sounds. This relates to my point about the effectiveness of the toys as a medium for thought and communication being due to their pliability; that is, that their real qualities are unimportant for practical expedient living, so they can be given arbitrary or conventional meanings and thus be used as a language. I would also like to have elaborated on the relation of Langer's conception of the function of symbols to Jung's (1933) and to have considered the bearing of both on the material presented here.

social world of art and so lessen the discrepancy. Caudwell points out that it is not only the artist who feels this discrepancy and not only the discrepancy between feeling and current forms of expression of it; it is also the scientist, in respect not of feeling, but of perception and currently accepted ways of formulating it, currently accepted views of 'reality', who wishes to contribute something of his own to the changing symbols of science. Perhaps even he must do this if the already discovered symbols are to become fully significant for him.

Effects of Premature Loss of Belief in the Self-Created Reality

The phenomenon of treating the world as one's own creation is mentioned by Fenichel. He says:

'There always remain certain traces of the original objectless condition, or at least a longing for it ("oceanic feeling"). Introjection is an attempt to make parts of the external world flow into the ego. Projection, by putting unpleasant sensations into the external world, also attempts to reverse the separation of ego from non-ego.'

And he goes on to refer to the child who 'when playing hide-and-seek closes his eyes and believes he now cannot be seen'; Fenichel then says, 'The archaic animistic conception of the world which is based on a confusion of ego and non-ego is thus illustrated.'

Although there are differences of opinion about what he calls here 'the original objectless condition', about whether or not there is some primitive object relation from the very beginning, which alternates with the 'objectless' or fused condition, I think Fenichel's description is valuable. The example of the child playing hide-and-seek vividly shows the belief in a self-created reality; just as analytical material shows related phenomena such as the child's belief that when he opens his eyes and sees the world, he thereby creates it, he feels it is the lovely (or horrible) stuff that he has made.

The idea that these states of illusion of oneness are perhaps a recurrently necessary phase in the continued growth of the sense of twoness leads to a further question: What happens when they are prevented from occurring with sufficient frequency or at the right moments? I think this boy was trying to tell me that what may happen is that the world becomes grey, lacking in affective colouring, prosaic. There was only one occasion when poetry, in the narrow sense, appeared in his material. One day he suddenly recited to me a poem that he had had to learn at school and he made me write it all down on two successive days. This is it.

'A parrot from the Spanish Main
Full young and early caged, came o'er
With bright wings to the bleak domain
Of Mulla's shore.
To spicey groves where he had won
His plumage of resplendent hue
His native fruits and skies and sun
He bade adieu.
For these he changed the smoke of turf
A heathery land and misty sky
And turned on rocks and raging surf
His golden eye.
But petted in our climate cold
He lived and chattered many a day
Until with age from green and gold
His wings grew grey.
At last when blind and seeming dumb
He scolded, laughed, and spoke no more
A Spanish stranger chanced to come
To Mulla's shore.
He hailed the bird in Spanish speech
The bird in Spanish speech replied
Flapped joyously around the cage
Dropped down and died.' [6]

The boy was obviously delighted with the poem and said he was going to set it to music. He denied that it was sad. The significance, in the transference, of the stranger who spoke his language, was shown by a dream; he had fallen on frozen ground and someone, associated with me, was helping him up and going to take him to a warmer climate. In this connection it is interesting that Eissler (1951), in trying to find an analogy to explain an aspect of schizophrenics' positive response to his treatment, describes the reactions of a castaway in a foreign land and says:

'But this castaway will never forget the sounds of his mother tongue, and even after decades of not having heard it the first sounds of it will create in him an amazing reaction.'

When I tried to consider what was the experience in this boy's life which corresponded with the early caging of the parrot, the history of his feeding difficulties was clearly relevant; for this boy, like the parrot, had had in general a very good home and been much loved. But he had suffered very early environmental

[6] I have not been able to trace the poem and have quoted it as he gave it to me.

thwartings in the feeding situation. In the early weeks of his life his mother had had too little milk and the nurse had been in the habit of not getting the supplementary feed ready in time, so that he had had to wait to finish his meal and had shown great distress: an experience that was re-lived in the transference when whatever time I was ready for him, he always said I was too late.

Although it is obvious that a child must suffer frustration there is still something to be said about the way in which it should occur and the timing of it. I suggest that, if, through the pressure of unsatisfied need, the child has to become aware of his separate identity too soon or too continually, then either the illusion of union can be what Scott calls catastrophic chaos rather than cosmic bliss, or the illusion is given up and premature ego-development may occur; then separateness and the demands of necessity may be apparently accepted, but necessity becomes a cage rather than something to be co-operated with for the freeing of further powers. With this boy it was clear how the imposed necessities, regulations, non-self-chosen tasks, of a conventional school, had provided a setting for a repetition of his first difficulties in relation to the environment. In fact he often told me what his ideal school would be like and it amounted to being taught by a method very like what modern educationists call the project method.

If one asks the question, what factors play an essential part in the process of coming to recognize a world that is outside oneself, not one's own creation, there is one that I think has not been much stressed in the literature. Thus, in addition to the physical facts of the repeated bodily experiences of being separated from the loved object, and being together with it, and the repeated physical experiences of interchange with the not-self world, breathing, feeding, eliminating: in addition to the gradually growing capacity to tolerate the difference between the feeling of oneness, of being united with everything, and the feeling of twoness, of self and object, there is the factor of a capacity in the environment. It is the capacity of the environment to foster this growth, by providing conditions in which a recurrent partial return to the feeling of being one is possible; and I suggest that the environment does this by the recurrent providing of a framed space and time and a pliable medium, so that, from time to time, it will not be necessary for self-preservation's sake to distinguish clearly between inner and outer, self and not-self. I wish to suggest that it was his need for this capacity in the environment that my patient was telling me about in his village play, when he said there was to be a war, ' but not yet '. It was as if he were saying that the true battle with the environment, the creative struggle of interacting opposites, could not begin, or be effectively continued, until there had also been established his right to a recurrent merging of the opposites. And until this was established necessity was indeed a mechanized god, whose service was not freedom but a colourless slavery.

Looked at in this way the boy's remark, ' I don't like those people ', was not only due to a denial of an uprush of feared uncontrollable jealousy and envy, it represented also the re-enactment of a memory or memories of a near breakdown of relationship to the outside world. It was the memory, I suggest, of actual experience of a too sudden breaking in on the illusion of oneness, an intrusion which had had the effect of preventing the emergence from primary narcissism occurring gradually in the child's own time. But it represented also a later situation; for the premature ego-development, referred to by Melanie Klein as inhibiting the development of symbolization (or, in Jones's terms, of symbolic equivalents) was also brought about by the impingement of the war. For the sake of self-preservation, it had been necessary for him continually to distinguish clearly between external and internal reality, to attend to the real qualities of the symbol too soon. Thus it was reported to me that this boy had shown remarkable fortitude when, with his father away in the Navy, he and his baby brother and mother had lived through the blitz on London. And also, later on, his reports indicated that he was very self-controlled in school, in that situation where self-preservation demands a fairly continual hold upon objectivity, since day-dreaming and treating the external world as part of one's dream are not easily tolerated by school-masters. But the fact that this amount of objectivity was only achieved at a fairly high cost in anxiety was shown in his analysis, for at one time he was continually punishing me for imagined lapses into forgetfulness, inattention, unpunctuality. It was only later that he was able to tell me about what he now called his absentmindedness, in a tolerant way and without anxiety.

Implications for Technique

The considerations I have tried to formulate here are not only matters for theory, they have direct bearings upon technique. With this boy there was always the question of whether to emphasize, in interpreting, the projection mechanisms and persecutory defences and to interpret the aggression as such; but when I did this the aggression did not seem to lessen and I was sometimes in despair at its quite implacable quality. At times he treated me as if I were like the man in the Bible from whom a devil was driven out, but into whom seven more came, so that he went on attacking me with almost the fervour of a holy war. But when I began to think along the lines described above, even though I knew that I was not succeeding in putting these ideas clearly into words in my interpretations, the aggression did begin to lessen and the continual battle over the time of the beginning of each session disappeared. Of course I may be mistaken in thinking that the change in the boy's behaviour which accompanied the change in my idea of the problem was a matter of cause and effect, since the issue is very complicated and brings in many debatable questions of theory. But I think that it was significant that, near the end of his analysis, this boy told me that when he was grown up and earning his own living he would give me a papier-mâché chemical clock, which would keep perfect time and would be his own invention. He said it would be of papier-mâché because I had an ornament, a little Indian dog, made of this, and also I remembered how he himself had tried to make papier-mâché bowls, during his play with me, but unsuccessfully. Granted that the idea of the giving of the clock stood for many things, including returning to me the restored breast and restored penis, and also represented his gratitude for the recovery of his own potency, I thought he was telling me something else as well. I thought that the malleability of the papier-mâché provided him with a way of expressing how he felt about part of the curative factor in his analysis. It was his way of saying how, in the setting of the analytic play-room, he had been able to find a bit of the external world that was malleable; he had found that it was safe to treat it as a bit of himself, and so had let it serve as a bridge between inner and outer. And it was through this, I suggest, as well as through the interpretations I had given about the content of his wishes towards outer and inner objects, that he had become able to accept the real qualities of externality, objective time standing as the chief representative of these. And in those phases when he could not make this bridge, because the fact that I had to work to a time-table forced on him an objective reality that he was not yet ready for, then I became merely the gap into which he projected all his ' bad ' wishes, or internal objects representing these. When he could not feel that he had ' made ' me, that I was his lovely stuff, then I was the opposite, not only bad but also alien, and bad because alien; so I became the receptacle for all that he felt was alien to his ego in himself, all the ' devil ' parts of himself that he was frightened of and so had to repudiate. It seemed as if it was only by being able, again and again, to experience the illusion that I was part of himself, fused with the goodness that he could conceive of internally, that he became able to tolerate a goodness that was not his own creation and to allow me goodness independently. Exactly how an infant does come to tolerate a goodness that is recognized to exist independently of himself seems to me to have not yet been entirely satisfactorily explained; though the factor of the relief obtained from giving up the illusion of omnipotence is mentioned in the literature and was clearly apparent in this boy. The repeated discovery that I went on being friendly and unhurt by him, in spite of the continual attacks on me, certainly played a very important part. For instance, there was another ritual catechism which would begin with ' Why are you a fool? ' and I had to say, ' Why am I a fool? ' Then he would answer, ' Because I say so '. Clearly if he had to feel that all the foolishness of adults was his doing, as well as their goodness, then he was going to bear a heavy burden. But I think he could not proceed to the stage of experiencing the relief of disillusion until he had also had sufficient time both to experience and become conscious of the previous stage; he had to become aware that he was experiencing the stage of fusion before he could reach the relief of de-fusion. And it was only when he could become conscious of the relief of de-fusion that we were then able to reach his depression about injuries that he had felt he was responsible for, both internally and externally, in his family situation and in relation to me.

On looking back it seems to me that the greatest progress in his analysis came when I, on the basis of the above considerations, was

able to deal with the negative counter-transference. At first, without really being aware of it, I had taken for granted the view of infantile omnipotence which is described by Fenichel:

'Yet even after speech, logic, and the reality principle have been established we find that prelogical thinking is still in operation and even beyond the rôle it plays in states of ego regression or as a form of purposeful distortion. It no longer fulfills, it is true, the function of preparing for future actions but becomes, rather, a *substitute* for unpleasant reality.'

I had accepted this view but grown rather tired of being continually treated by this boy as his gas, his breath, his fæces, and had wondered how long the working through of this phase would take. But when I began to suspect that Fenichel was wrong here, and that this prelogical fusion of subject and object does continue to have a function of preparing for future action, when I began to see and to interpret, as far as I could, that this use of me might be not only a defensive regression, but an essential recurrent phase in the development of a creative relation to the world, then the whole character of the analysis changed; the boy then gradually became able to allow the external object, represented by me, to exist in its own right.

Caudwell says that the artist and the scientist

'are men who acquire a special experience of life—affective with the artist, perceptual with the scientist—which negates the common ego or the common social world, and therefore requires refashioning of these worlds to include the new experience.'

This boy had, I think, indicated the nature of this process by his reaction to the school's refashioning of a tiny bit of itself and its routines. For this had happened in response to the vividness of his belief in the validity of his own experience; a vividness which also had contributed to a refashioning in me of some of my analytic ideas.

Conclusion

On the basis of the study of such material as I have described here, and also from my own experiments in painting, I came to see the pertinence of Melanie Klein's statement that symbolization is the basis of all talents; that is, that it is the basis of those skills by which we relate ourselves to the world around us. To try to restrict the meaning of the world symbolization, as some writers tend to do, to the use of the symbol for purposes of distortion, may have the advantage of simplification, but it has other disadvantages. One of these is that it causes unnecessary confusion when one tries to communicate with workers in related disciplines, such as epistemology, æsthetics, and the philosophy of science; it interferes with what might be a valuable collaboration in the work of clarifying some of the obscure issues about the nature of thought. This isolation of psychoanalysis, by its terminology, from related fields, may not have been a disadvantage in the early days of the struggle to establish analytic concepts in their own right, but now such isolation can I think lead to an impoverishment of our own thinking.

Another advantage of not limiting the meaning of the word symbol to a defensive function would be a clarification of theory by bringing it more in line with our practice. The analytic rule that the patient shall try to put all that he is aware of into words does seem to me to imply a belief in the importance of symbolization for maturity as well as for infancy; it implies the recognition that words are in fact symbols by means of which the world is comprehended. Thus in the daily battle with our patients over the transference we are asking them to accept a symbolic relation to the analyst instead of a literal one, to accept the symbolism of speech and talking about their wants rather than taking action to satisfy them directly. And, as all analytic experience shows, it is when the patient becomes able to talk about all that he is aware of, when he *can* follow the analytic rule, then in fact he becomes able to relate himself more adequately to the world outside. As he becomes able to tolerate more fully the difference between the symbolic reality of the analytic relationship and the literal reality of libidinal satisfaction outside the frame of the session, then he becomes better.

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A PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL APPROACH TO ÆSTHETICS

By HANNA SEGAL, London

' Denn das Schöne ist nichts
als das Schrecklichen Anfang, den wir noch gerade ertragen,
und wir bewundern es so, weil es gelassen verschmäht
uns zu zerstören.'

In 1908 Freud wrote: ' We laymen have always wondered greatly—like the cardinal who put the question to Ariosto—how that strange being, the poet, comes by his material. What makes him able to carry us with him in such a way and to arouse emotions in us of which we thought ourselves perhaps not even capable?' [1] And as the science of psycho-analysis developed, repeated attempts were made to answer that question. Freud's discovery of unconscious phantasy life and of symbolism made it possible to attempt a psychological interpretation of works of art. Many papers have been written since, dealing with the problem of the individual artist and reconstructing his early history from an analysis of his work. The foremost of these is Freud's book on Leonardo da Vinci. Other papers have dealt with general psychological problems expressed in works of art showing, for instance, how the latent content of universal infantile anxieties is symbolically expressed in them. Such was Freud's paper ' The Theme of the Three Caskets ',[2] Ernest Jones's ' The Conception of the Madonna through the Ear ',[3] or Melanie Klein's ' Infantile Anxiety Situations Reflected in a Work of Art and the Creative Impulse.' [4]

Until recently such papers were not mainly concerned with æsthetics. They dealt with points of psychological interest but not with the central problem of æsthetics, which is: what constitutes good art, in what essential respect is it different from other human works, more particularly from bad art? Psychological writers attempted to answer questions like: ' How does the poet work? ' ' What is he like? ' ' What does he express? ' In the paper ' The Relation of the Poet to Day-dreaming ', Freud has shown how the work of the artist is a product of phantasy and has its roots, like the children's play and dreams, in unconscious phantasy life. But he did not attempt to explain ' why we should derive such pleasure from listening to the day-dreams of a poet '. How he achieves his effects is to Freud the poet's ' innermost secret '.[5] Indeed, Freud was not especially interested in æsthetic problems. In ' The Moses of Michelangelo ' [6] he says: ' I have often observed that the subject-matter of works of art has a stronger attraction for me than their formal and technical qualities, though to the artist their value lies first and foremost in this latter. I am unable rightly to appreciate many of the methods used and the effects obtained in art.' He was also aware of the limitations of analytical theory in approaching æsthetics. In the preface to the book on Leonardo da Vinci [7] he says that he has no intention of discussing why Leonardo was a great painter, since to do that, he would have to know more about the ultimate sources of the creative impulse and of sublimation. This was written in 1910. Since that time the work of Melanie Klein has thrown more light on the problem of the creative impulse and sublimation, and has provided a new stimulus to analytical writers on art. In the last fifteen years a number of papers have appeared dealing with problems of creation, beauty and ugliness. I would mention, in particular, those by Ella Sharpe, Paula Heimann, John Rickman and

[1] Freud (1908). ' The Relation of the Poet to Day-dreaming ', *Collected Papers*, Vol. IV.
[2] Freud (1913). ' The Theme of the Three Caskets ', *Collected Papers*, Vol. IV.
[3] E. Jones (1914). ' The Conception of the Madonna through the Ear ', *Essays in Applied Psycho-Analysis*, Vol. II.
[4] M. Klein (1925). ' Infantile Anxiety Situations Reflected in a Work of Art and the Creative Impulse ', *Contributions to Psycho-Analysis*, 1921–45.
[5] Freud (1908). ' The Relation of the Poet to Day-dreaming ', *Collected Papers*, Vol. IV.
[6] Freud (1914). ' The Moses of Michelangelo ', *Collected Papers*, Vol. IV.
[7] Freud (1920). *Leonardo da Vinci.* (London: Kegan Paul, 1922.)

Fairbairn in this country, and H. B. Lee in the U.S.A.

Maybe it is possible now, in the light of new analytical discoveries, to ask new questions. Can we isolate in the psychology of the artist the specific factors which enable him to produce a satisfactory work of art? And if we can, will that further our understanding of the æsthetic value of the work of art, and of the æsthetic experience of the audience?

It seems to me that Melanie Klein's concept of the depressive position makes it possible at least to attempt an answer to these questions.

The 'depressive position', as described by Melanie Klein, is reached by the infant when he recognizes his mother and other people, and amongst them his father, as real persons. His object relations then undergo a fundamental change.[8] Where earlier he was aware of 'part objects' he now perceives complete persons; instead of 'split' objects—ideally good or overwhelmingly persecuting—he sees a whole object both good and bad. The whole object is loved and introjected and forms the core of an integrated ego. But this new constellation ushers in a new anxiety situation: where earlier the infant feared an attack on the ego by persecutory objects, now the predominant fear is that of the loss of the loved object in the external world and in his own inside. The infant at that stage is still under the sway of uncontrollable greedy and sadistic impulses. In phantasy his loved object is continually attacked in greed and hatred, is destroyed, torn into pieces and fragments; and not only is the external object so attacked but also the internal one, and then the whole internal world feels destroyed and shattered as well. Bits of the destroyed object may turn into persecutors, and there is a fear of internal persecution as well as a pining for the lost loved object and guilt for the attack. The memory of the good situation, where the infant's ego contained the whole loved object, and the realization that it has been lost through his own attacks, give rise to an intense feeling of loss and guilt, and to the wish to restore and re-create the lost loved object outside and within the ego. This wish to restore and re-create is the basis of later sublimation and creativity.

It is also at this point that a sense of inner reality is developed. If the object is remembered as a whole object, then the ego is faced with the recognition of its own ambivalence towards the object; it holds itself responsible for its impulses and for the damage done to the external and to the internal object. Where, earlier, impulses and parts of the infant's self were projected into the object with the result that a false picture of it was formed, that his own impulses were denied, and that there was often a lack of differentiation between the self and the external object; in the depressive phase, a sense of inner reality is developed and in its wake a sense of outer reality as well.

Depressive phantasies give rise to the wish to repair and restore, and become a stimulus to further development only so far as the depressive anxiety can be tolerated by the ego and the sense of psychic reality retained. If there is little belief in the capacity to restore, the good object outside and inside is felt to be irretrievably lost and destroyed, the destroyed fragments turn into persecutors, and the internal situation is felt to be hopeless. The infant's ego is at the mercy of intolerable feelings of guilt, loss and internal persecution. To protect itself from total despair the ego must have recourse to violent defence mechanisms. Those defence mechanisms which protect it from the feelings arising out of the loss of the good object form a system of manic defences. The essential features of manic defences are denial of psychic reality, omnipotent control and a partial regression to the paranoid position and its defences: splitting, idealization, denial, projective identification, etc. This regression strengthens the fear of persecution and that in turn leads to the strengthening of omnipotent control.

But in successful development the experience of love from the environment slowly reassures the infant about his objects. His growing love, strength and skill give him increasing confidence in his own capacities to restore. And as his confidence increases he can gradually relinquish the manic defences and experience more and more fully the underlying feelings of loss, guilt and love, and he can make renewed and increasingly successful attempts at reparation.

By repeated experiences of loss and restoration of the internal objects they become more firmly established and more fully assimilated in the ego.

A successful working through of the depressive anxieties has far-reaching consequences; the ego becomes integrated and enriched through the assimilation of loved objects; the depen-

[8] For the description of the preceding phase of development see Melanie Klein's *Contributions to Psycho-Analysis*, 1921–1945, and H. Rosenfeld's paper in this issue of Int. J. Psycho-Anal.

dence on the external objects is lessened and deprivation can be better dealt with. Aggression and love can be tolerated and guilt gives rise to the need to restore and re-create.

Feelings of guilt probably play a rôle before the depressive position is fully established; they already exist in relation to the part object, and they contribute to later sublimation ; but they are then simpler impulses acting in a predominantly paranoid setting, isolated and unintegrated. With the establishment of the depressive position the object becomes more personal and unique and the ego more integrated, and an awareness of an integrated, internal world is gradually achieved. Only when this happens does the attack on the object lead to real despair at the destruction of an existing complex and organized internal world, and with it, to the wish to recover such a complete world again.

* * * *

The task of the artist lies in the creation of a world of his own.

In his introduction to the second Post-Impressionist Exhibition, Roger Fry writes: 'Now these artists do not seek to give what can, after all, be but a pale reflex of actual appearance, but to arouse a conviction of a new and different reality. They do not seek to imitate life but to find an equivalent for life.' What Roger Fry says of post-impressionists undoubtedly applies to all genuine art. One of the great differences between art and imitation or a superficial 'pretty' achievement is that neither the imitation nor the 'pretty' production ever achieves this creation of an entirely new reality.

Every creative artist produces a world of his own. Even when he believes himself to be a complete realist and sets himself the task of faithfully reproducing the external world, he, in fact, only uses elements of the existing external world to create with them a reality of his own. When, for instance, two realistic writers like Zola and Flaubert try to portray life in the same country, and very nearly at the same time, the two worlds they show us differ from each other as widely as if they were the most phantastic creations of surrealist poets. If two great painters paint the same landscape we have two different worlds.

> ' . . . and dream
> Of waves, flowers, clouds, woods,
> Rocks, and all that we
> Read in their smiles
> And call reality.'

How does this creation come about? Of all artists the one who gives us the fullest description of the creative process is Marcel Proust: a description based on years of self-observation and the fruit of an amazing insight. According to Proust, an artist is compelled to create by his need to recover his lost past. But a purely intellectual memory of the past, even when it is available, is emotionally valueless and dead. A real remembrance sometimes comes about unexpectedly by chance association. The flavour of a cake brings back to his mind a fragment of his childhood with full emotional vividness. Stumbling over a stone revives a recollection of a holiday in Venice which before he had vainly tried to recapture. For years he tries in vain to remember and re-create in his mind a living picture of his beloved grandmother. But only a chance association revives her picture and at last enables him to remember her, and to experience his loss and mourn her. He calls these fleeting associations: 'intermittences du cœur', but he says that such memories come and then disappear again, so that the past remains elusive. To capture them, to give them permanent life, to integrate them with the rest of his life, he must create a work of art. 'Il fallait . . . faire sortir de la pénombre ce que j'avais senti, de le reconvertir en un équivalent spirituel. Or ce moyen qui me paraissait le seul qu'était-ce autre chose que de créer une œuvre d'art?' ('I had to recapture from the shade that which I had felt, to reconvert it into its psychic equivalent. But the way to do it, the only one I could see, what was it—but to create a work of art?')

Through the many volumes of his work the past is being recaptured; all his lost, destroyed and loved objects are being brought back to life: his parents, his grandmother, his beloved Albertine. 'Et certes il n'y aurait pas qu'Albertine, que ma grandmère, mais bien d'autres encore dont j'aurais pu assimiler une parole, un regard, mais en tant que créatures individuelles je ne m'en rappellais plus; un livre est un grand cimetiére oú sur la plupart des tombes on ne peut plus lire les noms effacés.' ('And indeed it was not only Albertine, not only my grandmother, but many others still from whom I might well have assimilated a gesture or a word, but whom I could not even remember as distinct persons. A book is a vast graveyard where on most of the tombstones one can read no more the faded names.')

And, according to Proust, it is only the lost past and the lost or dead object that can be

made into a work of art. He makes the painter, Elstir, say: 'On ne peut recrèer ce qu'on aime qu'en le renonçant.' ('It is only by renouncing that one can re-create what one loves.') It is only when the loss has been acknowledged and the mourning experienced that re-creation can take place.

In the last volume of his work Proust describes how at last he decided to sacrifice the rest of his life to writing. He came back after a long absence to seek his old friends at a party, and all of them appeared to him as ruins of the real people he knew—useless, ridiculous, ill, on the threshold of death. Others, he found, had died long ago. And on realizing the destruction of a whole world that had been his, he decides to write, to sacrifice himself to the re-creation of the dying and the dead. By virtue of his art he can give his objects an eternal life in his work. And since they represent his internal world too, if he can do that, he himself will no longer be afraid of death.

What Proust describes corresponds to a situation of mourning: he sees that his loved objects are dying or dead. Writing a book is for him like the work of mourning in that gradually the external objects are given up, they are re-instated in the ego, and re-created in the book. In her paper 'Mourning and its Relation to Manic-Depressive States',[9] Melanie Klein has shown how mourning in grown-up life is a re-living of the early depressive anxieties; not only is the present object in the external world felt to be lost, but also the early objects, the parents; and they are lost as internal objects as well as in the external world. In the process of mourning it is these earliest objects which are lost again, and then re-created. Proust describes how this mourning leads to a wish to re-create the lost world.

I have quoted Proust at length because he reveals such an acute awareness of what I believe is present in the unconscious of all artists: namely, that all creation is really a re-creation of a once loved and once whole, but now lost and ruined object, a ruined internal world and self. It is when the world within us is destroyed, when it is dead and loveless, when our loved ones are in fragments, and we ourselves in helpless despair—it is then that we must re-create our world anew, re-assemble the pieces, infuse life into dead fragments, re-create life.

* * * *

If the wish to create is rooted in the depressive position and the capacity to create depends on a successful working through it, it would follow that the inability to acknowledge and overcome depressive anxiety must lead to inhibitions in artistic expression.

I should now like to give a few clinical examples from artists who have been inhibited in their creative activities by neurosis, and I shall try to show that in them it was the inability to work through their depressive anxieties which led to inhibitions of artistic activity, or to the production of an unsuccessful artistic product.

Case A is a young girl with a definite gift for painting. An acute rivalry with her mother made her give up painting in her early teens. After some analysis she started to paint again and was working as a decorative artist. She did decorative handicraft work in preference to what she sometimes called 'real painting', and this was because she knew that, though correct, neat and pretty, her work failed to be moving and æsthetically significant. In her manic way she usually denied that this caused her any concern. At the time when I was trying to interpret her unconscious sadistic attacks on her father, the internalization of her mutilated and destroyed father and the resulting depression, she told me the following dream: 'She saw a picture in a shop which represented a wounded man lying alone and desolate in a dark forest. She felt quite overwhelmed with emotion and admiration for this picture; she thought it represented the actual essence of life; if she could only paint like that she would be a really great painter.'

It soon appeared that the meaning of the dream was that if she could only acknowledge her depression about the wounding and destruction of her father, she would then be able to express it in her painting and would achieve real art. In fact, however, it was impossible for her to do this, since the unusual strength of her sadism and her resulting despair, and her small capacity to tolerate depression, led to its manic denial and to a constant make-believe that all was well with the world. In her dream she confirmed my interpretation about the attack on her father, but she did more than this. Her dream showed something that had not been in any way interpreted or indicated by me: namely, the effect on her painting of her persistent denial of depression. In relation to her painting the denial of the depth and seriousness of her

[9] Melanie Klein (1940). 'Mourning and its Relation to Manic-Depressive States', *Contributions to Psycho-Analysis*, 1921–45.

depressive feelings produced the effect of superficiality and prettiness in whatever she chose to do—the dead father is completely denied and no ugliness or conflict is ever allowed to disturb the neat and correct form of her work.

Case B is that of a journalist aged a little over thirty, whose ambition was to be a writer, and who suffered, among other symptoms, from an ever increasing inhibition in creative writing. An important feature of his character was a tendency to regress from the depressive to the paranoid position. The following dream illustrates his problem: 'He found himself in a room with Goebbels, Goering and some other Nazis. He was aware that these men were completely amoral. He knew that they were going to poison him and therefore he tried to make a bargain with them; he suggested that it would be a good thing for them to let him live, since he was a journalist and could write about them and make them live for a time after their death. But this stratagem failed and he knew that he would finally be poisoned.'

An important factor in this patient's psychology was his introjection of an extremely bad father-figure who was then blamed for all that the patient did. And one of the results was an unbearable feeling of being internally persecuted by this bad internal father-figure, which was sometimes expressed in hypochondriacal symptoms. He tried to defend himself against it by placating and serving this bad internal figure. He was often driven to do things that he disapproved of and disliked. In the dream he showed how it interfered with his writing: to avoid death at the hands of internal persecutors he has to write for them to keep them immortal; but there is, of course, no real wish to keep such bad figures alive, and consequently he was inhibited in his capacity for writing. He often complained, too, that he had no style of his own; in his associations to the dream it became clear that he had to write not only for the benefit of the poisoners, and to serve their purposes, but also at their command. Thus the style of his writing belonged to the internal parental figure. The case, I think, resembles one described by Paula Heimann.[10] A patient of hers drew a sketch with which she was very displeased; the style was not her own, it was Victorian. It appeared clearly during the session that it was the result of a quarrel with another woman who stood for her mother. After the quarrel the painter had introjected her as a bad and revengeful mother, and, through guilt and fear, she had to submit to this bad internal figure; it was really the Victorian mother who had dictated the painting.

Paula Heimann described this example of an acute impairment of an already established sublimation. In my patient his submission to a very bad internal figure was a chronic situation preventing him from achieving any internal freedom to create. Moreover, although he was trying to appease his persecutors, as a secondary defence against them, he was basically fixed in the paranoid position and returned to it whenever depressive feelings were aroused, so that his love and reparative impulses could not become fully active.

* * * *

All the patients mentioned suffered from sexual maladjustments as well as creative inhibitions. There is clearly a genital aspect of artistic creation which is of paramount importance. Creating a work of art is a psychic equivalent of pro-creation. It is a genital bisexual activity necessitating a good identification with the father who gives, and the mother who receives and bears, the child. The ability to deal with the depressive position, however, is the pre-condition of both genital and artistic maturity. If the parents are felt to be so completely destroyed that there is no hope of ever re-creating them, a successful identification is not possible, and neither can the genital position be maintained nor the sublimation in art develop.

This relation between feelings of depression and genital and artistic problems is clearly shown by another patient of mine. C, a man of thirty-five, was a really gifted artist, but at the same time a very ill person. Since the age of eighteen he had suffered from depression, from a variety of conversion symptoms of great intensity, and from what he described as 'a complete lack of freedom and spontaneity'. This lack of spontaneity interfered considerably with his work, and, though he was physically potent, it also deprived him of all the enjoyment of sexual intercourse. A feeling of impending failure, worthlessness and hopelessness, marred all his efforts. He came to analysis at the age of thirty-five because of a conversion symptom: he suffered from a constant pain in the small of his back and the lower abdomen, which was

[10] Paula Heimann: 'A Contribution to the Problem of Sublimation and its Relation to Processes of Internalization', *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, **23**, 1942, Part 1.

aggravated by frequent spasms. He described it as ' a constant state of childbirth '. It appeared in his analysis that the pain started soon after he learned that the wife of his twin brother was pregnant, and he actually came to me for treatment a week before her confinement. He felt that if I could only liberate him from the spasm he would do marvellous things. In his case identification with the pregnant woman, representing the mother, was very obvious, but it was not a happy identification. He felt his mother and the babies inside her had been so completely destroyed by his sadism, and his hope of re-creating them was so slight, that the identification with the pregnant mother meant to him a state of anguish, ruin and abortive pregnancy. Instead of producing the baby, he, like the mother, was destroyed. Feeling destroyed inside and unable to restore the mother, he felt persecuted by her; the internal attacked mother attacked him in turn and robbed him of his babies. Unlike the other three patients described, this one recognized his depression and his reparative drive was therefore very much stronger. The inhibition both in his sexual and artistic achievements was due mainly to a feeling of the inadequacy of his reparative capacity in comparison with the devastation that he felt he had brought about. This feeling of inadequacy made him regress to a paranoid position whenever his anxiety was aroused.

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Patient E, a woman writer, was the most disturbed of the patients described here. She was a severe chronic hypochondriac, she suffered from frequent depersonalization and endless phobias, amongst them food phobias leading at times to almost complete amorexia.

She had been a writer, but had not been able to write for a number of years. I want to describe here how her inability to experience depression led to an inhibition of symbolic expression.

One day she told me the following dream: ' She was in a Nursing Home and the Matron of this Home, dressed in black, was going to kill a man and a woman. She herself was going to a fancy dress ball. She kept running out of the Nursing Home in various fancy disguises, but somehow something always went wrong, and she had to come back to the Nursing Home, and to meet the Matron. At some point of the dream she was with her friend Joan.'

Her friend, Joan, was for my patient the embodiment of mental health and stability. After telling me the dream she said: ' Joan was not in a fancy dress, she was undisguised, and I felt her to be so much more vulnerable than me.' Then she immediately corrected herself: ' Oh, of course I meant she was so much less vulnerable than me.' This slip of the patient gave us the key to the dream. The mentally healthy person is more vulnerable than my patient, she wears no disguises and she is vulnerable to illness and death. My patient herself escapes death, represented by the Matron, by using various disguises. Her associations to this dream led us to a review of some of her leading symptoms in terms of her fear of, and attempted escape from, death. The disguises in the dream represented personifications, projective and introjective identifications, all three used by her as means of not living her own life and—in the light of the dream—not dying her own death. She also connected other symptoms of hers with the fear of death. For instance her spending almost half her lifetime lying in bed, ' half-dead ', was a shamming of death, a way of cheating death. Her phobia of bread, her fear of sex, appeared to her now as ways of escaping full living, which would mean that one day she would have ' spent her life ' and would have to face death. So far, she had almost lived on ' borrowed ' life. For instance, she felt extremely well and alive when she was pregnant, she then felt she lived on the baby's life; but immediately after the baby's birth she felt depersonalized and half-dead.

I mention here only some of her more striking symptoms which all pointed in the same direction; to a constant preoccupation with the fear of death. The analyst, represented by the Matron, tears off her disguises one after another, and forces her to lead her own life and so eventually to die.

After some three sessions completely taken up with the elaboration of this theme, she started the next one with what appeared to be a completely new trend of thought. She started complaining of her inability to write. Her associations led her to remember her early dislike of using words. She felt that her dislike was still present and she did not really want to use words at all. Using words, she said, made her break ' an endless unity into bits '. It was like ' chopping up ', like ' cutting things '. It was obviously felt by her as an aggressive act. Besides, using words was ' making things finite and separate '. To use words meant acknow-

ledging the separateness of the world from herself, and gave her a feeling of loss. She felt that using words made her lose the illusion of possessing and being at one with an endless, undivided world: 'When you name a thing you really lose it.'[11] It became clear to her that using a symbol (language) meant an acceptance of the separateness of her object from herself, the acknowledgement of her own aggressiveness, 'chopping up', 'cutting', and finally losing the object.

In this patient the loss of the object was always felt as an imminent threat to her own survival. So we could eventually connect her difficulties in using language with the material of the earlier sessions. Refusing to face this threat of death to her object and to herself, she had to form the various symptoms devised magically to control and avoid death. She also had to give up her creative writing. In order to write again, she would have to be stripped of her disguises, admit reality, and become vulnerable to loss and death.

I shall now describe shortly a session with the same patient two years later.

She had known for some time that she would have to give up her analysis at the end of the term, through external circumstances. She came to this session very sad, for the first time since it became clear that she would end her analysis. In preceding sessions she felt nausea, felt internally persecuted and 'all in bits and pieces'. She said at the beginning of the session that she could hardly wait to see me for fear that her sadness would turn into a 'sickness and badness'. She thought of the end of her analysis, wondered if she would be able to go on liking me and how much would she be able to remember me. She also wondered if she in any way resembled me. There were two things she would wish to resemble me in: the truthfulness and the capacity to care for people which she attributed to me. She hoped she may have learned these from me. She also felt I was an ordinary kind of person, and she liked that thought. I interpreted her material as a wish to take me in and identify herself with me as a real 'ordinary' feeding breast, in contrast to an earlier situation when an idealized breast was internalized, which subsequently turned into a persecuting one.

She then told me the following dream: 'A baby has died—or grown-up—she didn't know which; and as a result her breasts were full of milk. She was feeding a baby of another woman whose breasts were dry.'

The transference meaning of that dream was that I weaned her—my breast was dry—but she had acquired a breast and could be a mother herself. The baby who 'died or grew up' is herself. The baby dies and the grown woman takes its place. The losing of the analyst is here an experience involving sadness, guilt (about the rivalry with me in relation to the baby), and anxiety (will she be able to go on remembering me). But it is also an experience leading to the enrichment of her ego—she now has the breasts full of milk and therefore need no longer depend on me.

Towards the end of the hour, she said: 'Words seem to have a meaning again, they are rich', and she added that she was quite sure she could now write 'provided I can go on being sad for a while, without being sick and hating food'—i.e. provided she could mourn me instead of feeling me as an internal persecutor.

Words acquired a meaning and the wish to write returned again when she could give up my breast as an external object and internalize it. This giving up was experienced by her as the death of the breast, which is dried up in the dream and the death of a part of herself—the baby part—which in growing up also dies. In so far as she could mourn me words became rich in meaning.[12]

This patient's material confirmed an impression derived from many other patients, that successful symbol formation is rooted in the depressive position.

One of Freud's greatest contributions to psychology was the discovery that sublimation is the outcome of a successful renunciation of an instinctual aim; I would like to suggest here that such a successful renunciation can only happen through a process of mourning. The giving up of an instinctual aim, or object, is a repetition and at the same time a re-living of the giving up of the breast. It can be successful, like this first situation, if the object to be given up can be assimilated in the ego, by the process of loss and internal restoration. I suggest that

[11] This theme became later linked with the 'Rumpelstiltskin' theme of stealing the baby and the penis, but I cannot follow it up here.

[12] I have given here only the transference meaning of the dream in order not to detract from my main theme. This transference situation was linked with past experiences of weaning, birth of the new baby and the patient's failure in the past to be a 'good' mother to the new baby.

such an assimilated object becomes a symbol within the ego. Every aspect of the object, every situation that has to be given up in the process of growing, gives rise to symbol formation.

In this view symbol formation is the outcome of a loss, it is a creative act involving the pain and the whole work of mourning.

If psychic reality is experienced and differentiated from external reality, the symbol is differentiated from the object; it is felt to be created by the self and can be freely used by the self.

I cannot deal here extensively with the problem of symbols, I have brought it up only in so far as it is relevant to my main theme. And it is relevant in that the creation of symbols, the symbolic elaboration of a theme, are the very essence of art.

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I should now like to attempt to formulate an answer to the question whether there is a specific factor in the psychology of the successful artist which would differentiate him from the unsuccessful one. In Freud's words: 'What distinguishes the poet, the artist, from the neurotic day-dreamer?' In his paper 'Formulations Regarding the Two Principles in Mental Functioning', Freud says: 'The artist finds a way of returning from the world of phantasy back to reality, with his special gifts he moulds his phantasies into a new kind of reality.' Indeed, one could say that the artist has an acute reality sense. He is often neurotic and in many situations may show a complete lack of objectivity, but in two respects, at least, he shows an extremely high reality sense. One is in relation to his own internal reality, and the other in relation to the material of his art. However neurotic Proust was in his attachment to his mother, his homosexuality, his asthma, etc., he had a real insight into the phantastic world of the people inside him, and he knew it was internal, and he knew it was phantasy. He showed an awareness that does not exist in a neurotic who splits off, represses, denies or acts out his phantasy. The second, the reality sense of the artist in relation to his material, is a highly specialized reality assessment of the nature, needs, possibilities and limitations of his material, be it words, sounds, paints or clay. The neurotic uses his material in a magic way, and so does the bad artist. The real artist, being aware of his internal world which he must express, and of the external materials with which he works, can in all consciousness use the material to express the phantasy. He shares with the neurotic all the difficulties of unresolved depression, the constant threat of the collapse of his internal world; but he differs from the neurotic in that he has a greater capacity for tolerating anxiety and depression. The patients I described could not tolerate depressive phantasies and anxieties; they all made use of manic defences leading to a denial of psychic reality. Patient A denied both the loss of her father and his importance to her: Patient B projected his impulses on to an internal bad object, with the result that his ego was split and that he was internally persecuted: Patient C did the same, though to a lesser extent: Patient E regressed to the schizoid mechanisms of splitting and projective identification which led to depersonalization and inhibition in the use of symbols.

In contrast to that, Proust could fully experience depressive mourning. This gave him the possibility of insight into himself, and with it a sense of internal and external reality. Further, this reality sense enabled him to have and to maintain a relationship with other people through the medium of his art. The neurotic's phantasy interferes with his relationships in which he acts it out. The artist withdraws into a world of phantasy, but he can communicate his phantasies and share them. In that way he makes reparation, not only to his own internal objects, but to the external world as well.

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I have tried, so far, to show how Melanie Klein's work, especially her concept of the depressive position and the reparative drives that are set in motion by it, and her description of the world of inner objects, throws new light on the psychology of the artist, on the conditions necessary for him to be successful and on those which can inhibit or vitiate his artistic activities. Can this new light on the psychology of the artist help us to understand the æsthetic pleasure experienced by the artist's public? If, for the artist, the work of art is his most complete and satisfactory way of allaying the guilt and despair arising out of the depressive position and of restoring his destroyed objects, it is but one of the many human ways of achieving this end. What is it that makes a work of art such a satisfactory experience for the

artist's public? Freud says that he ' bribes us with the formal and æsthetic pleasures.'

To begin with, we should distinguish between the æsthetic pleasure and other incidental pleasures to be found in works of art. For instance, the satisfaction derived from identification with particular scenes or characters can also arise in other ways, and it can be derived from bad as well as from good art. The same would apply to the sentimental interests originating in memories and associations. The æsthetic pleasure proper, that is, the pleasure derived from a work of art and unique in that it can only be obtained through a work of art, is due to an identification of ourselves with the work of art as a whole and with the whole internal world of the artist as represented by his work. In my view all æsthetic pleasure includes an unconscious re-living of the artist's experience of creation. In his paper on ' The Moses of Michelangelo ', Freud says: ' What the artist aims at is to awaken in us the same mental constellation as that which in him produced the impetus to create.'

We find in Dilthey's philosophy a concept called by him ' nach-erleben '.[13] This means to him that we can understand other people from their behaviour and expression, we intuitively reconstruct their mental and emotional state, we live after them, we re-live them. This process he calls ' nach-erleben '. It is, he says, often deeper than introspection can discover. His concept, I think, is equivalent to unconscious identification. I assume that this kind of unconscious re-living of the creator's state of mind is the foundation of all æsthetic pleasure.

To illustrate what I mean I will take as an example the case of ' classical ' tragedy. In a tragedy the hero commits a crime: the crime is fated, it is an ' innocent ' crime, he is driven to it. Whatever the nature of the crime the result is always complete destruction—the parental figures and child figures alike are engulfed by it. That is, at whatever level the conflict starts—' Œdipus Rex ', for instance, states a genital conflict—in the end we arrive at a picture of the phantasies belonging to the earliest depressive position where all the objects are destroyed. What is the psychological mechanism of the listener's ' nach-erleben ' ? As I see it, he makes two identifications. He identifies himself with the author, and he identifies the whole tragedy with the author's internal world. He identifies himself with the author while the latter is facing and expressing his depression. In a simplified way one can summarize the listener's reaction as follows: ' The author has, in his hatred, destroyed all his loved objects just as I have done, and like me he felt death and desolation inside him. Yet he can face it and he can make me face it, and despite the ruin and devastation we and the world around us survive. What is more, his objects, which have become evil and were destroyed, have been made alive again and have become immortal by his art. Out of all the chaos and destruction he has created a world which is whole, complete and unified.'

It would appear then that two factors are essential to the excellence of a tragedy: the unshrinking expression of the full horror of the depressive phantasy and the achieving of an impression of wholeness and harmony. The external form of ' classical ' tragedy is in complete contrast with its content. The formal modes of speech, the unities of time, place and action, the strictness and rigidity of the rules are all, I believe, an unconscious demonstration of the fact that order can emerge out of chaos. Without this formal harmony the depression of the audience would be aroused but not resolved. There can be no æsthetic pleasure without perfect form.[14]

In creating a tragedy I suggest the success of the artist depends on his being able fully to acknowledge and express his depressive phantasies and anxieties. In expressing them he does work similar to the work of mourning in that he internally re-creates a harmonious world which is projected into his work of art.

The reader identifies with the author through the medium of his work of art. In that way he

[13] *Wilhelm Dilthey*, an Introduction. Hodges.

[14] Roger Fry says: ' All the essential æsthetic quality has to do with pure form ', and I agree, but he adds later: ' The odd thing is that it is, apparently, dangerous for the artist to know about this.' Roger Fry feels that it is odd, I think, because of an inherent weakness of the formalist school he represents. The formalists discount the importance of emotional factors in art. According to Fry, art must be completely detached from emotions, all emotion is impurity, and the more the form gets freed from the emotional content the nearer it is to the ideal. What the formalists ignore is that form as much as content is in itself an expression of unconscious emotion. What Fry, following Clive Bell, calls ' significant form ', a term he confesses himself incapable of defining, is form expressing and embodying an unconscious emotional experience. The artist is not trying to produce pretty or even beautiful form, he is engaged on the most important task of re-creating his ruined internal world and the resulting form will depend on how well he succeeds in his task.

re-experiences his own early depressive anxieties, and through identifying with the artist he experiences a successful mourning, re-establishes his own internal objects and his own internal world, and feels, therefore, re-integrated and enriched.

* * * *

But is this experience specific to a work of art that is tragic, or is it an essential part of any æsthetic experience? I think I could generalize my argument. To do so I shall have to introduce the more usual terminology of æsthetics and re-state my problems in new terms. The terms I need are 'ugly' and 'beautiful'. For Rickman, in his paper 'The Nature of Ugliness and the Creative Impulse',[15] the 'ugly' is the destroyed, the incomplete object. For Ella Sharpe[16] 'ugly' is destroyed, arythmic, and connected with painful tension. I think both these views would be included if we say that 'ugliness' is what expresses the state of the internal world in depression. It includes tension, hatred and its results—the destruction of good and whole objects and their change into persecutory fragments. Rickman, however, when he contrasts ugly and beautiful, seems to equate 'beautiful' with what is æsthetically satisfying. With that I cannot agree. Ugly and beautiful are two categories of æsthetic experience and, in certain ways, they can be contrasted; but if beautiful is used as synonymous with æsthetically satisfying, then its contradictory is not 'ugly', but unæsthetic, or indifferent, or dull. Rickman says that we recoil from the ugly; my contention is that 'ugly' is a most important and necessary component of a satisfying æsthetic experience. The concept of ugliness as one element in æsthetic satisfaction is not uncommon in the tradition of philosophical æsthetics; it has been most strikingly expressed, however, by the artists themselves. Rodin writes: 'We call ugly that which is formless, unhealthy, which suggests illness, suffering, destruction, which is contrary to regularity—the sign of health. We also call ugly the immoral, the vicious, the criminal and all abnormality which brings evil—the soul of the parricide, the traitor, the self-seeker. But let a great artist get hold of this ugliness; immediately he transfigures it—with a touch of his magic wand he makes it into beauty.'

What is 'beautiful'? Taking again the beautiful as but one of the categories of the æsthetically satisfying, most writers agree that the main elements of the beautiful—the whole, the complete, and the rhythmical—are in contrast with the ugly. Amongst analytical writers—Rickman equates the beautiful with the whole object; Ella Sharpe considers beauty essentially as rhythm and equates it with the experience of goodness in rhythmical sucking, satisfactory defecation and sexual intercourse. I should add to this rhythmical breathing and the rhythm of our heart-beats. An undisturbed rhythm in a composed whole seems to correspond to the state in which our inner world is at peace. Of non-analytical writers, Herbert Read comes to a similar conclusion when he says that we find rhythmical, simple arithmetical proportions which correspond to the way we are built and our bodies work. But these elements of 'beauty' are in themselves insufficient. If they were enough then we would find it most satisfactory to contemplate a circle or listen to a regular tattoo on a drum. I suggest that both beauty, in the narrow sense of the word, and ugliness must be present for a full æsthetic experience.

I would re-word my attempt at analysing the tragic in terms of ugliness and beauty. Broadly speaking, in tragedy 'ugly' is the content—the complete ruin and destruction—and 'beautiful' is the form. 'Ugly' is also an essential part of the comic. The comic here is ugly in that, as in caricature, the overstressing of one or two characteristics ruins the wholeness—the balance—of the character. Ugly and tragic is also the defeat of the comic hero by the sane world. How near the comic hero is to the tragic can be seen from the fact that outstanding comic heroes of past ages are felt, at a later date, to be mainly tragic figures; few people to-day take Shylock or Falstaff as figures of fun only; we are aware of the tragedy implied. The difference between tragedy and comedy lies then in the comic writer's attempt to dissociate himself from the tragedy of his hero, to feel superior to it in a kind of successful manic defence. But the manic defence is never complete; the original depression is still expressed and it must therefore have been to a large extent acknowledged and lived by the author. The audience re-lives depression, the

[15] J. Rickman (1940). 'The Nature of Ugliness and the Creative Impulse', *Int. J. of Psycho-Anal.*, **21**, Part 3.
[16] Ella Sharpe: 'Certain Aspects of Sublimation and Delusion' (1930). 'Similar and Divergent Unconscious Determinants underlying the Sublimations of Pure Art and Pure Science' (1935).

fear of it, and the aggression against it which are expressed in a comedy and its final successful outcome.

It is easier to discover this pattern of overcoming depression in literature, with its explicit verbal content, than in other forms of art. The further away from literature the more difficult is the task. In music, for instance, we would have to study the introduction of discords, disharmonies, new disorders which are so invariably considered to be ugly before they are universally accepted. New art is considered ' difficult ', it is resisted, misunderstood, treated with bitter hatred, contempt; or, on the other hand, it may be idealized to such an extent that the apparent admiration defeats its aim and makes its object a butt of ridicule. These prevalent reactions of the public are, I think, manifestations of a manic defence against the depressive anxieties stirred by art. The artists find ever new ways of revealing a repressed and denied depression. The public use against it all their powers of defence until they find the courage to follow the new artist into the depths of his depression, and eventually to share his triumphs.

The idea that ugliness is an essential component of a complete experience seems to be true of the tragic, the comic, the realistic, in fact of all the commonly accepted categories of the æsthetic except one—and this single exception is of great importance.

There is, undoubtedly, a category of art which shows to the greatest extent all the elements of beauty in the narrow sense of the word, and no apparent sign of ugliness; it is often called ' classical ' beauty. The beauty of the Parthenon, of the Discobolos, is whole, rhythmical, undisturbed. But soulless imitations of beauty, ' pretty ' creations are also whole and rhythmical; yet they fail to stir and rouse nothing but boredom. Thus classical beauty must have some other not immediately obvious element.

Returning to the concept of *nach-erleben*, of experiencing along with another, we may say that in order to move us deeply the artist must have embodied in his work some deep experience of his own. And all our analytical experience as well as the knowledge derived from other forms of art suggest that the deep experience must have been what we call, clinically, a depression, and that the stimulus to create such a perfect whole must have lain in the drive to overcome an unusually strong depression.

If we consider what is commonly said about beauty by laymen, we find a confirmation of this conclusion. They say that complete beauty makes one both sad and happy at the same time, and that it is a purge for the soul—that it is awe-inspiring. Great artists themselves have been very much aware of the depression and terror embodied in works of classical beauty which are apparently so peaceful. When Faust goes in search of Helen, the perfect classical beauty, he has to face un-named terrors; to go where there is no road:

> ' Kein Weg! Ins Unbetretene
> Nicht zu Betretende; ein Weg aus Unerbetene,
> Nicht zu Erbittende.'

He must face endless emptiness:

> '—Nichts Wirst du sehn in ewig leerer Ferne,
> Den Schritt nicht hören den du tust,
> Nichts Festes finden, wo du rührst.'

Rilke writes: ' Beauty is nothing but the beginning of terror that we are still just able to bear.'

Thus to the sensitive onlooker, every work of beauty still embodies the terrifying experience of depression and death. Hanns Sachs, in his book, *Beauty, Life and Death*, pays particular attention to the awesome aspect of beauty; he says the difficulty is not to understand beauty but to bear it, and he connects this terror with the very peacefulness of the perfect work of art. He calls it the static element; it is peaceful because it seems unchangeable, eternal. And it is terrifying because this eternal unchangeability is the expression of the death instinct—the static element opposed to life and change.

Following quite a different trend of thought I come to similar conclusions about the rôle of the death instinct in a work of art. Thus far my contention has been that a satisfactory work of art is achieved by a realization and sublimation of the depressive position, and that the effect on the audience is that they unconsciously re-live the artist's experience and share his triumph of achievement and his final detachment. But to realize and symbolically to express depression the artist must acknowledge the death instinct, both in its aggressive and self-destructive aspects, and accept the reality of death for the object and the self. One of the patients I described could not use symbols because of her failure to work through the depressive position; her failure clearly lay in

her inability to accept and use her death instinct and to acknowledge death.

Re-stated in terms of instincts, ugliness—destruction—is the expression of the death instinct; beauty—the desire to unite into rhythms and wholes, is that of the life instinct. The achievement of the artist is in giving the fullest expression to the conflict and the union between those two.

This is a conclusion which Freud has brought out in two of his essays, though he did not generalize it as applicable to all art. One of these essays is that on Michelangelo's Moses, where he clearly shows that the latent meaning of this work is the overcoming of wrath. The other essay is his analysis of the theme of the Three Caskets. He shows there that in the choice between the three caskets, or three women, the final choice is always symbolical of death. He interprets Cordelia in *King Lear* as a symbol of death, and for him the solution of the play is Lear's final overcoming of the fear of death and his reconciliation to it. He says: 'Thus man overcomes death, which in thought he has acknowledged. No greater triumph of wish-fulfilment is conceivable.'

All artists aim at immortality; their objects must not only be brought back to life, but also the life has to be eternal. And of all human activities art comes nearest to achieving immortality; a great work of art is likely to escape destruction and oblivion.

It is tempting to suggest that this is so because in a great work of art the degree of denial of the death instinct is less than in any other human activity, that the death instinct is acknowledged, as fully as can be borne. It is expressed and curbed to the needs of the life instinct and creation.

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PRELIMINARY NOTES ON SOME DEFENCE MECHANISMS IN PARANOID STATES

By PAULA HEIMANN

In this paper I wish to draw attention to a combination of defence mechanisms which I observed in the analyses of paranoid patients. I do not intend to present a comprehensive study of paranoid conditions, nor do I wish to deal with the important problem of distinguishing between paranoid states in neurotic and psychotic patients.

The analysis of paranoid patients has some characteristic features. The patient is preoccupied with experiences in which a certain person or persons have done and are doing harm to him (or her). He produces abundant material to prove that he is the victim of this person's hostility, and he describes in much detail his own state of suffering, pain, fear and mental incapacity. The person by whom the patient feels persecuted is one very near to him (wife or husband or child), and often enough the patient is quite certain that his contemporary enemy does exactly the same things to him as an important figure in his earlier life, usually one of his parents. He concludes that he is doomed to suffer in this way and he feels very bitter about it.

The analytic sessions are filled by the patient's reporting ever new incidents in which he has been humiliated, attacked and in one way or another made to suffer.

He describes intolerable states of panic and agony. He cannot find peace anywhere. Attempts at activity do not relieve his state of mind, but on the contrary infinitely add to his suffering, because he cannot accomplish what he has started; either his mind goes blank, or a turmoil of ideas overwhelms him. He cannot read or converse with people because he cannot follow a train of thought, and a new terror sweeps over him. People will pounce on him, he will be scorned and ridiculed. And so one pain follows another, one persecution and anticipation of persecution leads on to others. When his persecutory fears have become transferred to the analyst, the analytic sessions become devoted to the enumeration of the analyst's wrongdoings. At such a point my patients have accused me of having no human sympathy with the sufferer—indeed I make my living out of him; I have no interest in helping him since that would end my sinecure; I am conceited and dictatorial and intent on putting my stupid theories over, to the patient's detriment; my interpretations are taken from the text-books which I have learnt by heart and which have no bearing on the patient; analysts think they are God Almighty, but in fact nobody has ever been helped by analysis. The patient is convinced that his condition has deteriorated through the analysis; he never was as ill as now. He feels that the analyst sides with his enemies—is his enemy.

The analytic sessions with Mr. X. followed this pattern. He would begin the hour by complaining about his condition and reporting on his sufferings in great detail, each of which he felt to be due to analysis in general and me in particular. Whilst he himself was quite unaware of it, it was obvious to me that the detailed report on his painful experiences offered him the chance of attacking me and gave him a good deal of satisfaction. Consciously he was alarmed and distressed and the victim of my persecution. I used to listen to his complaints for quite a time silently. Then, when he felt he had expressed himself sufficiently, I took up his accusations in detail and made explicit what he had merely implied or hinted at. I found that it was very important to establish the links between his actual feelings of persecution and the incidents or interpretations, which had occurred in recent or earlier analytic sessions, and which had stirred his persecutory fears. I put into words as completely and specifically as possible whatever in his statements had remained only a vague allusion or an innuendo. I did not make any remarks of a reassuring or comforting nature, nor did I assert my sympathy or good will. The rationale of my technique

was not that I wished to show how much I understood his feelings or how seriously I took whatever he said explicitly or implicitly, but I felt that only by fully dealing with his conscious and preconscious ideas of persecution could I establish contact with him, and that he was only able to converse with me, after he had had a free run of accusations against me. As Freud has stressed, the analyst must start with the material which is on the surface of the patient's mind. When I thus traced his references and allusions to interpretations and incidents in preceding sessions, his tendency to feel insulted and wronged and to distort my interpretations became to some extent obvious to him, and he did come to feel that I understood him. Thus even in this part of the analytic session in which we focussed on his complaints, it became possible to interpret his actual motives, feelings and phantasies. Insight into his tendency to invest my interpretations and behaviour with malicious intentions on my part emerged, so to say, effortlessly, as a by-product.[1] Gradually this feature, i.e. ordinary interpretative work, became dominant, and he collaborated by producing relevant associations, dreams or memories which brought his unsolved conflicts with his original objects more into the open.

In this way, by an exclusively analytic procedure, the patient's initial state of persecutory anxiety was reduced, and he often volunteered the information that he felt better and that his alarm and restlessness had gone, etc. He would, however, hardly ever give me any thanks for the relief which on his own statement he was actually experiencing, and at a later point he often made this very relief a cause for complaint, i.e. that by my ' nice voice and pleasant personality ' I seduced him and lulled him into a false sense of security which, he declared, was not founded on any ' real ' improvement. Indeed, whenever in his introductory report on his condition during the interval between the sessions he did mention an improvement, he almost unfailingly attributed it to some person having been nice to him and explicitly disavowed any connection with the analytic work.

I have already mentioned that, when listening to my patient's complaints it was obvious that unconsciously he enjoyed attacking me. In general I have found that paranoid patients unconsciously derive a good deal of sadistic gratification in situations which they consciously only register as persecutory. However, I had not been quite certain how this unconscious sadistic gratification was connected with defensive processes. In one par-particular session with Mr. X. this was demonstrated very clearly. As usual, he began with a report on his wretched life, his anxieties and inabilities, the torments caused by his fears and his futile attempts to ward them off. Scornful and mocking references to the analyst were there in plenty. He felt at the end of his tether. His situation was aggravated this time, because he had to make a change in his business. He knew what he wanted to do, yet felt unable to make the decision. He felt maximally persecuted, and the decision he had to make appeared to him to be of a vital order. Analysis, in his view having obviously failed to ameliorate his condition, had at this point to be put aside, and he demanded that I should give him advice about his so pressing ' real ' problem and intervene directly in his external situation. I did not obey his order but proceeded in the usual way, and he became less anxious and less persecuted and recognized at some point that in fact his situation was not as urgent as he had at first believed. But his attacks on the analysis and on me, and his pleasure in inflicting insults and accusations seemed a bit stronger perhaps than usual. On leaving, though much relieved and with more insight into the factors related to his actual problem, he stated that I had not helped him at all and that he would be as much tormented after the hour as he had been before it.

The way, however, in which he made this statement did not accord with an anticipation of misery. It was with relish that he flung this parting shot at me. The affect accompanying his remark was triumphant and menacing. Manifestly his words contained two statements, one about my failure to help him and the other about the condition of torment he foresaw for himself. The hostile triumph in his attitude was clearly related to my failure and might be rendered by a phrase like this: ' You should be ashamed for having so blatantly failed in your job.' But this rendering of his thought would only express his triumph at having established my incompetence. There was also, as I said, an unmistakable threat in his attitude, which if

[1] Cf. James Strachey: ' Symposium on the Theory of the Therapeutic Results of Psycho-Analysis ', *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, **18**, April–July, 1937, Parts 2 and 3. Strachey shows that it is important to enable the patient to make a ' comparison between his archaic and imaginary objects and his actual and real ones ', p. 142.

put into words would run like this: 'I shall torment *you* after the hour exactly as I did when I came. You cannot escape from my attacks, although (or because) you will not be there to defend yourself.'

The unconscious meaning of the patient's parting remark was that *I* was going to be tormented. He used the pronoun which referred to himself because he was unconscious not only of his cruel impulses towards me, but also of the means by which he anticipated their gratification.

It takes much longer to describe than to perceive a process which takes place in a moment. It seemed to me that I could actually witness the process of introjection in operation, and the fact that such introjection occurred when he was about to leave me, brings to mind Freud's suggestion that introjection may be the sole condition on which the ego can give up an object.[2] Throughout the hour the patient had attacked and scorned me and tried to force me to enter his life outside the analysis. At the point of leaving me he introjected me in order to continue his attacks.

Before presenting my conclusions from this observation I wish to relate briefly certain facts of this patient's history which elucidate the transference situation.

The anal-sadistic quality of his conduct in the analytic sessions will have become obvious already. In his sexual life anal-sadistic elements played a significant part.

During a certain period in his life he greatly enjoyed breaking wind in the presence of his mistress who did not like this, but for his sake tolerated it. With his complaints my patient repeated with me this element of his love life. Further he sometimes visited prostitutes and ordered them to beat him and manually excite his penis. It can be seen that his conscious notions of suffering at my hands partly represent a transference from his beating practices.

I can here mention only a few of the phantasies connected with these practices which are relevant to my subject-matter.

(1) He was strongly identified with the prostitute whom he ordered to do the beating. (Identification with the manifestly sadistic partner in masochistic relations has long been established by psycho-analysis.)

(2) It was not so much he who was beaten, but his internal father.

(3) To beat meant further to beat something out, in the way in which Moses by beating the rock forced the water out of it. When the patient was beaten, it was not only that the pain was experienced by his internal father, but he got the persecuting, bad and hated father out of his system.

(4) The prostitute, who had to be subservient to his will and on his bidding carried out the beating and gave him pleasurable sensations in his genital, was not to have any pleasure herself. In this way he enacted his parents' intercourse as in his Œdipal phantasies he wished it to have been: his mother should not have loved his father, she should have married him only for his money, and she should loathe sexual intercourse with him. The father should feel the humiliation of being rejected and of being impotent to give pleasure to his partner.[3]

Another detail of my patient's history is significant for the understanding of his behaviour in the session which I reported. He often spoke with great love and admiration of his mother and illustrated her kindness and forbearance by various incidents. He remembered, for example, how he took her into his car and drove off with her, and how, when they had gone a good distance from home, he unburdened himself by accusing her of the many wrong things he felt she had done to him. She listened patiently and with her characteristic kindness. When my patient tried to make me leave the sphere of analysis and follow him into his life outside, he re-enacted his relation with his mother in the transference situation. In the past he took the original object of his sadistic love, his mother, into his car and removed her physically from her home. It is not difficult to see that the car was a symbol of himself and that in unconscious phantasy the patient took his mother into himself introjecting her once more as often on earlier occasions. In the transference relationship he introjected the substitute object, the analyst.

When Freud introduced the concept of a grade in the ego,[4] the ego ideal, which he later developed into the super-ego, he envisaged the intra-psychic situation as an internal object relationship. The relevant passage may be quoted:

[2] *The Ego and the Id*, 1923.

[3] The homosexual aspects of the beating practices are omitted because I am not concerned with presenting a comprehensive case history. For the same reason I also do not mention in which way shame and horror affected the patient and how in certain situations he attempted to make reparation.

[4] *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, 1921.

> '. . . Let us reflect that the ego now appears in the relation of an object, to the ego ideal which has been developed out of it, *and that all the interplay between an outer object and the ego as a whole*, with which our study of the neuroses has made us acquainted, may possibly be repeated upon this new scene of action inside the ego.' (My italics.)

In his subsequent writings this wide notion of an intra-psychic emotional relationship has not been worked out. It has been superseded by the concept of the ego as one functional unit and the super-ego as another, entrusted with the enforcement of moral principles on the ego. The structural relation between the ego and the super-ego has assumed a dominant position in psycho-analytic theory. Melanie Klein's research by widening our knowledge of the development of the super-ego takes us back to Freud's first notion of an intra-psychic object relation. The introjected object which acts as the judge of the ego, the super-ego, represents only one aspect, a highly important one, of the relation between the ego and its introjected objects, but it does not exhaust all the emotional experiences which the ego derives as the result of introjection (and projection).[5]

The paranoid type of introjection with which the present paper is concerned establishes an internal object which the ego can treat with the same sadism with which the subject treats or wishes to treat the original object in the outer world. This, it seems to me, is possible because together with the introjection of the object a splitting in the ego takes place, and the part of the ego which becomes identified with the introjected object is split off from the rest. In this way a 'new scene of action inside the ego' is arranged on which the ego continues its sadistic love relationships. The sadistic gratifications which the ego obtains from the internal object represent at the same time a discharge of the destructive impulses by which the ego is endangered, in other words they represent an *intra-psychic* deflection of the death instinct.

I used to think of processes of internal projection when I observed incidents similar to the one I described in some detail; but I did not understand how such intra-psychic projection took place, until I came to appreciate the part played by the splitting mechanisms. In the light of Melanie Klein's [6] concept of the paranoid/schizoid position and through her presentation of the defensive processes of splitting in early infantile life, I realized that intra-psychic projection is preceded by a split in the ego.

This combination of introjection, splitting and intra-psychic projection seems to me to represent defences which are characteristic of paranoid states, and of very great significance in preventing the patient from breaking down under the stress of his persecutory fears. To put it in an over-simplified manner: the paranoid patient is endangered only to the extent to which he is identified with the internal object which he persecutes. By means of splitting and projection this identification is controlled and limited.[7] It seems that occasionally the protective inner processes of splitting and projection which for the time being end the identification with the internal persecuted/persecuting object reach consciousness. Several of my patients who suffered from paranoid states told me that sometimes, without any accountable reason, the whole torment, panic, whirlpool of incoherent ideas, etc., would disappear, in a flash, and they would feel free, capable and even happy.

If the division in the ego is maintained, the success of the defensive splitting appears to depend on how much of the ego remains free and separated from that part which through the introjection of the persecuted/persecuting object is lost, and no longer operates within the organization of the ego. To use a spatial analogy, it must be very important that the dividing line should run between a smaller part, which becomes the introjected object, and the larger part of the ego. This would ensure that a sufficient amount of ego-functions remains comparatively unimpaired and available for the subject's needs. An assumption of this kind is in keeping with the fact that all the patients under my observation who suffered from paranoid states were capable of maintaining themselves in an ordinary milieu and of carrying out social and professional activities with a varying degree of competence.

[5] Cf. Joan Riviere: 'The Unconscious Phantasy of an Inner World Reflected in Examples from English Literature', this Journal, p. 160.

[6] 'Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms', *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, *27*, 1946, and in the forthcoming book, *Developments in Psycho-Analysis*. Hogarth Press.

[7] To some extent the beating incidents reflect these intra-psychic events. Since the patient employed the prostitute, he could control and limit the amount of pain he wished to experience.

Spatial analogies are not very satisfactory, but they are useful for the description of quantitative factors. A ' broad mind ' is not entirely a metaphor. Wealth of ideas and associations and width of the mental orbit are very real facts. An essential part of the therapeutic process of analysis, ' working through ', depends, as Freud has shown, on the quantity of the associative links which the patient's ego comes to establish with the formerly dissociated idea. In this process, which undermines the pathogenic power of the particular idea, the ego makes use of introjective techniques.

Analytic therapy follows the patterns of normal development. The child progresses by introjecting his loved and admired parents; his ego assimilates its good internal objects and is at the same time stimulated to develop its own constructive capacities, its social, intellectual and artistic gifts.

When introjection, however, is determined by the person's destructive impulses, under the pressure of paranoid fears, the introjected object is not assimilated. The ego acquires a dangerous object and, as I suggested above, by means of splitting it is divided into a part which is maintained as ego, whereas another part is identified with the bad internal object and is treated as such. Repeated introjections of this kind lead to repeated splits in the ego. The defensive process is bound to fail, if for various reasons the division in the ego cannot be maintained and the different parts of the ego fuse. On this hypothesis, the moment of integration spells danger; when integration occurs, the ego will be flooded with anxiety, and it will have to marshal other defences. I think that projection outwards will often be used at this point, and for this reason the individual will need objects suitable for such projection (projection of what is felt to be bad and dangerous), in other words the individual will need a ' bad ' object in the external world. A vicious circle may be started in this way, because the subject is both attracted and persecuted by the external object which through projection has become an alter ego (projective identification).

The paranoid type of introjection and splitting seems to impair many ego functions to a certain extent. In a paranoid condition the ego is not coherent and well functioning; it is not merely reduced in quantity owing to the split. I believe that here there lies an important difference between the results of splitting and of repression. In the latter case the ego is impoverished. A certain amount of its energy is spent in maintaining repression, and the person has not developed his potential abilities. Within his limits, however, he is fully coherent, capable, and he is largely free from anxiety.

Paranoid patients are practically always in a state of anxiety. They are preoccupied with the theme of their persecutions. As is well known these patients have a sharpness of observation, but ideas of reference lead to faulty conclusions. Their attention is focussed on whatever feeds their suspicion, and they are unable to give due weight to anything else. They are shallow in their thinking, spread over a wide area on the surface, but avoid the depth. (This suggests that the splitting line runs also between depth and surface, horizontally, as it were.) By exaggerating an isolated aspect, hairsplitting, they lose sight of the essence of the matter. They cannot accept a different view of the situation and repeatedly change the issue.

I have found that paranoid patients often are gifted speakers. They find words easily and have a rich and varied vocabulary. They are capable of arguing successfully, but they argue too much and think too little. They prove their own foregone conclusion, which is that they are being wronged. (One of my patients complained that analysis was like a Russian trial in which the outcome is pre-judged.) I believe it is this capacity for verbalization and skill in arguing, which is sometimes mistaken for a high intelligence, whilst in fact the paranoid patient's intellectual achievements are restricted and rather poor. When the ego is predominantly engaged in defensive manœuvres, it is not free to assimilate ideas and use its creative capacities.[8] It is often quite striking to see the extent to which a person, otherwise intelligent and imaginative, can become dull, rigid and monotonous, in fact stupid, when swayed by paranoid fears.[9]

The triumph which the paranoid patient

[8] Cf. Paula Heimann: ' A Contribution to the Problem of Sublimation and its Relation to Processes of Internationalisation ', *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, **23**, 1942, Part 1.

[9] In this context I am not dealing with the rôle which anal obstinacy plays in such ' stupidity '. In passing I would mention that, as is to be expected, all my patients who tended to produce paranoid states, showed strong anal features both as part of their sexual (hetero-sexual) activities and in the form of character traits.

shows when convicting his object of incompetence, stupidity, cruelty, etc., links the paranoid with the manic state. Exaltation of the self occurs in the manic and in the paranoid patient alike. Freud and Abraham have shown that the delusion of persecution has a highly narcissistic character and implies delusions of grandeur. The paranoid split in the ego leads to a condition similar to mania where the ego, as Freud described, has mastered the complex or thrust it aside or surmounted the object itself.[10] The manic patient consciously feels cheery, loved, elated and capable of achieving whatever he likes, the paranoid patient consciously feels persecuted, bitter, wretched and interfered with in his activities. Behind this impressive difference, however, there are great similarities. The manic person, if contradicted in his amiable, pally expansiveness easily becomes violently aggressive. Other similarities lie in the impaired thought processes such as shallowness, flight of ideas, change of issues, inability to accept a different view, etc.[11]

The common denominator of the manic and the paranoid state is the defence against the sense of guilt, unworthiness and depression, that is, the emotions which Melanie Klein comprises under the term 'depressive anxiety'. Both states derive from the 'manic defence' which operates when the infant has reached the depressive position, but under the impact of depressive anxieties again and again returns to the former, the paranoid/schizoid position. These regressive movements re-establish the mechanisms of denial and splitting, idealization and omnipotence, etc.

It is from the conflict of ambivalence and from guilt for attacking the loved and good object that both the manic and the paranoid person take flight.

The paranoid person develops the delusion of persecution and denies that he both loves and attacks the person by whom he feels persecuted. His defences against his conscious fears include the unconscious gratification of his sadism. As a result of combining introjection with splitting and intra-psychic projection he experiences such sadistic gratification also in relation to his introjected object. When the division(s) in his ego cannot be maintained, he is in danger of becoming identified with his persecuted object and of breaking down under the impact of depressive and persecutory anxieties.

Whether or not he can avert this danger, depends on his ability to marshall other defences.

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[10] Mourning and Melancholia, C.P. IV.

[11] Intolerance of an opinion different from his own which occurs in both, the paranoid and the manic patient shows that both have regressed to an early infantile phase in which the gratifying mother fuses with the self, whilst the frustrating mother is felt as different from the self and its enemy. The patient from whose analysis I have quoted, found it exceedingly frustrating if his sexual partner showed any initiative, and often in the analysis he longed for me to be completely passive, absolutely silent and not to express any opinion of my own, different from his. I found that all my paranoid patients resented interpretations because they 'had not thought of this' themselves. This resentment was not only an expression of a general attitude that, whatever comes from an enemy must be dangerous and better rejected. It had the specific quality that something was dangerous, because it was different from the person himself.

The manic patient's attitude is illustrated by the German saying: 'Und willst Du nicht mein Bruder sein, so schlag ich Dir den Schädel ein.' ('If my brother you won't be, I shall just slay thee.') The paranoid patient makes the same statement in a less humorous manner.

NEW BEGINNING AND THE PARANOID AND THE DEPRESSIVE SYNDROMES

By MICHAEL BALINT, London

Editorial Note

Nearly all the papers in this number of the Journal are by those of Mrs. Klein's colleagues or pupils whose approach to psycho-analysis is known to be strongly influenced by her theoretical conclusions, so that their work will be widely taken as representative of hers. We are glad to include this paper by one old colleague and friend who had appreciated her work from the beginning. But we feel it should be made clear that his views on certain basic points are not the same as hers.

The divergence concerns the rôle of unconscious phantasy and early development, and so naturally also affects psycho-analytic procedure. It may be illustrated by one example:

Dr. Balint, unlike Mrs. Klein, believes there is a phase of primary object love in which aggressiveness, and the persecutory anxieties aroused by it, do not yet play an important rôle. But it is perhaps less about the priority than about the distorting influence of aggression that, in our view, far reaching differences lie. To Mrs. Klein, aggression inevitably distorts the child's picture of the world, making him feel attacked with hatred whenever he is at all thwarted or deprived. Early environment may do much to increase, or lessen, this sense of persecution; but a ' bad ' home does not create it, nor does a good one prevent it from appearing.

To Dr. Balint, however, persecutory feelings seem to be something which, in a good home, would hardly arise at all.

A more extreme form of this view, and of the technique which corresponds to it, was originally adopted by Ferenczi. And, although Dr. Balint does not go as far as he did, the same objections would we think be made by Mrs. Klein to both: namely, that there is an over-emphasis on external factors which leads to an underrating of internal ones, and so to an underrating of the power of primary unconscious phantasies.

It follows from Mrs. Klein's views on the primary importance of the paranoid-schizoid position that with every patient it will reappear in the transference, and that the success of every analysis depends on the extent to which its origin in the projection of aggression can then be made conscious by transference interpretations. But reassurance tends to prevent or obscure its reappearance in this form. Therefore, in her view, psycho-analytic procedure depends solely upon interpretations and reassurances are to be avoided. Now the indulgences on the fore-pleasure level which Dr. Balint describes in this paper, and which he feels to be helpful to analysis, cannot be small in their effects on the patient's unconscious. We therefore believe that they must operate as reassurances which disturb the transference situation, and which, for this reason, would be avoided by Mrs. Klein and other analysts practising her methods.

But while we have felt bound to draw attention to these differences in theory and technique, we welcome Dr. Balint's paper as an original and stimulating exposition of divergent views.

P. H. R. M-K.

I

I felt greatly honoured when I was asked to contribute a paper to this number as I cannot consider myself Mrs. Klein's pupil in the ordinary sense of the word. My justification for inclusion is a long-standing interest in her work, and—if I may call it so—a friendship dating back to our bygone Berlin days when both of us were still under analysis and by good luck for me we lived for some time only a few doors away from each other. In every other respect our positions were wholly different. I was a real beginner, fresh from the University, while Mrs. Klein was already an analyst of repute who was listened to attentively, even though at times ironically. She still had an uphill fight to face, being the only non-academic and the only child analyst in the midst of a very academic and very ' learned ' German society. Time and again she brought her clinical material, using very courageously and for the sake of greater faithfulness the naïve expressions of the nursery as her child patients did, often causing in her learned and reluctant audience embarrassment, incredulity or even sardonic laughter. Yet, despite this ambivalent reception she remained steadfast in her primary aim of showing that neurotic symptoms and defensive mechanisms found in adults can be observed also in young children and very often, in quite relevant respects, can be studied

better in children than in adults. Both Mrs. Klein and the analytic world have travelled a long way since those days. Many—certainly not all—of her then hotly disputed ideas have since become an integral part of the body of accepted analytic knowledge.

As my tribute to her birthday I wish to show how her ideas helped me to understand an impasse in my work and gave me hope that in the future this impasse might be avoided by better knowledge and skill. In 1932 I described [1] a peculiar phase in the analytic treatment of patients. Since then on several occasions I have returned to the same theme trying to describe it more and more exactly.

My clinical experience was briefly this: At times when the analytic work has already progressed a long way, i.e. towards the end of a cure, my patients began—very timidly at first—to desire, to expect, even to demand certain simple gratifications mainly though not exclusively from their analyst. On the surface these wishes appeared unimportant: to give a present to the analyst or—more frequently—to get one from him, to be allowed to touch or stroke him or to be touched or stroked by him, etc., and most frequently of all: to be able to hold his hand or just one of his fingers. Two highly important characteristics of these wishes are easily seen. First: they can be satisfied only by another human being, an autoerotic satisfaction is simply impossible. Second: the level of gratification never goes beyond that of mild forepleasure. Correspondingly [2] a really full satisfaction followed by an anticlimax can hardly ever be observed, only a more or less complete saturation. Thus, if satisfaction arrives at the right moment and with the right intensity, it leads to reactions which can be observed and recognized only with difficulty, as the level of pleasure amounts only to a *tranquil quiet sense of well being*.

This leads me to a very difficult technical problem: what the analyst should do about these wishes. The first task is obvious: both he and his patient must recognize them and understand their essentially primitive nature. This is a difficult task because these wishes—like all other material produced by the patient—are overdetermined, and all the overlying determinants must first be resolved by the analytic work before their primitiveness can clearly emerge. In most cases this much is sufficient. There are, however, some patients whose analysis—in my experience—demands more. They belong to a class which can be described either as deeply disturbed, or as people, whose ego development was distorted by early traumas. These patients have the ability—or compulsion, or symptom—of regressing to a state of infantile helplessness in which they do not seem to be able to comprehend intellectual considerations, i.e. interpretations couched in words. These states are, of course, overdetermined; they are a sign of strong resistance, an expression of intense fear, a bitter reproach, a way of demonstrating the disastrous effects of the trauma, a means of getting masochistic pleasure by repeating the surrender to the trauma and by inviting through helplessness another traumatic attack, etc., etc. In some such cases—encouraged by Ferenczi's experiments [3]—my patient and I agreed that some of the primitive wishes belonging to such a state should be satisfied in so far as they were compatible with the analytic situation. The terms of such ' agreement ' are naturally very elastic, but in the mutually trusting atmosphere of this period they have proved quite workable.

To maintain this mutually trusting atmosphere between patient and analyst requires very great tact and careful skill. On one side lies the precipice of addiction-like states. If the analyst is incautiously indulgent, the patients develop an almost insatiable greediness, they can never have enough. On the other side are the horrors of the state of frustration. Perhaps the most striking feature of this state is the overwhelming flood of sadistic tendencies. Session after session may be completely taken up with the most cruel phantasies of how the analyst should be treated as a retaliation for his indifferent and thus frustrating behaviour, and/or equally cruel phantasies about what the patient must expect as the well merited punishment of his aggressiveness. Similarly intense but well disguised aggressiveness can also be demonstrated in the addiction-like states; the form of the disguise is usually inhibited masochistic pleasure in one's own sufferings. In both states—of frustration and of addiction alike—in contrast to the silent

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[1] In ' Charakteranalyse und Neubeginn ', read at the 12th Congress of the Int. Ps. A. Assoc., published: *Int. Zeitschr. f. Psa.* (1934), **20**, 54.

[2] M. Balint: ' Eros and Aphrodite ', *Int. Zeitschr. f. Psa.* (1936), **22**, 453; *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.* (1938), **19**, 199.

[3] S. Ferenczi: ' The Principle of Relaxation and Neocatharsis ', *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.* (1930), **11**, 428. ' Child Analysis in the Analysis of Adults ', *ibid.* (1931), **12**, 468. ' Confusion of Tongues between the Adults and the Child ' (originally in 1933), *ibid.* (1949), **30**, 225.

signs of well timed and spaced satisfactions, one encounters vehement and noisy reactions caused by very painful, almost unbearable tensions in the patients. It is anything but easy to steer an even course through all these difficulties and pitfalls. However, if one succeeds, this period proves to be very fruitful; rigid ego structures, character traits and defensive mechanisms, ossified behaviour patterns and ever-repeated forms of object relations become analysable, understandable to both patient and analyst and finally adaptable to reality which then usually leads to a true termination of the analysis.

I had two reasons for calling these phenomena *new beginning*. The main reason was psychological. The whole, very dramatic, process struck one as if the patient—though only very cautiously—gave up bit by bit his accustomed automatic forms of object relation, or in other words: his hitherto unchangeable, fateful, ways of loving and hating. Simultaneously he made timid attempts at trying out new ways which, however, could easily be proved to be really old ones which in their time had been spoilt for him by his frustrating, unresponsive, or merely indifferent early environment. His ever-recurring bad experiences amounting in some cases to real traumas forced him at that time to start his neurotic ways of loving and hating. Now, in the safety of the analytical transference, he seemed to give up tentatively his defences, to regress to an—as yet—undefended, naïve, i.e. pre-traumatic state, and to *begin anew* to love and to hate in a primitive way, which was then speedily followed by the development of a mature, well adapted, non-neurotic (as far as such a state is thinkable) way of loving and hating.

A piece of theory is the corollary of this train of thought. I consider this period of *primitive, or archaic object love* (at first—under the influence of S. Ferenczi—I used the term: *passive object love*) to be the *fons et origo* of human libido-development. The original and everlasting aim of all object relations is the primitive wish: *I must be loved* without any obligation on me and without any expectation of return from me. All ' adult ' ways of object relation, i.e. of loving and hating, are compromise formations between this original wish and the acceptance of an unkind, unpleasant, indifferent reality. If a neurotic compromise (i.e. one economically much too expensive) is resolved by analysis, the original primitive form of love emerges again. This has to be realized and the patient be allowed to go back, to ' regress ', to this archaic, pre-traumatic state. The more the patient is able to divest himself of his acquired forms of object relation, the more he is able to begin anew to love, the greater is the probability of his developing a non-neurotic ' adult ' way of loving.

My additional reason for calling these phenomena new beginning came from biology.[4] In highly unfavourable external circumstances only those living beings can survive who are able to give up their well differentiated organization and regress to primitive stages in their development, in order to begin the process of adaptation anew. Highly developed forms are more efficient but also more dependent on a special set of environmental factors. Primitive, undifferentiated states are elastic, capable of new adaptation in various directions. The similarity is striking: Highly differentiated forms both in biology and in psychology are rigid unadaptable; if a radical new adaptation becomes necessary, the highly differentiated organization must be reduced to its primitive undifferentiated form from which a new beginning may then issue.

II

Looking through my case material, i.e. all the patients who continued their analyses beyond the trial period, I find that a proper period of new beginning leading to a true termination of the analysis could be achieved only in about 20 per cent. of my cases.[5] Another 20 per cent. could be described as practically cured and another 30 to 40 per cent. as considerably improved (the uncertainty is due to the interpretation of the adverb ' considerably '), while 20 to 30 per cent. must be considered as uninfluenced or not materially improved.

All these figures deserve thorough discussion. On this occasion I propose to examine what

[4] M. Balint: ' Psychosexuelle Parallelen zum biogenetischen Grundgesetz ', *Imago* (1932), **18**, 14.

[5] Being abstract, i.e. lifeless, figures are a dangerous matter. Quoted by themselves, without relation to experience on which they are based, i.e. life, they can be very misleading. That is why I wish to add that my case material includes all sorts of patients from a short-lived monosymptomatic psychosomatic illness to very severe paranoias, schizophrenias and depressions, cases with good prognoses and so-called ' hopeless ' cases; the ages range from sixteen to over sixty and there are a number of training analyses amongst them. In short: the very mixed bag of a general psycho-analytic practice.

happened to the patients who achieved only a practical (not a theoretical) cure and to those who could be improved but not cured. If my idea about the importance of the new beginning is correct, the first question in this examination must be: what happened to the patients during this period? I mentioned this problem already in my first paper on this subject; [6] but in spite of constant attention and endeavour ever since, I have not been able to arrive at a satisfactory theoretical clarification. Using some of Mrs. Klein's ideas, I think I can now take an important step towards solution.

My clinical experience has been that all patients proceed very cautiously towards what I call ' new beginning '. This cautiousness I interpreted—to myself but also to my patients—as a precipitate of all the frustrations suffered during their development, on the lines of ' a burnt child dreads the fire '. Often we discovered that the patient's early environment was anything but loving, in fact quite often deliberately and maliciously frustrating. In other cases the environment apparently was not malicious, only careless or indifferent which, however, was interpreted by the patient's phantasies as malicious or hostile—sometimes probably correctly. All this, naturally, was worked through both in the recollection and in the repetition, i.e. in the transference to the analytical situation.

Even so, in some cases the mutually trusting atmosphere of the new beginning would not develop. The patients remained suspicious and mistrustful towards their analyst in spite of honest endeavour on both sides. And although they could speak as a possibility about their awakening primitive wishes—so characteristic of the period of new beginning—they could never relax, i.e. abandon their suspicious adult selves to the extent of feeling these wishes as an actual reality. They remained even in their most relaxed states split adults who ' took care of themselves ', they could not reach the state when they were ' one with themselves '.[7]

This state is—I think—reminiscent of that described by Mrs. Klein as the ' paranoid position '.[8] The patients, in their innermost selves, are convinced that everybody else is bad, hostile, malicious, an evil-wisher who grudges any happiness to anybody—and they readily admit that they too are hostile, bad and grudging. According to them the only true, the only possible relation between them and their environment, in fact between any two human beings, is that of guarded suspicion and never relaxing watchfulness. People do *not* love each other and if anybody says he does, or merely tries to show sincere interest (e.g. the analyst), it is the easiest thing for these patients to prove that all this is only hypocritical pretence, a make-believe, a clumsy attempt at misleading a fool in order to take advantage of him after lulling him into relaxing his guard. It is amazing how often these people succeed in creating a world around themselves in which all this is *really* true. And still more amazing, that sometimes they can trap their analyst as well. In spite of keeping constant watch on counter-transference —I must admit—I have not always been able to keep completely clear of this world of general suspicion.

Is one justified in calling this world of suspicion which the patient creates around himself out of his transference and of the systematically provoked and nursed counter-transferences of practically all of his objects, a world of persecutory anxieties? Mrs. Klein uses these two terms—paranoid and persecutory—as synonyms, perhaps even preferring the latter as a more general notion. As far as my experience goes, in the phase described above, which precedes the relaxation and abandonment of the period of new beginning, the attitude of the patients can be best described in terms of *delusions of reference* (Beziehungswahn). Everything, the most everyday happening, will inevitably be referred to the patient's own person, everything has some hidden meaning and almost always this deep, the ' true ' meaning is inconsiderateness and lovelessness. The question, therefore, is: can persecution on the one hand, and loveless, careless indifference on the other, be considered as meaning the same thing? Or, is this meticulous distinction only a late development without any meaning for the primitive unconscious mind?

Even if I am inclined to accept this latter possibility for the patient's (and the child's) unconscious, I cannot do so for our terminology. Words have their inevitable associations, not only for the patient but also for the analyst; using one word instead of another of necessity summons up a whole cluster of associations,

[6] *Loc cit.* (1934).

[7] Ferenczi: ' Notes and Fragments ', Integration and Splitting. *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.* (1949), **30**, 241. (Originally written in 1932.)

[8] E.g. in ' Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms ', *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.* (1946), **27**, p. 99.

creates a very definite atmosphere in our minds—and in our discussions. That is why I wish, when describing this kind of environment, to stick to careless loveless indifference, creating in turn fear and suspicion in the patient. This state of affairs is adequately described by ' paranoid ' attitude or position and I propose to use ' persecutory ' and ' persecution ' only in their proper sense, not as general notions.

Some people seem to be unable to overcome completely this barrier of suspicion. With my present technique at least I have not been able to resolve this world of suspicion in all my patients. With the patients who finished their analyses in the stage when they could admit—as a possibility—that they were feeling those primitive wishes but could not abandon themselves to break down the barrier between themselves and these wishes, the analytic cure usually achieved quite commendable results. After analysis these people could, as a rule, maintain a good social adaptation, achieve social and financial success and show hardly any neurotic symptoms. They have no serious difficulty with their sexual life, usually no impotence or frigidity. But somehow their love life is cool and colourless. They can never accept their partners as true equals; the partners though quite attractive and pleasant people, do not mean much. The patients themselves remain all their lives independent, unattached, lonely people, somewhat suspicious, hypercritical and overbearing. Characteristically their criticisms though never unjustified or incorrect, are always exaggerated, somehow out of proportion. Another interesting feature is that they do not feel ill and in fact they cannot be called ill.

If I was able to help my patients out of this paranoid position, another state developed; and here too, Mrs. Klein's work has helped me a great deal towards its proper evaluation. Before describing this state, I wish to add that the change from the suspicious state to this new one is a very gradual process fraught with several real relapses and with still more that threaten, but do not materialize. This new state is best described as depression. As a rule the patients say in so many words: I am worthless, unlovable; I know I ought to be different; I see it would be better for me and for everyone if I were different; I would be a much better man in every way, more pleasant, more lovable, perhaps even happy—but I cannot change, it is totally impossible. Sometimes they can even admit that they do not want to change or dare not.

Behind all that façade, however, there is the feeling of a deep, painful, narcissistic wound which, as a rule, can be made conscious without serious difficulty, somehow in this way: It is terrifying and dreadfully painful that *I am not loved for what I am*, time and again I cannot avoid seeing that people are critical of me; it is an irrefutable fact that no one loves me as I want to be loved. From here it is an easy step for the patient to get back into the paranoid state by projecting the real cause of this ever present experience on the general loveless indifference between man and man. If this can be prevented by correct and timely interpretations, the patient cannot but admit that he—or at least parts of himself—are not really lovable, or using Mrs. Klein's word: not really good. In this way a long-standing but carefully covered up split becomes apparent and a very painful process starts in which one part of the patient's mind—the healthy part of his ego—has to struggle with the rest of his ego and his old superego—with some help, it is true, from the analyst.

This is a very hard and painful fight, giving up consciously parts of ourselves as unlovable and unacceptable to our fellow men—or using again Mrs. Klein's word: as bad. By now the patient knows the history of these parts, that they have been developed mainly as defences against an environment felt to be cruel, indifferent, etc.; but at the same time he knows also that those parts represent, albeit in a distorted way, the people most important and dearest to him and—last but not least—these parts have been for many, many years and still are important parts of himself which he valued highly. An additional reason for the high emotional value of these parts to the patient is that they are, so to speak, the last survivors of his archaic object relation, they are the remnants of the eternal wish that he may live without the strain of constantly testing the reality, and without any obligation of regard or consideration for the wishes and sensitivities of people around him. All these wishes have become incorporated in the introjected archaic objects or, using another metaphor, the introjection of the archaic objects has enabled these wishes to survive in great force. The stronger these wishes, the greater is the task of renouncing them consciously. During this very bitter struggle the patients show all the features described so

poignantly by Freud:[9] 'A profoundly painful dejection, abrogation of interest in the outside world, loss of capacity to love, inhibition of all activity, and a lowering of the self-regarding feelings, . . . culminating in expectations of punishment.'

Is one to call this syndrome melancholia or depression? Here I am fully on the side of Mrs. Klein who hardly ever calls this state melancholia, but speaks of depressive position and depressive anxieties.[10] In my opinion the clinical observations reported above have a significantly different mechanism from that studied and described by Abraham and Freud [11] for which I propose to reserve the term melancholia, while depression could be used in a wider sense which should include the classical melancholia, the early states described by Mrs. Klein, my clinical observations and very likely many more others.[12] I think it can be accepted that one condition, perhaps the distinguishing one of every depression is a very painful split leading to one part of the personality rejecting the other part and trying to discard it altogether, even to annihilate it. (In paranoid states this fight seems to be successfully terminated, all the bad things have been projected outside, the ego feels whole, clever, superior and often overbearing—in fact like a true conqueror. Like every conqueror, however, the paranoiac, too, has to organize a police state around himself in which suspicion reigns supreme.) In classical melancholia—according to Fenichel [13] it is either the ego that fights against the superego and the introjects or the superego that fights against the ego and the introjects. Neither of these two descriptions fits my case.

To show what I mean I shall start with the every-day adaptation to reality. In every such process giving up part of our personality (certain of our wishes) for some time or even for good is unavoidably involved. As we know from Freud,[14] a very instructive example of this is mourning. Conversely every adaptation can be described as, and perhaps is, in fact, mourning. From here an interesting line of thought leads to the general problem of the acceptance of unpleasure;[15] certainly a most important facet of adaptation. All this—mourning, adaptation, the classical melancholia, in fact every form of depression—show very strong *secondary narcissistic* features, usually taking the form of a bitter resentment about an undeserved unfair and unjust injury——a mixture of paranoid and depressive mechanisms. Mourning, again, is a good example. Under the pressure of the feeling of an unjust injury quite often markedly paranoid features develop, as can be often observed after the death of a beloved person: assuming hostile intentions in the doctors who did not treat our beloved with proper skill and care, or even accusing the dead partner of not taking enough care of himself, etc.—obvious projections of one's own unconscious tendencies.

The depressive states, preceding the new-beginning, in many points differ considerably from these forms. There is undoubtedly the fight of one part of the personality against the other (the pre-condition of every depression) but this time the aim is not to create or to widen a split but to remove it, to enable the patient to be 'one with himself'. The parts against which the patient's ego has to fight are not rejected, condemned or hated (although these feelings may be, and often are, present) but above all mourned for, and—*sit venia verbo*—buried with full honours. And lastly, the whole process happens all the time on two planes simultaneously; on a narcissistic plane in the patient's mind and on the plane of transference, i.e. in an object relation. In my opinion, this last quality constitutes the crucial difference between all the other depressive states and the therapeutic depression, of which the phenomena in the new-beginning period are but one example. In this benign form of depression the patient in his newly won courage allows himself to experience the actual revival of old, primitive, object relations; he admits them not only as mere possibilities but as actual wishes and feelings, although he is in no doubt that the analytical situation permits at best only very partial gratifications and even these only for a very limited period; he does not shut himself off from the painful sweetness of these desires, i.e. does not repress them. In this way he may

[9] 'Mourning and Melancholia', in *Coll. Papers*, **4**, p. 153.

[10] E.g. in 'A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic Depressive States', *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.* (1935), **16**, 145. 'Mourning and its Relation to Manic-Depressive States', *ibid.* (1940), **21**, 125. 'The Œdipus Complex in the Light of Early Anxieties', *ibid.* (1945), **26**, 11.

[11] Freud, *loc. cit.* Abraham: 'Development of the Libido', in *Selected Papers*, p. 418 ff. London: Hogarth Press. M.

[12] Cf. M. Balint: 'On Punishing Offenders', in *Psycho-Analysis and Culture*. New York, 1951.

[13] *The Psycho-Analytic Theory of Neuroses*. New York: Norton & Co., 1945, p. 398.

[14] *Mourning and Melancholia, loc. cit.*

[15] Ferenczi: *Bausteine zur Psychoanalyse*, **1**, p. 84. *Further Contributions*, p. 366.

remain ' unsplit ', the memory of these gratifications remains accessible and even further gratifications of these infantile, primitive longings by a real object remain potentially possible, although admittedly somewhat comical because of their often very primitive nature.

I must add that my knowledge of these phenomena is still not so well founded as it is of the paranoid state, and consequently most of my mistakes used to happen here. Perhaps an added difficulty is the very high vulnerability of patients in the depressive period which is far beyond that of the paranoid period, in fact it surpasses all expectation. Time and again I was surprised that in spite of every precaution and—as far as I know—the best of wills, one or the other of my patients felt deeply and unjustly hurt by an interpretation or even by a ' neutral ' remark or an ' everyday ' gesture of mine.

As in the paranoid state, it happens that some patients cannot be helped—by my present technique—through the depressive state, and so finish their analysis with a partial result. And similarly, although the therapeutic result is quite commendable, it is not as good as one would wish. These patients, too, usually show a good social adaptation, a good measure of success in life, but somehow they remain discontented, they cannot enjoy their laurels. For them there is always some flaw in everything, fate is never as kind to them as to others. Despite this they are well liked, though often considered difficult and awkward; lots of people are willing to go out of their way to help them to quite a considerable degree which these patients accept and even demand as a matter of course. Their love life runs on similar lines; they are usually fairly successful, people fall for them often quite unexpectedly, still their basic ambivalent attitude remains unchanged. They accept the love offered to them, even demand more and more of it and then go on wondering about the true motives of the partner for choosing them, whether these motives are sound and trustworthy enough. The same applies to their physical sexuality; as a rule they are not impotent or frigid but never quite certain of it. Their whole sexuality seems to be rather precarious but somehow it works. In contrast to the patients who left analysis during the paranoid period who do not feel ill and hardly ever complain, the patients leaving analysis before the depressive state could be resolved usually complain a lot, try to raise guilt feelings in their environment (and in their former analyst) by exhibiting and even flaunting their shortcomings, but they hardly ever want to make real efforts towards a basic change. Apparently they cannot renounce their right to expect miraculous help from their environment—a clear remnant of the archaic object love.

III

To sum up my clinical experience (leaving out the technical difficulties): New beginning means the capacity for an unsuspicious, trusting self-abandoned and relaxed object-relation. There are two clinically necessary conditions without which a proper phase of new beginning cannot develop. These are: (1) The relinquishing of the paranoid attitude, the realization that the paranoid anxieties were unfounded or at least grossly exaggerated, (2) the acceptance without undue anxiety of a certain amount of depression as an inevitable condition of life, the confidence that it is possible—nay certain—to emerge from this kind of depression a better man.[16]

Is it justified to assume that the sequence: paranoid attitude—depression—archaic object love, occurring regularly in the end phases of my analyses, is significant? i.e. that it is determined by some principle of repetition? Or is this sequence accidental, caused merely by the peculiarity of my technique? In a paper recently reprinted in English [17] I discussed in detail the reasons for preferring the first assumption with regard to the archaic object love. But if we accept the view that the occurrence of primitive forms of object love in the transference

[16] Professor Lagache who kindly read the MS. suggested that the idea of new beginning should not be restricted to the events occurring towards the end of a treatment but to use it also in relation to all the occasions during an extended analysis when a patient gives up some complicated defensive mechanism for the first time. In this experience—which I can fully confirm—each time the patient first develops some form of the paranoid and depressive syndromes described in this paper, overcomes it and then starts some new attitude, usually of a primitive nature. Further analysis proves in all such cases that the newly begun attitudes or activities are in fact repetitions of early forms. Such an extension is probably legitimate and I think it will prove to be fruitful as it will almost certainly lead to a better understanding of the all important problem of tolerating unpleasure and through it to the general problem of adaptation to reality, especially to the reality of one's objects. I see, however, a number of complications and must therefore content myself with this short note.

[17] M. Balint: ' Early Developmental States of the Ego. Primary Object Love ', *Imago* (1937), **23,** 270; *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.* (1949), **30,** 265.

situation has the significance of repetition, the same must be assumed of its concomitant syndromes: the paranoid attitude and the depression.

The next objection will likely be: the sequence —paranoid attitude-depression-primary object love—observed in adult patients, though perhaps of repetitive nature, is probably so distorted that any inference to early states of development is unjustified without careful validation by direct observation of the child. This—on the surface —appears to be a legitimate argument which can be, and is in fact often, used against any inference from adult to infant —except against the classical theory of primary narcissism. In the paper just quoted, I think, I showed the fallacy in this argument.

But if we accept the view that the clinical observations described in this paper are, at least partly, determined by repetition of early states of human development, we have to face a very old and very vexed problem of psychoanalysis, that of chronology. The clinical sequence is doubtless: paranoia—depression—new-beginning. Moreover, till the full development of the last phase, the therapeutic situation remains precarious and the patient may relapse at any moment into either of the two previous states. Can one conclude that the above sequence describes the line of development of the human mind? It is a weighty argument that Mrs. Klein and her school think, in fact, that the first phase of the human mind is dominated by paranoid anxieties and mechanisms and that this is followed by the depressive position.

If I were to accept this chronology, I should have to give up the idea of the archaic object love as the first phase; it is true, however, that even in this case the archaic object love might be retained as a focal point of all later forms of object love but it would be preceded by the paranoid and the depressive phases. In other words: The sequence: paranoid attitude—depression—archaic form of love, as observed in adult patients, corresponds to the sequence of early stages of the human mind. Mrs. Klein's theory of the persecutory phase followed by depression is correct; one has only to insert the archaic object love between these two earlier phases and any later form of object relation.

There are, however, several important clinical facts that speak against this conception. I have mentioned already that both the paranoid and the depressive states preceding the period of new beginning show many narcissistic features. According to my experience narcissism is always secondary.[18] (If I am right, Mrs. Klein has recently come very near to this idea. In any case she has stressed time and again the presence of early object relations, an inevitable corollary of which is that narcissism is secondary—unless it is assumed that object relations and a narcissistic attitude co-exist right from the beginning of extra-uterine life which, however, is contrary to my clinical observations discussed in the paper just mentioned.) If we accept the secondary nature of all narcissistic features, then it is very probable that syndromes incorporating many narcissistic traits are also secondary phenomena, forms of reaction, and not primary phases.

A second, still weightier argument is provided by the different fate of these three phases during analytic treatment under my technique. All three must be interpreted and worked through, none of them can be carried over unchanged into adult life. As I have mentioned, the paranoid phantasies must be worked through, recognized as originating from a greatly distorted picture of the reality, i.e. from faulty reality testing, and then be given up. The depression —caused by the realization that the environment is largely indifferent towards us (or as someone said to me recently: ' has not been cut to fit us ') and that we must renounce certain of our wishes if we want any favour from our environment—must be accepted as inevitable and the attempts at circumventing it largely given up. Or in other words: removing the paranoid anxieties enables the patient to evaluate the every day hardship of life in their proper proportion, while removing the depressive anxieties enables him to accept a certain amount of depression as caused by common frustrations and to arrange his life better by taking full account of them.

The fate of the archaic object love is quite different. Although the difference is great, I find it difficult to express it in words. Both the paranoid and the depressive attitude, preceding the period of new-beginning appear to be markedly pathological, they must be overcome, put right; the archaic form of object love is only undeveloped, and the healthy adult way of love life may grow out of it in a straight line. The task of analytic therapy is only to assist

[18] M. Balint: ' Early Development Stages of the Ego, Primary Object Love, *loc. cit.*

this development. From another angle the same difference may be described in this way: Both the paranoid and the depressive attitude are fraught with anxieties; analysis can reduce the intensity of these anxieties and then these attitudes lose their importance. There is no fear inherent in the archaic object love—only naïve confidence and unsuspicious self-abandonment; the more paranoid and depressive anxieties and fears have been removed by analysis, the more clearly the phenomena of the archaic object love—the new-beginning in an adult patient—develop before our eyes.

I find it difficult to reconcile these clinical facts with the theory that the very first extra-uterine phase of the human mind is characterized by the paranoid attitude, out of which then the depressive position develops. The next argument, I expect, will be worded somehow in this way: There is no need to reconcile my observation with those of Mrs. Klein and her school, the two sets of observations are—because of the different techniques used—incommensurable. Although very plausible, I think this argument is unacceptable as it is only a pusillanimous, and at the same time stealthily supercilious, attempt at avoiding the real issue, admittedly a very difficult one. The real issue is this: how far does the analyst's individual technique, i.e. his attitude in the analytical situation, his theoretical expectations, the set of technical terms used by him, etc., etc., influence among other things: (*a*) the patient's reactions and associations, (*b*) the analyst's observations, and (*c*) the analyst's description of his observations. As may be expected, most analysts (including myself) superciliously admit the possibility, or rather the certainty, of such a 'distorting' influence by the technique of any one not belonging to their own school while pusillanimously stating that their own technique exerts no, or only negligible, influence of this kind.

In my Zurich Congress paper [19] I dealt with some aspects of this cardinal problem, especially with the importance to the analyst of using his own accustomed ways of thinking and speaking, i.e. his familiar set of technical terms. I am fully aware that by this only the very fringe of the problem has been reached and that it will not be easy to penetrate further. But what are we to do in the meanwhile? i.e. before we know with some certainty how far the analyst's honest account of his experience in the analytical situation is biassed by his technique?

I wish to propose two interim working principles. First: for the time being we should accept every positive finding by an analyst as something that must be evaluated by, and then allotted some place in, any theoretical construction. A theory which cannot explain and place a clinical observation satisfactorily should be considered with due scepticism. On the other hand, negative findings need not necessarily be given such weight. The reason for this discrimination is that it is not impossible for one to miss this or that event in the long process of analysis, or not to attribute to it the weight it deserves, because of some emotional blind spot not yet dealt with by one's own training analysis or the subsequent self-analysis. On the other hand, it is not very likely that one could be misled to the extent of reporting something non-existent. Secondly: as long as we have hardly any well-founded knowledge of the dynamisms governing the relation of the various technical approaches to their respective theoretical findings, we have no choice but to accept most analytic techniques as peers. I wish I could add to this frighteningly sweeping statement: 'except a few obviously faulty ones'! The reason why I abstain from including this rider, is that for the present I cannot see any criteria which would enable us to decide objectively what is an 'obviously faulty' technique and what is not, although, like every other analyst, subjectively I am convinced that doubtless there are some 'obviously faulty' techniques.

Honouring these two working principles let us now return to the differing descriptions of our analytical experiences. Among the new terms introduced by Mrs. Klein we find a very important notion which must have been based on clinical experiences very similar to, if not identical with, those which lead me to the idea of the primitive object relation. This notion is the phantasy of the 'idealized object'. Such an object is inviolate and inviolable, it has no needs and no demands, is eternal and never changing and it can and does give bountifully everything that one can wish for. Obviously a very near description of what I would call an archaic or primitive object, though equally obviously it has a much richer content. The first question we have to decide is, is this 'idealized object' a primary or a secondary phenomenon, or in

[19] M. Balint: 'Changing Therapeutical Aims and Techniques in Psycho-Analysis' *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.* (1950), **31**, 121–2.

other words has it or has it not a history? I think it is correct to say that the general view is that the 'idealized object' is the result of a split, the other split off part being the persecutory object.

But, if we accept this, we must ask ourselves what was the original, the unsplit, the primary object? what was its history before the split? and what will its fate be in later life? e.g. does it disappear altogether in the turmoil of the archaic splitting? The present literature—if I am right—does not give answers to any of these questions, in fact, it has not even asked these questions.

Apparently we have reached a problem not yet solved, perhaps not even noticed. In my view there are two trains of thought which point to a possible solution; both of them are based on the fact that the concept of the 'idealized object' is much richer than that of the 'archaic object'. First the 'idealised object' contains a very important element of denial, especially the denial of aggressive intentions against it. The true meaning of being inviolate and inviolable is, very likely, the bitter experience that the most violent aggressiveness has proved of no avail against it. This characteristic alone points irrefutably to its comparative lateness, to its secondary nature. In contra-distinction there is no quality of aggressivity or its denial in the concept of archaic object relation, only confidence and self-abandonment.

A second train of thought makes use of the inter-relation between the development of libidinous object relation, on the one hand, and that of reality testing, on the other.[20] Primary, archaic, object relation hardly demands any reality testing, there is no need to account for the object. A change is brought about by the experience of being frustrated or being compelled to wait for satisfaction by an indifferent, insufficiently considerate, or even hostile environment. This enforces upon the child a very primitive kind of reality testing, resulting in splitting the object into a frustrating bad, and into a gratifying good, part object. Out of the former develop the phantasies about the hostile, persecutory or depressing objects, out of the latter—as a kind of reaction-formation or reparation—the phantasy of the 'idealized object'. It is certain that there are many more phases in this complicated interrelation of two parallel developments (that of object relations and that of testing the reality); the last rung of which is the mature form of object relation with a fully developed sense of reality enabling the individual to accept a certain measure of unpleasure as unavoidable, or in other words, to accept reality as real and even to enjoy it as far as it is enjoyable. But, behind every one of the many forms of object relation there remains practically unchanged the eternal archaic wish: I shall be loved for every little bit that I am, by every one of my objects, for whom I need not care, whose interests and sensitivity I need not consider, who shall be just there when I want them, and shall not bother me after my needs have been satisfied.[21]

Considering all this, I think that the unsuspicious, naïve, archaic object love should be considered as the first postnatal phase in the development of the human mind; it is a centre or a nodal point from which all later developments radiate. One such development is narcissism: if I am not loved by the world (in the way I want it), I must love myself. Another direction of development is depression and the paranoid attitude. These two are closely interlinked, each of them can be used as a defence against the other; quite often—even after the termination of an analysis—I remained in doubt whether to consider the change over from one position to the other in that particular case as a progression or a regression. Several of these baffling clinical experiences have been mentioned in this paper, e.g. that patients who left the analysis without working through their paranoid attitudes usually appear healthier and feel better than those who went through their paranoid position but left the analysis before fully coping with their depressive attitude. All this prompts me to leave the chronology of these two phases undecided for the time being. Yet another direction of development, mainly due to certain educational influences, is what analysis describes as anal-sadistic object-relation. And last, but not least, there is that very complicated and rather precarious direction which we call adult sexuality and genital object-love.

Unfortunately the different lines of development are neither straight, nor cleanly separated one from the others. I pointed out that both

[20] Cf. Alice Balint: 'Love for the Mother and Mother-Love', *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.* (1949), **30**, 251–59.

[21] Attention was called to a very important new field for studying clinical phenomena closely linked with this idea by D. W. Winnicott in a paper: 'Transitional Objects and Transitional Phenomena' read before the Brit. PsA. Soc. on May 30, 1951.

the paranoid and the depressive positions show many markedly narcissistic features; conversely in the clinical picture of very narcissistic patients strong paranoid and depressive features are always present.

If we accept the view that a real adaptation—the acceptance of unpleasure—is only possible if one can face depression without undue anxiety, then the depressive position must be considered as a second focus through which every line of development associated with adaptation must pass. The relation between these two nodal points of development—archaic object-love and normal depression—is far from being clear; on the basis of my scanty knowledge I expect that they have a profound influence on each other. I could quote many more examples of such entanglement of directions of development or—using another metaphor—of overlapping.

I do not think, however, that a similar overall importance can be attributed to the paranoid position, which then perhaps means that the depressive position must be considered more fundamental, more primitive than the paranoid.

I wish to mention one more complication. My experiences concern only adults and thus the conclusions reported here are inferences, based on the assumption that these processes, these positions or syndromes, have a fairly similar dynamism, stay in a fairly similar chronological and structural relation to each other in adults and in children. Although as far as we know there is no proof against this assumption, it is only a plausibility, not a certainty. On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that practically all our knowledge about the infantile mind was acquired when analysing adults. The only exception of which I know are Mrs. Klein's ideas and theories which originated mostly—though not exclusively—in her work with children. Despite all these complications I think that a theory of human development starting with the state of archaic object love is worth considering and worth examining again after more clinical material has been collected.

* * * *

It is fair to say that the value of any new contribution to scientific theory or practice can best be assessed by the quality and number of problems that have emerged under its impact. Measured by this standard the value of Mrs. Klein's contribution is high indeed. It is no exaggeration to say that her ideas are at present perhaps the most hotly discussed topics in our psycho-analysis. This is only the natural consequence of her dauntless courage in directing her research towards the very roots of human nature, in consequence of which her ideas cannot be but challenging.

In my tribute to her birthday I have tried to show her how the challenge of her ideas has helped me to solve some of my old problems and led me to find many more new ones.

PSYCHO-ANALYSIS AND ETHICS

By R. E. MONEY-KYRLE, London

Introductory Note

This paper was originally written (all but the last section in the spring of 1948) for readers with a general philosophic, rather than a specialized psycho-analytic, interest.[1] In deciding to keep it for the special Birthday Number of this Journal, I had therefore to consider whether I should not redraft it for the other type of reader. But, as my aim was only to apply some of Melanie Klein's ideas in a philosophic field, to have gone into greater analytic detail would have tended to obscure my main argument. I hope this will explain, and excuse, my elementary and over-simplified treatment of analytic theory. The best account of the relevant part of such theory is to be found in Melanie Klein's own paper: 'A Contribution to the Theory of Anxiety and Guilt' (1948).

1. *The Transfer of an Ethical Problem from Philosophy to Science*

Philosophers are now divided into two main schools of thought: those who try to ask and answer metaphysical questions, and those who try to show that all metaphysical questions are meaningless.[2] But if logic is on the side of the second school, we still need not dismiss all speculative philosophy as a sterile pursuit. The questions it formulated may often have been grammatically meaningless, but those who formulated them were clearly wrestling with some problem which they felt to be important. What was wrong was not that there was no problem, but that there was a failure to formulate it in such a way that an answer would be possible. So the essential difference between science and philosophy would seem to be, not that science deals with significant and philosophy with meaningless problems, but that science deals with those that are clear cut and philosophy with those which have not got beyond the stage of being only dimly felt.[3] Many centuries of philosophical endeavour may be required before such questions get beyond this stage, and when they do they cease to be philosophical and are immediately transferred to science. In other words, the task of philosophy is perhaps always a preliminary one: that of formulating new problems for science.

Among the oldest questions of philosophy are: What is a good individual? And what is a good society or state? It is not difficult to see what the philosopher who asks, and tries to answer, these questions is trying to do. He is trying to defend his moral and political preferences—both from doubts within himself and from the hostility of others—and he is trying to do this in a particular way, by argument rather than by force.

It is clear that success in these tasks would be a very notable achievement. It would—at least in theory, though not necessarily in practice—transfer the ultimate arbitrament of moral and political disputes from the arena of force to the court of rational discussion. But is it even theoretically possible?

If what is being sought is a 'proof of a preference',[4] this is certainly a futile quest, which would never have been attempted but for a confusion between two senses of the word 'belief'. We may say, for instance, that we 'believe in' democracy when what we really mean is that we desire it and may thus mislead ourselves linguistically into treating our desire as if it were a belief which could be 'true' or 'false'. But strictly speaking, a desire or

[1] It was read before the Social Psychology Section of the British Psychological Society (January, 1952). The main argument has also been developed in my book *Psycho-Analysis and Politics* (1951). (Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd.)

[2] According to Wittgenstein, the right method of teaching philosophy would be to confine oneself to propositions of the sciences, leaving philosophical assertions to the learner, and proving to him, whenever he made them, that they are meaningless. *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, 1922.

[3] Professor Jerusalem of Vienna expressed this well by saying that philosophy begins with an 'intellectual discomfort'.

[4] Many ethical arguments can be shown to have been circular. For instance, a preference for a particular moral code or political system is first expressed in a definition. Then the definition is treated as a proposition and an attempt is made to prove it 'true'.

preference is not an object of belief, can be neither true nor false, and is therefore not susceptible to ' proof '.

The discovery that preferences cannot be proved may be an important negative achievement of ' positivist ' philosophy. But I no longer think that this disposes of ethics. It would do so if beliefs and preferences were entirely independent of each other. But they are not. We know that our preferences affect our beliefs; and it is equally true that our beliefs affect our preferences. As we acquire knowledge—and this consists in the substitution of true beliefs for false ones—our moral and political preferences undergo a change. Now consider the way in which such changes could occur in different individuals, whom we may suppose to start with very different preferences. There are three possibilities: the preferences may remain divergent, or they may converge, or they may converge in some respects and remain divergent in others. There is no *a priori* means of knowing which of these three alternatives is correct. If the first, then such preferences are relative, and all attempts to find a rational argument to justify some one against the rest, must necessarily fail. If, however, either of the two alternatives should prove to be the case, if preferences converge, either wholly or in part, with increasing knowledge, then such preferences or at least some aspect of them, could be justified as being held by all wise men. Moreover, since knowledge, that is, true beliefs, can be proved and communicated, it would be logically possible, though not perhaps feasible in practice, for the wise to convert others to their preferences.

Some such possibility as this must have been in Plato's mind when he formulated the basic problems of ethics. His question, in effect, was not ' What is a good man or a good society? ' but ' What are the morals and politics of the wise? ' We may try to reconstruct from a trivial example some of the background of his thought. If a man prefers pork pie to caviare, this may be either because, while acquainted with both, he really prefers pork pie, or because he is unacquainted with caviare. Plato seems to have taken the second alternative for granted, and proceeds to enquire about the taste of the truly wise who are acquainted with everything.

Now this question could have a unique answer only if Plato's assumption is correct, that is to say, if differences of æsthetic or moral and political taste result solely from the limitations of our knowledge or experience. But whether it has a unique or a multiple answer, it is a significant question of a kind which could transfer ethics from philosophy to science.

Unfortunately he does not seem to have tried to find an empirical answer. Instead, he became enmeshed in the coils of a concealed tautology. For his answer—that the wise prefer the good—results solely from his definitions: that the good is what is most desirable, and that what is most desirable is what we should desire if we were acquainted with everything.

Moreover, for Plato, wisdom did not consist in any empirical knowledge, but in acquaintance with the ideal prototypes of things.

Nevertheless, there can be no doubt, I think, that Plato's formulation of the problem as one about the morals and politics of the wise is the only formulation that can lead to significant and important results. Unlike the question ' what is a good man or a good society? ' which can only be answered by a definition, the question ' what are the morals and politics of the wise? ' is, at least in theory, capable of an empirical answer, which may or may not prove to be unique.

To make it also a practical question, we must modify it a little further. In the first place, we must specify the type of wisdom we refer to. Obviously some kinds of knowledge are more relevant than others. Neither our moral nor our political preferences are much influenced by our knowledge of motor cars or aircraft. But both are modified, often profoundly, by our knowledge of what is broadly called the humanities—or, more specifically, by our understanding of ourselves and so of other people, that is, by our knowledge of psychology. Our politics, if not our morals, must also be influenced by other forms of knowledge, for example, of economics and the technique of production and of general sociology. But, since these influence our choice of means to a predetermined social end, rather than of the end itself, we may ignore them for the moment, and begin by considering only the influence of our knowledge of ourselves.

In the second place, wisdom—which for our immediate purpose we have now equated with psychological insight—although increasing, is always incomplete. No one can claim to be all wise, or even very wise, though if he studies he may hope to be becoming wiser. If therefore the ethical question is not to be purely academic, we must stop asking about the ethics of the wise,

and ask instead about the changing ethics of those whose wisdom is increasing. Taking account of these modifications, our question now becomes: How do our moral and political preferences change with increasing psychological insight? Do the preferences of different people remain divergent? Do they tend to converge? Or do they converge in some respects and remain divergent in others? If so, what is the type of morality and ideology towards which they converge?

These questions, or so it seems to me, have always been latent in ethics. The task of philosophy is to make them manifest by so formulating them that an empirical answer is possible. From then on the task of answering them belongs to science—in this case, to psychology.

2. *Psycho-analysis as a Method of Psychological Research*

Plato put his question nearly two and a half millenia ago; and even had he put it clearly, that is, in a form admitting an empirical answer, we might have had to wait until now before a correct answer could have been given. The relevant science might not have been sufficiently developed.

Suppose this question to have been asked in this form at some previous time. We should have seen that the moral and political preferences of any individual usually changed, at least to some extent, as his knowledge of the sciences of man increased. But I do not think we should have been able to observe any certain convergence between the preferences of different individuals as they each advanced in learning. Indeed, it would have seemed clear enough that an equally profound knowledge of history, of economics and of every other branch of the humanities was compatible with the widest moral and political divergencies. We should therefore have been forced to the conclusion that there was no rational means by which one set of values could be defended against others. The essential relativity of values would have seemed well established—each being right only for those who held them and wrong for others.

Almost within the last half century, however, a new branch of learning has developed which is particularly relevant to our enquiry; for more than any other it profoundly affects all our feelings and desires. This science investigates a field the very existence of which was only recently discovered—namely the field of our own unconscious minds. We may therefore reopen the old question in a new form and ask: How are our morals and politics affected as we become more conscious of ourselves?

The technique that enables us to widen the boundaries of our consciousness is psycho-analysis. That the effects it has on our emotions and desires is solely the result of the knowledge it conveys, and not of some other influence, is a point vital to the argument to be developed. To prove that we meet our obligations to the patient we need only show that these changes diminish his distress by helping to restore his capacity for both work and pleasure. To justify them to any society that sets itself above the individual, we might also have to show that they make him a more efficient functioning unit. But these are both arbitrary courts. To justify them to science, which is not arbitrary, we have to show that they are the result of having helped him to see the truth about himself. To increase in him this kind of wisdom is the analyst's overriding aim.

Everyone knows that analysis is a form of therapy for mental illness. But there is some uncertainly—perhaps even among analysts—about its aims and the way in which they are achieved. If the analyst has a sense of responsibility towards his patients—and it is impossible to imagine a competent analyst who has not—he certainly desires to lighten their distress. If he has a sense of responsibility towards society—and this is a less important asset—he may wish to improve their adaptation to it. But if either of these were his primary aim he might sometimes have to use a different method. He might have to prevent his patients becoming conscious of some troubles which they had hitherto successfully evaded. Or he might have to prevent them from becoming wiser than the society they lived in, lest their adaptation to it should be worsened rather than improved.

In general, however—and in the long run perhaps always—the hedonic interests of the patient, and the utilitarian interest of society, are best served by the pursuit of truth. That this should be so is very far from obvious. The content of the unconscious consists of insatiable libidinal desires, passionate destructive hatreds, terrible anxieties and all the abysses of depression and despair. What hedonic, what utilitarian, purpose can possibly be served by bringing these to light? That it does serve such purposes has been proved by every analysis that has succeeded in its primary purpose of raising the iron curtain

of repression. But how are we to explain so unexpected a result? One part of the explanation is that opposite impulses, which have been dissociated from each other, are necessarily modified when brought together in the light. But I think a more important part is that some of these impulses are diminished in intensity by the discovery that they are reactions to imaginary situations, which they themselves created, rather than to real ones.[5] The patient, in fact, learns two sorts of truth about himself: firstly, that he has many impulses and emotions which he had previously denied. And secondly, that these impulses (which seemed omnipotent at a time when there was no distinction between sensation and idea) have first created, and are now maintained by, an unconscious phantasy world which is a gross distortion of the conscious world of sensory perception. It is, I think, this last discovery that most changes his emotional behaviour.

Of course the emotional and the intellectual aspects of the process react reciprocally upon each other. An interpretation that lessens a patient's anxiety improves his emotional relation to his analyst and this in turn removes an impediment to further insight. But if the emotional change is achieved by a ' reassurance ' rather than an interpretation, there is no durable advance. So it is always the increase in insight —the successive flashes of self-knowledge awakened by interpretation—that initiates and maintains the therapeutic process.

A grossly over-simplified example may best serve to illustrate this single point. A young man complains of exaggerated nervousness in the presence of authority. This soon shows itself in his relation to his analyst. Consciously, he regards him as helpful and sympathetic, and indeed over-estimates the extent of his skill and benevolence. But he begins to behave as if he believed him to have the exact opposite of these qualities—as if he believed him to be a sinister, almost a diabolic, figure who had both the power and the wish to injure him. This, in fact, is what he does unconsciously believe. If true, such a belief would amply justify his symptoms, which are neurotic only in so far as it is contrary to all the evidence. His analyst's task is to help him free himself from it by showing him how it was developed. They begin by discovering that all authoritative figures in his life, from his present analyst to his father, of whom he was once extremely jealous, have been consciously admired and loved, but unconsciously hated. This goes some way to explain his fear, because he naturally expects to be hated in return. What reduces the fear, however, is not, I think, the mere discovery of the hatred, but the discovery that the hatred has distorted its object. A vicious spiral had been in operation: his unconscious hatred had painted his father blacker than he was, and this increased blackness had in turn increased his hatred, until he had built up, in unconscious phantasy, a truly diabolic figure of which he lived in mortal dread.[6] Meanwhile, at the conscious level, all this was not only denied but actually reversed; for he had tried to defend himself against his dread by over-idealizing its object. Consciously, he had painted every authority, from his father to his analyst, much whiter than they really were, and so had sought to turn them into wholly benevolent guardians of himself—into gods to protect him from his devils. With these discoveries, the two opposite pictures begin to converge to a reality which is somewhere in between the two, and the fear, together with the exaggerated admiration, is appreciably diminished.

Even in an over-simplified example, I cannot pretend that this is the end of the story. Hatred based on jealousy does not fully account for the sadistic malevolence of that phantom of his unconscious imagination of which he stood so much in awe. The sadism was originally his own. Its first object was his mother. He had later projected it upon his father whom he had thus made its agent in his early quarrels with her; and he had then become terrified of the Frankenstein which his omnipotent phantasy seemed to have created. So what we ultimately arrive at is the fear of a destructive impulse within himself—and here perhaps remains a nucleus of ineradicable conflict and anxiety.

All this and more has to be laid bare by slow and painful steps before his fear of authority can be reduced to that rational minimum which is justified by the extent to which any given authority has the power and will to do him harm. But perhaps I have said enough to show how analysis achieves its results. The patient's

[5] The therapeutic process has been examined in great detail by James Strachey in two papers: ' The Nature of the Therapeutic Action of Psycho-Analysis ' (1934), and ' Symposium on the Theory of the Therapeutic Results of Psycho-Analysis ' (1937), *Int. J. Psycho-anal.*, **15** and **17**.

[6] As is well known, such figures are unconsciously felt to be internal persecutors, which are projected into the analyst and other figures in the external world.

emotional behaviour is irrational. It is not justified by the situation he is really in. He behaves as if he were in different situations. He unconsciously believes he is in them; he is in them in unconscious phantasy; he is unconsciously deluded. Analysis seeks to show him what are these beliefs, these phantasies or these delusions, and how they are produced. So far as it succeeds in this, it frees him from them; he may still have conflicts, and he may still have some fear of his own aggressiveness, but he no longer has delusions, and no longer fears the phantoms his aggressiveness created. So far as he ceases to believe in his phantasy world, he behaves rationally in the world of his perceptions. Thus analysis is a rational process which operates solely by exposing error and replacing it by truth.

We know from the records of many past analyses a good deal about the various types of unconscious belief or phantasy we are likely to meet, and experience is continually adding to the list. As several usually operate at once, the art consists, not only in seeing which are there, and one's own rôle in them, but also in choosing which to interpret first. Different analysts, even when they belong to the same school and have the same degree of technical ability, may perhaps take them in rather different orders; but, if these analysts are relatively free from individual blind-spots, no important theme is likely to be missed, and the end result will be very much the same. For what has been pieced together is the truth of which there can be no two versions.[7]

3. *Two Types of Conscience*

Among the various changes of feeling and desire that occur in analysis, as the patient gradually learns the truth about himself, are changes in his moral attitude. A moral impulse may be defined as an impulse to do, or to refrain from doing, something because to refrain from doing, or to do, it would arouse a sense of guilt. Obviously such impulses can change their object, or increase or diminish in intensity. But what is less obvious, and was for a long time overlooked, is that there can also be a qualitative change in the guilt which is their motive.

We are accustomed to think of guilt as an elementary feeling. We now know that it is a compound of at least two elements. In a deep analysis, there is a fundamental change in the relative intensity of these components, or, to be more exact, in the patient's relative capacity to feel them; he becomes less sensitive to one and, on the whole, more sensitive to the other. But this distinction, which we owe to Melanie Klein, is comparatively recent. In earlier analyses, which did not penetrate into the deeper levels of infantile experience, only the diminishing component in guilt attracted much attention. We will consider separately the moral changes brought about by these earlier analyses and compare them with the changes occurring in the more recent and fuller analyses which those influenced by Melanie Klein's work on very early levels of infantile experience endeavour to conduct.[8]

Unlike psychopathic delinquents and some psychotics, who often give the (incorrect) impression of having no capacity for guilt at all, most neurotics and especially obsessionals are extremely conscientious. And it was with neurotics that analysis was at first concerned. Their guilt seemed to have been first aroused in early childhood by certain primitive sexual wishes and to have subsequently become attached to, and so interfered with, many non-sexual sublimations. The result was a crippling, and often progressive, inhibition of whatever activities they tried. They seemed to be suffering from an excess of guilt, so that the diminution of this guilt appeared as the ultimate aim of their analyses.

A prolonged study of such over-conscientiousness in neurotics led Freud to the discovery of the super-ego—one of the major achievements of analysis. The first step, and by no means a small one, was to recognize the guilt motive at all in what to the patient seemed a meaningless symptom which gratuitously condemned him to impotence in whatever he strove to undertake —indeed often in whatever his conscious morality bade him undertake. And when this was done, the way in which such a crippling, and often self-defeating, morality could have been developed remained to be unearthed. Freud's well-known explanation is certainly true, but is no longer generally believed to be the whole truth. It may be briefly stated thus: the child's Œdipean jealousy brings him into conflict with the parent

[7] As to the wider differences between different schools, it is not always easy to distinguish between those which are real and those which are apparent. The real differences, which are considerable, are between the different contents attributed to the unconscious. The apparent ones are between different conceptual systems used to represent the same content.

[8] Of course the terms 'deep' and 'shallow' are relative. What seems deep to-day may seem shallow enough to our successors.

of the same sex as himself, whom he may have loved and admired but now also, though less consciously, hates and wishes to mutilate and to destroy. His sense of guilt is originally his fear of a talion punishment from this parent, and in particular his fear of being castrated by him. After a period of conflict, of varying intensity and duration, he succeeds in repressing his jealousy, and good relations with this parent are once more restored. But the change is brought about in a very special way. The image of the loved, hated and feared parent is split into two. The more realistic aspect continues to be identified with the external parent of perception. But the less realistic and more terrifying aspect is incorporated in phantasy as an unconscious part of the self. To this ' introjected ' parent Freud gave the name of super-ego. In his view, it is the necessary guardian of morality; but when over-developed, it condemns its possessor to mental illness, and by so doing defeats part of its own purpose which is to transmit the positive as well as the negative demands of the society we live in.

Freud by no means ignored, indeed he stressed, the fact that the same parent who is feared and hated is also admired and loved.[9] Nevertheless the super-ego morality described by him is predominately a morality of fear.

Moreover, it is an essentially relative morality. Its primary taboos—those on incest and parricide—are of course common to all mankind; but since its basic aim is to appease, by obedience, a feared authority, it is as varied in its superstructure as the will of the authority to be obeyed. Its immediate sanction is the introjected parents whose moral code was in turn derived from their parents and so from the traditional mores of the society in which they lived. And since the super-ego is readily identified with the sanctions of this society, it is further strengthened by them, and becomes both indirectly and directly the precipitate of these mores. Thus the super-ego morality of a ' good ' German Nazi is very different from that of a ' good ' British socialist, and still further removed from that of a ' good ' Trobriander or Dobuan. There is indeed only one common element in the super-ego moralities of different societies or sub-groups; they all alike demand the same unquestioning obedience, but to codes of very different kinds.

If we next enquire about the changes effected in super-ego morality by the self-knowledge which analysis endeavours to extend, there can be little doubt about the answer. So far as this morality is based on irrational fears, for example, on a castration anxiety which is no longer, as it may have been in primal times, justified by the actual situation, the effect of analysis is to weaken the fear and the morality based upon it. Of course the process is never complete; a varying amount of ' persecutory guilt ' remains. But the direction of the change is always and inevitably the same—towards the liquidation of a morality based on an irrational anxiety.

No special analytic knowledge is required to convince us that there must be another aspect of morality based not on fear but love. Yet its unconscious ramifications have proved even harder to unravel. What we have now learnt about them we owe to Melanie Klein's discovery of early persecutory and depressive states in the development of children, which we must now examine.[10]

Those analysts who accept her results are quite as concerned as those who have not yet done so with the exposure of the phantasies underlying the persecutory element in guilt. Indeed, they seek to carry this process much further; for in their view the super-ego, which Freud discovered, does nor begin, as he believed, about the age of five, but is already at that age approaching its final form after five years of previous development. In its earlier stages, however, it consists of unintegrated phantasy objects, by which the infant believes himself to be persecuted from within, and has not yet acquired its final character of an integrated internal mentor. The phase in which these persecutory anxieties reach a maximum intensity has been called by Melanie Klein the ' paranoid position '. Its discovery has of course greatly increased the chances of successful treatment of adult paranoics. It has also enabled us better to analyse the paranoid elements in all patients —including ' normal ' people—and so further to diminish the persecutory elements in their conscious and unconscious sense of guilt.

Now sooner or later, in any deep analysis, as the sense of persecution is diminished, depressive feelings begin to appear. As these are analysed in turn they are always found to express grief and remorse for injuries to a loved object for

[9] See Freud (1928). ' Humour ', *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, 9, 1928.

[10] Melanie Klein: *The Psycho-Analysis of Children* (1932) and *Contributions to Psycho-Analysis*, 1921–1945, 1948.

which the patient feels himself to be responsible. This grief and remorse constitute the other element in guilt which we may describe as depressive as distinct from persecutory.

In order to understand its origin, and its relation to the persecutory element, we must try to reconstruct the first stage in the intellectual and emotional development of a newborn baby. This is the association of percepts with memory images to form concepts of enduring objects. Since to him the most noticeable attribute of any percept or memory image is the pain or pleasure it provides, he begins by linking all similar percepts and memory images that are pain giving or frustrating to form one object and all similar pleasurable or gratifying ones to form another. Thus, for example, his first concept of the breast is not of one object but of two, which are as wholly incompatible with each other as night and day. Moreover, since he attributes to, or ' projects ' upon, the frustrating breast all his own rage at the frustration, it is felt as persecutory as well as disappointing. And, similarly, by the projection of his love, the gratifying breast is also felt to be actively benevolent.

That these ideally ' good ' and ideally ' bad ' objects are different aspects of the same one (and that the same child both loves and hates them) [11] is a discovery which is delayed because it is so intensely painful. But sooner or later this discovery is made, and with it comes the first onset of depression, which later forms the depressive element in guilt.

Since the good object which is injured, either in phantasy or fact, tends to turn into a persecutor, the two elements are, perhaps from the beginning of the depressive phase, almost inseparably combined. But they can be combined in very different proportions, and the proportions in which they are combined in any given individual will determine the type of his conscience, the kind of situation that arouses it and the nature of the action it impels.

All true guilt, as Freud long ago discovered, is aroused by what is basically the same situation, namely conflict with the inner representative of an integrated parental figure. But the two elements in it will be combined in proportions determined by the extent to which this figure is felt to be bad and persecutory or good and beneficent. And from this it follows that the external situations that arouse guilt can be very different for different individuals. Those whose super-egos are predominantly persecutory will experience guilt, and of a predominantly persecutory kind, in situations where they are tempted to defy this figure or some external power which represents it. But the situations that will arouse guilt in those whose inner figures are predominantly good will be such as imply an injury to, a betrayal of, or a failure to protect, the people or values that symbolize their good internal objects.

There will also be a fundamental difference, not only in the quality of the guilt and in the type of situation that arouses it, but in the reaction to the guilt aroused. Those with predominantly persecutory consciences react by propitiation. Those in whom the persecutory element is slight and are in consequence relatively more sensitive to the depressive element react by reparation.

It is obvious that these two types of conscience, which are characteristic of different individuals, can coexist in the same one. To some extent they always do so. Every child, especially in the Œdipean phase of his development, is faced with situations that evoke a direct conflict between them. In the boy, for instance, to disobey an autocratic father is felt as wrong because it arouses great quantities of guilt in which persecutory feelings predominate. But to obey this father may involve the desertion, not only in phantasy but also to some extent in fact, of a defenceless mother. Then obedience too is felt as wrong because it arouses the other type of guilt in which the predominant feeling is depressive. In some people this kind of conflict persists throughout life. But in the majority, it is settled one way or the other fairly early, and with it the subsequent pattern of their consciences.

We have next to enquire about the way in which the depressive element in guilt is affected by a deep analysis. In the case of the persecutory element, as we have seen, the effect is to diminish it. And the theoretical limit of this process—never of course achieved in practice—would be a state in which the patient feared only real dangers in the external world and had ceased to fear, because he had ceased to believe in, those existing only in unconscious phantasy. He might still fear the disapproval of his fellows, or the long arm of the law; but he would have ceased to be afraid of being castrated or eaten

[11] See W. Clifford M. Scott. ' A Psycho-Analytic Concept of the Origin of Depression ', *Brit. med. J.*, 1949.

by his super-ego. In the case of depressive guilt, however, the effect is somewhat different. Since much of this guilt arises from acts performed in unconscious phantasy, the exposure of the phantasy as distinct from fact certainly relieves it. But phantasied acts imply a desire to commit them. That the patient has wished to destroy, to injure, to desert or to betray his loved objects is itself a fact, which analysis cannot disprove but rather exposes to the light of day. Thus a substantial reduction in this kind of guilt cannot be achieved merely by showing that the destructive impulses have not in reality achieved their aim—unless these impulses themselves are also reduced. What analysis does do is to weaken these impulses indirectly; for aggression toward loved objects, while partly primary and irreducible, is greatly increased by the persecutory anxieties the phantastic basis of which analysis does undermine. It also helps to free the reparative response to the irreducible destructiveness that still remains.

Thus analysis, while diminishing the conflicts that lead to depression, increases rather than diminishes the capacity to feel guilt of a depressive kind whenever a ' good ' object is in any way injured or betrayed.

4. *Humanism as an Attribute of Insight*

We can now see what must be the end of at least the first part of our enquiry—that concerned with morals. We have discovered that there is a causal link between the possession of a certain kind of conscience and the possession of a certain kind of wisdom. This gives us, in broad outline, the answer to our question. All that remains is to fill in some of the more salient details.

We may begin by classifying people into four main groups according to their attitude to morals. Of course some people will belong to more than one group, and indeed everyone will do so to some extent; but this is a complication which for simplicity we may here disregard. In the first group are those who do not appear to have any morality at all. They do not consciously experience either form of guilt themselves, and regard those who claim to be influenced by moral obligations or scruples as hypocrites or weaklings. But this is because they deny their unconscious guilt, not because they do not have any to deny. They pride themselves on being super-normal; but in reality they are hypo-manic, for their freedom from anxiety and depression is achieved at the cost of their capacity to understand themselves. The second group contains those who are at once self-rightous and censorious. Their guilt is for export only. They deny it in themselves, but see it more clearly in others on to whom they project their own share as well. So they live in a state of moral indignation with the scapegoats for their own offences. They too believe themselves to be normal people, who indeed excel others in virtue; but they are really hypo-paranoid and live in terror of discovering the truth about themselves.

The two remaining groups are composed of people who are conscious of a conscience. The distinction between them is not so clear cut, for it is formed, as it were, by the middle point on a scale stretching between two theoretical extremes. At one end of the scale, are those in whom the persecutory element in guilt predominates. They are concerned mainly with obedience to an exacting super-ego or its external representatives. They tend to be self-disciplined but hard. Their consciences may be described as authoritarian. The other end of the scale contains those who have little sense of persecution and in whom the capacity for the depressive element in guilt is relatively unimpaired. Such people are less afraid of disobedience; but they are more consciously distressed by any disloyalty to the values or persons who symbolize their good internal objects. In practice they may be less law-abiding citizens, but they are more kindly and more ready to take up arms in the defence of other people's wrongs. In short, they have more freedom within themselves and more responsibility towards their neighbours.

These distinctions may be illustrated by different attitudes to the morality of war. The hypo-manics have no guilt about attacking neighbours they despise, and may do so with elation. The hypo-paranoids are over anxious to start crusades against neighbours on whom they have projected their own unadmitted crimes. Unlike either of these, the attitude of those with an authoritarian conscience will depend on the nature of the inner authority they serve. If it tells them to fight, they will do so with obedient zeal irrespective of the real issues involved. If it tells them not to, they will remain obstinately pacific, and will not even defend the people or values they love. In this they are in sharp contrast with the humanists who are prepared to fight whatever threatens what they care for, but who do not initiate aggression.

Similar differences characterize the attitude

of these last two groups to sexual morality. The authoritarians conform with the conventions of society; the humanists are influenced more by positive loyalties than by restrictive codes.

Passing from descriptive to causal differences, we have already seen that the humanist conscience is possessed by, and only by, those who are relatively free from blind spots and capable of feeling what is in themselves. They surpass all other groups in the insight which, on the one hand, diminishes their irrational persecutory anxieties, and, on the other, enables them to feel grief if they injure or abandon what they love. Thus a movement away from the authoritarian and towards the humanist type of conscience is the moral effect of any increase in that kind of wisdom which consists in insight or self-knowledge. And this is true however the increase in insight is brought about—whether by a formal analysis or by some other means.

But the humanist consciences of different individuals are by no means necessarily identical. They have a common form or pattern which distinguishes them sharply from the authoritarian type of conscience; but the content, the current symbols of the good objects to be cherished and protected, may be widely different. This gives the answer to the first half of the question we began with; as people become wiser in self-knowledge their morality converges in some respects and remains divergent in others. Their consciences become more humanist in form, but this common form is compatible with a wide variety of content.

5. *The Influence of Insight on Political Opinion*

There still remains the second half of our question—that concerned with politics. Can we also say that increased insight would bring about some convergence in the form or content of our political preferences?

That it would do so at least so far as insight influences morals and morals influence politics must be already clear. I do not think, for example, that a humanist politician could tolerate the guilt of attacking a comparatively harmless neighbour, as Germany did in 1939, or of abandoning a friendly one, as we did in 1938. So both active and passive forms of non-humanist political behaviour would tend to be reduced. And, in general, a predominance of the humanist type of conscience would modify the political behaviour of any group, whether nation, class or party, to other groups in much the same way as it would modify the private behaviour of individuals to each other. Since each group would be likely to be the priority ' good object ' to its own members, they would still be likely to put its interests first, which, if threatened, they might indeed defend more stoutly than at present. But they would not be able to ride rough shod over the interests of another group, or to desert those of a friendly one, without a sense of guilt; nor would they be so prone, in resisting an aggressive group, to project their own guilt feelings upon it and so to paint it blacker than it is. In other words, our political behaviour would not only be more consistently loyal to our own values, but also less callous towards its rivals and less vindictive towards its enemies. In short, there would be a measure of convergence towards a humanist standard of political behaviour.

There would also be some convergence in our political beliefs, by which I mean our beliefs about political affairs. Such beliefs—for example, those expressed in our idea of other nations, parties or classes, or in our sociological, including economic, theories—are by no means solely determined by our contacts and our studies. They are often very greatly influenced by unconscious phantasies surviving from early childhood which distort our conscious inferences and deductions. So insight, by reducing these impediments to social science, would help to bring us nearer to a common truth.

But can we go still further and say that increasing insight would bring about some convergence in political ideology, that is, in the different ' ideal ' states or societies which different individuals would like to live in?

Anthropology has taught us that any fairly homogeneous people tends to create a society congenial to itself, and that many different kinds of society exist each of which is ' good ' to its own members, but ' bad ' to members of the others. The anthropologist, who himself has a specific character, will naturally prefer some kinds of people and some kinds of society above the rest. But, in the absence of any independent standard against which to measure his own subjective one, he will usually dismiss such judgments as relative and therefore outside the bounds of science. This attitude may be in itself a healthy reaction against a too naïve assumption of superiority by earlier travellers. But it seems to me to be carried much too far in the relativist denial that any independent standard can be found.

The relativist position culminates in the

relativist definition of normality, according to which a normal person is one well adapted to the society he lives in. Definitions cannot be false; but they can be ill chosen, or they can fail to fit the pre-existing concept they are endeavouring to express in words. Now the clinical concept of normality may be vague. But it certainly does not depend on adaptation to society; for, if it did, some people whom every clinician would class as ill would have to be classed as normal in some societies. A verbal definition of normality that both fits the clinical concept and is absolute in the sense of being independent of the standards of any arbitrarily chosen culture may be difficult to find. But it seems to me to emerge, at least in outline, from the following considerations. What we call illness, whether this is a specific symptom or a ' character defect ' is something we try to cure, or at least to lessen, by analysis, that is, by helping the patient to achieve a higher degree of insight or self-understanding than he had before. Sometimes the task is beyond our present technical ability. But this does not lessen our belief that insight, if we could only awaken it, would still effect the cure. In other words, we believe that what we call health is something that can be achieved by insight. Now, if this causal connection between health and insight exists, we can use it to give a verbal definition of normality that does fit the clinical concept and is independent of any arbitrarily chosen cultural standards. We can define a normal—that is, a healthy—mind, as one that knows itself.[12]

Since in reality self knowledge is always incomplete, it follows from our definition that there can be no completely normal person. But this conclusion, with which no analyst will quarrel, does not lessen the value of a term to denote a limit to which real people approximate in various degrees.

Having reached a definition of a normal mind as one that knows itself, we have next to enquire about its other attributes. These are not included in the definition and can only be discovered empirically. Some of the moral attributes we have already found: they comprise what we called a ' humanistic ' as opposed to other forms of conscience. Two qualities which Freud used to define normality in a wider sense are certainly attributes of anyone who is approximately normal in the narrow one. These are a well-developed capacity for both work and enjoyment. But, for our present purpose, the most comprehensive and significant attribute is perhaps maturity.

We can now re-word our question about the ideological effects of insight in rather different terms and ask what kind of state would be most congenial to people who, as a result of insight, are humanist in conscience and have also attained a fairly high level of psychological maturity in other respects too. There can be no doubt that such people would be most unhappy (and maladjusted) in any state that sought to dominate their consciences or to control their labours. They would therefore be opposed to totalitarianism in all of its many different forms. But neither would they be content to thrive in a *laissez faire* society which accepted no obligations towards those who were less fortunate or less efficient in the economic struggle for existence. So their political aim would be a state that accepted responsibility for welfare without curtailing independence.[13] This also gives us the answer to our question in its original form. The effect of increasing insight would be to bring about some convergence in political ideology towards what may still be called, in spite of totalitarian attempts to misappropriate the term, the democratic aim.

6. *Conclusion*

How little, or how much, have we achieved by this enquiry? Certainly there is nothing new in the conclusion that wise men are humanist in morals and democratic in their politics. Most people in democratic countries believe it already. But to prove it empirically has, I think, only been made possible by the more recent discoveries of analysis—in particular by those we owe to Melanie Klein's pioneering work which she began with children. These discoveries, as I have tried to show, enable us for the first time to construct an argument capable both of confirming this belief in those who already have it, and perhaps, in the long run, also of convincing those who at present hold a contrary opinion.

[12] The two expressions: ' A mind that knows itself ' and ' an integrated mind ' are I think equivalent. Integration as a criterion of mental health has been stressed by Marjorie Brierley (1947) in her paper ' Notes on Psycho-Analysis and Integrative Living ', *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, **28.** (Chapter VI in *Trends in Psycho-Analysis*, Int. Psycho-Anal. Library, No. 39.)

[13] The political cleavage in this country since the war has been roughly between those who stress the first to the partial neglect of the second, and those who stress the second to the partial neglect of the first, of these two desiderata. But in the last few years each party seems to have borrowed—if without acknowledgment—from the other a good deal of what it had previously neglected.

GROUP DYNAMICS: A RE-VIEW

By W. R. BION, London

Using knowledge derived from his psycho-analytic studies Freud attempted [1] to illuminate some of the problems which had been raised by Le Bon, McDougall and others in their studies of the group. In this article I shall briefly summarize [2] some theories at which I have arrived by applying to groups, in which I was participating, the intuitions developed by present-day psycho-analytic training. These theories differ from many others, in merits and defects alike, in having been forged in the actual emotional stresses they are intended to describe and they therefore constitute a different approach from that made by Freud. It will be noticed that I introduce some concepts new to psycho-analysis; this is in part because I am dealing with different subject-matter and in part because I wished to see if, by making a start disencumbered by previous theories, I might reach a point at which my views of the group and psycho-analytic views of the individual could be compared and thereby judged to be either complementary or divergent.

I assume that every individual acts as if he believes that the group has an attitude to him and that it is possible to put into words what this attitude is. Translation into precise speech of what I suppose to be the attitude of the group to me or to someone else, and of the individual to the group constitutes the interpretations.

The conclusions that follow represent the distillation of some eight years of work. These are they:

In any group there may be discerned certain broad trends of mental activity. Every group, however casual, however idle it may appear to be, meets to ' do ' something. In this activity, according to the capacity of the individual, they co-operate. This co-operation is voluntary and dependent on some degree of sophisticated skill in the individual. Participation in this activity is a product of years of training, experience, and individual mental development. Since this activity is associated with the performance of a task it is related to reality, its methods are rational and therefore, in however embryonic a form, scientific. It follows that its characteristics are similar to those attributed by Freud to the Ego.[3] This aspect of group mental activity I have called the Work Group (W).

The activities of W. are obstructed, diverted, and on occasion assisted by certain other mental activities which have in common the attribute of powerful emotional drives. These activities, at first apparently chaotic, are given a certain cohesion if it is assumed that they spring from basic assumptions common to all the group. The first assumption is that the group exists in order to be sustained by a leader on whom it depends for nourishment, material and spiritual, and protection. This mental state I have called the basic assumption of dependence (D.) and its leader the dependent leader (D.L.). The second basic assumption is that the group has met for purposes of pairing; I have called this mental state the basic assumption of pairing (P.). It is suffused with messianic hopes and its leader (P.L.) can best be described as the unborn genius. The third basic assumption is that the group has met to fight something or to run away from it. It is prepared to do either indifferently. I have called it the fight-flight basic assumption (F.) and its leader (F.L.). Participation in basic assumption mental activity requires no training, experience or mental development. It is instantaneous, inevitable and instinctive. In contrast with W. it makes no demands on the individual for a capacity to co-operate but depends on the individual's possession of what I call valency —a term I borrow from the physicists to express a capacity for instantaneous involuntary combination of one individual with another for sharing and acting on a basic assumption.

W. function is always in evidence together with one, and only one, basic assumption. But though W. may remain unaltered the contemporary basic assumption that pervades its

[1] Freud: *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego. Totem and Taboo. Moses and Monotheism.*

[2] A more complete account may be found in *Human Relations*, Bion, W. R., Vol. 1, Nos. 3 and 4, Vol. 2, Nos. 1 and 4, Vol. 3, Nos. 1 and 4.

[3] Freud: *Ego and Id*, 1927, p. 30.

activities can be changing frequently; sometimes there may be two or three changes in an hour, sometimes the same basic assumption remains active for months on end. To account for the fate of the inactive basic assumptions I have postulated the existence of a proto-mental system in which physical and mental activity is undifferentiated and which lies outside the field ordinarily considered profitable for psychological investigations.[4]

Many techniques are available, and are in fact daily used, for the investigations of W. For the investigation of basic assumption phenomena I consider psycho-analysis, or some extension of technique directly derived from it, to be essential—a point I shall elaborate later. But since W. functions are always pervaded by basic assumption phenomena it is clear that techniques that ignore the latter will give misleading impressions of the former.

The emotions which can be detected in the activities associated with a basic assumption may all be described by terms in common use such as anxiety, fear, hate, love and the like. Nevertheless it seems to me that the emotions common to any basic assumption are subtly affected by each other as if they were held in a combination peculiar to the active basic assumption. That is to say the anxiety in evidence in D. has a different quality from anxiety which is evident in P., and so on with all other feelings which individuals exhibit.

Whatever basic assumption is active the leadership of the group may be identical with the W.L. But D.L., P.L., and F.L., need not be identified with any individual in the group. The identification may in each case be with an inanimate object or with an idea.[5] It may also be identified with the history of the group, a phenomenon I have most often noticed in D. On these occasions the group, complaining of an inability to remember what took place in a previous session has set about making a record of its meetings. This record then becomes a ' bible ' to which appeal is made if the leader proves to be refractory material for moulding into the likeness proper to the D.L. Bible-making is an activity to which the group resorts when threatened with an idea the acceptance of which would entail development on the part of the individuals comprising the group. Such ideas must be regarded as deriving emotional force, and exciting emotional opposition, from their association with characterists appropriate to the P.L. In particular when D. or F. are dominant a struggle takes place to suppress the new idea or P.L. so that these basic assumptions should retain their dominance in the emotional life of the group. If the P.L. is not suppressed in its incipient stage then a period of dominance by P. is ushered in. The dominance of P. in a group continues until feelings of anxiety give way to feelings of persecution whereupon a period of dominance by F. supervenes. This in turn, after a similar sequence of emotions, gives way to a period of dominance by D. In my experience this is the most common sequence of events.

The change need not be from one basic assumption to another but may take certain aberrant forms depending upon the dominant basic assumption at the time of the increase in persecutory tension. These aberrant forms always lead to the involvement of an extraneous group. If D. is dominant the emergence of P.L., particularly in the form of an idea, is countered by provoking the influx or invasion by another group. If F. is dominant the tendency is to absorb or invade another group. If P. is dominant the tendency is to schism. This last reaction may appear anomalous unless it is remembered that the P.L. should be ' unborn ', or, in other words, non-existent. The crux of the matter lies in the quality of the new idea to demand development and the inability of the basic assumption groups to tolerate development. The reasons for this I shall educe later.[6]

There are certain specialized W. Groups whose task is peculiarly prone to stimulate the activity of a particular basic assumption. Typical groups of this nature are provided by a church or an army. It is possible to regard the church as a group peculiarly prone to interference by D. phenomena and the army as suffering a similar interference from F. But another possibility has to be borne in mind and that is that these groups are budded off by the main groups of which they form a part for the specific purpose of neutralizing D. and F. respectively and thus preventing their obstruction of the W. function of the main group. If we adopt the latter hypothesis then we must regard it as a sign of failure in the specialized W. Group if D. or F. functions either cease to manifest themselves within the specialized W. Groups or else grow to overwhelming

[4] Bion, W. R.: *Human Relations*, Vol. 3, No. 1.
[5] Freud: *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*. Le Bon: *The Crowd*, Benn, 1947, p. 129.
[6] This article, p. 245, Symbol Formation.

strength. In either case the result is the same —the main group has to take over the functions proper to the specialized W. Groups. Something of this kind may underlie the evolution in church and D. functions of the so-called Welfare State,[7] or, in army and F. functions, outbreaks of war. In the small groups of which I have experience these phenomena appear, in D. as a tendency to form a small sub-group to interpret the D.L. to the group, or, in F. as a tendency to find a pretext to send a deputation to some external group. In my experience the formation of any committee or deputation can be seen as a response not only to some need deriving from W. function, but also to the rising pressure of a basic assumption.

I have not mentioned any specialized W. Group, analagous to church or army, for P. but an aristocracy may be such a group.

There are two important inherent characteristics of basic assumption mentality. Time plays no direct part in basic assumption mentality; it is a dimension of mental function that is not recognized: consequently all activities which require an awareness of time are imperfectly comprehended and tend to arouse feelings of persecution. Interpretation of group activity on the basic assumptions level always lays bare a disturbed relationship to time. The second characteristic, which I mentioned earlier, is the absence of any process of development as a part of basic assumption mentality. It is a point to which I shall refer later[8] but for the moment I concern myself only with the fact that stimuli to development meet with a hostile response on the basic assumption level. The fact that time is a component of all developmental processes tends to an exacerbation of hostile feeling and it is the growth of this hostility which helps to produce the situation, described above, in which a specialized W. Group fails in its function of neutralizing its basic assumption It will be appreciated that this is a matter of importance in any group which purports, by the study of the group, to promote a therapeutic development of insight. It is the growth of hostility thus engendered that tends to determine that the reaction to the emergence of the P.L.,[9] will take an aberrant form rather than spend itself in the cyclic change from one basic assumption to another. For, if a group wishes to prevent development, the simplest way to do so is to allow itself to be overwhelmed by basic assumption mentality and thus become approximated to the one kind of mental life in which a capacity for development is not required. The main compensation for such a shift appears to be an increase in a pleasurable feeling of vitality.[10]

The defence which schism affords against the development-threatening idea (P.L.) can be seen in the operation of the schismatic groups ;[11] ostensibly opposed but in fact promoting the same end. One group adheres to the D.L., often in the form of the group ' bible '. This group popularizes the established ideas by denuding them of any quality that might demand painful effort and thereby secures a numerous adherence of those who oppose the pains of development. Thought thus becomes stabilized on a level which is platitudinous and dogmatic. The reciprocal group, supposedly supporting the new idea (P.L.) becomes so exacting in its demands that it ceases to recruit itself. Thus both groups avoid the painful bringing together of the primitive and the sophisticated which is the essence of the developmental conflict. The superficial but numerous schismatics are thus opposed by the profound but numerically negligible schismatics. The result reminds one of the fear expressed sometimes that a society breeds copiously from its least cultured members while the ' best ' people remain obdurately sterile.

We have reached a point at which my description of the group is sufficiently far removed from that which Freud proposed; before considering in detail where the apparent difference lies I would bring my views into juxtaposition with some earlier theories of the group.

In his discussion of society Plato supposes that individuals are rational and that the governing consideration is the limitation imposed by reality. If the individual sticks to his task, if he co-operates with other individuals and lets them fulfil theirs, all will be well. In my

[7] Freud: *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, p. 51. Freud here brings close together, without linking them, W. and basic assumption phenomena. For contrast I would put my view thus: If the State stimulates (and the Church fails to neutralize) D., its policy will show D. characters; if a scientific group stimulates D it will also show D. characters. W. changes but basic assumptions remain.

[8] This article, p. 245.

[9] The messianic idea, or person, evokes destructive attacks in the group in which the messianic idea or person appears. The essence of P. is that the P.L. is ' unborn.' Association of the P.L. with an actual idea or person heralds the break up of P.

[10] The point is discussed by Reinbold Niebuhr in *The Nature and Destiny of Man.*

[11] Interesting material on schismatic groups may be found in: Ronald Knox, *Enthusiasm*, O.U.P., 1951.

terms this implies that group mental activity is wholly comprised in W. functions and can be governed by reference to reality. But my contention is that W. is only one part of group mentality and cannot be understood without reference to other mental phenomena. Aristotle indeed appears to criticize Platonic theory because it is deficient in its grasp of the reality of human behaviour, but the real change comes with St. Augustine's formulations in the 19th Book of *De Civitate Dei*.[12] He seems here to postulate a new dimension, and, by insisting that a right relationship with God is a prerequisite for a right relationship with individuals, to be predicating a state of mind similar to that which I describe as D. For in D. the individuals do not have a relationship with each other but only with the D.L. Since St. Augustine there has been no return to the classical view. The liberal view is that emotion and reason are easily harmonized, that is to say, that the operations of the W. Group can be harmonized with the operations of the basic assumption group. Nietzche reacts against what he feels to be the arid intellectualism that this view would produce, seeming to suggest that a group achieves vitality only in so far as it releases the aggressive impulses. This would mean that a feeling of vitality could only be achieved by the dominance of the basic assumption, notably F. These and similar views are expressed in the group as ideals to be sought after as a solution of the problems of the group. But from what I have already said it will be realized that in practice none provide any lasting solution. Group reactions are infinitely more complex than the foregoing theories, even in their full deployment, suggest. Freud expressly disavowed any but a superficial study of the group problem (*Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*), making his observations in the course of a criticism, derived from psycho-analysis, of the work done by others.[13]

In his *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, Freud points out that individual and group psychology cannot be absolutely differentiated because the psychology of the individual is itself a function of the individual's relationship to another person or object. He objects that it is difficult to attribute to the factor of number a significance so great as to make it capable by itself of arousing in our mental life a new instinct that is otherwise not brought into play. In my view no new instinct is brought into play—it is always in play. It is not necessary for a number of people to be brought together—the individual cannot help being a member of a group even if his membership of it consists in behaving in such a way as to give reality to the idea that he does not belong to a group at all. The psycho-analytical situation is not 'individual psychology' but 'pair'. The individual is a group animal at war, both with the group and with those aspects of his personality that constitute his 'groupishness'.

It is necessary for a group to meet because the conditions for study can be provided only in that way. Freud, and others whom he quotes such as McDougall and Le Bon, seems to me to consider that group psychology is something which comes into being when there are a number of people collected together in the same place and at the same time and in this respect I agree with Freud that too much significance is thereby attributed to number: I think he is mistaken in saying that a solution must only be sought in one or other of the two alternatives:

(1) the possibility that the social instinct is not primitive, or
(2) that its development begins in a manner such as that of the family.

There is a third. I would say that the importance of the aggregation of individuals into a group is similar to the importance of the bringing together of analyst and analysand: it is necessary for an analysand to come to a psycho-analyst for the transference relationship to be rendered demonstrable: the group should come together so that the characteristics of the group may be demonstrated. There is no intrinsic importance in the coming together of the group; it must come together sufficiently closely for me to be able to give an interpretation without having to shout it. Therefore the number must be limited and the degree of dispersion of the group must be limited. This is necessary also because all individuals must have an opportunity of witnessing the evidence on which interpretations are based. The congregation of the group in a particular place at a particular time is important for these mechanical reasons, but it has no significance for the pro-

[12] *The City of God. St. Augustine.* Everyman edition. The point is discussed by Ernest Barker in his introduction to this edition.

[13] Freud: *Totem and Taboo.* Trans. by J. Strachey, 1950, p. 75, footnote 1.

duction of group phenomena. The idea springs from the erroneous impression that a thing must commence at the moment when its existence becomes demonstrable. No individual however isolated in time and space should be regarded as outside a group or lacking in active manifestations of group psychology, merely because conditions do not make it possible to demonstrate it. The concept of the human being as a group animal would solve the difficulties which are felt to exist in the seeming paradox that a group is more than the sum of its members. The explanation of certain phenomena must be sought in the matrix of the group and not in the individuals that go to make up the group. Time-keeping is no function of any part, in isolation, of the mechanism of a clock, yet time-keeping is a function of the clock and of the various parts of the clock when held in combination with each other.

To sum up, there are characteristics in the individual of which the significance cannot be understood except as part of his equipment as a herd animal nor can their operation be seen unless in the intelligible field of study—which is the group.

Freud does not recognize, in his discussion of groups, the importance of his own revolution in looking for an explanation of neurotic symptoms, not in the individual, but in the individual's relationship with objects.

The apparent difference between group psychology and individual psychology is an illusion produced by the fact that the group brings into prominence phenomena which appear alien to an observer unaccustomed to using the group.[14] Freud states that his contribution is visible only in his selection both of material and opinions (presumably from the standard works he cites in *Totem and Taboo*, p. 75, note 1, 1950). Explanations of group behaviour are derived from the psycho-analytic situation. It is possibly for this reason that Freud's description of the group reads strangely when compared with actual experiences in a group. I attribute great force and influence to the Work Group which, through its concern with reality, is compelled to employ the methods of science in no matter how rudimentary a form; despite the influence of the basic assumptions, it is the W. Group which triumphs in the long run. Freud himself considers—notably when he discusses the part that the group plays in the production of language,[15] folk song, folklore, etc.—that Le Bon is unfair to the group when he says it never thirsts after truth. Freud discusses McDougall's view that conditions in the highly organized group remove 'the psychological disadvantages of group formation'. McDougall here approximates to my view that the function of the specialized work group is to manipulate the basic assumption to prevent obstruction of the work group. Freud describes the problem as one of procuring for the group 'precisely those features which were characteristic of the individual and which are extinguished in him by the formation of the group'. He postulates an individual outside the primitive group who possessed his own continuity, his self-consciousness, his traditions and customs, his own particular functions and position. He says that owing to his entry into an 'unorganized' group, the individual had lost his distinctiveness for a time. In my view the struggle of the individual to preserve his distinctiveness, assumes different characteristics according to the state of mind of the group at any given moment. Group organization gives stability and permanence to the work group, which is felt to be more easily submerged by the basic assumptions if the group is unorganized. Individual distinctiveness is no part of life in a group acting on the basic assumptions. Organization and structure are weapons of the W. Group. They are the product of co-operation between members of the group and their effect once established in the group is to demand still further co-operation from the individuals in the group. In this respect McDougall's organized group is always a work group and never a basic assumption group. A group acting on a basic assumption needs no organization or co-operation. The counterpart of co-operation in the basic assumption group is what I have called valency—a spontaneous, unconscious function of the gregarious quality in the personality of man. It is only when a group begins to act on a basic assumption that difficulties arise. Action inevitably means contact with reality and contact with reality compels

[14] It is also a matter of historical development; the link between individual and group psychology cannot be forged until there has been sufficient understanding of Melanie Klein's work on the psychoses, and in particular of the papers on Symbol Formation and schizoid mechanisms to make its application to group work possible. I develop this point later.

[15] In view of my suggestions on p. 245 of this article it seems significant that Freud picks on the development of language as an example.

regard for truth and therefore imposes scientific method and hence the evocation of the work group.

Freud deduces group situations from his study of the transference. For reasons I have given, the transference is likely to be coloured by group characteristics deriving from P. which are stimulated by the pair situation actually existing in psycho-analysis. Indeed, in the group situation we can find one source both of the prominence of sexual elements in psycho-analysis and the suspicions and accusations of the opponents of Freud that psycho-analysis was 'sexual'. He was able to deduce from psycho-analysis some of the characteristics of two specialized work groups, army and church, but was not led to a discussion of the specialized work group which attaches most importance to breeding and is therefore most likely to have to deal with P., namely the aristocracy. If W. characteristics were allowed to play a dominant rôle, the aristocracy would have a closer resemblance to the genetics department of a university, or a stud farm, than it has. As it is, we cannot regard the interest shown in breeding as having the scientific aura which should be pathognomic of the work group. The reason is that it is not dealing with a W. problem. It is a specialized sub-group split off to deal with P. in much the same way as the army and the church have to deal with F. and D. respectively. Therefore, the relationship of this sub-group with the main group will not be determined by the fidelity with which it conducts its love affairs on strictly genetic principles, but rather on the efficiency with which it satisfies the group demand that the P. should be so dealt with that it does not obstruct the W. functions of the group as a whole.

Now I have already said that in P. anxiety derives from the feeling that both group and individual are subservient to the unborn genius. The function of the aristocracy is sometimes to find an outlet for activity based on P. without outraging the reality sense of the group; sometimes to prevent the reality sense of the group from undermining the institutions on the preservation of which the group depends for the neutralization of P.

Freud criticizes Le Bon's views on the leader of the group. Le Bon states that a collection of human beings place themselves instinctively under the authority of a chief; that the leader must fit in with the needs of the group in his personal qualities and that he must himself be held by a strong faith in order to awaken the group's faith. Le Bon does not carry his view of the relationship between leader and group as far as I do by my description of the D.L., F.L., and P.L. The statement that the leader must fit in with the group in his personal qualities is compatible with my view that any leader of the group is ignored when his behaviour or characteristics fall outside the limits set by the prevalent basic assumption. I also think that the leader must be held by the same 'faith' that holds the group though I do not believe that this is in order to awaken the group's faith. On the contrary, my view is that the attitude of the group and its leader alike are merely functions of the active basic assumption.

Freud discusses McDougall's distinction between the simple 'unorganized' group and the 'organized' group, and gives an account of two states of mind which, in my opinion, do not belong to different groups but can be observed to co-exist in the same group. McDougall's simple 'unorganized' group resembles the basic assumption groups.[16] I do not agree that the 'unorganized' group is suggestible; I consider that it is very difficult to put over any view that does not fit in with the prevalent basic assumption. It is possible that the idea that the group is suggestible arises because any idea that is conformable with the prevalent basic assumption is automatically accepted.

Freud quotes one point in McDougall's conditions for raising the level of collective mental life, to which I would draw attention and that is his statement[17]—'the first of these conditions, which is the basis of all the rest, is some degree of continuity of existence of the group.' This convinces me that in the organized group McDougall is describing what I call the W. Group. Meyer Fortes[18] discussing Radcliffe Brown's views on social structure particularly the distinction between 'structure as an actually existing concrete reality' and 'structural form', says that the distinction is associated with the continuity of social structure through time. In my view the continuity of social structure through time is a function of the W. Group. Meyer Fortes states that the time

[16] Freud: *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, p. 29. McDougall: *The Group Mind*, p. 45.
[17] McDougall: *The Group Mind*, p. 49.
[18] Meyer Fortes: *Time and Social Structure: an Ashanti Case Study.*

factor in social structure is by no means uniform in its incidence and adds that all corporate groups, by definition, must have continuity. As with McDougall's distinction between organized and unorganized groups, so with the incidence of the time factor. I do not believe that we are dealing with two different kinds of group, in the sense of two different communities, but rather with two different aspects which co-exist of the same community. Continuity in time is an intrinsic quality of W. Group activity, but is not a component of the basic group. All the functions of the basic assumption group are in full activity before ever the group comes together in a room, although their observation may be difficult, and continue after the group has dispersed. There is neither development nor decay in basic assumption functions and in this respect they differ totally from the W. Group. It stands to reason that observation of the group's continuity in time is likely to present anomalous and contradictory features if the operation of two different kinds of mental functioning within the group has not been recognized. It may help to clarify my meaning if I say that when an individual asks 'When does the group meet again?' he is referring to W. and W. only in so far as he is talking about mental phenomena at all. The basic assumption group does not disperse or meet and references to time have no meaning in the basic assumption group. The apparent impatience of the basic assumption group may therefore be read as an expression of anxiety aroused by phenomena associated with continuity, development, etc. which are intrinsically co-mingled with a dimension of which the basic assumption group knows nothing. It is as if an organism devoid of organs of sight were to be made aware of phenomena that could only be understood by someone acquainted with the properties of light.

McDougall's principles for raising collective mental life to a higher level seems to me to be an expression of the desire to prevent the basic assumption groups from obstructing W. His second condition appears to emphasize the need for individuals to have a clear knowledge of W. aims. His fourth point, namely the existence of a body of traditions and customs and habits in the minds of the members of the group, determining their relations to one another and the group as a whole, comes very near to the platonic view of group harmony based on individual function which I have already described as a W. phenomenon. It also corresponds to the views put forward by St. Augustine in the 19th book of *The City of God*. At first sight this would seem to contradict my statement that McDougall is describing W. phenomena, but the discrepancy is resolved if it is remembered that in my view St. Augustine's theory is an attempt to postulate a specialized W. Group for dealing with D.

Freud bases the next stage in his discussion [19] on the statement that in a group an individual's emotions become extraordinarily intensified while his intellectual ability becomes markedly reduced. From actual experience in a group I would say that this statement needs qualification. It will be appreciated that in the groups I have studied, the group naturally expects me to take the lead in organizing its activities. I take advantage of the position thus accorded me to lead the group in my own way—that is to say, in an exploration of group dynamics. This means that the desire for an organized group is frustrated. The group thereupon fears the emergence of the basic assumption groups and expresses its fear by an attempt to produce a structure and an organization, thus doing its best to suppress all emotion, emotion being an intrinsic part of the basic assumption groups. This produces a state of affairs which to the individual often appears as an intensification of emotion. Since attention is focussed upon this, since furthermore the lack of structure promotes the obtrusion of the basic assumption group in which intellectual activity is of the limited kind I have already described, it feels as if intellectual ability is markedly reduced. The belief that this is so is still further encouraged by the fact that the dominating position of the basic assumption causes the individuals to ignore all intellectual activity which does not fit in with the basic assumption. Actually I do not in the least believe that there is a reduction of intellectual ability in the group, nor yet that 'great decisions in the realm of thought and momentous discoveries and solutions of problems are only possible to an individual working in solitude',[20] although the belief that this is so is commonly expressed in the group discussion and all sorts of plans are elaborated for circumventing the supposedly pernicious influence of the emotions

[19] Freud: *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, p. 33.
[20] *Op. cit.*, p. 25.

of the group. Indeed I give interpretations because I believe that intellectual activity of a high order is possible in a group together with an awareness (and *not* an evasion) of the emotions of the basic assumption group. My behaviour in doing this betrays, I hope, my indebtedness to psycho-analytic experience. If group therapy is found to have a value I believe it will be in the conscious experiencing of group activity of this sort. Freud turns to discussion of something that crops up under a variety of names such as ' suggestion ', ' imitation ', ' prestige of leaders ', ' contagion '. I have used ' valency ' partly because I wish to avoid the suggesions which already adhere to the terms I have listed, partly because the term ' valency ', as used in physics in reference to the power of combination of atoms, carries with it the greatest penumbra of suggestiveness useful for my purpose. I mean the capacity of the individual for instantaneous combination with other individuals in an established pattern of behaviour—the basic assumptions. I shall not follow Freud's discussion in detail, but will pass on to his use of the term ' libido ' which he takes from his study of the psycho-neuroses.[21] At first sight it would appear that I conflict with him if he uses the word ' libido ' and I use ' valency '. But in taking the word from his study of the neuroses, Freud is approaching his examination of the group through the technique of psycho-analysis and psycho-analysis, in the light of my theories of groups, can be regarded as a work group most likely to stimulate P.; that being so, the psycho-analytic investigation as a part of P. is likely to reveal sexuality in a central position. Furthermore, it is likely to come under attack as a sexual activity since, according to my theory of P., the group must assume that two people can come together for a sexual purpose only.

It is natural, therefore, that if Freud uses the discoveries that spring from psycho-analytic investigation in order to elucidate the phenomena of the group, he will see the nature of the bond between individual members of the group as libidinous. An investigation carried out in the group itself shows that the libidinous component in the bond is only characteristic of P., and that the bond has a different complexion in F. and D. I attribute it to the same cause that Freud later describes the Commander-in-Chief of the Church as Christ.[22] In fact, as I hope to show later, the Commander-in-Chief in this context is the Deity. Christ, or the Messiah, as I have already said, is the Leader not of D., but of P. The Messiah is an accidental feature in religion, the Deity, intrinsic. In P. the Messiah is essential. It is significant that Freud makes this mistake which should be obvious on purely theological grounds. The point is, that in psycho-analysis, regarded as a P., the Messiah tends to occupy a central position and the bond between individuals is libidinous. The Messianic idea betrays its presence in the supposition that the individual patient is worth the analyst's very considerable devotion and also in the view, sometimes expressed, that as a result of psycho-analytic work a technique will be perfected that will, ultimately, save mankind. Freud's description of the nature of the tie between individuals of the group, I regard as correct for only one phase, though an important one in the group mental life, and feel the need for some more neutral term that will describe the tie on all basic assumption levels (but excluding the tie in the W. Group, which I regard as being of a sophisticated nature more aptly indicated by the word ' co-operation ').

There is another reason for using the term valency; Freud's notion of the leader as important because the group depends upon him and derives its qualities from his personality is I think mistaken; the leader is as much the creature of the basic assumption as any other member of the group. That is to say, the leader does not create the group by virtue of his fanatical adherence to an idea, but is rather an individual whose personality renders him peculiarly susceptible to the obliteration of individuality by the basic assumption groups' leadership requirements. That is, if it is true to say that in F., for example, the individual loses his distinctiveness, this applies to the F.L. as much as to anyone else. He only appears to have a distinctive personality because his personality is of a kind that lends itself to exploitation by the group demand for fighting or flight as the only two techniques its leader should require of it; the leader has no greater freedom to be a person than any other member of the group. This does not agree with Le Bon's idea that the leader must possess a strong and imposing will, nor yet with Freud's idea that he corresponds to a hypnotist. Such power as he has derives

[21] *Op. cit.*, p. 37.
[22] *Op. cit.*, p. 42.

from the fact that he has become, in common with every other member of the group, what Le Bon describes as 'an automaton who has ceased to be guided by his will'. In short, he is leader by virtue of his capacity for instantaneous, involuntary (maybe voluntary too) combination with every other member of his group and only differs from them in that, whatever his function may be in W., he is the incarnation of the leader of the basic assumption group.

Freud's view does not seem to me to make possible an understanding of the dangerous possibilities that exist in the phenomenon of group leadership. His view of the leader, and indeed all other views of which I am aware, is not easily reconciled with my experience of leadership as it emerges in practice. The usual description of the leader seems to me to be a mixture of different group phenomena with the characteristics of the W.L. predominating. Now, for reasons I have already given, the W.L. is either harmless through lack of influence with the group or else a man who carries weight on account of his grasp of reality. It is likely, therefore, that descriptions of leadership which are coloured mostly by the characteristics of the W.L., would tend to be optimistically tinged. My view of the basic assumption group leader does not rule out the possibility of identity with W.L. function, but it allows for the existence of a leader, apparently evoking the enthusiastic allegiance of the group, but devoid of any contact with reality other than the reality of basic assumption group demands. When it is realized that this can mean that the group is being led by an individual whose personality has been obliterated, an automaton, 'an individual who has lost his distinctiveness', but who yet is so suffused by the emotions of the basic assumption group that he carries all the prestige of a W.L., it becomes possible to explain some of the disasters into which groups have been led by leaders whose qualifications for the post seem, when the emotions prevalent at their prime have died down, to be devoid of substance.

We can regard Church and Army either as work groups whose task is of such a nature that they are likely to have more experience than usual of D. and F., or alternatively as sub-groups of the main group with the specific tasks of coping with D. and F. manifestations in such a way that the W. function of the main group is, as far as possible, unobstructed.

I turn to Freud's views on panic. Freud says that panic is best studied in military groups.[23] He does not appear to claim actual experience of panic in a military group. I have experienced panic on two occasions with troops in action and have on several other occasions in small civilian groups had reason to think that the emotional experience bore a sufficiently close resemblance to my military experiences to deserve the name panic. In some respects to which I shall shortly refer these experiences do not appear to me to bear out Freud's theories, though I think he is discussing the same phenomenon. I consider that McDougall's description of panic refers to an experience which is the same as mine. I am confirmed in this belief when McDougall says [24] 'Other of the cruder, primary emotions may spread through a crowd in very similar fashion though the process is rarely so rapid and intense as in the case of fear', and then describes in a footnote an instance he witnessed in Borneo of the almost instantaneous spread of anger through a crowd.[25] McDougall has thus brought very close together, though without making the connection, anger and fear, and thus supports my view that panic is an aspect of F., and that there is no essential difference between panic flight and uncontrolled attack. But here is my difficulty: if it is argued, not merely that my theories offer a false description of the phenomena of the group, but that the experiences on which I base them were not panics at all, I do not really know what reply can be made, nor what steps are open to me to discover where my error lies, so long as the problem is approached as if it were an academic one, soluble apart from contact with the group itself.

Here then are my findings: panic can never arise except in a situation which might as easily have given rise to rage: rage or fear in the given situation is offered no readily available outlet: frustration of the rage or fear, which is thus inescapable, cannot be tolerated because frustration is a function of time and time is not a dimension of basic assumption phenomena. Flight offers a vehicle, for expression of the emotion in F., which is immediately available and therefore meets the demands of F. for instantaneous satisfaction of impulse. The group, in F., will follow any

[23] *Op cit.*, p. 45.
[24] McDougall: *The Group Mind*, C.U.P., p. 24.
[25] McDougall: *The Group Mind*, C.U.P., p. 26.

leader, and, contrary to all views hitherto expressed, retains its coherence in doing so, who will fulfil the characteristics of F.L., namely give only such orders as are recognizable as licensing instantaneous flight or instantaneous attack. Provided that an individual in the group conforms to these limitations of the F.L. he will have no difficulty in turning a group from headlong panic flight to attack, or from headlong attack to panic.

The stimulus for panic, or the rage which I consider to be identical, must always be an event which falls outside the W. Group functions of the group concerned. That is to say, that the degree of organization of the group is not relevant unless the organization, part of W. function, is concerned with the actual external event as part of its *raison d'être*. In Freud's example of the fire in a theatre or place of amusement [26] the W. Group is devoted to the watching of a play but not to the witnessing of a conflagration, still less to the extinguishing of it. The essential point about organization is that it should be suitable both to the pursuit of the external aim of the group and to the manipulation of the basic assumption such a pursuit is most calculated to evoke. Panic in an army is not produced by a military danger, though military danger is, in the nature of things, very likely to be present. It is not likely to be produced by any situation in which attack or flight are appropriate to the operations of the W. Group. If it appears to arise in such a situation it is because the actual cause is not observed.

Before I express further views about the causes of panic it would be useful to consult early views that cannot be impugned on the grounds that they are tainted by theoretical psychological presumptions. To go to origins, the word itself derives from the belief that this fear was inspired by Pan,[27] to whom is attributed the ability to induce in man terror like that of a frightened and stampeding flock or herd of animals. Pan is amorous and has as his chief function originally the making fertile of flocks. To him is attributed also the source of nightmares. He is formidable if disturbed at mid-day. There appears to be very little mythology about Pan and although there are attempts comparatively late to make him a universal god, these do not seem to have been very successful.

It seems from this that panic fear was from the first regarded as a group phenomenon in which fear possessed all members of the group instantaneously. It appears also that to the individual the fear is felt as something induced by an ' internal object ' in the sense in which I understand Melanie Klein to use those words. It is noteworthy that the power of evoking nightmares is attributed to Pan because it would appear from this that the induction of panic fear was felt to be a quite different activity. My experience is by itself too limited to draw any conclusions from it, but it is worth remarking that such experience as I have had suggests that panic is in fact far more likely to arise in broad daylight or at least in a fully waking state. At any other time what occurs is not a panic but a nightmare and this is an individual, not a group phenomenon.

It is now clear that between the theories Freud suggested, approaching the problem from the psycho-analysis of the individual, and the theories I have suggested, making my approach from the study of the group itself, there is a considerable gap. It is possible that the gap appears to be more considerable than it is because of my deliberate use of new terminology. I am disposed, however, to believe that more than a question of terminology is involved and for this belief I shall now advance my reasons.

My first relates to the group's capacity for enduring almost endless periods of trivial conversation or none at all. There are protests, but endurance of this monotony appears to be a lesser evil than action to end it. When interpretations are made, they are as likely as not disregarded. Allowing for the possibility that the disregard is, as in psycho-analysis, more apparent than real, that the interpretations are faulty and on that account inefficacious, there yet remains a residue of inertia that is not explained by this or any suggestion that the F.L., D.L. and P.L., are so dominant that statements which lie outside the characteristic functions of these three are disregarded.

I have been forced to the conclusion that verbal exchange is only understood by the W. Group. In proportion as the group is dominated by a basic assumption verbal communication is important only as a vehicle for sound. Tacitus gives a description of the operations of the bard in a German tribe—

[26] Freud: *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, p. 47.

[27] *Oxford Classical Dictionary. Encyclopædia Brittanica*, 11th edition. Articles on Pan.

a description that might be prophetic of Hitler addressing a Nazi rally—which illustrates my point.[28] The key to this is provided by Melanie Klein in her discussion of the importance of symbol formation in the development of the individual. The W. Group understands that particular use of symbols which is involved in verbal communication: the basic assumption group does not. In the basic assumption group the individual *is* the totem animal. He is not identified with it, or equated with it, he is it. Similarly he *is* the D.L., P.L., or F.L., or a function of those symbols (as a sense of reality demands that we should call them).

The 'language' of the basic assumption group is therefore a method of communication devoid of the precision that is conferred by a capacity for the formation and use of symbols. The basic assumption group therefore lacks a powerful aid to development and remains fundamentally unaffected by stimuli that would provoke it. But the basic assumption group has a means of communication that might well lay claim to the title of the Universal Linguistic which Croce conferred on Æsthetic. Every human group instantaneously understands every other human group no matter how diverse in culture, language and tradition—but only within the limitations of the basic assumptions.

In the light of these speculations we may re-read the biblical account of the building of the Tower of Babel.[29]

The myth has these components: a universal language, a tower which is felt by the Deity to menace his position, a 'confounding' of the universal language and a scattering abroad of the people on the face of the earth. Using my theories to interpret this myth, I suggest that it embodies an account of the development of language, which development is itself an expression of the capacity for symbol formation. This capacity is exemplified in the myth by employment of the building of a tower to reach to heaven as a symbol of the increased potency achieved through the development of language. The inability to use symbols, which is shown even by recent commentators, is also suggested by the literal way in which the tower is mentioned. The growth of language would be a group event of the kind which I have mentioned as demanding development in the individual members of the group and would be opposed as an attack upon the D.L. The reaction to this development is the formation of schisms.

Melanie Klein has shown that the inability to form symbols is characteristic of certain individuals[30]; I would extend this to all individuals in their functions as members of the basic assumption group.

We may now consider afresh a point that has struck many observers—namely the loss in a group of the individual's distinctiveness.[31] The individual sees in the group a source of infinite frustration but the psychiatrist will be impressed by the opportunity it affords for externalization of problems. One consequence is that the individual splits off his aggressiveness and projects it into the 'leader'. His wish to fight, to nourish, to choose a partner or his parents, all are in turn deposited in some external figure. Thus one source of the characteristics of F.L., D.L., or P.L., is activated. On this account, and because of the individual's feelings of guilt at being in possession of the group which is equated with the breast, the leader thus formed arouses feelings of persecution and steps then have to be taken to split off these feelings and to denude the leader of noxious persecutory qualities.[32] This is done by a variety of complex mechanisms which may for the moment be ignored while we notice that such activity, in which every member of the group participates—incidentally it is at this point the therapist in charge of the therapeutic group must be most on his guard against becoming a protagonist of the idea that the 'group' is 'good for' the patients—must be felt by the group as a process of 'curing' the leader. This feeling helps to explain one component in the belief that the leader is the patient to the welfare of whom all group energies must be devoted. To turn now to the mechanisms employed in 'treating' the persecutor. One is by reassurance which is directed towards allaying the anxieties both of the individual chosen to be the leader and of the group as a whole. This process is, however, only a com-

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[28] Tacitus: *Germania*. Everyman edition.

[29] *The Holy Bible*, Genesis 11, v. 1–9. This account is a part of the Jahvistic code and could therefore be regarded as an example of recording by a group with D. dominant when threatened by the emergence of P.

[30] Melanie Klein: *The Importance of Symbol Formation in the Development of the Ego*, 1930.

[31] Freud: *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, p. 32.

[32] Melanie Klein: 'Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms', *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, **27**, 1946.

paratively superficial one, and is consequently easily observed. The leader is congratulated, in a great variety of terms, on his goodness, the group on its good fortune in having such a leader. It is in the course of these manipulations that ritual and ceremony come in to their own, as do also the presentation of gifts or sacrifices. The sacrifices again may take many forms, the commonest being the abandonment by the rest of the group of all ambitions for cure or hopes of personal achievement. Their characteristics will vary according to whether the chosen individual is D.L., F.L. or P.L. For example, if D. is prominent the rituals and sacrifices bear a resemblance to the procedures of religious groups; if F. then the army; if P.L. then the privileges often associated with aristocracy.

A more profound movement in the group dynamics, which is implicit but not obvious in the superficies of reassurances and the like is the attempt to rid the group of feelings of persecution by a shifting of the problems produced by projective identification from the basic assumption group to the work group. In practice this means that the most ill member of the group becomes the object of the group's attentions and becomes its leader, a situation I have described as the dual of D.; the choice of descriptive term really depends on the emphasis the observer wishes to give to different components of the situation. It cannot be fully described as W. because in theory the W. Group is occupied with a real task, which in the groups of which I speak is the study of the group although in fact this theory is an idealization that is never achieved. It cannot be justly described as a basic assumption group because in theory the basic assumption group is wholly characterized by an instinctual emotional absorption in acting on the given basic assumption—again not a state ever achieved in practice. Its interest for me lies in its resemblance to an incipient spontaneous development of psychotherapy. It is as if the group tried to cure itself by the concentration of its illnesses into one person and then to cure or expel the one person.

To sum up, ' the loss of the individual's distinctiveness ' is a phenomenon indistinguishable from depersonalization. The link between my findings from the study of the group and those of psycho-analysis is provided by Melanie Klein's formulations in her *Notes on Schizoid Mechanisms*.

I conclude with the following propositions:

(1) Individuals in a group must be considered to possess a capacity, called valency by me, for holding each other in involuntary and inevitable emotional combination. Activity arising from this is quite different from that which springs from co-operation, a term I reserve for describing voluntary combination.

(2) In every group two kinds of mental activity can be recognized as co-existent, W. Group activity and basic assumption Group activity, co-operation being a function of the former, valency of the latter.

(3) The individual, regarded as a participant in the basic assumption group is unable to form or employ symbols. This gives rise to the sense of ' collective lowering of intellectual ability ' described by McDougall and others. In consequence, the group, in its basic assumption activity, does not, and cannot develop.[33] What is more the sense of intellectual deficiency produced by the interplay between the basic assumption group, which is incapable of symbol formation, and the W. Group, which constantly employs it, can be so strong as to pervade W. Group function and inhibit intellectual activity in it.

(4) It follows that the employment of symbolism in a group is a W. function only. In consequence when a group appears to be employing symbols, especially if emotions are engaged, it is in fact doing no such thing—it is equated with them.[34]

(5) From this it follows that words, if they are to elucidate basic assumption group phenomena, must not be interpreted in the light of their value as symbols (which would only elucidate W. Group function) but as sounds having pre-verbal significance. Their manifest content must be ignored and an attempt made to view them as identical, in their basic assumption function, with the bizarre verbalizations of the psychotic. Their rational content must be ignored as accidental.

(6) Just as the psycho-analysis of the psychotic must be regarded as differing from the psycho-analysis of the neurotic so, and for similar reasons, the interpretation of basic assumption group phenomena must be regarded

[33] Melanie Klein: *Importance of Symbol Formation in the Development of the Ego*, 1930.

[34] Hanna Segal: ' Some Aspects of the Analysis of the Schizophrenic ', *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, **31**, 4, 1950.

as differing from the interpretation of W. Group phenomena.

(7) The understanding of the emotional life of the group, which is a function of the basic assumptions, is only comprehensible in terms of psychotic mechanisms. For this reason advances in the study of the group are dependent upon the development and implications of Melanie Klein's theories of internal objects, projective identification, and failure in symbol formation and their application in the group situation.

(8) Further investigation of group dynamics, and especially of basic assumption group phenomena, might be directed to the investigation of:

(*a*) depersonalization, as the essential feature in the 'loss of individual distinctiveness',

(*b*) failure in symbol formation, and the use of symbols as an essential feature in inhibiting development of the basic assumption groups; and

(*c*) interpretation of basic assumption phenomena in terms of psychotic, rather than neurotic, mechanisms.

(9) From these propositions follows a final proposition that theories of the kind I have proposed should be tested only against actual interpretation in a group at the moment when the phenomena are demonstrable.

History of life on this planet shows that decay of a species is often associated with over-development of some portion of its organism. In effect such over-development defeats its end and leads to the supersession of one species by the next. Is there a possibility of similar over-development of mental function? The group may provide evidence for an opinion.

SPECIAL ISSUE EDITED BY

Paula Heimann *Roger Honey-Kyrle*

CLINICAL ESSAY PRIZE

Members and Associate Members of the International Psycho-Analytical Association are reminded that competitors for the Clinical Essay Prize must send in their work to the Hon. Secretary of the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 63 New Cavendish Street, London, W.1, by March 31 of the year in which they wish to enter into the competition.

The conditions governing the competition are the following:—

A prize of (not exceeding) 30 guineas is offered.

Requirements for the Essay

The essay shall consist of a clinical record of a case investigated by psycho-analytical methods. It should illustrate clearly the events and changes in the mental life of the patient and their relation to external environment. In awarding the prize, the Judges will pay attention to acuity of observation and the clarity with which the facts are stated. If the writer wishes to draw theoretical conclusions, he must bear in mind the necessity of making the evidence for such conclusions carry conviction.

It is recommended that the length of the essay should not exceed twenty thousand words.

Date of Sending in Essays: Language: Format, etc.

Essays must be submitted on or before the thirty-first day of March in any year, in the English language. They must be typescript on quarto paper with ample left-hand margin. They must be in triplicate and be sent to the Hon. Secretary of the Institute. All copies of essays submitted become *ipso facto* the property of the Institute (or its successor) while it has the appointment of the Trustees for the Prize Fund.

No Award

If no essay of merit worthy of a prize is submitted in any year, no award shall be made for that year.

Joint Award

In the event of the Judges regarding the essays of two or more competitors of equal merit, they may divide the prize-money into equal parts and award it to such competitors jointly.

Eligibility

Any person of either sex, who is not a member or a past-member of the Board of the Institute, shall be eligible for the competition.

Tenure

The prize shall be given to the writer of the best essay in the opinion of the Judges submitted in any year, but the prize may be awarded to the same person twice, provided that he submits a second essay of sufficient merit in a later competition, and that the prize shall not be awarded more than twice to the same person.

Title

The competitor to whom the prize is awarded in any year may be called the Clinical Prizeman for that year.

Copyright

The copyright of any essay to which a prize is awarded shall become the property of the Institute. Should the author wish to quote it in whole or in part, the Institute shall not unreasonably withhold its consent. The Institute shall not publish in England or abroad, whether in English or in translation, the whole or any part of such essay during the author's life-time without his consent in writing. Other persons who may wish to quote extracts from any prize essay shall obtain the written consent both of the Institute or its successors, and, during his life-time, of the author.

MICHAEL BALINT.

Hon. Secretary,
Institute of Psycho-Analysis,
63 *New Cavendish Street*,
*London, W.*1.